

Introduction
TO
INDIAN PHILOSOPHY

INTRODUCTION TO INDIAN PHILOSOPHY

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INDIAN REALISM ETC ETC*

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Preface

The object of writing this book is to present a fairly comprehensive and critical account of the important problems of Epistemology, Ontology, Ethics, and Theology of the Charvaka, the Nyaya, the Vaisheshika, and the Mimamsa systems of Indian Philosophy. Profuse Sanskrit texts have been cited, and exhaustive references have been given. Detailed arguments of leading Indian philosophers of different schools, which have led them to their conclusions, have been given. Though some arguments are common to different schools, they have been repeated under different schools to show their similarities and differences.

The absence of diacritical marks will be a serious disadvantage to the readers. Sanskrit texts have been printed in Dev Nagri character which may be a handicap to the Western readers. But this could not be avoided.

The book is intended for the use of advanced University students. If they are benefited by it, my labour will be amply repaid.

MEERUT,
14th March, 1949.

Jadunath Sinha.

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Abbreviations

- B. I. BIBLIOTHICA INDICA.
 B. P. BHASHAPARICHCHHEDA BY VISHVANATHA.
 Br. UP. BRHADARANYAKA UPANISHAD.
 Ch. S. S. CHOWKHAMBA SANSKRIT SERIES.
 Ch. UP. CHANDOGYA UPANISHAD.
 E. H. ETHICS OF THE HINDUS BY S. K. MAITRA (CALCUTTA UNIVERSITY).
 H. I. P. HISTORY OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHY BY S. N. DAS GUPTA (CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS).
 I. I. P. INTRODUCTION TO INDIAN PHILOSOPHY BY S. C. CHATTERJEE & D. M. DATTA (CALCUTTA UNIVERSITY).
 I. L. A. INDIAN LOGIC AND ATOMISM BY A. B. KEITH.
 I. P. INDIAN PHILOSOPHY BY S. RADHAKRISHNAN (GEORGE ALLEN AND UNWIN, LONDON).
 I. P. M. INTRODUCTION TO PURVA MIMAMSA BY P. SHASTRI (CALCUTTA).
 I. P. P. INDIAN PSYCHOLOGY : PERCEPTION BY J. N. SINHA (KEGAN PAUL, LONDON).
 KM. KARMA MIMAMSA BY A. B. KEITH.
 KR. KIRANAVALI BY UDAYANA (Ch. S. S.).
 LV. LAGHUVRTTI ON KR.
 MS. MIMAMSA SUTRA BY JAIMINI.
 N.B. NYAYA BHASHYA BY VATSYAYANA (JIVANANDA EDITION, CALCUTTA).
 NK. NYAYAKANDALI BY SHRIDHARA, A COMMENTARY ON PRASHASTAPADA'S BHASHYA ON VAISHESHIKA SUTRA (V. S. S.).
 NKS. NYAYA KUSUMANJALI BY UDAYANA.
 NKSP. NYAYA KUSUMANJALI PRAKASHA BY VARDHAMANA.
 NM. NYAYA MANJARI BY JAYANTA BHATTA (V. S. S.).
 NR. NYAYA RATNAKARA BY PARTHASARATHI MISHRA, A COMMENTARY ON SHLOKAVARTIKA
 NS. NYAYA SUTRA BY GOTAMA.
 NSV. NYAYA SUTRAVRTTI BY VISHVANATHA.
 NV. NYAYAVARTIKA BY UDDYOTAKARA (B. I.).
 NVTT. NYAYAVARTIKATATPARYATIKA BY VACHASPATHI MISHRA (V. S. S.).
 O. I. P. OUTLINE OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHY BY M. HIRIYANNA (GEORGE ALLEN & UNWIN, LONDON).

- PB. PRASHASTAPADA BHASHYA ON VAISHESHIKA SUTRA (V. S. S.).
 PK. PANCHASTIKAYASAMAYASARA.
 PP. PRAKARANAPANCIKA BY SHALIKANATHA (Ch. S. S.)
 PSPM. IHL PRABHAKARA SCHOOL OF PURVA MIMANSA BY G. N. JHA.
 SB. SHAVARA BHASHYA ON MIMANSA SUTRA.
 SBS. SHANKARA BHASHYA ON BRAHMA SUTRA.
 SD. SHASTRADAPIKA BY PARTHASARATHI MISHRA (Ch. S. S.)
 SDS. SHADDARSHANASANGRAHA BY MADHAVACHARYA.
 SDSC. SHADDARSHANASAMUCHCHAYA.
 SK. SANKHYA KARIKA BY ISHVARAKRISHNA.
 SM. SIDDHANTAMUKTAVALI BY VISHVANATHA (NIRNAYA SAGARA PRESS, BOMBAY).
 SP. SAPTAPADARTHI BY SHIVADITTA (V. S. S.)
 SPMB. MITABHASHINI ON SAPTAPADARTHI (V. S. S.).
 SSSS. SARVASIDDHANTASAKASANGRAHA.
 SV. SHLOKAVARTIKA BY KUMARILA (Ch. S. S.)
 TB. TARKABHASHA BY KESHAVA MISHRA.
 TC. TATTVACHINTAMANI BY GANGESHA (B. I.).
 TK. TARKAKAUMUDI.
 TR. TARKIKARAKSHA BY VARADARAJA.
 TRD. TARKARAHASYADIPIKA.
 TS. TARKASANGRAHA BY ANNAMBIATTI.
 TSD. TARKASANGRAHADIPIKA.
 TSP. PREFACE TO TARKASANGRAHA BY BODAS AND ATHALYE (BOMBAY).
 VPS. VIVARANAPRAMEYASANGRAHA BY VIDYARANYA MADHAVACHARYA (V. S. S.)
 VS. VAISHESHIKA SUTRA OF KANADA.
 V.S.S. VIZIANAGRAM SANSKRIT SERIES.
 VSU. UPASKARA BY SHANKARA MISHRA ON VAISHESHIKA SUTRA.
 VSV. VAISHESHIKASUTRAVRTTI BY JAYA NARAYANA.
 YSP. YUKTISNEHAPRAPURANI BY RAMAKRISHNA ON SHASTRADAPIKA.

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

§ 1. The Spiritual Background of Indian Philosophy

Philosophy attempts to arrive at a conception of the Reality as a whole. It seeks to have a world-view. It investigates the nature of the Reality including Nature, Soul, and God. It tries to interpret the meaning and value of human life and its relation to the world in which we live. Philosophy, in this sense, is the criticism of life and experience.

Philosophy is built upon speculation. Logical thinking is the organ of knowledge. Philosophy endeavours to comprehend the nature of the reality by logical thinking. Western philosophy is guided by theoretical interest. Independent reflection untrammelled by authority is its foundation. It is not guided by practical considerations of morality and religion. But Indian philosophy is actuated by spiritual motives. It is a spiritual quest. It is a speculation on the nature of the Reality with a view to attaining liberation (मोक्ष) which is the *Summum Bonum* of human life. It seeks insight into the nature of the reality because it is a means to the realization of the Supreme Good.

Indian philosophy is essentially spiritual. Philosophy and religion are intimately connected with each other in India. Religion is not a system of dogmas but a living experience. It is the practical realization of the spiritual truth. Philosophy is the theory of the Reality. It is insight into the nature of the Reality, which leads to liberation. So Indian philosophy is not idle theorizing but a spiritual quest. It is "a way of life, an approach to spiritual realisation."¹

Philosophy is called *Darshana* in India. *Darshana* means vision. Philosophy is the vision of the Reality as a whole. It is an insight into the nature of the

1 Radha Krishnan *Indian Philosophy*, Vol I, p 26

whole reality. Indian philosophy is based on reflective thinking subordinate to the authority of the Vedas. Authority is not arbitrary. It is the authority of intuitions of seers of truths. Reasoning is subordinate to intuition. So Indian philosophy is based on speculation guided by intuition with a view to attaining liberation.

§ 2. The Schools of Indian Philosophy.

The schools of Indian philosophy are divided into two broad classes, namely, orthodox (आस्तिक) and heterodox (नास्तिक). The orthodox systems recognize the authority of the Vedas. The heterodox systems do not recognize their authority. The former are called astika not because they believe in God. The latter are called nastika not because they do not believe in God. The Nyaya, the Vaisheshika, the Sankhya, the Yoga, the Mimamsa, and the Vedanta are the six orthodox systems. The Charvaka, the Bauddha, and the Jaina schools are the heterodox systems. They do not believe in the authority of the Vedas. The Sankhya and the Mimamsa are atheists; they do not believe in God; yet they are regarded as orthodox because they accept the authority of the Vedas.

The Nyaya and the Vaisheshika have a common philosophy of Nature, Soul, and God, though they have minor differences. They were blended with each other at a later stage, and formed a syncretic school called the Nyaya-Vaisheshika. The Sankhya and the Yoga have a common philosophy of Prakrti and Purushas, though the former is atheistic and the latter is theistic. So they are sometimes called the Sankhya-Yoga system. There are two schools of Mimamsa founded by Kumarila Bhatta and Prabhakara. They are called the Bhatta and the Prabhakara schools of Mimamsa. There are two main schools of Vedanta founded by Shankara and Ramanuja. Shankara is an advocate of unqualified monism (अद्वैतवाद or केवलाद्वैतवाद). Ramanuja is an advocate of qualified monism (विशिष्टाद्वैतवाद). There are other minor schools of the Vedanta advocated by Madhva, Vallabha, Nimbarka, Shrikantha and others. Sometimes Mimamsa

is called Purva (earlier) Mimamsa because it treats of rituals and sacrifices and the philosophy of ritualism. And the Vedanta is called Uttara (later) Mimamsa because it treats of the nature of Brahman. The former deals with actions while the latter deals with knowledge. These are the orthodox systems. In spite of their wide divergence of outlook, they all believe in the authoritativeness of the Vedas. Besides these, there are other minor schools of orthodox systems, such as the Grammarian school, the Medical school, etc.

There are three main heterodox schools, Charvakas, Bauddhas and Jainas. The Charvakas are materialists. They believe in the reality of matter only. They do not recognize the reality of the soul and God.

The Bauddhas are phenomenologists. They believe in the reality of phenomena, changes, or impermanence. They do not recognize the reality of permanence. There are different schools of Bauddhas. The Vaibhashikas and the Sautrantikas are realists. They believe in the reality of external objects. The former are advocates of direct realism. They hold that impermanent external objects are directly perceived. The latter are advocates of indirect realism or representationism. They hold that impermanent external objects are not directly perceived, but inferred from cognitions in the mind, which represent them. The Yogacharas are generally subjective idealists. They hold that there are no external objects; they are nothing but cognitions of the percipient mind which is a stream of consciousness. The Madhyamikas hold that there are neither external objects nor internal cognitions; they are mere appearances; the reality is essenceless, predicateless, undefinable and incomprehensible. Some Bauddhas hold that the Absolute Consciousness alone is real.

The Jainas are dualists. They believe in the reality of souls (जीव) and non-soul (अजीव). The non-soul includes matter (पद्वल). The Jainas are atheists. They do not believe in God as the creator of the world.

The Charvakas, the Bauddhas, and the Jainas are regarded as heterodox because they reject the authority

of the Vedas. Thus Indian philosophy includes not only the Hindu systems but also the Bauddha and the Jaina systems.

3. The Common Characters of Indian Philosophy.

The different systems of Indian philosophy have some common characters, inspite of their wide differences.

1. The reality of the Atman.

All the orthodox schools of Indian philosophy believe in the existence of the Atman. The Nyaya and the Vaisheshika hold that the Atman or the self is the permanent and eternal substance endowed with cognition, pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, and volition. The Atman is a knower, an enjoyer, and an agent. Knowing, feeling, and willing are adventitious qualities of the self. Consciousness is not the essence of the self. It acquires consciousness in conjunction with the mind (manas) and the body. The Mimamsa also holds the same view. It regards the self as an eternal, infinite substance, endowed with consciousness as an adventitious quality. The self has no consciousness in the states of dreamless sleep and liberation. The Sankhya holds that the Purusha or the self is an infinite and eternal spirit, the essence of which is consciousness. Consciousness constitutes the essence of the self; it is not its adventitious quality. It is inactive. It is devoid of feeling. Buddhi or intellect is active, and endowed with pleasure or pain. Buddhi is an evolute of Prakrti which is active. But Purusha is pure consciousness. The Advaita Vedanta holds that the Atman is pure being, pure consciousness, and pure bliss. The Sankhya believes in many purushas, but not in God. The Advaita Vedanta believes in the reality of one Atman only. Among the heterodox schools, the Charvakas do not recognize the reality of the self; the Bauddhas regard the self as a flux of cognitions, feelings, and volitions. But the Jainas recognize the existence of the permanent self which is endued with infinite knowledge, infinite perception, infinite bliss, and infinite power.

2. The Law of Karma.

All schools of Indian philosophy except the Charvakas believe in the Law of Karma. It is the law of moral causation. A good action inevitably brings about a good consequence. A bad action inevitably brings about a bad consequence. A good action produces merit (पुण्य) in the soul ; this brings about pleasure. A bad action produces demerit (पाप) in the soul ; this brings about pain. Pleasure and pain are the inevitable consequences of good and bad actions. There is no escape from the grip of this moral law.

Actions, good or bad, leave behind them some potency which is sure to yield pleasure or pain, joy or sorrow in future. They are sure to bring on their fruits. The fruits may be enjoyed in immediate or remote future in this life or even in a future life. Transmigration of the soul is a consequence of the Law of Karma.

The conception of the *Rta* (ऋत) in the Rg Veda is the germ of the Law of Karma. *Rta* means the physical order. All phenomena of nature follow their own laws. These laws of nature constitute the *Rta*. It also means the moral order. The laws of nature are the expression of the divine will which follows the moral law. The cosmic order is also the moral order. It is the expression of divine justice. The whole universe is based on *Rta* and moves in it. The Vedic belief that when a sacrifice is performed in a right manner, it leaves behind it a potency or unseen power (अदृष्ट), that is sure to produce its merited consequence in proper time, is also an expression of the Law of Karma. The Upanishads clearly conceive the Law of Karma as a moral law. As we sow, so we reap. Good actions lead to a good character ; bad actions lead to a bad character. Good character leads to a good birth. "A man becomes good by good deeds and bad by bad deeds." He gains those objects in the next birth, which he covets in this birth¹. *Samsara* (संसार) is an endless cycle of births and deaths. A person can attain good births by good

¹ Brh. Up., iii. 2. 13 ; Chand Up. iii, 1. 10.

deeds. And he can escape from *samsara* by true knowledge of the *Atman*.

The Nyaya-Vaisheshika, the Sankhya-Yoga, the Mimamsa, and the Vedanta believe in the Law of Karma. These orthodox schools believe that good or bad actions produce an unseen potency (अदृष्ट) which takes some time to mature and brings about enjoyment or suffering. The fruits of actions are partly reaped in this life and partly in the next life. But they can never be got rid of. Every deed produces its natural effect in the world; it also produces a disposition (संस्कार or वासना) in the mind which inclines the person to repeat the deed. Thus *karma* has a cosmic as well as a psychological aspect.¹ The physical order governed by the Law of Causality is subservient to the moral order governed by the Law of Karma. The Jaina theory of *Karma* is peculiar, which will be discussed later.

3. Metempsychosis.

Metempsychosis or transmigration of the soul also is a common feature of all the systems of Indian philosophy except the Charvakas. It is a corollary of the Law of Karma which demands that good actions must have good consequences and bad actions must have bad consequences. But the consequences of all actions cannot be reaped in this life. So they must be reaped in the next life. *Samsara* is a beginningless series of births and deaths. It is due to ignorance (अज्ञान) or false knowledge (मिथ्या-ज्ञान). When ignorance is removed by true knowledge of the Reality, *samsara* ceases. *Samsara* is bondage (बन्ध). It is stopped by liberation (मोक्ष). Bondage is due to ignorance. Liberation is due to true knowledge.

Transmigration means the assumption of another body by the soul after death. Death is dissolution of the body. It is not the extinction of the soul. The soul survives the death of the body and assumes another body, human, subhuman, or superhuman, which is fit for enjoying the consequences of actions done in this

¹ *Indian philosophy*, Vol. I, p 247.

birth. The same soul continues through different births. Transmigration of the soul presupposes the permanence and continuity of the soul. All orthodox systems believe in the permanence and transmigration of the soul.

The Charvakas do not believe in the soul as distinct from the body, life, or mind. So they do not believe in transmigration. The Bauddhas regard the soul as a changing flux of psychoses. But yet they believe in the transmigration of the changing stream of consciousness. The last psychosis embodying the disposition (वासना) of all the psychoses in the stream of consciousness assumes a body appropriate to it. Thus the Bauddhas also believe in the continuity of the stream of consciousness through different births, though they do not recognize the permanence of the soul. The Jainas recognize the reality of the permanent soul which endures through changing mental processes. And they also believe in the transmigration of the soul. Thus the concept of transmigration is common to the orthodox and heterodox systems.

4. Liberation.

The conception of liberation (मोक्ष) is common to all the schools of Indian philosophy. Only the Charvakas do not believe in it. They are materialists. They do not recognize the soul as a distinct reality. So they do not recognize the liberation of the soul. They look upon liberation as power and enjoyment on earth. They cannot conceive of liberation as a transcendental condition of the soul. The Bauddhas speak of *nirvana* (निर्वाण) as the liberation of the soul. It is total cessation of all suffering. *Nirvana* literally means extinction. But it is not total annihilation. It is the absolute negation of all pain. Some Bauddhas regard it as a state of pure bliss. The Jaines regard liberation as the natural condition of the soul endowed with infinite knowledge, infinite perception, infinite bliss, and infinite power. The pristine purity of the soul is realized when the crust of subtle particles of *karma* matter which conceals its nature is removed completely

by right thought, right faith, and right conduct. Thus the Bauddhas and the Jainas believe in liberation as the supreme goal of life.

The Sankhya regards liberation as discrimination (*viveka*) between *purusha* and *prakṛti*. It regards bondage as non-discrimination between them. The *purusha* is eternally free. It erroneously identifies itself with *prakṛti* or Primal Matter and its evolutes, body, sense-organs, the mind (*manas*), the intellect (*buddhi*), and egoism (अहंकार). Liberation is the natural condition of the soul (*purusha*). Bondage is a phenomenal appearance only due to non-discrimination. The Yoga regards liberation as freedom or independence of the soul (*kaivalya*). It is aloofness or isolation of the soul from the entanglements of *prakṛti*. This transcendental condition of the soul can be realized by rooting out all potencies (संस्कार) of deeds from the mind by severe discipline and self-control. The Sankhya and the Yoga conceive of liberation as pure transcendental consciousness absolutely free from pleasure and pain which are merely empirical modes of *Buddhi*.

The Nyaya and the Vaisheshika conceive of liberation (मोक्ष) as the pure existence of the soul free from all connection with mind (*manas*) and body. It is an unconscious condition of the soul. Consciousness is an adventitious attribute of the soul. It does not constitute its essence. It acquires consciousness in conjunction with body and mind. It loses consciousness in the state of liberation. Liberation is attained by true knowledge of the reality. It is a condition of absolute freedom from pain and suffering.

The Mimamsa also conceives liberation as the intrinsic nature of the soul, free from pleasure and pain. The soul, in its intrinsic state, is unconscious. Liberation is a negative condition of absolute freedom from pain. But it is not a state of bliss. It is the natural condition of the soul, beyond pleasure and pain. In the state of liberation there is potentiality of consciousness (ज्ञान-शक्ति) but not actual consciousness.

The Advaita Vedanta (Shankara) regards liberation

as the realization of the identity of the soul with Brahman. The Atman is the transcendental self. It is pure existence, pure consciousness, and pure bliss. It is Brahman. Its bondage is phenomenal. It is due to ignorance. The soul erroneously identifies itself with body, sense-organs, manas, buddhi and ahamkara, which are products of cosmic nescience (माया). This false identification is the cause of bondage. Bondage is due to ignorance (अविद्या). It is removed by true knowledge (विद्या). Thus liberation is the natural, transcendental condition of the self. It is not an unconscious state. It is not a negation of pain. It is a transcendental condition of pure existence, pure consciousness, and pure bliss. It is the realization of the Brahmanhood of the self.

Thus, the conception of liberation is a common character of all the systems of Indian philosophy. The attainment of liberation is the goal of philosophical speculation.

5. Ethical discipline.

All schools of Indian philosophy demand rigid self-control, severe moral discipline, constant meditation on truths, right faith and devotion as indispensable prerequisites for the vision of truth and consequent liberation. Ethical life and insight into the Reality go together. Philosophical investigation and ethical discipline cannot be divorced from each other. Though different schools lay stress on different aspects of ethical life, *e. g.*, true knowledge, right action, right faith, or devotion, yet they all recognize the importance of control of passions, non-injury to life, and restraint of desire for pleasure. So Dr. Das Gupta rightly speaks of the unity of *sadhana* (साधना) among different schools of Indian philosophy.

6. Initial Pessimism and ultimate Optimism.

Indian philosophy has been branded as pessimistic by some critics. Life is full of pain. Suffering is the inevitable accompaniment of life. *Samsara* (संसार) is the beginningless cycle of births and deaths which

are painful. Buddhism draws an overdrawn picture of the misery of life. The Sankhya and the Yoga also make too much of the problem of evil and suffering. The Buddha realized the four noble truths: (1) There is suffering. (2) There is a *cause* of suffering. (3) There is a *cessation* of suffering. (4) There is a *way* to stop suffering. This pessimistic attitude of Buddhism cast a shadow on many schools of Indian philosophy. But Buddhism believed in the cessation of all suffering. The Sankhya and the Yoga also believed in the absolute negation of all pain as the highest goal of life, and pointed out the way to it. All schools believed in liberation which is absolutely free from all kinds of suffering, according to some, and which is a state of unalloyed bliss, according to others. Thus the initial outlook of Indian philosophy may be pessimistic, but it is optimistic as to the supreme end of life.

7. **Pramanas.**

All schools of Indian philosophy accept same means of knowledge (प्रमाण) as valid. They are not dogmatic. Their ontology is based on epistemology. Ontology is theory of reality. Epistemology is theory of knowledge.

The Charvakas recognize perception (प्रत्यक्ष) only as a valid means of knowledge. They disprove the validity of inference. The Bauddhas recognize perception (प्रत्यक्ष) and inference (अनुमान) as valid means of knowledge. The Sankhya recognizes perception, inference, and testimony (शब्द) as valid means of knowledge. The Nyaya recognizes perception, inference, analogy or comparison (उपमान), and testimony as valid means of knowledge. The Mimamsa and the Advaita Vedanta recognize perception, inference, analogy, testimony, presumption (अर्थापत्ति), and non-perception (अनुपलब्धि) as valid means of knowledge.

The different schools of Indian philosophy discuss the nature, origin, and conditions of validity of these different *pramanas*.

8. **Belief in the Authority of the Vedas.**

All orthodox schools of Indian philosophy recognize

the authority of the Vedas. They subordinate reasoning to intuition. The authority of the Vedas is nothing but the authority of intuition. Intuition is immediate apprehension of the Reality. It is not immediate feeling. It is not perception through the sense-organs. It is above discursive thought or intellectual knowledge. It is supra-intellectual direct apprehension. It is direct and immediate apprehension of the Reality by the self. It is higher immediacy. It is not immediacy of immediate feeling or sense-perception. It is not empirical. It is not derived from experience through the sense-organs. It is transcendental. It transcends sense-experience. It is immediate vision (दर्शन) of Truth.

Reasoning is regarded as subordinate to intuition. Intuition can override reasoning. But reasoning cannot sit in judgement over intuition. Therefore, reasoning should be carried on under the guidance of intuition. But different schools of Indian philosophy have invented different theories of the Reality by logical reasoning and appealed to those texts in the Vedas and the Upanishads which are in favour of the conclusions thus reached. Thus Indian philosophy is not a faithful interpretation of the Vedic texts only. It is based upon independent reflection within certain limits. It is not dogmatic. It is critical. It is based on epistemology. Every school of Indian philosophy has its own theory of knowledge. It discusses the nature, origin and validity of different kinds of knowledge. There is a vast literature which enquires into the validity of authority even. Indian philosophy does not dogmatically assume the authority of the Vedas.

We find various types of realism and idealism, monism, dualism, and pluralism, materialism and spiritualism, deism, pantheism, and theism in Indian philosophy. Thus it would be wrong to regard Indian philosophy as dogmatic and unprogressive, and fettered by the authority of the Vedas and the Upanishads. In fact, there are germs of various types of thought in them, which have been developed by different schools of Indian philosophy with the help of independent reflection.

9. The Reality of the World or World-appearance.

All schools of Indian philosophy recognize the reality of the world, at least as appearance. The Nyaya-Vaisheshika recognizes the reality of the world in space and time, governed by the law of causality, and subservient to the Law of Karma. The world is a physical order as well as a moral order. The Nyaya-Vaisheshika seeks to account for the origin of the material world out of atoms in space and time. The Sankhya-Yoga also recognises the reality of the world and traces its evolution from Prakrti which is the original state of equilibrium of *sattva* (essence), *rajas* (energy), and *tamas* (inertia or mass). The Mimamsa also recognizes the reality of the world formed out of atoms under the guidance of the Law of Karma. The Vishishtadvaita Vedanta (qualified monism) of Ramanuja also recognizes the reality of the world evolved out of Prakrti constituted by *sattva*, *rajas*, and *tamas* subordinate to God.

The Advaita Vedanta of Shankara regards the world as an *appearance*, but not as an illusion. It recognizes the empirical reality of the world-appearance. But it does not recognize its ontological reality. The Sunyavada of the Madhyamika Bauddha (Nagarjuna) also recognizes the empirical reality of the world-appearance. Only the Yogacara Bauddha reduces the world to mere ideas in the perceiving mind. He does not recognize the reality of the world apart from the perceiving mind.

The Vaibhashika Bauddha recognizes the reality of the world as an object of perception. The Sautrantika Bauddha also recognizes the reality of the world as an object of inference. The Jaina also recognizes the reality of the external world as existing in time and space and made of atoms. Thus the reality of the world is recognized by the majority of the systems of Indian philosophy. These are the common characters of the different systems of Indian philosophy.

References : Das Gupta : *History of Indian Philosophy* Vol. I, Ch. IV.
 Dutt and Chatterjee : *Introduction Indian Philosophy*, Ch. I.
 Maxmuller : *Six Systems Indian Philosophy*, Ch. III.
 Radhakrishnan : *Indian Philosophy*, Vol. I, Ch. I.

CHAPTER II

The Charvaka Philosophy—Materialism

INTRODUCTION

1. The Origin of the word Charvaka.

The origin of the word '*Charvaka*' is not definitely known. Some derive it from the root '*charv*'—to chew or eat, because the Charvaka propounds the doctrine: "*Eat, drink, and be merry.*" Others derive it from the word '*Charu-vak*' or sweet-tongued, because the Charvakas propounded a doctrine which was attractive to the common people. Others think, it was the name of a sage who first expounded the doctrine of materialism. It has no other significance. The followers of the sage were called '*Charvakas*.'¹ Dr. Das Gupta says, "It is difficult to say whether the word Charvaka was the name of a real personage or a mere allusive term applied to the adherents of the *lokayata* view."² The doctrine of the Charvaka is also called *Lokayatamata* or the view of the common people. The Charvaka is also called *Lokayatka*.

2. The Author of the Charvaka Philosophy.

Brhaspati is said to be the author of the Charvaka philosophy. Some Vedic hymns embodying heretical doctrines are ascribed to Brhaspati. The *Mahabharata* and the *Padma Purana* ascribe the Lokayata doctrine of materialism to Brhaspati. About a dozen *sutras* or aphorisms are ascribed to him. They are quoted in the works of Kamalasila, Jayanta, Prabhachandra and Gunaratna. They are attributed by some to *Charvaka*, by others to *Lokayata*, and by Gunaratna to Brhaspati. Jayanta speaks of the two schools of the Charvakas, viz. *Dhurta Charvakas* and *Sushikshita Charvakas* in *Nyayamanjari*. Kamalasila mentions two commentaries on the *sutras* of Brhaspati on divergent lines corresponding to the two divisions mentioned by Jayanta. A work in verse also is ascribed to Brhaspati. Some verses are quoted by Madhavacharya in *Sarva-*

1 O. I. P., p. 187, I. I. P., pp. 63—64

2 H. I. P., Vol. III., p. 533.

darshana-sangraha for the exposition of the Charvaka system.¹

3. The Germs of the Charvaka Philosophy.

The germs of the Charvaka philosophy are found in the earlier texts. The *Shvetashvatara Upanishad* mentions the doctrines of 'accidentalism' (यदृच्छावाद) and 'naturalism' (स्वभाववाद). Accidentalism denies the Law of Causality. It explains the world by mere chance. It regards the world as a chaos. There is some order in the world. But it is purely accidental. Naturalism does not deny causality. It regards the world as governed by the law of causality. But it traces all changes of a thing to the *nature* (स्वभाव) of the thing itself. "Every thing is unique and its entire history is predetermined by that uniqueness. Hence according to the *Svabhavavada*, it is not a lawless world in which we live; only there is no external principle governing it. It is self-determined, not undetermined. So this doctrine, unlike the other, recognizes necessity as governing all phenomena; but it is a necessity that is inherent in the very nature of a thing, not imposed upon it by any external agency."² Both the doctrines deny supernatural intervention in the world.

The doctrine of naturalism (स्वभाववाद) is opposed to supernaturalism or belief in the supernatural or unseen principle (अदृष्टवाद). It is positivistic in character. It traces all phenomena to the *nature* of things. It recognizes the reality of the experienced world. It denies the immortality and transmigration of the soul. It might have admitted the reality of the soul lasting as long as life does. It seems to deny the Law of Karma. It seems to trace the material world to five elements.³ These two doctrines embody the germs of the Charvaka philosophy.

4. The Charvaka Philosophy.

The Charvakas are heretics. They are free thinkers. They do not believe in the authority of the Vedas.

1 H. I. P., Vol. III, pp. 532—33.

2 O. I. P., p. 104.

3 *Ibid.*, pp. 104—05.

They recognize perception only as a means of valid knowledge. They dispute the validity of inference. They do not recognize the reality of anything which is beyond the range of perception. So they are positivists. They do not believe in God. They are atheists. They do not believe in the permanent soul, future life, and the Law of Karma, like the naturalists (स्वभाववाद). They believe in the reality of the external world composed of gross elements such as earth, water, fire and air, which are perceptible. They regard consciousness as an epiphenomenon of the body. They are materialists. They regard pleasure as the *Summum Bonum* or the highest good of life. They reject virtue (धर्म) and liberation (मोक्ष) as the supreme ends of life (पुरुषार्थ). They regard gratification of desire (काम) or pleasure, and wealth (अर्थ), which is a means to pleasure, as the supreme ends. They are hedonists. They try to explain the world as a fortuitous combination of gross material elements. So they are called mechanists or accidentalists (यदृच्छावाद). They try to explain all phenomena by the Law of Nature. They reject supernatural agents. So they are called naturalists (स्वभाववाद). Thus the Charvakas are materialists, positivists, atheists, mechanists, naturalists, and hedonists.

II. Epistemology or Theory of Knowledge.

5. Perception alone is the means of valid knowledge.

The Charvakas hold that perception alone is the means of valid knowledge. They reject inference and testimony as means of valid knowledge. Perception is of two kinds, *viz.*, external perception and internal perception. External perception is brought about by the contact of the sense-organs with objects. Internal perception depends upon external perception. The mind can work upon the materials supplied by external perception¹. All perceptual knowledge is not valid. There are illusory perceptions also.

6. Inference is not valid.

The Charvakas reject inference as a means of valid

¹ S D S., p. 6.

knowledge. The Nyaya holds that inference takes the form of a syllogism for demonstration to others as shown below :—

1. The hill is fiery ;
2. Because it is smoky ;
3. Whatever is smoky is fiery, like a kitchen ;
4. The hill is smoky :
- ∴ 5. The hill is fiery.

For inference for oneself the first three or the last three members of the syllogism are enough. In any case, inference depends on the inductive relation (व्याप्ति) or universal concomitance between the middle term (*e. g.* smoke) and the major term (*e. g.* fire).

Now, the Charvaka urges that inference would be valid, if the inductive relation were valid. But the inductive relation can neither be ascertained by perception, nor by inference, nor by analogy, nor by testimony. Perception is either external or internal. External perception is due to the intercourse between the sense-organs and the objects. But the sense-organs can never come into contact with all cases of the middle term (*e. g.* smoke) and the major term (*e. g.* fire). Past, future, and distant objects are beyond the range of the sense-organs. Internal perception is not independent of external perception. The mind can work on the materials supplied by external perception. So internal perception as well as external perception cannot ascertain the invariable concomitance of the middle term and the major term.

The inductive relation, which is the ground of inference, cannot be established by inference, because it involves *petitio principii* or begging the question. Inference depends upon the inductive relation (व्याप्ति). And the inductive relation also depends upon inference. This is arguing in a circle.

The inductive relation cannot be established by analogy or comparison (उपमान). Analogy depends upon the relation between a name and the thing named. A person who has never seen a *gavaya* (wild cow) hears from a forester that it is like a cow. He goes

to a forest and sees an animal resembling a cow. He concludes that it is a wild cow (*gavaya*). This knowledge based on the relation between a name and the object signified by it is called analogy by the Nyaya. The Charvaka contends that analogy itself depends upon a particular kind of relation between a sign (name) and the signate (thing). Therefore it cannot ascertain the invariable concomitance of the middle term and the major term free from conditions, which is the ground of inference

The inductive relation cannot be established by testimony (शब्द). Testimony is authority of reliable persons. The Charvaka urges that we cannot believe in a dogmatic statement of another person. If he is a reliable person, we may believe in his statement. But this involves inference. Testimony is not an independent source of knowledge. It involves perception and inference. But neither perception nor inference can establish the inductive relation. Besides, if inference always depends upon testimony, there can be no inference for oneself (स्वार्थानुमान).

Thus inference is not possible, because the inductive relation (व्यपत्ति), which is the ground of inference, cannot be established by perception, inference, analogy, or testimony. The inductive relation is a general principle. We can never pass from the particular to the general. We are not justified in passing from the observed to the unobserved facts. Perception is the only means of valid knowledge (प्रमाण).

It may be argued that perception apprehends the relation between the *class-characters* (सामान्य) of smoke and fire (e. g., genus of smoke and genus of fire), which are always present in all particular instances of smoke and fire respectively. The Charvaka does not recognize the reality of classcharacters. He recognizes the reality of individuals only. Yet he argues that assuming the existence of class-characters for the sake of argument, perception may apprehend the relation between two *class-characters* (e. g., genus of smoke and genus of fire), but not the invariable relation between all *individual* cases of smoke and fire, which is necessary for inference. In order to infer a *particular* fire from a *particular* smoke perceived, we must know that the two *particular* cases of smoke and fire are inseparably

related. But this invariable concomitance between two particular instances cannot be established by perception. Perception is confined to 'here and now.' It is confined to a few particular instances in the present time and space. It can never apprehend the instances in the past and the future. Therefore the inductive relation cannot be established by perception. It is a mere summation of particulars perceived. It is not a genuine universal principle¹.

A valid inference depends upon an *unconditional* (निरुपाधि) and invariable concomitance between the middle term or the reason (हेतु) and the major term or the probandum (साध्य). The invariable concomitance must be free from all conditions (उपाधि). A condition is that which has invariable concomitance with the major term or the probandum (साध्य) but which has no invariable concomitance with the middle term or the reason. The inductive relation or invariable concomitance must not be vitiated by any conditions. But the absence of such conditions in the past and the future cannot be perceived at the time of making inference. Conditions may exist unperceived even now and vitiate the invariable concomitance. The invariable concomitance is ascertained by perception of a very large number of cases (भूयोदर्शन) of agreement in presence between the middle term (e. g., smoke) and the major term (e. g., fire). But the nature of things is not constant. So it is not possible that any two entities should always be found to agree with each other under all circumstances in all times and all places. Perception of a large number of cases cannot rule out the possibility of a failure of agreement in future. Besides, mere agreement in presence will not do. We must know also agreement in absence. We must know that wherever there is no fire, there is no smoke. The method of double agreement i. e., agreement in presence and agreement in absence only can establish the invariable concomitance required by inference. But it is impossible to ascertain the universal agreement in presence and in absence between the middle term and the major term. It is impossible to perceive that all cases of smoke are also the cases of fire, and also that all cases of the absence of fire are the cases of the absence of smoke. Therefore inference is not valid².

But we often act in life on inference. Some inferences lead to successful actions. Some inferences lead to unsuccessful actions. The Charvaka holds that this is purely accidental. Inference may be accidentally true. But truth is not the essential character of inference. It is an accident of inference. In fact, probability is the guide of life.

¹ SDS, pp. 5—8.

² H. I. P., Vol. III pp. 534—36, NM., p. 119; SDS, pp. 8—9.

7. Testimony is not valid.

The Charvaka argues that testimony (शब्द) is the authority of a reliable person or a reliable scripture. The authority is known to us through words. Words are perceived through the ears. So testimony is nothing but auditory perception. It is not an independent source of knowledge. So long as testimony or auditory perception of words gives us knowledge of things which are actually perceived, it is valid. But if testimony suggests the existence of transcendental entities or unperceived objects, it is invalid. The Vedas are not authoritative. They are the inventions of cunning priests who conjured heaven and hell, virtue and vice, and inculcated the performance of sacrificial rites by laymen in order to earn their own livelihood.

Testimony involves inference. We believe in the testimony of a reliable person only, because we unconsciously infer that his authority is acceptable, since he is a reliable person and the authority of all reliable persons is acceptable. Thus testimony is based upon inference. Inference is not valid. Hence testimony also is not valid. Just as sometimes inference accidentally leads to successful actions, and sometimes to unsuccessful actions, so testimony also sometimes accidentally leads to successful actions and sometimes to unsuccessful actions. Truth is an accidental mark of testimony. Thus testimony is not valid. Perception alone is valid. Probability based on experience is the guide of life. The Charvaka may be said to be an empiricist. He regards experience alone as a source of valid knowledge.

III. METAPHYSICS.**8. Materialism.**

The Charvaka recognizes perception as the only means of valid knowledge (प्रमाण). So he recognizes the reality of those objects only which are perceived. He is frankly a materialist. He regards matter as the only reality because it is perceived. He does not recog-

nize the existence of the soul, future life, God, and the Law of Karma, because they are beyond the range of perception. The Charvaka is a positivist. He does not believe in transcendental entities.

9. The World.

The Charvaka recognizes the existence of the world because it is perceived. Generally, Indian philosophers hold that it is composed of five elements, *viz.*, earth (*क्षिति*), water (*अप्*), fire (*तेजस्*), air (*मरुत्*), and ether (*आकाश*). But the Charvakas generally deny the existence of ether because it is not perceived. They regard the world as composed of the four gross elements of earth, water, fire and air which are perceived¹. There are five sense-organs, the skin, the tongue, the nose, the eyes, and the ears. There are gross objects perceived by these sense-organs. There are no objects which cannot be perceived by them.² Therefore the Charvakas cannot believe in the existence of atoms because atoms are imperceptible. But some Charvakas hold that the world is composed of five elements, *viz.*, earth, water, fire, air and ether (*आकाश*). They recognize ether as the fifth element.³

10. There is no Soul.

Perception is the only source of knowledge. Consciousness (*चैतन्य*) is perceived. So it is real. But the so-called permanent soul is not perceived. So it is not real. The soul is the body endowed with consciousness. There is no proof for the existence of the soul apart from the body⁴.

The body is composed of the four material elements earth, water, fire, and air. It is an aggregate of these elements. The sense-organs also are produced by their atomic arrangements. Consciousness is produced by these material elements even as intoxicating liquor is produced by molasses when it undergoes fermentation⁵.

¹ चतुर्भूतात्मकं जगत् । SDS., TRD., p. 300

² SDS, LV, p. 72.

³ पञ्चभूतात्मकं जगत् । SDS, TRD., p. 300

⁴ चैतन्यविशिष्टदेह एव आत्मा । SDS., p. 3

⁵ मदशक्तिवत् चैतन्यमुपजायते । *Ibid.*, p. 3.

Some Charvakas hold that consciousness is produced by the four material elements. Others hold that consciousness is manifested by them like fermenting intoxication. Consciousness is either produced or manifested by diverse kinds of arrangements and rearrangements of the atoms of earth, water, fire and air which compose the body¹. Some Charvakas believed in the existence of atoms. Thus consciousness may be said to be a function of matter, or a bye-product or an epiphenomenon of matter, in the language of modern western materialism. Consciousness may also be said to be an emergent characteristic, because the Charvakas do not admit that consciousness is a quality of the ingredients of the body, taken severally. Pleasure and pain are attributes of the body, for they bring about changes in it².

The soul is identical with the body. This is indicated by our common experiences such as 'I am fat', 'I am lean', 'I am black', etc. Fatness, leanness, blackness etc., are qualities of the body. Therefore, the soul is identical with the body endowed with consciousness³.

The Dhurta Charvakas hold that there is no soul apart from the body, which is the aggregate of the four material elements. The Sushikshita Charvakas, on the other hand, hold that there is a soul apart from the body as the constant knower and enjoyer of all experiences, but it is destroyed along with the body. It does not persist after destruction of the body and transmigrate into some other body. If there were a transmigrating soul, it would remember the experiences of the past births, even as a person remembers the past experiences of his own present life during childhood and youth. So the soul endures till the disintegration of the body⁴. The Dhurta Charvakas deny the existence of a soul apart from the body.

Some Charvakas identify the soul with the body on the strength of the common experiences such as

1 TSP, p. 520 ; H.I.P., III., pp. 539-40.

2 O. I. P., p. 191n.

3 PP., p. 147 ; O. I. P., p. 192.

4 NM., p. 467, H. I. P., III., p. 540.

'I am fat,' I am 'lean', etc. Some Charvakas identify the soul with the sense-organs on the strength of the common experiences such as 'I am blind', 'I am deaf'. Some Charvakas identify the soul with life or vital forces on the strength of common experiences such as 'I am hungry', 'I am thirsty', etc. Others identify the soul with the mind (मनस्) or the internal organ on the strength of the common experiences such as 'I am resolved,' 'I am in doubt,' etc. Resolution and doubt are functions of the mind. Sadananda gives this account of the Charvaka doctrines in *Vedantasara*¹.

There is no permanent soul apart from the body. So there is neither pre-existence nor future life, nor transmigration of the soul. If the soul transmigrated from one body to another, then it would remember the experiences of the past life, just as a person remembers the experiences of his childhood or youth². There cannot be the same series of consciousness in two different bodies³. The Charvakas are positivists. They do not believe in transcendental entities. So they deny the existence of the permanent, eternal, soul-substance apart from the physical organism, existing before birth, abiding during life, and enduring for ever after death. Only the Sushikshita Charvakas recognise the existence of the soul enduring during life.

11. There is no God.

God cannot be perceived. So there is no God. The material elements combine by chance, and their fortuitous combination brings about the world (यद्रच्छावाद). The elements produce their effect by their very nature (स्वभाववाद). They do not require the supernatural intervention of God. The Charvakas are positivists and naturalists. They repudiate supernaturalism. There is no necessity for God. He is not the efficient cause of the world. The Charvakas are atheists. They look upon the world as the fortuitous combination of material elements.

1 P. 26. (Jacob's edition, 1925); also SBS, i. 1. 1., p. 5, (Ashtekara & Co, Poona, 1918), SBS., iii. 3. 53.

2 H. I. P., III., p. 540; TSP., p. 521, Ibid., p. 541.

12. There is no Law of Karma or Moral Law.

The Law of Karma is said to be the moral law. It brings about the appropriate fruits of actions. It conjoins good actions with pleasures, and bad actions with pains. Sometimes there are long intervals between actions and their deserts. Actions leave behind potencies or dispositions in the souls, which mature in time, and are manifested as deserts. The Charvakas reject all these subtile transcendental entities and the Law of Karma, simply because they are imperceptible.

The Charvakas hold that there is no liberation (मोक्ष), no virtue or vice; there are no results of merit and demerit, heaven or hell. The Charvakas reject the Law of Karma.¹

IV. ETHICS.**13 Gross Egoistic Hedonism.**

The Charvakas regard sensuous or sensual pleasure as the highest good. The pleasure due to the embrace of a woman is the supreme good. There is neither heaven nor hell; there is no permanent soul surviving death and enduring in future life or transmigrating into another body. So live happily so long as you live. 'Eat, drink and be merry.' Run into debt and enjoy pleasure. The so-called soul will not come back to the world after the body is burnt into ashes. So try to get the maximum amount of pleasure out of this life. But pleasure is often found mixed with pain in life. This should not discourage us in the pursuit of pleasure. Pleasure should not be renounced in fear of pain which accompanies it. A person desiring to eat rice must take the trouble of casting off the husk of paddy. A person desiring to eat fish must take the trouble of separating the bones. Pleasure is often accompanied by pain. We must undergo painful experiences in order to attain pleasure. They are fools who give up the pursuit of pleasure arising from the attainment of objects of enjoyment because it is alloyed with pain.²

The maximum amount of sensuous pleasure of the

1 SDSC., P. 71.

2. SDS., pp. 3-4, 10-11

individual in this life is the highest good. Pain should be avoided as far as practicable. A good life is a life of maximum pleasure with minimum pain. A good action is one that yields more pleasure than pain. A bad action is one that gives more pain than pleasure. The Charvakas seem to be advocates of gross egoistic hedonism. They do not give preference to intellectual pleasures over bodily pleasures.

14 Pleasure and Wealth : Ends of life (पुरुषार्थ).

Indian thinkers generally recognize four supreme ends of life, viz., virtue (धर्म), wealth (अर्थ), pleasure (काम), and liberation (मोक्ष). Virtue and vice are inventions of the cunning priests. There is no liberation. If it is taken in the sense of destruction of all sufferings, it can be obtained only by death. So neither virtue nor liberation should be our ends. Pleasure is the only supreme end. Wealth is a means to pleasure. It is not an end in itself. So enjoyment and wealth ought to be pursued.

V. RELIGION.

15. Vedic rites

The Charvakas reject the authority of the Vedas. They were written by cunning priests. Some Vedic texts are false ; some are self-contradictory ; some are tautologous. There is neither heaven nor hell ; neither liberation nor transmigration. Duties pertaining to the four castes bear no fruits here or hereafter. The religious rites were invented by imposters for their own livelihood. If a beast slain in the Jyotishtoma rite goes to heaven, why does not the sacrificer sacrifice his own father ? If the offerings of the Sraddha ceremony gratify the departed souls, what is the need of supplying travellers with provisions for the journey ? They may as well be gratified by offerings of food at home. The authors of the Vedas were knaves and impostors.¹

16. The Carvakas were free thinkers.

The Charvakas were free thinkers. They demolished the foundation of orthodox Indian philosophy. They rejected the authority of the Vedas, denied the Law

1. SDS , pp. 10-11.

of Karma, the permanent soul, future life, transmigration, heaven and hell, and even virtue and vice. They regarded matter as the ultimate reality, and consciousness as a bye-product of matter. They regarded the world as the fortuitious combination of material elements. They explained the phenomena of nature by the inherent nature of things. They denied the existence of God as the efficient cause of the world. They regarded perception as the only means of valid knowledge. They rejected inference and testimony. They denied the reality of all transcendent entities. They regarded the individual's greatest sensuous pleasure as the highest good. They were materialists, positivists, naturalists, mechanists, atheists, and egoistic hedonists. The orthodox schools of Indian philosophy had to refute the heterodox views of the Charvakas, and establish the reality of transcendent entities. They were compelled to give up dogmatism and become critical in their metaphysical speculations. Thus the Charvaka philosophy, with its bold independence of spirit, was thought-provoking and infused a critical spirit into Indian philosophy.

16. Can the Soul be identified with the body ?

The Sushikshita Charvakas hold that there is a permanent soul apart from the body as the constant knower and enjoyer of experiences, which is destroyed when the body perishes. But the majority of the Charvakas hold that there is no soul apart from the body; the soul is the body endowed with consciousness; consciousness is not a property of the material elements, earth, water, fire, and air, severally; but it is generated by them when they are transformed into the body as an emergent quality, even as intoxicating property is generated by molasses and the like ingredients when they undergo fermentation. The body itself is the conscious soul, because consciousness exists in the body: consciousness is found in the body so long as it continues. It disappears when the body perishes. Therefore consciousness is a property of the body. Heat is present in fire. When fire perishes, heat disappears. So heat is a property of fire. Vital acts, consciousness, memory, etc., are not

the property of the so-called soul. They are found to exist in the body, and never outside it. Hence they must be regarded as properties of the body. There is no proof for the existence of a soul apart from the body, in which consciousness may exist.

Shankara has stated the arguments of the Charvakas as given above and criticised them. First, consciousness sometimes does not exist, though the body exists. There is no consciousness during deep sleep or swoon. Therefore consciousness should be regarded as a property of something different from the body, *viz.*, the soul. Secondly, complexion is a property of the body; it can be perceived in the body by all persons. But consciousness is a private property of an individual person; it can be perceived only by him. If consciousness were a property of the body, it would be capable of being perceived by all. Therefore consciousness is not a property of the body, but of something different from it, *viz.*, the soul. Thirdly, it cannot be asserted definitely that consciousness continues so long as the physical organism continues. It may continue to exist in some form after the dissolution of the body. Even such a doubt disproves the Charvaka doctrine that consciousness is a property of the body. Consciousness may continue to exist as a property of the soul which survives the death of the body and transmigrates into some other body. This hypothesis cannot be rejected as illegitimate. Fourthly, what is the nature of consciousness? The Charvakas hold that it is produced by the aggregate of material elements. Is it an entity different from them? Or is it a property of material elements? The Charvakas do not recognize the existence of a non-material entity. So they cannot regard consciousness as an immaterial entity. They cannot also regard it as a property of the aggregate of material elements, since material things and their qualities are *objects* of consciousness. Consciousness apprehends them. Therefore it cannot be identified with its objects. Just as fire cannot burn itself, so an object cannot apprehend itself. Hence consciousness can never be regarded as a property of its objects. Just as the

Charvakas affirm the reality of material things because they are perceived, so we should affirm the reality of consciousness as an independent entity because it apprehends external objects and mental modes. Lastly, there cannot be visual perception of things without light; but visual perception is not a property of light. Light is a condition of visual perception. So the body may serve as an auxiliary condition (उपकरण) for consciousness to apprehend objects. Hence consciousness cannot be regarded as a property of the body, and the soul is not the same as the body endowed with consciousness.¹

1. B. S , III. iii, 54.

'References : Introduction to Indian Philosophy, Ch. II.

Outlines of Indian Philosophy, ch. VIII.

History of Indian Philosophy, Vol, III , pp. 512—50.

Sarvadarshanasangraha, Ch. I.

Sarvadarshanasamuchchaya, pp. 71—77.

Tarkarahasyadipika on the same pp. 300—10.

Shankara's commentary on the Brahmasutras, III iii. 54.

Vedantasara (Jacob's edition), p. 26.

Nyayamanjari, pp. 467—69.

CHAPTER III. THE NYAYA PHILOSOPHY

1. Introduction

Gotama (fourth century B. C.) was the founder of the Nyaya philosophy. He was also known as Gautama and Akshapada. So the Nyaya philosophy is also known as the Akshapada system. It is called Tarkashastra (*i. e.* the science of reasoning), Pramanashastra (*i. e.* the science of demonstration), Vadavidya (*i. e.* the science of debate), and Anvikshiki (*i. e.* the science of critical study). It is primarily concerned with the conditions of valid reasoning. It also deals with metaphysical problems, *viz.*, the nature of the physical world, the individual soul, and God. It aims at the attainment of liberation which is the ultimate end.

Gotama was the author of the *Nyaya-Sutra*. Vatsyayana (fourth century A. D.) wrote a famous commentary on it named *Nyaya-Bhashya*. Uddyotakara (sixth century A. D.) wrote a commentary on it named *Nyaya-Vartika*. Vacaspati Mishra (ninth century A. D.) wrote a commentary on it called *Nyaya-Vartika-tatparya-tika*. Udayana (tenth century A. D.) wrote a commentary on it named *Tatparya-parishuddhi*. Jayanta (tenth century A. D.) wrote a running commentary on the *Nyaya-Sutra* called *Nyayamanjari*. These are the works of the old Nyaya school.

Gangesha (twelfth century A. D.) is the founder of the modern Nyaya school. His *Tattvachintamani* is the classical work which has several commentaries. The later works on the Nyaya system accept the seven categories of the Vaisheshika. They combine the Nyaya and the Vaisheshika systems into one and belong to the syncretist school. Varadaraja's *Tarkika-raksha* (twelfth century A. D.), Keshava Mishra's *Tarkabhasha* (thirteenth century A. D.), Annam Bhatta's *Tarkasamgraha* (seventeenth century A. D.) and Vishvanatha's *Bhasha Parichchheda* and *Siddhantamuktavali* (seventeenth century A. D.) are important works of the syncretist school.

2. Sixteen topics (पदार्थ).

The Nyaya enumerates sixteen philosophical topics (पदार्थ): (1) the means of right knowledge (प्रमाण); (2) the objects of right knowledge (प्रमेय); (3) doubt (संशय); (4) the end or motive of action (प्रयोजन); (5) illustrative example (दृष्टान्त); (6) accepted conclusion (सिद्धान्त); (7) constituent propositions of a syllogism (अवयव); (8) hypothetical reasoning (तर्क); (9) ascertainment of truth (निर्णय); (10) debate or discussion (वाद); (11) disputation (जल्प); (12) wrangling (वितण्डा); (13) fallacy (हेत्वाभास); (14) quibble (झल); (15) casuistry (जाति); (16) the point of the opponent's defeat (निग्रहस्थान).

(1) *Pramanas* or the means of right cognition are of four kinds: (i) perception; (ii) inference; (iii) analogy; and (iv) testimony. These will be considered in detail below.

(2) *Prameyas* or the objects of right knowledge are (i) soul; (ii) body; (iii) sense-organs; (iv) objects; (v) apprehension; (vi) mind; (vii) activity; (viii) defects; (ix) rebirth; (x) fruition; (xi) pain; (xii) and release. Some of the *prameyas* will be considered below.

(3) *Samshaya* or doubt is uncertain knowledge of the self wavering between two alternatives, e.g., 'Is it a post?' or 'Is it a man?' It involves the perception of the common qualities of two objects, the recollection of the peculiar qualities of both contrary to one another, and lack of definite apprehension of any of these two sets of qualities in one and the same object. Doubt is indefinite knowledge. It is not error or false knowledge.

(4) *Prayojana* or motive is the end which induces a person to act. It is the final cause of action. It is not the efficient cause or the spring of action. The primary end or object of all action is the attainment of pleasure and the avoidance of pain. The attainment of the means to pleasure is the secondary end or motive of action.¹ Pleasure is always mixed up with pain. So the highest good is deliverance from pleasure and pain both.²

1 N.B., i. 1. 24, NM, pp 562—63.

2 NV., i. 1. 24.

THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE

3. Nature of Valid Knowledge (Prama' and Invalid Knowledge (Aprama').

The Nyaya takes knowledge (ज्ञान) or cognition (बुद्धि) as apprehension (उपलब्धि) of objects.¹ Knowledge is the manifestation of objects²; all things are manifested or revealed by knowledge. Valid knowledge (प्रमा) is right apprehension of an object. Memory is not valid knowledge. It is the recollection of a previous cognition. Apprehension is knowledge other than memory. Doubt, illusion, and conjecture are invalid knowledge. Valid knowledge is the apprehension (अनुभव) which agrees with the real character of the object apprehended.³ *Pramana* is the means of valid knowledge. Invalid knowledge is not of the nature of apprehension. Memory is invalid knowledge. Invalid knowledge does not apprehend the real character of its object. It does not correspond to its object.

Valid knowledge (प्रमा) is the knowledge of an object as endowed with qualities which really exist in it.⁴ When we apprehend a jar (वट) as possessing the qualities of jar-ness (वटत्व) etc.) which actually exist in it, our knowledge is valid. But invalid knowledge (अप्रमा) is the knowledge of the qualities in an object, which do not really exist in it.⁵ When we apprehend the qualities of a snake in a rope which do not really exist in it, our knowledge is invalid.

Knowledge is produced in the self by the not-self. It is the result of causal action of the not-self on the self. It is an adventitious attribute of the self. It is produced by a collocation of conditions. These are the assumptions of the Nyaya. It holds that some excellence (गुण) in the generating conditions of knowledge is the cause of valid knowledge (प्रमा), and some defect (दोष) in the generating conditions of knowledge is the cause of invalid

1 NS, 1 1 15. 2 अर्थप्रकाशो बुद्धिः । TK., p. 6.

3 यथार्थानुभवः प्रमा । TB., p. 1, TR, p. 8.

4 तद्विशेष्यकत्वे सति तत्प्रकारकं ज्ञानं प्रमा । Sm., p. 445

5 तदभाववति तत्प्रकारकं ज्ञानं अप्रमा । Ibid., p. 440.

knowledge¹. For example, the intercourse of a sense-organ with an object endowed with qualities is the excellence (गुण) which is the cause of valid perception. Yellowness of the eyes in jaundice is the defect (दोष) which is the cause of the illusory perception of a yellow conch². Likewise there are specific excellences (गुण) which are the causes of valid inference, analogy, and testimony. Positive excellence (गुण) in the conditions of knowledge is the cause of valid knowledge (प्रमा). Positive defect (दोष) in the conditions of knowledge is the cause of invalid knowledge (अप्रमा). The general conditions of knowledge or the mere absence of defects in them should not be regarded as the cause of valid knowledge.

There are four kinds of valid knowledge: (1) perception; (2) inference; (3) analogy; (4) and testimony. There are three kinds of invalid knowledge: (1) doubt; (2) error; (3) and guess or conjecture. Doubt (संशय) is indefinite knowledge. It is of the nature of vacillation between two conflicting judgements *e. g.*, 'Is is a post' or 'Is it a man?' It is uncertain knowledge. Error (विपर्यय) is illusory perception. It is false knowledge. It is definite knowledge of one thing (shell) as another (silver). It does not agree with its object. *Tarka* or guess is indirect proof. It shows that a wrong assumption leads to absurdity. If there were no fire there could not be smoke. The existence of fire is neither known by perception nor by inference. *Tarka*, therefore, does not give us any definite knowledge of objects. But it tells us that the opposite of a suggested premise is impossible. Doubt, error and *tarka* are invalid knowledge.

4 Truth and Error.

Knowledge is true when it agrees with its object. Knowledge is false when it does not agree with its object. When we apprehend the qualities of an object, which really exist in it, our knowledge is true. When we apprehend the qualities in an object, which do not really exist in it, our knowledge is invalid.⁴ When we

1 *Ibid.*, p. 443. 2 *Ibid.*, p. 444. 3 NB., i.1.40, I.P. II, p. 114.

4 *Tarkamrta* (Jivananda edition, Calcutta) p. 11.

apprehend that a conch is white. we have true knowledge. But when a person suffering from jaundice apprehends a conch as yellow, he has false knowledge. Truth is correspondence of knowledge with reality. Error is lack of agreement of knowledge with reality. Correspondence is truth. Non-correspondence is error. The Nyaya gives realistic definition of truth and error.

But the Nyaya holds that validity (प्रामाण्य) or invalidity (अप्रामाण्य) of knowledge is known by successful activity (प्रवृत्तिसामर्थ्य) or unsuccessful activity (प्रवृत्तिविसंबाद). When we perceive an object as water, approach it, drink it, and satisfy our thirst, we know that our knowledge is valid. But when we perceive an object as water, pursue it, but never get water, and cannot satisfy our thirst, we know that our knowledge is invalid. Thus the Nyaya gives pragmatic tests of truth and error. Pragmatism holds that workability is the test of truth, and unworkability is the test of error. "Workability is only the test of truth and not its content. For the Naiyayika, truth is not mere workability, though it is known by it. Truth is prior to verification. A judgement is true, not because it is verified, but it is verified because it is true."¹ Thus correspondence of knowledge with reality leads to successful activity. Discrepancy of knowledge with reality leads to unsuccessful activity. The relation of ideas or judgments to facts is not resemblance but correspondence. This correspondence is established by successful activity. Knowledge gives rise to a desire; the desire incites the self to an action. If the action fulfils the desire, it is successful. Thus successful action establishes the truth or validity of the knowledge. But if the action excited by the knowledge fails to fulfil the desire, it establishes the falsity or invalidity of the knowledge. Prior to fruitful activity, knowledge cannot be established as valid. A valid knowledge of objects is the prior condition of successful activity.²

1 I. P., II, pp., 128—29. 2

2 NM, pp 171—74.

5. Extrinsic Validity of Knowledge (परतःप्रामाण्य).

The Nyaya holds that knowledge is the bare manifestation of objects. It is neither valid nor invalid in itself. It is not intrinsically valid or invalid. Its truth or validity depends upon its correspondence or conformity with objects or facts. Its falsity or invalidity depends upon its non-correspondence or non-conformity with objects or facts. A knowledge is true when it apprehends the real character, qualities, and relations of its object. It is false when it does not apprehend the real character, qualities and relations of its object. Therefore, validity and invalidity are not intrinsic or natural characteristics of knowledge. They are adventitious or extrinsic characteristics of knowledge. They do not depend upon the general conditions of knowledge. They depend upon special conditions other than the general conditions of knowledge itself. Validity (प्रामाण्य) depends upon some positive excellence (गुण) in the generating conditions of knowledge. Invalidity (अप्रामाण्य) depends upon some positive defect (दोष) in the generating conditions of knowledge. Validity is due to neither the general conditions of knowledge nor mere absence of defects (दोषाभाव). It is produced by some positive excellence or efficiency (गुण) in the general conditions of knowledge. Thus validity does not owe its origin (उत्पत्ति) to knowledge itself but to some other extraneous conditions (परतः). And invalidity also does not owe its origin to knowledge itself but to some other extraneous conditions. It is due to neither the general conditions of knowledge nor the mere absence of positive excellence (गुणाभाव) but to some positive defect or deficiency (दोष) in the conditions of knowledge. Thus knowledge is not intrinsically valid or invalid. It is neither valid nor invalid in itself. But it acquires validity or invalidity from extraneous conditions. For example, the sense-object-intercourse is the positive excellence (गुण) which accounts for validity of perception. Distance or minuteness of objects, defect of a sense-organ or

the mind, and the like are the positive defects (दोष) which account for invalidity of perception. A specific effect requires a specific cause. Truth or validity is a specific character of some knowledge. Falsity or invalidity is another specific character of some other knowledge. Therefore validity and invalidity must be due to different specific characters of the general conditions of knowledge, which either promote or vitiate them. Thus validity and invalidity both are extrinsic or accidental characters of knowledge due to extraneous conditions.

Again, how is validity or invalidity of knowledge known? How is it ascertained? The Nyaya holds that validity or invalidity of knowledge is not self-evident. It is not apprehended by the knowledge itself which is either valid or invalid. When a valid knowledge is generated in the self, it does not apprehend its validity at once. Or when an invalid knowledge is generated in the self, it does not apprehend its invalidity at once. If validity were apprehended by valid knowledge at once, there would be no doubt as to its validity, and consequent effort to verify it. Again, if invalidity were apprehended by invalid knowledge at once, there would be no unfruitful action. But, in fact, we know an object (e.g. water), but are in doubt as to the validity of our knowledge. We desire to verify it. We make an effort, approach it, touch it, and drink it. It quenches our thirst. This fruitful action verifies the validity of our knowledge. If we fail to quench our thirst by the water known, we come to know that our knowledge is invalid. Thus validity of knowledge is inferred from the capacity to produce successful activity (प्रवृत्तिसामर्थ्य), and invalidity of knowledge is inferred from the incapacity to produce successful activity (प्रवृत्तिविसंवाद). Workability is the test of truth. Unworkability is the test of falsehood¹. Thus the Naiyayika holds that the truth and falsity of knowledge, which are produced by extraneous conditions such as positive excellence or efficiency (गुण) and

¹NM, pp 170—74, *The Nyaya Theory of Knowledge* (C. U.), pp 84-89

positive defect or deficiency (दोष) in the generating conditions of knowledge, are also known by certain extraneous conditions other than the general conditions of knowledge such as the capacity to produce fruitful activity or the incapacity to produce fruitful activity (परतः प्रामाण्याप्रामाण्यज्ञप्तिः). Correspondence with objects is the content of truth. Practical efficiency or serviceableness is the test of truth. Non-conformity with objects is the content of falsehood. Lack of practical efficiency or unworkability is the test of falsehood. Thus the Nyaya combines realism with pragmatism in its theory of knowledge. Realism is the doctrine that holds that truth is harmony or agreement of knowledge with its object external to it, and falsehood is disharmony or disagreement of knowledge with its object external to it. Pragmatism is the doctrine that fruitful activity is the test of truth, and unfruitful activity is the test of falsehood. The Nyaya theory of knowledge may be described as realistic pragmatism.

6. Logical Realism.

The Nyaya advocates logical realism. Realism is the doctrine that external objects are real and independent of consciousness or the self; they do not owe their existence to their being known by the finite self or the infinite self; their being known does not affect their existence; they are known because they exist; their existence is prior to their being known. Idealism, on the other hand, holds that external objects are mere ideas of the finite self or the infinite self perceiving them; their existence consists in their being known by the finite self or the infinite self. Subjective Idealism holds that the so-called external objects are mere ideas of the finite selves perceiving them. Objective Idealism holds that external objects are ideas of the infinite self or God perceiving them. It is called also Absolute Idealism. The world is conceived by it as externalisation of the Divine Spirit; it is spiritual in nature; it is the manifestation of the Absolute Spirit.

The Nyaya advocates realism. It regards the world as real and independent of the finite spirits and the infinite spirit. It regards the world as material and

composed of atoms existing in space and time, independent of consciousness. The Nyaya refutes the subjective idealism of the Yogacara Buddhist.¹ It also refutes the absolute idealism of the Advaita Vedanta. The Nyaya realism is based on logical grounds. Knowledge manifests objects. It consists in the manifestation of objects (अर्थप्रकाश). The nature of the external world is known by the self. It is intelligible to the self. The human spirit can comprehend its nature. Liberation can be attained by the true knowledge of the reality. Bondage is due to ignorance. Ignorance can be removed by true knowledge. True knowledge presupposes a theory of knowledge or epistemology. Therefore the realism of the Nyaya is based on a theory of knowledge or logical grounds. Hence it may be called logical realism.²

7. Perception.

Perception, inference, analogy, and testimony are the four kinds of knowledge. Gotama defines perception as non-erroneous cognition produced by the intercourse of the sense-organs with the objects not associated with a name, and determinate³. Perception is a kind of cognition. It is an attribute of the self. It is generated by the contact of the self with the mind (मनस्), the contact of the mind (मनस्) with the sense-organs, and the intercourse of the sense-organs with their proper objects. The manas is the internal organ. The sense organs are the external senses. The definition of perception given above mentions only the specific condition of perception. The mind-soul-contact is the generic condition of all knowledge. The mind-sense-organ-contact is implied by the sense-organ-object-intercourse. If the manas be not in contact with the external sense-organs, there cannot arise perception. The definition mentions two kinds of perception, viz., indeterminate perception (निर्विकल्प

1 J. N. Sinha: *Indian Realism*, Ch. VII

2 I. I. P., pp. 189-91.

3 इन्द्रियार्थमन्तिकर्षोत्तं ज्ञानम् अव्यपदेश्यम् अव्यभिचारि व्यवसायात्मकं प्रत्यक्षम् । NS, 1. 1. 4

प्रत्यक्ष) and determinate perception (सविकल्प प्रत्यक्ष). The definition mentions the logical condition of valid perception. It should not contradict the real nature of the object (अव्यभिचारि). It should apprehend the real character of the object.

This definition does not apply to the perception of God or to the perception of the yogins, which is not produced by the external senses. So Vishvanatha defines perception as direct or immediate knowledge or the cognition which is not derived through the medium or instrumentality of any other cognition.¹ This definition is applicable to human as well as divine perception. It excludes inference, analogy, and testimony. Inference is produced through the instrumentality of the knowledge of invariable concomitance (व्याप्तिज्ञान). Analogy is produced through the instrumentality of the knowledge of similarity. Testimony is produced through the instrumentality of the knowledge of words.

8. Indeterminate Perception and Determinate Perception.

The Naiyayika recognizes two kinds or stages of perception: (1) Indeterminate Perception; (2) Determinate Perception. Gotama describes a kind of perception which is not associated with a name (अव्यपदेश्य). The other ancient Naiyayikas call it indeterminate perception (निर्विकल्प प्रत्यक्ष). Jayanta Bhatta holds that indeterminate perception apprehends generality, substantiality, quality and action, but is devoid of association with a name, while determinate perception (सविकल्प प्रत्यक्ष) apprehends all these characters together with a name². Bhasarvajna defines indeterminate perception as the immediate apprehension of the bare nature of an object just after the intercourse of the object with the sense organ.³ It is simple apprehension of something. Gangesha, the founder of the modern Nyaya, defines indeterminate perception as the non-relational apprehension of an object free from all

¹ ज्ञानाकरणकं ज्ञानं प्रत्यक्षम् । SM , p 237.

² NM , p. 99. ³ Nyāyasarā, p. 4.

association of name, genus, and the like.¹ Indeterminate perception is not of the nature of a judgment. It is not perceptual judgment. It is 'knowledge of acquaintance' in the language of William James. It is devoid of subject-predicate-relation. Annam Bhatta rightly defines indeterminate perception as the immediate apprehension of an object with its properties without apprehending the relation between them.² The ancient Nyaya holds that indeterminate perception is a psychological stage of perception. But the modern Nyaya holds that it is a logical stage of perception. It is not an object of perception. It is inferred from determinate perception as its prior stage.³ The modern Nyaya holds that indeterminate perception is neither valid nor invalid.

Gotama mentions well-defined or determinate perception (व्यवसायात्मक). The other ancient Naiyayikas call it determinate perception (सविकल्प प्रत्यक्ष). Bhasarvajna defines determinate perception as the apprehension of an object as qualified by its properties such as substance, quality, action, genus, name, and the like.⁴ Annam Bhatta defines determinate perception as the apprehension of the relation between the qualified objects (विशेष्य) and its qualifications (विशेषण), viz., name, genus, and the like.⁵ Determinate perception is relational apprehension. It is perceptual judgment. There is subject-predicate-relation in it. It involves assimilation, discrimination, and association. It is 'knowledge about' an object. When we perceive a table as a substance endued with the qualities of a colour, a size, a shape, and the like, bearing the name 'table', and belonging to the class of tables, and distinct from a chair, a bench, and the like, we have determinate perception. Determinate perception is produced by the intercourse of the sense-organs with objects in co-operation with the subconscious impressions (संस्कार) produced by past perceptions. It contains presentative and representative elements. Indeterminate perception is a simple presentative process. But determinate perception is a complex presentative-representative

1 TC., Vol. 1, p. 809. 2 TSD., p. 30. 3 I.P.P., pp. 41-47

4 Nyayasara padapanchika, p. 14. 5 TSD., p. 30.

process. It is called perception because the sense-object-intercourse is its principal cause and subconscious impression (संस्कार) is an auxiliary condition¹. Determinate perception is valid.

9. Recognition.

The Nyaya holds that recognition (प्रत्यभिज्ञा) is a single unitary process. It is a kind of perception qualified by past perception; it is qualified perception. 'This is that Devadatta'. This kind of perception is called recognition. Jayanta Bhatta defines recognition as the perception of a present object qualified by the past time, due to the contact of a sense-organ with the present object, or as the perception of a present object, as modified by a past cognition.² It is a kind of perception. Memory is produced by subconscious impressions (संस्कार). Perception is produced by the intercourse of the sense-organs with their objects. Recognition is produced by the co-operation of both, though the sense-object-intercourse is its principal cause. The Nyaya regards recognition as a kind of qualified perception or perception qualified by the past cognition of the object³. It is a single presentative cognition or perception brought about by the intercourse of a sense-organ with an object in co-operation with the subconscious impression of a past cognition of it.⁴

10. Ordinary Perception (लौकिकप्रत्यक्ष).

The Nyaya recognizes two kinds of perception: (1) ordinary perception (लौकिक प्रत्यक्ष) and (2) extra-ordinary perception (अलौकिक प्रत्यक्ष). There is ordinary intercourse of the sense-organs with their objects (लौकिकसन्निकर्ष) in ordinary perception. There are two kinds of ordinary perception, viz., external perception (बाह्यप्रत्यक्ष) and internal or mental perception (मानसप्रत्यक्ष). There are five kinds of external perception, viz., visual (चक्षुष) perception, auditory (श्रावण) perception, tactual (त्वाच) perception, gustatory (रासन) perception, and olfactory

1 1. P.P., p. 63. 2 N.M., p. 459., 3 N.M., p. 46., 4 I.P.P., pp. 95—97.

(द्राणज) perception. The self perceives colour through the visual organ (eyes), sound through the auditory organ (ear), cold and heat through the tactual organ (skin), taste through the gustatory organ (tongue), and smell through the olfactory organ (nose). The self perceives its qualities, cognition, pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, and volition through the mind (मनस्), which is the internal organ.

The external sense-organs are composed of material elements. The visual organ is composed of fire (तेजस्). Therefore it is the organ of the perception of colour, the specific quality of fire. The auditory organ is composed of ether (आकाश). Therefore it is the organ of the perception of sound, the specific quality of ether. The tactual organ is composed of air. Therefore it is the organ of the perception of touch, the specific quality of air. The gustatory organ is composed of water. Therefore it is the organ of the perception of taste, the specific quality of water. The olfactory organ is composed of earth. Therefore it is the organ of the perception of smell, the specific quality of earth. The external sense-organs are physical in nature and are composed of those material elements whose specific qualities are perceived through them. The mind (मनस्) is the internal organ. It is not physical in nature. It is not composed of physical elements. It is the organ of the perception of the qualities of the self. External objects are perceived through the external senses. The qualities of the soul are perceived through the internal organ (मनस्). The mind supervises the functions of the external senses. It is the central co-ordinating organ in all kinds of external perception.

11. Extra-ordinary Perception (अलौकिक प्रत्यक्ष).

There is extra-ordinary intercourse (अलौकिक सन्निकर्ष) in extra-ordinary perception. There are three kinds of extra-ordinary perception brought about by *samanya - lakshana - sannikarsha*, *jnana-lakshana-sannikarsha*, and *yogaja sannikarsha*.

(1) *Perception of a class.*

Samanya-lakshana-sannikarsha (सामान्यलक्षणसन्निकर्ष) is the extra-ordinary intercourse through the knowledge of a generic character. The Nyaya holds that through the knowledge of the generic character of an individual, we perceive all the individuals of the class. We perceive a person ; we perceive 'manhood' (the generic character of man) in him ; through the medium of this generic character we perceive all men. This perception of all individuals through the medium of the perception of a generic character is an extra-ordinary perception due to *samanya-lakshana-sannikarsha*. All individuals cannot be directly present to the senses ; but they are presented indirectly by the knowledge of a generic character.

(2) *Indirect or Acquired Perception.*

Jnana-lakshana-sannikarsha (ज्ञानलक्षणसन्निकर्ष) is the extra-ordinary intercourse through association. An object is not directly present to a sense-organ ; but it is indirectly presented to the senses by the past cognition of it. It is revived in memory ; and through the medium of the idea revived we perceive the object. This is called intercourse through association. It brings about indirect or acquired perception. We perceive a piece of sandal from a distance through the eyes. We seem to have a *visual* perception of *fragrant* sandal. Here the visual perception of the sandal brings to consciousness the idea of fragrance by association, which was perceived in the past through the nose. This idea of smell revived in memory brings about the acquired visual perception of fragrant sandal. The modern Nyaya explains error or illusion also by intercourse through association.

(3) *Yogic perception.*

There is another extra-ordinary intercourse. It is the intercourse brought about by meditation (योगज सन्निकर्ष). A peculiar merit is produced in the self by intense meditation. By virtue of it the self can

perceive past, future, remote, hidden, and subtle objects. Yogic perception is intuitive in nature.

There are two kinds of yogic perception: *Yukta* and *Yunjana*. The former is the intuitive perception of a yogin who has attained union with God. Such yogic intuition is constant and spontaneous. The latter is the intuitive perception of a yogin who is endeavouring to attain union with God. It requires the aid of concentration to perceive all objects. It is not effortless. It requires the effort of attention¹.

There is ordinary intercourse (लौकिक सन्निकर्ष) in ordinary perception (लौकिक प्रत्यक्ष). The contact of a sense-organ with an object is an ordinary intercourse. But in extra-ordinary perception (अलौकिक प्रत्यक्ष) there is extra-ordinary intercourse (अलौकिक सन्निकर्ष). An object is not directly present to a sense-organ. But it is conveyed to a sense-organ through an extra-ordinary medium. The perception of a generic character (सामान्य) or an idea (ज्ञान) revived in memory, or a supernatural power brought about by meditation may be the medium of extra-ordinary intercourse.

12. The Nyaya theory of Error : Anyathakhyati.

The Naiyayika holds that an error or illusion (भ्रम) is misapprehension of one object as another. It is apprehension (ख्याति) of one thing as another (अन्यथा). It consists in apprehending certain qualities and relations in an object in which they do not exist. For instance, when we perceive the qualities of silver in a shell, we have an error or illusion. An illusion is a single psychosis of a perceptual character. In the illusory perception of a shell as silver, the shell is wrongly perceived as silver owing to a defect in the sense-organ and subconscious impression of silver revived by the perception of similarity. In illusory perception or erroneous judgment (e.g. 'this is silver') the subject (e.g. 'this') is actually given or directly perceived, the predicate (e.g. 'silver') is elsewhere, and

¹ SM , pp. 274—85 , I. P.P., pp. 79—82.

given or presented in an indirect manner through the instrumentality of its past cognition.¹ There is extraordinary intercourse here through the medium of a cognition (ज्ञानलक्षणसन्निकर्ष). An illusion has an objective basis. It is not purely subjective. It is right so far as it apprehends the subject or the substantive element (*e.g.* 'this'); it is wrong so far as it apprehends the predicate or the attributive element (*e.g.* 'silver'). (सर्वं ज्ञानं धर्मिण्यभ्रान्तं प्रकारे तु विपर्ययः²). 'Discrepancy found in error is in regard to the predicative element.'³

13. Inference (अनुमान).

Inference is indirect or mediate knowledge. It is the knowledge of an object (*e.g.* fire) through the medium of the knowledge of some mark (*e.g.* smoke), by virtue of a relation of invariable concomitance between the two. First, there is the perception of a mark (*e.g.* smoke) in an object (*e.g.* a hill). Secondly, there is the recollection of the relation of invariable concomitance between the mark (*e.g.* smoke) and the inferable object (*e.g.* fire). Thirdly, there is the knowledge of the existence of the unperceived object (*e.g.* fire) possessing the mark in a particular object (*e.g.* a hill).

Inference is called anumana because it is a kind of knowledge (मान) which we get *after* (अनु) other knowledge. It is indirect or mediate knowledge. It is derived from the knowledge of the invariable concomitance between the sign (हेतु) and the inferable object (साध्य). There is no scope for inference, where we can have perception. We infer only in regard to those objects which are not perceived. If we touch an object with our hands, we do not care to infer its existence⁴. We try to infer the existence of an object which we do not perceive and with regard to which we are in doubt. We do not infer the things

1 I.P.P., pp. 301—302

2 S.P., p. 25. 3 O.I.P.P., p. 253

4 NB, 1, 1. 3

which we know definitely¹. Bhasarvajna defines inference as the means of correct mediate knowledge through the relation of invariable concomitance (सम्यगविनाभावेन परोक्षानुभवसाधनम् अनुमानम्²). And he defines perception as the means of correct immediate knowledge.³ Perception is confined to 'here and now'. It apprehends only present objects. Inference apprehends past, future, and remote objects as well as those which are present.⁴ Perception does not depend upon the knowledge of the relation of invariable concomitance, while inference is not possible without it.

Inference, in Western logic, is of two kinds, deduction and induction. Deduction is the inference of a particular truth from a general truth, or of a less general truth from a more general truth. An example of deductive inference is given below :

All men are mortal ;
Socrates is a man :
∴ Socrates is mortal.

This is called a syllogism in Western logic. The subject of the conclusion (e. g. Socrates) is called the *minor* term. The predicate of the conclusion (e. g. mortal) is called the *major* term. The term that is present in both the premises or given propositions (e. g. man) is called the *middle* term. The middle term is the medium of comparison between the major term and the minor term. Thus in Western syllogism there are three distinct terms, each occurring twice. The given propositions are called premises. The proposition which contains the major term is called the *major premise*. The proposition which contains the minor term is called the *minor premise*. The proposition which is derived from the premises is called the *conclusion*. Thus there are three propositions in a syllogism.

Induction, in Western logic, is the inference of a general truth from particular truths. Particular facts are gathered by observation and experiment and a general law is derived from them. An example of induction is given below :

John is mortal ;
James is mortal ;
William is mortal ;
Mohan is mortal ;
Rama is mortal :
∴ All men are mortal.

In induction a general conclusion is drawn from many

1 NB, i. 1. 1.

2 Nyayasara (Nirnayasagar Press, Bombay), p. 4.

3 Ibid, p 2.

4 NB., I 1. 5.

premises. The premises are particular facts gathered from observation and experiment. A general law is derived from particular facts on the ground of the Uniformity of Nature and the Law of Causation.

14. Inference for oneself and Inference for others : The Constituents of Inference.

In Nyaya there are two kinds of inference, *viz.* inference for oneself (स्वार्थानुमान) and inference for others (परार्थानुमान). In the first kind of inference we do not require the formal statement of the different members of a syllogism. But in the second kind of inference we try to convince others of its truth by stating all the members of a syllogism in a formal manner. It takes the form of a formal demonstrative syllogism. Inference for oneself is a psychological process. Inference for others is a logical process.

In inference for oneself, for example, a person already knows by repeated observation the invariable concomitance between smoke and fire. He goes to a hill and perceives smoke there. Then he doubts that fire may exist there. Then he remembers the invariable concomitance between smoke and fire: 'Wherever there is smoke there is fire.' Then he comes to know that 'this hill has smoke which is invariably accompanied by fire'. Then he infers that 'this hill has fire'. This is the psychological analysis of inference for oneself.

In inference for others there is a formal statement of the five members of a syllogism as follows :—

1. The hill has fire ;
2. Because it has smoke ;
3. Whatever has smoke has fire, for example, a kitchen ;
4. The hill has smoke such as is invariably accompanied by fire ;
- ∴ 5. The hill has fire.

The five members of a syllogism given above are : (1) the proposition (प्रतिज्ञा) ; (2) the reason (हेतु) ;

(3) the example (उदाहरण); (4) the application (उपनय); (5) the conclusion (निगमन).

The proposition (प्रतिज्ञा) is the thesis to be established. It makes a statement. The reason (हेतु) states the reason for the statement. The example (उदाहरण) is the universal proposition, showing invariable concomitance between the reason (हेतु) and the asserted fact (साध्य), as supported by known instances. The *upanaya* is the application of the universal proposition to the present case. The *nigamana* is the conclusion drawn from the preceding propositions.

There are three terms in the syllogism. The *paksha* is the subject in which the predicate or the inferable object is doubted¹. It is the minor term about which something is inferred. The *sadhya* is the object that is inferred about the minor term. It is the major term. The *hetu* is the mark or sign which indicates the presence of the inferable object (*sadhya*). It is the middle term by which the major term is inferred to be true of the minor term. Thus the *paksha*, the *sadhya*, and the *hetu* correspond to the *minor* term, the *major* term, and the *middle* term of the Aristotelian syllogism. In the example given above 'the hill' is the *paksha* or minor term, 'fire' is the *sadhya* or major term, and 'smoke' is the *hetu* or middle term. The *paksha* is the subject in which we infer the existence of something. The *sadhya* is the object which we want to establish in the *paksha*. It is the object to be inferred. The *hetu* is the reason for establishing a relation between the *paksha* and the *sadhya*.

The *sadhya* is also called the *vyapaka* (pervader) because it pervades the *hetu*. The *hetu* is also called the *vyapya* (pervaded) because it is pervaded by the *sadhya*. The middle term is pervaded by the major term. Wherever there is the middle term, there is the major term. But wherever there is the major term,

¹संदिग्धसाध्यवान् पक्षः । TS., p 45.

there is no middle term. For example, smoke (हेतु) is pervaded by fire (साध्य) : Wherever there is smoke there is fire, but fire (साध्य) is not pervaded by smoke (हेतु) ; wherever there is fire, there is no smoke. The *hetu* (हेतु) or reason is also called *linga* (sign) because it indicates the presence of the inferable object (साध्य). It is also called ground (*sadhana*) because it is the ground of our knowledge of the *sadhya* or what is inferred.

There are five members of the Nyaya syllogism. The first member is the *pratijna* (proposition) or the thesis to be established. It makes a statement which is to be proved : 'the hill has fire'. It contains two factors, the minor term and the major term ; the major term is predicated of the minor term. The second member of the syllogism, the *hetu* (reason) states the presence of the middle term in the minor term : 'because the hill has smoke.' The knowledge of the presence of the middle term in the minor term (पक्षधर्मता) is a condition of inference. The third member of the syllogism is the *udaharana* (example) which is a universal proposition showing the invariable concomitance between the middle term and the major term supported by known instances : 'whatever has smoke has fire, e.g. a kitchen'. It is the universal major premise of a syllogism. It is supported by known instances. The example is an illustration of a general principle. No inference is possible without knowledge of the invariable concomitance (व्याप्ति) between the middle term and the major term. It is the result of generalisation from many similar particular instances observed repeatedly. There are two kinds of examples : (1) homogeneous or affirmative in which the major term (e.g. fire) and the middle term (e.g. smoke) both are present, as the kitchen ; (2) heterogeneous or negative in which the major term (e.g. fire) and the minor term (e.g. smoke) both are absent, as the lake. The fourth member of the syllogism is the *upanaya* (application). It consists in the application of the universal proposition to the subject of the inference or the minor term. It asserts the presence of the

middle term in the minor term, the middle term being invariably accompanied by the major term : 'the hill has smoke such as is invariably accompanied by fire.' The fifth member of the syllogism is the conclusion (निगमन). It restates the proposition (प्रतिज्ञा) as established : 'the hill has fire'.

The Nyaya syllogism may be compared with the Aristotelian syllogism. They differ in some essential features. First, the former in the form of inference for others (परार्थानुमान) consists of five propositions, while the latter consists of three propositions. The first three propositions of the former correspond to the conclusion, the minor premise, and the major premise of the latter. Or the last three propositions of the former correspond to the major premise, the minor premise, and the conclusion of the latter. Secondly, the former is both deductive and inductive, dealing with formal and material truth, while the latter is deductive, dealing with mere formal truth. Thirdly, the example (उदाहरण) which illustrates a general principle, is the special feature of the former; it is absent from the latter. It indicates that the universal major premise is an induction generalised from particular instances observed, so that induction is the basis of deduction. But induction and deduction cannot be separated from each other. They are integral members of a syllogism. Fourthly, in the Aristotelian syllogism the major term and the minor term stand apart in the premises, though the middle term connects them with each other. But in the Nyaya syllogism the connection of the major term with the minor term through the medium of the middle term is made explicit by bringing the three terms together in the same proposition (उपनय).

There are five characteristics of the middle term. First, it must be present in the minor term (पक्षधर्मता); e.g. smoke must be present in the hill. Secondly, the middle term must be present in all homogeneous or positive instances in which the major term

exists ; *e.g.* smoke must be present in the kitchen in which fire exists (सपक्षसत्त्व). Thirdly, the middle term must be absent in all heterogeneous or negative instances in which the major term does not exist ; *e.g.* smoke must be absent in the lake in which fire does not exist (विपक्षसत्त्व). Fourthly, the middle term must be non-incompatible with the minor term ; *e.g.* it must not aim at proving the coolness of fire (अबाधितविषयत्व). Fifthly, the middle term must be characterised by the absence of counteracting reasons leading to a contradictory conclusion. These are the five characteristics of the middle term of a valid inference.

15. Kinds of Inference.

Inference is of two kinds, *viz.*, inference for oneself (स्वार्थानुमान) and inference for others (परार्थानुमान). We have already disussed their nature.

Gotama distinguishes three kinds of inference : (1) *Purvavat* (पूर्ववत्); (2) *Sheshavat* (शेषवत्); (3) *Samanyatodrsta* (सामान्यतोद्दृष्ट). A *purvavat* inference is the inference of an effect from a cause. A cause is perceived ; its unperceived effect is inferred. Dense clouds are perceived ; from them the future rain is inferred. A *sheshavat* inference is the inference of a cause from an effect. An effect is perceived ; its unperceived cause is inferred. The fulness of the river, the swiftness of the current, and muddiness of the water are perceived ; from them the past rain-fall is inferred. These two kinds of inference are based on the causal relation. In the first, an effect is inferred from a cause. In the second, a cause is inferred from an effect. A *samanyatodrsta* inference is the inference of an unknown property from its invariable accompaniment on the ground of uniformity of experience. Horns are perceived in an unknown animal ; cloven hoofs are inferred from them. They are not causally connected. There is uniformity of co-existence between them. Thus the third kind of

inference is based upon the uniformity of experience; it is not based upon the uniformity of causation.

These three kinds of inference have been interpreted in another way. A *purvavat* inference is based on previous experience. Smoke has been perceived in the past to be invariably accompanied by fire. Smoke is perceived now; so fire is inferred from it. This inference is based on previous experience of the invariable concomitance of smoke with fire. A *sheshavat* inference is *parishesha* or inference by elimination. For example, sound must be a quality because it cannot be a substance, an action, or anything else. A *samanyitodrshita* inference is the inference of an unperceived object from the middle term which is perceived, though the relation between the middle term and the major term is not perceived. For example, we infer the existence of the soul-substance from the qualities of cognition, pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, and volition which must inhere in a substance. These qualities are similar to other qualities. Therefore they must inhere in a substance. This substance is the soul.

The Navya Nyaya recognizes three other kinds of inference: (1) *Kevalanvayi* (केवलान्वयि); (2) *Kevalavyatireki* (केवलव्यतिरेकि); (3) *Anvayavyatireki* (अन्वयव्यतिरेकि). These kinds of inference are based on the different methods of establishing the invariable concomitance between the middle term and the major term (व्याप्ति). "An inference is called *kevalanvayi* when it is based on a middle term which is always positively related to the major term. Here the knowledge of *vyapti* between the middle and major terms is arrived at only through the method of agreement in presence (*anvaya*), since there is no negative instance of their agreement in absence."¹ For example:

All knowable objects are nameable;

The pot is a knowable object:

∴ The pot is knowable.

In this inference the major premise is a universal affirmative proposition. The predicate 'nameable' is

¹ *The Nyaya Theory of Knowledge*, p. 293

affirmed of 'all knowable objects'. This universal proposition is established by the method of agreement in presence (*anvaya*) between the knowable and the nameable. It is established by simple enumeration of the positive instances of their agreement in presence. All knowable objects are nameable. There are no knowable objects which are not nameable. There are no negative instances of their agreement in absence. We cannot have a universal negative proposition corresponding to the universal affirmative proposition. The minor premise and the conclusion also are universal affirmative propositions. Hence the *kevalanvayi* inference is a syllogism of the first mood in the first figure called Barbara.

An inference is *kevala-vyatiireki* when it is based on a middle term which is negatively related to the major term. It is based on the invariable concomitance between the middle term and the major term (*व्याप्ति*) which is established by the method of agreement in absence (*व्यतिरेक*) because there is no positive instance of agreement in presence between the middle term and the major term except in the minor term. The *kevala-vyatiireki* inference depends on the invariable concomitance between the absence of the middle term and the absence of the major term. For example:

What is not different from the other elements has no smell;

The earth has smell:

Therefore, the earth is different from the other elements.

In this inference the middle term 'smell' is the differentia of the minor term 'earth'. "An inference which is based on the differentia (*लक्षण*) as the middle term is called *kevalavyatiireki*. In it the minor term is co-extensive with the middle. Hence we have no positive instance of the co-existence of the middle with any term but the minor. So there can be *vyapti* or a universal relation only between the absence of the middle and the absence of the major term. We cannot point to any positive instance of agreement

in presence between the major and middle terms, except those covered by the minor term. Hence the major premise is a universal negative proposition arrived at by simple enumeration of negative instances of agreement in absence between the major and middle terms"¹. The minor premise is a universal affirmative proposition. But the conclusion is affirmative, though the major premise is negative. This is not a valid mood of syllogism according to the rules of Western syllogism.

An inference is *anvaya-vyatireki* when it is based on a middle term which is both positively and negatively related to the major term. It depends on the invariable concomitance (व्याप्ति) between the presence of the middle term and the presence of the major term as well as between the absence of the middle term and the absence of the major term. The universal relation (व्याप्ति) is established by the method of agreement in presence (अन्वय) and agreement in absence (व्यतिरेक). "The *vyapti* or the universal proposition is affirmative (*anvayi*) when it is the result of an enumeration of positive instances of agreement in presence between the middle and major terms. It is negative (*vyatireki*) when it is based on the simple enumeration of negative instances of agreement in absence between the middle and major terms. The difference between the universal affirmative and the universal negative propositions (*anvaya-vyapti* and *vyatirekavyapti*) is that the subject of the affirmative proposition becomes the predicate, and the contradictory of the predicate of the affirmative proposition becomes the subject in the corresponding negative proposition. Hence an *anvaya-vyatireki* inference may be based on either a universal affirmative or a universal negative proposition as its major premise"². For example:

- (1) All smoky objects are fiery ;
 The hill is smoky :
 Therefore, the hill is fiery.

¹ *Ibid*, pp 294-95

² *Ibid*, pp. 295-96.

- (2) No non-fiery objects are smoky ;
 The hill is smoky :
 Therefore, the hill is fiery.

16. Fallacies.

The fallacies of inference are material fallacies. They are concerned with the subject-matter of inference. They are called *hetvabhasas* (हेत्वाभास) since they are based on reasons (हेतु) which *appear* (आभास) to be valid, but are not really so. There are fallacious reasons (हेतु) in invalid inferences. There are five kinds of fallacies: (1) *Savyabhichara* (2) *Viruddha*; (3) *Satpratipaksha* (4) *Asiddha*; (5) *Badhita*.

(1) The *Savyabhichara* (सव्यभिचार) *hetu* or irregular middle does not lead to a single conclusion, but to opposite conclusions. It is not uniformly concomitant with the major term. It is related to both the existence and the non-existence of the major term. Hence it is also called *anaikantika* (अनैकान्तिक) or an inconstant concomitant of the major term, whereas the middle term must be pervaded by the major term, or the major term must be present in all the cases in which the middle term is present. For example :

All knowable objects are fiery ;
 The hill is knowable :
 Therefore, the hill is fiery.

Here the middle term 'knowable' is present in fiery objects (e.g. kitchen) as well as non-fiery objects (e.g. lake). All knowable objects are not fiery. Hence we cannot infer that a hill is fiery because it is knowable. We may as well infer that a hill is fireless because it is knowable. This kind of fallacy is also called *sadharana* (साधारण).

Three kinds of *savyabhichara hetu* are recognised, viz., *sadharana*, *asadharana*, and *anupasamharin*.

The *sadharana hetu* (साधारण हेतु) is a too wide middle term. It is present in both the *sapaksha* (positive) and the *vipaksha* (negative) instances. Here the middle term

co-exists both with the presence of the major term and with its absence. In the example given above, the middle term 'knowability' is observed to be present in fiery things such as a kitchen and the like, and also in fireless things such as a lake and the like. The middle term here is too wide in extent.

The *asadharana hetu* (असाधारण हेतु) is a too narrow middle term. It is present in neither the *sapaksha* (positive) nor the *vipaksha* (negative) instances. The absence from the *vipaksha* instances is an essential characteristic of the middle term. But the presence in the *sapaksha* instances is also its essential characteristic. But the *asadharana hetu* is not present in the *sapaksha* instances. It is so narrow that it exists in the minor term (*paksha*) alone, and nowhere else. It exists in neither the *sapaksha* instances nor the *vipaksha* instances. It is too narrow in extent. For example, 'sound is eternal, because it is audible'. Audibility exists in sound only. It is present nowhere else. It is not found to be present in all eternal substances, e. g. the self, ether, etc., and in all non-eternal substances. Because audibility is not found to be present in eternal substances, we cannot establish a *vyapti* between audibility and eternity. Therefore the inference is invalid.

The *anupasamhari hetu* (अनुपसंहारि हेतु) is the middle term which is non-exclusive. It has "all things" as the minor term (पक्ष), so that no *sapaksha* or *vipaksha* instances are possible. "All things" include every thing, and leave nothing to serve as a *sapaksha* or a *vipaksha* instance. For example 'all things are non-eternal, because they are knowable.' Here the middle term is non-exclusive.

(2) The *viruddha hetu* (विरुद्ध हेतु) or the contradictory middle term is that which is pervaded by the absence of the major term. The middle term should be pervaded by the presence of the major term. But the contradictory middle is pervaded by its absence. It is offered to establish the existence of the major term. But it actually proves its non-existence on account of its being invariably connected with the absence of

the major term. For example, 'sound is eternal, because it is produced'. Here the middle term 'produced' is invariably connected with 'non-eternal,' but never with 'eternal'. Hence the inference is invalid.

The *viruddha hetu* differs from the *savyabhichara hetu* in that the former is invariably connected with the non-existence of the major term, while the latter is invariably connected with neither the existence nor the non-existence of the major term.

(3) The *satpratipaksha hetu* (सत्प्रतिपक्ष हेतु) is the middle term which is contradicted by another middle term. For example, 'sound is eternal, because it is audible' and 'sound is non-eternal, because it is produced'. Here the middle term 'audible' is intended to prove 'eternity'; but it is contradicted by another middle term 'produced' which proves non-eternity. The two middle terms prove opposite conclusions; both the reasons seem to be equally strong. The first middle term which proves the existence of the major term is contradicted by the second middle term which proves the non-existence of the major term.

The *satpratipaksha hetu* is a counter-balanced reason. Its force is neutralized by the other reason (हेतु). But when the other reason is stronger than this and can effectively prove the contradictory conclusion, the *hetu* becomes *badhita*.

The *satpratipaksha hetu* is different from the *viruddha hetu*. In the *viruddha hetu* or contradictory middle, one and the same middle term proves the contradictory of what it is intended to prove. But in the *satpratipaksha* another middle term proves the contradictory of the conclusion. The *viruddha hetu* is incompatible with the major term in the same inference, while the *satpratipaksha hetu* is incompatible with the major term in another inference.

(4) The *asiddha hetu* (असिद्ध हेतु, inconclusive middle) is not an established fact, but an unproved assumption. The middle term is assumed in any of the premises, and therefore cannot prove the conclusion. The *asiddha*

hetu may assume three forms, namely, (i) *ashrayasiddha* (ii) *svarupasiddha* and (iii) *vyapyatvasiddha*.

(i) The *ashrayasiddha hetu* (आश्रयासिद्ध हेतु) is a middle term which has no real locus. The minor term is the locus (आश्रय) of the middle term. If the minor term is unreal, the middle term cannot be related to it. One of the characteristics of a valid middle term is that it must be known to be actually existing in the minor term (पक्षधमता). But if the minor term is unreal or imaginary, the middle term cannot be known to exist in it. The minor premise, therefore, becomes false. For example, 'the sky lotus is fragrant, because it belongs to the class of lotus.' Here the minor term 'sky-lotus' is unreal; so the middle term 'class of lotus' cannot exist in it. The middle term having no real locus may be called the baseless middle.

(ii) The *svarpuasiddha hetu* (स्वरूपासिद्ध हेतु) is the middle term which cannot exist in the minor term (पक्ष). Here the minor term is not unreal as in the *ashrayasiddha*, but the middle term cannot by its very nature abide in the minor term which may be real. One of the characteristics of a valid middle term is that it must be present in the minor term (पक्षधमता); but if the middle term is by its very nature inconsistent with the minor term, it cannot be present in the minor. Hence the inference is invalid. For example, 'sound is a quality, because it is visible.' Here the middle term 'visible' cannot exist in the minor term 'sound'. The middle term is incompatible with the minor term. Hence it cannot exist in it.

(iii) The *vyapyatvasiddha hetu* (व्याप्यत्वासिद्ध हेतु) is the middle term whose invariable concomitance with the major term has not been proved. There is conditional *vyapti* here. The invariable concomitance of the middle with the major is vitiated by a condition (उपाधि). For example, 'the hill has smoke, because it has fire'. In this inference the *vyapti*, 'wherever there is fire there is smoke', which is the ground of inference is not universally true. It is true only in those cases where a condition (उपाधि), 'conjunction with wet fuel,' is present. Where there

is no such condition (e.g., wet fuel), there is no smoke where there is fire. There is smokeless fire in the absence of wet fuel. The inference 'the hill has smoke, because it has fire' is invalid, because here the middle term is not unconditionally related to the major term; the relation of the middle term 'fire' to the major term 'smoke' is conditional (सोपाधिक) on 'conjunction of fire with wet fuel.' The conditional middle is *vyāpyatvasiddha*. A condition (उपाधि) is that which invariably accompanies the major term, but does not always accompany the middle term (साध्यव्यापकत्वे सति साधनाव्यापकः उपाधिः). In the inference given above, 'fire' is the middle term, 'smoke' is the major term, and 'wet fuel' is the condition (उपाधि). 'Wet fuel' always accompanies 'smoke' when 'smoke' is present in 'fire', but it does not always accompany 'fire'. A condition (उपाधि) always accompanies the major term (साध्य) but does not always accompany the middle term (साधक लिङ्ग). The *vyāpyatvasiddha* is the conditional middle.

(5) The *badhita hetu* (बाधित हेतु) is the middle term which is contradicted by some other source of valid knowledge. It seeks to prove the existence of a major term, the absence of which is proved by some other stronger source of knowledge. For example, 'fire is cold, because it is a substance'. Here the middle term 'substance,' which seeks to prove the existence of 'coldness' in 'fire', is contradicted by the perception of 'hotness' in 'fire'.

The *badhita* is different from the *satpratipaksha*. In the former an inference is contradicted by another source of knowledge; while in the latter one inference is contradicted by another inference. The *badhita hetu* is the *non-inferentially* contradicted middle. The *satpratipaksha hetu* is the *inferentially* contradicted middle. The *badhita hetu* is actually disproved by another stronger source of valid knowledge. The *satpratipaksha hetu* is not actually disproved by a stronger source of valid knowledge, but only neutralized by another counter-inference. There is actual contradiction (*badha*) in the *badhita*; but there is no such contradiction in the *satpratipaksha*, but only counter-balancing of the forces

of the two inferences, neither of which prevails over the other. But if one of them prevails and disproves the other, the *hetu* ceases to be *satpratipaksha* and becomes *badhita*.¹

17. Vyapti. (व्याप्ति)

Inference is based upon *vyapti*. *Vyapti* is the invariable concomitance of the middle term with the major term. It is the logical ground of inference. Inference depends upon two conditions. In the first place, the middle term must be known to be present in the minor term (पक्षधर्मता). In the second place, the middle term must be known to be invariably concomitant with the major term (व्याप्ति). In the inference 'the hill has fire, because it has smoke' our knowledge of the major term (*e.g.* fire) as related to the minor term (*e.g.*, hill) depends on our prior knowledge of the middle term (*e.g.* smoke) as related to the minor term (*e.g.* hill), and as invariably accompanying the major term (*e.g.* fire). The universal relation of the middle term with the major term, which is called *vyapti*, is the logical ground of inference.

What is the nature of *vyapti*? It literally means pervasion. It is the pervasion of the middle term by the major term. Hence the middle term is called *vyāpya* (व्याप्य), and the major term (साध्य) is called *vyāpaka* (व्यापक). The major term (*e.g.* fire) pervades or always accompanies the middle term (*e.g.* smoke). But the middle term (*e.g.* smoke) does not pervade or always accompany the major term (*e.g.* fire). Wherever there is smoke, there is fire. But wherever there is fire, there is no smoke. There are cases of smokeless fire (*e.g.* red hot iron). Thus smoke is pervaded by fire, but fire is not pervaded by smoke.

Vyapti is an invariable and unconditional concomitance between the middle term and the major term. The major term must always accompany the middle term without being limited by any condition (उपाधि).

¹ TS, pp. 46-49.

The Nyaya Theory of Knowledge, pp. 306-19;

B.L. Atreya: *The Elements of Indian Logic*, pp. 137-46.

A condition (उपाधि), we have already found, always accompanies the major term but does not always accompany the middle term. The universal relation between the middle term and the major term must not be vitiated by any condition (उपाधि). It must be unconditional.

Positively, *vyapti* is the uniform co-existence of the middle term with the major term in the same locus, so that the major term is not absent in any locus in which the middle term exists. Negatively, *vyapti* is the non-existence of the middle term in all the places in which the major term does not exist. These two definitions give us two universal propositions, one positive and the other negative, e. g., "all cases of smoke are cases of fire", and "no case of non-fire is a case of smoke."¹

How is *vyapti* known ? How do we arrive at the universal proposition (व्याप्ति) on which inference depends ? How do we pass from particular facts observed to a general law ? How do we pass from particular cases of co-existence of smoke and fire to universal co-existence of the two ?

This is the problem of induction. The Indian schools of philosophy do not separate induction from deduction as the Western logicians do. They treat inference as *deductive-inductive* in character ; it is not only formally valid but also materially valid.

The Charvaka holds that perception is the only source of knowledge ; perception is confined to 'here and now'—to particular facts in the present time and space. So we can never generalize from particular facts observed. We cannot establish *vyapti* on which inference depends. Hence inference is impossible.

The Buddhists hold that *vyapti* is based on the principles of causality (तदुत्पत्ति) and identity in essence (तादात्म्य). When two things are related to each other as cause and effect, they are universally related to each other. There is a necessary relation between cause and effect, so that we can infer the

¹ BP., 68 ; *The Nyaya Theory of Knowledge*, p. 263.

cause from the effect, and we can also infer the effect from the cause. The universal relation (व्याप्ति) is based on the law of causality. Similarly, it is also based on the law of essential identity. A thing is always related to what is identical with it in essence. Identity is the relation between the genus and the species included in it. A '*simshapa*' is a species of the genus 'tree'; they are identical in essence. From this we know that all *simshapas* are trees, for they will cease to be *simshapas*, if they are not trees. Hence the Buddhists regard *vyapti* as based on the necessary principles of causality and essential identity. They regard these principles as necessary and universal truths, which are the presuppositions of all experience. They cannot be derived from experience. *Vyapti* is not the result of generalisation.

The Advaita Vedanta holds that *vyapti* is established by an induction by simple enumeration. It is established by uncontradicted experience of agreement in presence between two things. When we find in numerous cases that two things go together, and there is no exception to their concomitance, we may take them to be invariably related to each other.

The Nyaya also holds that *vyapti* is established by uncontradicted experience of agreement in presence between two things. It is not based on *a priori* principles of causality and identity, as the Buddhists hold. The Nyaya holds that *vyapti* is established by repeated observation (भूयोदर्शन) of uniform agreement in presence (अन्वय) and uniform agreement in absence (व्यतिरेक) between two things, strengthened by the absence of any contrary instance (व्यभिचाराग्रह). "The Nyaya method of induction or generalisation may be analysed into the following steps. First, we observe that there is a uniform agreement in presence (अन्वय) between two things, or that in all the cases in which one is present the other also is present. Secondly, we see that there is uniform agreement in absence (व्यतिरेक) between them, i. e., in every case in which the one is absent the other also

is absent. So far we see that the two things go together both in their presence and absence, or that there is positive and negative coincidence between them (सहचार). Thirdly, we do not observe any contrary instance in which one of them is present without the other (व्यभिचाराग्रह). From this we conclude that there must be a natural relation of invariable concomitance between the two things."¹ Fourthly, the knowledge of their uniform co-presence and their uniform co-absence must be strengthened by elimination of conditions (उपाधिनिरास). We can eliminate all conditions by the repeated observation (भूयोदर्शन) of their agreement in presence and agreement in absence under varying conditions. Elimination of irrelevant conditions depends upon sufficient variation of circumstances. In this way we can eliminate all the suspected conditions that may vitiate the relation of invariable concomitance between the middle term and the major term, and establish *vyapti* or invariable concomitance.

17. The nature of Cause.

A cause is an unconditional or necessary, invariable antecedent of an effect. (अन्यथासिद्धिशून्यस्य नियतपूर्ववर्तिता कारणत्वम्²). An effect is the unconditional, invariable consequent of a cause. Causal relation is reciprocal. There is one cause of an effect. There is one effect of a cause. Plurality of causes is excluded. Antecedence, invariability and unconditionality or necessity are the essential characteristics of a cause. The cause must precede the effect. It must invariably precede the effect. It must unconditionally precede the effect. It must be directly and immediately connected with the effect. It must not be connected with the effect indirectly or remotely. A conditional or unnecessary (अन्यथासिद्ध) antecedent is a non-essential, accidental antecedent which does not play any part in the production of the effect. But an

¹ *The Nyaya Theory of Knowledge*, pp. 269—70.

² BP., 16.

unconditional or necessary (अन्यासिद्धिशून्य) antecedent is indispensable for the production of the effect. An unconditional antecedent is not a remote antecedent. It is a direct and immediate antecedent of an effect. Immediacy of an antecedent is implied by its unconditionality. A cause is an unconditional, invariable and immediate antecedent of an effect.

Hume defines a cause as an invariable antecedent. J. S. Mill defines it as an unconditional, invariable antecedent. Day is the invariable antecedent of night. Night is the invariable antecedent of day. Yet day is not the cause of night, and night is not the cause of day. Both depend upon other conditions, e.g., brightness of the sun, roundness of the earth, and revolving of the earth round the sun, in order to be invariably followed by each other. Hence they are not unconditional antecedents of each other. The conditions mentioned above are the unconditional antecedents of day and night. Therefore they are their causes. Carveth Read defines a cause as an unconditional, invariable, and immediate antecedent. He points out that unconditionality implies immediacy. A is the cause of B. B is the cause of C. Here A is the remote cause of C. It is a conditional antecedent. A gives rise to C, on condition that it first gives rise to B. B is the unconditional antecedent of C. B directly gives rise to C. Therefore an unconditional antecedent must be an immediate antecedent. The Nyaya definition of a cause corresponds to J. S. Mill and Carveth Read's definitions.

An effect is defined as the counter-entity of its own prior non-existence (प्रागभावप्रतियोगि कार्यम् ¹). It is a substance, a quality, or an action which did not exist before its coming into existence. It puts an end to its antecedent non-existence (प्रागभाव) by coming into being. It did not pre-exist in the cause. It was non-existent before its coming into existence. It is a new creation (आरम्भ) ; it begins afresh. This doctrine is called *asatkaryavada* (असत्कार्यवाद) or *arambhavada* (आरम्भवाद). The Nyaya advocates this view.

The Nyaya recognizes five kinds of *anyathasiddha* or non-essential antecedents. They are adventitious or accidental antecedents. They are not indispensable antecedents for the production of an effect. They are dispensable antecedents. *Anyathasiddha*

antecedents are not causally connected with the effect; but they are indirectly conjoined with it. Their antecedence is conditional upon something else. They are not unconditional or necessary antecedents. There are different kinds of such adventitious or dispensable antecedents. Firstly, the qualities of a cause do not constitute the cause. The potter's staff is the cause of a jar. But the colour of the staff is not its cause. It does not contribute to the production of a jar. It is not an unconditional antecedent of the effect. The staff being present, the jar is present. The staff being absent, the jar is absent. Their co-presence (अन्वय) and co-absence (व्यतिरेक) are independent of other conditions. But the colour of the staff depends upon the staff in order to be invariably present or absent with the presence or the absence of a jar. Hence it is a conditional antecedent. Secondly, the cause of a cause is not a cause of an effect. It is a conditional antecedent. The potter is the cause of a jar. But the potter's father is not its cause. The potter's father is the cause of the potter. The potter's father is the remote cause of the jar. But a remote cause is not a real cause. It is an indirect or mediate cause. The cause of an effect must be a direct and immediate antecedent which is necessary for the production of the effect. Thirdly, co-effects of the same cause are not to be regarded as cause and effect. The sound produced by the staff by the potter's wheel is an invariable antecedent of a jar. But it is not the cause of the jar. It is merely a co-effect. The sound is only a collateral antecedent. It does not play any part in the production of the jar. It is a co-effect of the staff or the wheel. The co-effects of the invariable antecedents are not unconditional antecedents. They depend upon the antecedents on which the effect depends. Hence they are conditional and adventitious antecedents. Fourthly, eternal and ubiquitous substances, which are always present and cannot be introduced or excluded, are not unconditional antecedents. Ether

is eternal and all-pervading. It does not operate in the production of an effect, though it invariably precedes it. So it is not an unconditional antecedent. Fifthly, an invariable antecedent which is unnecessary for the production of the effect is not an unconditional antecedent. An ass is necessary for carrying earth fit for the making of a jar. But it does not do anything in the production of it. So it is a dispensable or unnecessary antecedent. All these invariable antecedents which are not directly connected with the production of an effect are *anyathasiddha* or unnecessary antecedents. The invariable, unconditional, and immediate antecedents, which are necessary for the production of an effect, constitute its cause. Adventitious, collateral, or unnecessary antecedents or accompaniments should not be regarded as a cause.¹

The Mimamsaka holds that there is an unseen power in the cause which produces the effect. The Naiyayika does not believe in any transcendental energy (अतीन्द्रिय-शक्ति) in the cause. There is no mysterious causal power or efficiency which produces the effect. The Nyaya regards all energy as necessarily kinetic. It does not recognize any potential energy. Causal activity is molar or molecular movement (परिस्पन्द). It is of the nature of physical motion (भौतिक व्यापार). It is not a mysterious, imperceptible power as the Mimamsaka holds. Dr. B. N. Seal points out that the unconditional antecedence of the cause ultimately depends upon the test of expenditure of energy. The Nyaya holds that causation is a case of expenditure of energy, —all energy being kinetic. It consists in redistribution of motion. The Nyaya rejects transcendental energy of the Mimamsaka and potential energy of the Sankhya. The Sankhya holds that the effect is regarded as a modification of causal energy; the cause is potential energy; the effect is kinetic energy. The Nyaya regards all energy as kinetic. It looks upon the complement of unconditional, invariable, and immediate antecedents

1 BP, SM, 16, pp 105-09.

(कारणसामग्री) which are necessary for the effect as its cause. It looks upon the effect as the consequent event which results from the joint operations of the antecedent conditions.¹ The cause is an aggregate of antecedent necessary conditions (कारणसामग्री). The cause cannot bring about an effect if there are counteracting conditions. The non-existence of counter-acting forces (प्रतिबन्धकाभाव) is necessary for the production of an effect. Keshavamishra defines a cause as the invariable necessary antecedent which does not produce anything else. He defines an effect as the invariable necessary consequent which is not produced by any other cause. The Nyaya definition of cause corresponds to the definition in Western Logic : "The cause is the sum-total of the conditions, positive and negative, taken together." The presence of positive conditions and the absence of negative conditions are necessary for the production of an effect. The Nyaya seems to regard causality as sequence. It does not regard cause and effect as simultaneous or continuous.

The Nyaya rejects the plurality of causes. The causal relation is reciprocal. The same cause has the same effect. The same effect has the same cause. The cause is the unconditional, invariable antecedent of the effect. The effect is the unconditional, invariable consequent of the cause. But sometimes we find that the same effect is brought about by a variety of causes. The same effect is produced by different causes at different times. The flooding of the street may be due to a heavy downpour of rain or a flood in the river close by. But the apparent plurality of causes is due to defective analysis. If we closely observe the effect, we find different special traits of the effect in the two cases. The effects are not really the same. They are accompanied by different consequents. If we take the effect with its distinctive features (कार्यविशेष), we find that it has one specific cause (कारणविशेष). One specific cause has one specific effect. One specific

¹ *The Positive Sciences of the Ancient Hindus*, pp 263-66.

effect has one specific cause. Plurality of causes appears to be true, because we ignore the distinctive features of effect. Vachaspati and Jayanta regard the cause as an aggregate of operative conditions (कारणसामग्री), and the effect as an aggregate of necessary consequents. If we take a concrete view of cause and effect both, the doctrine of plurality of causes proves to be wrong.

The Nyaya distinguishes three kinds of causes. (1) The material (उपादान) or inherent (समवायि) cause is the substance or material out of which the effect is produced. Clay is the material cause of a jar. Threads are the material cause of a cloth. The effect inheres in its material cause. It cannot be separated from its material cause. But the material cause can exist apart from its effect. Threads can exist apart from the cloth. But the cloth cannot exist apart from the threads that constitute it. The cloth inheres in the threads. The relation between them is inherence (समवाय). The material cause is always a substance (द्रव्य). (2) The non-material or non-inherent (असमवायि) cause is that which inheres in the material cause and contributes to the production of the effect. The conjunction (संयोग) of the threads, which inheres in the threads, is the non-inherent cause of the cloth. The threads are the inherent cause. The conjunction of the threads, is the non-inherent cause. It inheres in the threads and not in the cloth. Both the effect and the non-inherent cause co-inhere in the material cause. For example, the cloth and the conjunction of threads both inhere in the threads. The non-material cause is always a quality or an action, while a material cause is a substance. (3) The efficient (निमित्त) cause is the motive power which helps the material cause to produce the effect. The weaver is the efficient cause of the cloth. His loom and shuttle are the accessory (सहकारि) causes of the cloth. The weaver produces the cloth out of the threads by joining them together with the help of his loom and shuttle. The efficient cause may be a substance, a quality, or an action. It is distinct from the material cause and the non-material cause.

Space, time, the knowledge and will of God, merit and demerit, and prior non-existence are regarded as the common causes of all effects. To these the absence of counter-acting factors is added. Hence by the causes of events we mean specific causes. Sometimes a distinction is made between a cause (कारण) or assemblage of conditions and an instrumental cause (करण). An instrumental cause (करण) is the condition that immediately produces the effect. The potter's stick, which is employed in directly producing the jar, is the instrumental cause (करण) of the jar. The instrumental cause (करण) is the peculiar cause (असाधारण कारण) which, by its activity (व्यापार) immediately brings about the effect. The modern Nyaya regards the activity itself which subsists in this peculiar cause as the instrumental cause.¹

The Nyaya advocates the doctrine of *asatkaryavada* (असत्कार्यवाद). The effect is a new beginning (आरम्भ). It was non-existent (असत्) before it came into existence. The effect does not pre-exist in the cause. It is not a mere unfoldment, development, or modification of the cause as the Sankhya holds. It is a new creation. This doctrine is called *arambhavada* (आरम्भवाद). The effect is not a mere appearance (विवर्त) of the cause as the Advaita Vedanta holds. The Nyaya holds that cause and effect are both real. It believes in the creation of new effects out of pre-existing causes. The Sankhya and the Vedanta hold that the effect is identical with the cause; the effect pre-exists in the cause, and the cause persists in the effect.

But the Nyaya insists that the effect is distinct from the cause. If cause and effect were not distinct from each other, we could not distinguish them from each other. The effect does not pre-exist in the cause because we do not perceive it in the cause. We do not perceive a cloth in threads. The cloth does not pre-exist in the threads. It is brought into existence afresh by the activity of the cause. It is non-existent prior to the operation of the cause. The effect is not a transformation of the cause. Milk cannot be said

to be transformed into curds. When milk changes into curds, there is disruption of its component particles. Their re-arrangement brings curds into existence. This shows that milk as such is destroyed, and a new thing (*e.g.* curds) is produced. The Nyaya does not recognize the distinction between the potential and the actual. The Nyaya view that cause and effect are different from each other is right. But the view that they are not identical in essence is wrong. The effect does pre-exist in the cause in an unmanifested condition. It is something new ; but it is not an absolutely new creation.

The Nyaya stresses the sequence view of causality. The cause is an unconditional, invariable, immediate antecedent of an effect. But the causal activity must immediately produce the effect. So the cause is continuous with the effect. If the effect inheres in the cause, then the cause may not precede the effect. If cause and effect are related to each other by inherence (समवाय), they should be regarded as identical in essence.

20. Comparison (उपमान).

Upamana (उपमान) is the means by which we acquire the knowledge of a new thing through its resemblance with another thing previously well-known. (प्रसिद्ध-साधर्म्यात् साध्यसाधनम् उपमानम्).¹ A person has never perceived a wild cow (गवय). But a forester tells him that it resembles a cow. He goes to a forest and sees an animal resembling a cow. He remembers that a wild cow resembles a cow. He knows the animal to be a wild cow (गवय) through the knowledge of its similarity with a cow (गो), which was previously well-known to him. There are two factors in *upamana*, namely, (1) the knowledge of a new or unfamiliar object, not perceived before, and (2) the knowledge of resemblance between it and a well-known object perceived already. The knowledge of the new object (*e.g.*, a wild cow) is acquired through the knowledge of its similarity with a well-

known object. The knowledge of similarity was not acquired by the knower from actual perception of the two objects together or in different places or at different times. It was not first-hand knowledge, but second-hand knowledge received from some other reliable person who perceived them both and knew their similarity. The ancient Naiyayikas hold that the authoritative statement, e.g., 'the *gavaya* is like a cow' is the special cause of the new knowledge. The modern Naiyayikas hold that the perception of similarity is the special cause of the new knowledge. The perception of similarity revives in memory the authoritative statement which brings about the new knowledge. But mere resemblance, whether it be perfect, imperfect, or slight, is not the sufficient ground of the new knowledge by comparison. First, if the resemblance is perfect, there can be no new knowledge. It is tautologous to say that the cow is like a cow. Secondly, if the resemblance is imperfect, it cannot lead to new knowledge. There is considerable resemblance between a cow and a buffalo. But if we argue on the strength of this imperfect similarity that 'the cow is like a buffalo', the argument may be invalid. Thirdly, if the resemblance is slight, it cannot lead to any new knowledge. We cannot argue that a mustard seed is like mount Meru, because both have existence. Therefore the amount or quantity of resemblance does not count much. The resemblance must be essential; it must be related to the causal connection between two things. The resemblance must point to the relation of cause and effect¹.

The *upamana* is the means of knowledge by comparison. The knowledge yielded by it is called *upamiti*. It is defined as the knowledge of the relation of a name to its object (संज्ञासंज्ञिसम्बन्धज्ञानम् उपमितिः). Its special cause is the knowledge of similarity.² It is also defined as the knowledge of a thing as similar to another thing, which is aided by the recollection of an authoritative statement made by another

¹ NB. & NV., ii.144—45.

² TS, p. 67.

person. It consists in the knowledge of the relation between a name and an object denoted by it.¹ There are the following steps in comparison. First, a person hears an authoritative statement, *e.g.*, 'the *gavaya* is like the cow.' Secondly, he observes similarity of a *gavaya* (wild cow) with a cow. Thirdly, he remembers the authoritative statement received from a reliable person. Lastly, he argues by comparison that this kind of object is denoted by the word in question.²

Upamana should not be confused with analogy of Western Logic. The argument from analogy takes the form: S and P resemble each other in many respects; S has another characteristic *x*; therefore P also must have the characteristic *x*. The earth and Mars resemble each other in many respects, *e.g.*, temperate climate, atmosphere, clouds and rain, etc. The earth has the further characteristic that it is inhabited by living beings. So Mars also may be inhabited by living beings. Evidently, *upamana* is different from analogy, though it depends upon the knowledge of resemblance (सादृश्यज्ञान). Sometimes *upamana* depends upon the knowledge of dissimilarity or contrast (वैधर्म्य). For example, a person recognizes an animal as belonging to the class of horses, because, unlike cows, they have no cloven hoofs. Further, *upamana* leads to the knowledge of the relation of a word to an object. It does not lead to the knowledge of resemblance between things, but to the knowledge of the relation between a name and an object. Hence *upamana* should not be identified with analogy.

21. Testimony (शब्द).

The Nyaya admits *shabda* as an independent source of valid knowledge. *Shabda* is the testimony of a trustworthy person. It is a sentence uttered by a person who knows the truth and communicates it correctly. Testimony consists in understanding the meaning of a statement made by a trustworthy person.

¹ TB., p. 13.

² BP., 79—80.

A reliable person is one who is in the habit of speaking the truth.¹ There are two kinds of *shabda* or verbal knowledge, namely, knowledge relating to perceptible objects (दृष्टार्थ) and knowledge relating to imperceptible objects (अदृष्टार्थ). The testimony of reliable persons and the scriptures with regard to perceptible objects of the world such as crops, rain-fall, medicines, rites, ceremonies, etc., comes under the first head. The testimony of the scriptures, saints and prophets with regard to imperceptible objects such as virtue and vice, future life, heaven, God and the like, comes under the second head.

The modern Naiyayikas divide *shabda* into two kinds, namely, secular (लौकिक) testimony and scriptural (वैदिक) testimony. The scriptures or the Vedas are created by God. Therefore the scriptural testimony is perfect and infallible. The secular testimony is not infallible, because man is liable to error. Only the testimony of reliable persons is valid. The testimony of untrustworthy persons is not valid. Testimony must always proceed from persons. It is based on the words of a trustworthy person, human or divine. Testimony is always personal. Its validity depends upon the reliability of the person who communicates it to us.

22. The Conditions of Intelligibility of a Sentence.

A sentence is a combination of words conveying a meaning. It must fulfil certain conditions in order to be intelligible.

In the first place, a sentence must consist of words which imply one another. Mutual implication is called expectancy (आकांक्षा). A word cannot by itself convey a full meaning. It must be related to other words in order to convey a complete meaning. The word 'bring' produces an expectancy in the mind for some other word or words. It raises the question, 'Bring *what*?' The answer is supplied by the words 'a horse'. The sentence 'Bring a horse' makes full sense. The words imply one another.

¹ TS., p. 68.

In the second place, a sentence consists of words which have fitness (योग्यता) for one another. Mutual fitness is another important condition of the intelligibility of a sentence. The sentence 'quench your thirst with water' conveys a meaning, because its constituent words have mutual fitness, congruity, or compatibility. The sentence 'quench your thirst with fire' is unintelligible, because the words constituting the sentence are incongruous with one another. Fire cannot quench thirst. Hence the second sentence does not satisfy the condition of compatibility or mutual fitness.

In the third place, a sentence consists of words which are in close proximity (सन्निधि) to one another. The words constituting a sentence must be uttered in quick succession without a long interval between one word and another. If the words, 'bring', 'a' and 'horse' are uttered at long intervals, they do not convey any meaning.

In the fourth place, the knowledge of the meaning of a sentence depends upon the knowledge of the intention (तात्पर्यज्ञान) of the speaker. The sentence 'saindhavamunaya' (सैन्धवमानय) means 'bring a horse' in one context ; it means 'bring salt' in another context. If a person utters the sentence while starting on a journey, it means the former. But if he utters it while taking his meal, it means the latter. The intention of the speaker should be gathered from the context.

Hence a sentence, in order to be intelligible, must consist of words which are interdependent on one another, compatible with one another, juxtaposed to one another, and convey a meaning in conformity with the intention of the speaker. Compatibility or mutual fitness implies formal consistency. The knowledge of the intention implies material consistency.

23. The Import of Words.

The Nyaya holds that the relation of a word to its meaning is due to convention. A particular word denotes a particular object owing to convention

established by God. This is the view of the ancient Naiyayikas. But the modern Naiyayikas hold that men also establish conventions, which vary with different people.

What is the import of a word? Does it imply an individual (व्यक्ति), or a form or configuration (आकृति), or genus (जाति)? The Nyaya holds that a word denotes the individual, its form and its genus together. "The word suggests the form, denotes the individual, and connotes the genus."¹ The word 'cow' denotes an individual cow, connotes 'cowness' or 'genus' of cow, and suggests a peculiar form, e. g., 'dewlap'. The individual is the abode of a definite form or configuration. The form is a collocation (आकृति). It is perceptible. The individual belongs to a genus or class. A word denotes an individual (व्यक्ति) belonging to a genus (जाति) and having a peculiar form (आकृति).

II. METAPHYSICS.

24. The World

The Nyaya metaphysics of the world is the same as that of the Vaisheshika. The world is real and external to God and the finite souls. The Nyaya advocates naive realism. Material objects with their primary and secondary qualities are real. They are not momentary. They are premanent and enduring. Substances are real and abiding. They are not mere aggregates of qualities. They have an existence over and above that of qualities. There are atoms of earth, water, fire, and air. Ether (आकाश) is one and ubiquitous. Time and space are objective realities. Time is one and infinite. Changes occur in time.

Space is one and infinite. Things co-exist in space. The world is intelligible. The finite self can know it. God is the creator of the world. He has created

¹ Radhakrishnan . *Indian Philosophy*, Vol. II , p. 107

the world out of the co-eternal atoms. He is not the creator of atoms. He is the divine architect. He has fashioned the world out of pre-existing atoms. God is the efficient cause of the world.

The world is governed by the law of causality. But it is not a mechanism devoid of teleology. The world is subject to the law of causality and the law of *karma*. It is governed by mechanical causation as well as moral causation. The Nyaya view of the world is teleological. The law of causality is subservient to the law of *karma*. God harmonises the mechanical world with the law of *karma*. He reconciles the realm of nature with the realm of spirits.

The Nyaya advocates dualism. It recognizes the existence of the self (आत्मन्) and the world, which are irreducible to each other. It advocates theistic atomism. It recognizes the existence of God and atoms co-eternal with each other. The Nyaya advocates deism. It regards God as external to the world and the finite selves. It believes in periodic creation and dissolution of the world.

25. The Individual Soul or Self (आत्मन्)

The Nyaya advocates the theory of the soul-substance. The self is regarded as a substance (द्रव्य). It is one in each body. It is eternal. It is ubiquitous. It is endued with the qualities of cognition, pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, and volition.¹ It also possesses merit and demerit which are the results of its activities. The self is unconscious in itself; it acquires consciousness in conjunction with mind (मनस्) and body. Consciousness is not the essence (स्वरूप) of the self. It is an adventitious quality of it. The self is an unconscious substance capable of being endowed with consciousness. In the states of dreamless sleep and liberation it remains in its prae condition devoid of consciousness. During the waking state it acquires consciousness in conjunction with mind, sense-organs, and objects. Consciousness cannot exist apart from the self, since it is a quality and requires a substance

¹ NS., I, 1: 10.

to support it. The substance in which consciousness exists is the self. But the self can exist apart from consciousness. The Sankhya and the Advaita Vedanta, on the other hand, hold that consciousness constitutes the essence of the self; it is its essential property; the self is essentially conscious (चित्स्वरूप); it is of the nature of the seer (द्रष्टा), while everything else is seen or known (दृश्य).

The Nyaya holds that the self is the knower (ज्ञाता), enjoyer (भोक्ता), and active agent (कर्ता). The self is the perceiver of all, the experiencer of all pleasures and pains, and the knower of all things.¹ Knowing, feeling, and willing are the qualities of the self. Cognition (बुद्धि) is knowing. Pleasure (सुख) and pain (दुःख) are feeling. Desire (इच्छा) and aversion (द्वेष) are prior conditions of volition. Volition (प्रयत्न) is willing. Knowing, feeling, and willing are modes of consciousness. They are transient qualities of the self which is permanent. The Sankhya, on the other hand, holds that the self (पुरुष) is only the knower or seer (द्रष्टा), devoid of feeling and activity. Pleasure and pain are modes of *buddhi*; the self has no feeling. Again, the self is not active. Activity belongs to *buddhi*. The self erroneously identifies itself with *buddhi*, and thinks itself to be active. The Sankhya regards *buddhi* as an internal organ, which is an evolute of *prakṛti*.

The Nyaya holds that the self is a permanent substance, which, though unconscious in itself, acquires consciousness in conjunction with *manas*, sense-organs, and objects. It is not identical with the organism, the vital forces, the sense-organs, or the *manas* as some Charvakas hold. It is not a stream of consciousness (विज्ञानसन्तान) as the Buddhists hold. It is not a series of momentary cognitions. It is not a mind-body-complex. It is a permanent substance in which consciousness inheres. The self is the inherent cause (समवायिकारण) of consciousness, though it is produced

1 NB., 1,1.9-11.

by a collocation of conditions. Cognition (ज्ञान) is not an activity (कर्म) of the self, as Kumarila holds. It is a quality (गुण) of the the self. There is no modal change (परिणाम) in the self. The self (आत्मन्) is not transcendental consciousness beyond the distinction of subject and object, as the Advaita Vedanta holds. Shankara identifies the self (Atman) with Brahman or the Absolute. The Nyaya regards the individual self (जीवात्मन्) as different from the supreme soul (परमात्मन्) or God. It regards the self as the knower or ego (ज्ञाता). It does not recognize the existence of pure consciousness unrelated to subject and object. But the Nyaya does not consider ego-hood to be the essence of the self.

The Nyaya regards the self as partless (निरवयव) and eternal (नित्य) It is simple. A compound substance made up of parts is destructible. It is broken into parts and destroyed. The self is simple and partless. Therefore it is indestructible. It has neither origin nor end. It is neither created nor destroyed by God. It had pre-existence before birth. It has future life after death.¹ It is eternal. It has neither birth nor death. Its association with body is called birth. Its separation from body is called death. It assumes a body suitable to its desert. The unseen power in the soul (अदृष्ट) generated by actions done in the previous birth organizes a body for the self, appropriate to it. The organism assumed by the transmigrating soul is a fit medium for the maturation of merit and demerit acquired by it in the previous birth. The soul transmigrates into a body fit for the experiences it has to undergo. Pre-existence and future life are not so much proved as assumed. The new-born infant's desire for milk is due to experience in the previous birth. His pleasures and pains also are due to the same cause. His smiles and cries are not mere reflex actions. They are conscious actions determined by experience in the previous birth.¹ If there is no pre-existence, there is gain of

1. NB. iii. 1, 19—22.

unmerited fruit (अकृताभ्यागम). If there is no future life, there is loss of merited action (कृतहान)¹ Inequalities in the present birth are ascribed to merit (धर्म) and demerit (अधर्म) acquired in the previous birth. Actions done in the present birth will be rewarded and punished in the future birth. Pre-existence and future life are based on these ethical considerations. The self persists as a simple, eternal substance in the midst of a cycle of births and deaths. Transmigration of the soul is held by the Nyaya to follow from the Law of Karma.

The Nyaya regards the self as ubiquitous (विशु). But it has experience only in conjunction with the body which is the vehicle of experience. In each body there is a unique self.² There are an infinite number of souls. If there were only one self, as the Advaita Vedanta holds, the experiences of one person would be shared by all others, and bondage or release of one would lead to bondage or release of others. Hence there is a unique soul in each body. It is all-pervading. It cannot have a limited magnitude, since what is limited has parts and is therefore destructible. It is not atomic as Ramanuja holds. If it were atomic, it could not have consciousness in connection with the whole body, and could not perceive its qualities, since qualities of atomic substances are imperceptible. It cannot be of intermediate magnitude. It cannot be larger or smaller than the body. If it were so, it could not occupy the body and pervade it. It cannot be co-extensive with the body as the Jaina holds. If it were so, it would be too small for the body which grows and develops. Again, a human soul could not transmigrate into an ant's body or an elephant's body. Hence the self is all pervading. But it cannot apprehend many things simultaneously owing to the atomic nature of *manas*, which is its internal organ. Each soul has one *manas* which persists throughout its empirical life (संसार). It is separated from the *manas* in the state of liberation.

1 NB., iv. 1. 10.

2 NB. iii. 1. 15.

The self has experience in connection with *manas* which is the internal organ. The *manas* is atomic. The self perceives its qualities, *viz.*, cognition, pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, and volition through the *manas*. It perceives external objects and their qualities, colour, sound, taste, smell, heat, cold, etc. through the external sense-organs. The external sense-organs are supervised by the *manas*. If the *manas* does not come into contact with the external sense-organs, the self cannot perceive external objects and their qualities. Again, if the self does not come into contact with the *manas*, it cannot have either internal perception (मानसप्रत्यक्ष) or external perception (बाह्यप्रत्यक्ष). Both *manas* and external senses are organs (करण) of the self. They are its instruments of knowledge. The external senses are the instruments of its external perception. The *manas* is the instrument of its internal perception. It is also the instrument through which the self has other kinds of valid knowledge, *viz.*, inference, comparison, and testimony. The self is the agent. The *manas* and the external sense-organs (इन्द्रिय) are its instruments. Hence the self cannot be identified with the *manas* and the external sense-organs. The agent (कर्त्ता) is quite different from its instruments (करण)¹.

26. The nature of Body and the Sense-Organs.

The self is the experiencer (भोक्ता). The body is its vehicle of experience (भोगायतन).² It is the fit medium through which the self can feel pleasure and pain appropriate to merit and demerit earned in the previous birth.³ There is no escape from the grip of the Law of Karma. As you sow, so you reap. Body is the means of enjoyment and suffering. Righteous actions produce merit in the soul. Vicious actions produce demerit in it. Merit brings about enjoyment. Demerit brings about suffering. Thus body is adapted to the soul, though it is material. Body is the organism which is supervised

¹ NB, III 1 12—16.

² NB, I. 1 9.

³ NB., III. 1, 27.

by the soul even as a chariot is supervised by a chrioteer. Body is unintelligent. The soul is intelligent. Body cannot act, unless it is operated by the soul. The Nyaya believes in the dualism of the body and the soul, but does not recognize them as co-ordinate realities. It regards the body as subordinate to the soul, and as realizing its ends.

The Nyaya defines body as the vehicle of actions, sense-organs, and objects (चेष्टेन्द्रियार्थोऽऽश्रयः शरीरम्).¹ The soul exerts to get pleasant objects and avoid unpleasant objects. Body is the seat of these voluntary actions. The sense-organs are affected by the weal and woe of the body. They are permeated by its life. They operate on their objects, as seated in the body. The soul apprehends objects through the sense-organs, which are organs of the body. Objects of experience produce pleasure or pain in the soul, when they are apprehended. The soul feels pleasure and pain in connection with the body, which are brought about by the intercourse of the sense-organs with their objects. It has cognitions of external objects also through the sense-object-intercourse. Thus it has cognitions, pleasure and pain in connection with the body. It carries out volitions into actions also through the body. Thus the body is the vehicle of its experience.²

Body is material. It is made of the five elements, *e.g.*, earth, water, light, air, and ether. Earth is its predominant constituent.³

Body is run by the vital forces (प्राण). The external sense-organs are constituted by five elements.⁴ The olfactory organ is made of earth, and therefore can apprehend smell, which is the specific quality of earth. The gustatory organ is made of water, and therefore can apprehend taste, which is the specific quality of water. The visual organ is made of light and therefore can

1 NS., i. 1. 11.

2 NB. i, 1, 11.

3 NB., iii. 1. 28.

4 NS., i. 1. 10.

apprehend colour, which is the specific quality of light. The tactual organ is made of air, and therefore can apprehend temperature, which is the specific quality of air. The auditory organ is made of ether, and therefore can apprehend sound which is the specific quality of ether. The *manas* is immaterial and atomic, while the external sense-organs are material and non-atomic. The *manas* is eternal. It is not of the nature of an effect. The external sense-organs are products of elements. The *manas* can apprehend all objects. But the external sense-organs can apprehend certain specific objects. They can apprehend those qualities with which they are endued. But the *manas* is not endued with the qualities of pleasure, pain, etc, which are apprehended by it. The *manas* and the sense-organs are the instruments of the soul.²

27. Proofs of the existence of the Self

First, the existence of the self is inferred from desire aversion, volition, pleasure and pain.³ Desire for an object depends on the recollection of pleasure given by a similar object perceived in the past. So it presupposes the unity of the self that perceived an object in the past and remembers the pleasure given by it on the perception of a similar object. Desire is always for a pleasant object. So it proves the existence of the self which is one and permanent, which is the subject of perception and recollection. Similarly, aversion to an object depends on the recollection of pain given by a similar object perceived in the past. It is always for a painful object. It presupposes the unity and permanence of the self which perceived an unpleasant object in the past and remembers it now. Volition is actuated by desire or aversion. Striving for the attainment of a pleasant object is actuated by a desire. Striving for the avoidance of a painful object is actuated by aversion. So volition also presupposes the existence of the self which is the subject of perception and recollection. Pleasure and pain also prove the existence of the self. An object perceived by the self gives it pain, because it

1 NB., N. V. 1. 1. 12.

2 NB., 1. 1, 4, N.M., p. 497.

3 NS., 1. 1 10.

remembers that a similar object gave it pleasure in the past. An object perceived by the self gives it pain, because it remembers that a similar object gave it pain in the past. Cognition also presupposes the existence of the self. First, the self has a doubt as to the nature of an object. Then it acquires a definite knowledge of it. It is the same self which has a desire to know, doubtful knowledge, and definite knowledge with regard to the object. Thus the existence of the self is proved by desire, aversion, volition, pleasure, pain, and cognition. They are the qualities of the self in which they inhere.¹

Secondly, consciousness is not a property of the body, as the Charvakas hold. They regard consciousness as an epiphenomenon of the body, even as liquor is a by-product of its ingredients. Desire, aversion and volition presuppose the unity of the self as the subject of perception, recollection, and recognition. But the body is subject to growth and decay. There is no unity in it in childhood, youth, and old age. An object perceived by a body in childhood cannot be remembered by it in youth. Different bodies cannot be the abode of perception and recollection.² If consciousness were an essential property of the body, it would endure after death, and there would be no lapse of consciousness during life. But no consciousness is found in a dead body, and a living body is devoid of consciousness in trance. If consciousness were an accidental property of the body, then its cause would be something other than the body. Consciousness cannot be a quality of the body, since it does not last as long as the body lasts, as its colour and other qualities do. A dead body has colour, but it is devoid of consciousness. If consciousness were a quality of the body, it, like colour, would be capable of being perceived by others also. If consciousness is a quality of the body, it is a quality of its component parts. If each part had consciousness, then an individual consciousness would be an aggre-

¹ NB., i 1, 10, iii, 2 36.

² NM., p 437.

gate of several consciousnesses of the constituent parts, and could not produce a single effect such as is actually found. A cognition of water leads to the drinking of it. It produces one effect. But if it were an aggregate of many cognitions, there would be no such agreement among them as to produce a single effect. Moreover, if consciousness were a property of the body, it would be a property of a jar and other material bodies, since they are composed of the same elements. But this is contradicted by experience. The body is the object of consciousness. So consciousness cannot be its property. It is absurd to hold that the body is the object of its own property. Consciousness cannot be a property of the body of which one is conscious, but of the self which is conscious. The body is the instrument of the self. It serves the ends of the self. It is a means to the realization of its values. So consciousness is a property of the self. It cannot be a property of the unintelligent body which is used by the self. If there is no permanent self different from the body, which is subject to change and death, there can be no merit and demerit and their inevitable consequences, enjoyments and sufferings, and the Law of Karma loses its significance. So consciousness is a property of the self which is different from the body, and uses it as its instrument.¹

Thirdly, consciousness is not a property of the sense-organs. The sense-organs are made of material elements (भौतिक). So they cannot be conscious like the body. They are the instruments (करण) of the self, which is the agent (कर्ता). The self uses them as instruments of knowledge. Consciousness is produced in it when it comes into contact with the sense-organs stimulated by external objects. The self knows them through the sense-organs, which, therefore, cannot be conscious. Moreover, the sense-organs apprehend their proper objects. The visual organ apprehends colours; the auditory organ apprehends sounds; the gustatory

1 NM., pp 437—40; NB., iii. 2, 37—40.

organ apprehends tastes; the olfactory organ apprehends odours; the tactual organ apprehends temperatures. The self synthesizes the impressions received through the different sense-organs from the same object, and refers them to it. The synthesis of sense-impressions is the activity of the self. It cannot be attributed to the sense-organs. The impressions of the same object through the different sense-organs are apperceived by the self which confers unity on them. The visual organ cannot apprehend smell; the olfactory organ cannot apprehend colour. It is the self that combines the impressions into a percept. The self perceives the colour of a mango, and remembers its smell and taste. Perception and recollection presuppose the unity of the self that is conscious. They are not the functions of the sense-organs. The self is conscious of external objects. The sense-organs are the instruments of consciousness (चेतनोपकरण). So there is a self beyond the sense-organs, which apprehends all objects, remembers them, recognizes them, and apperceives them.¹ Even when the sense-organs and the objects apprehended by them are destroyed, the recollection of them persists. It cannot therefore be the property of the sense-organs or the objects.² Consciousness is a property of the self.

Fourthly, consciousness is not a property of the *manas* or mind. It may be argued that the sense-organs apprehend different objects. But the *manas* apprehends all objects. So the synthesis of different sense-impressions may be referred to the *manas*. If the *manas* is said to be the agent which combines different impressions into a percept, it is nothing but the self. But it is not an agent (कर्ता). It is an instrument (करण) of knowledge. It is the internal organ through which the self perceives its qualities, cognition, pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, and volition. They cannot be perceived through the external sense-organs. The *manas* is the organ of internal perception. The self perceives external objects in succession

¹ NB., iii. 1. 1—3 ; NM , pp. 440—41.

² NB., iii, 2. 19.

because of the atomic nature of the *manas* which comes into contact with the external sense-organs in succession. The non-simultaneity of perceptions is due to the atomic nature of the *manas* which mediates between the self and the external sense-organs. The non-simultaneity of recollections and all other kinds of cognition also is due to the same cause. But the yogins have a simultaneous perception of all objects, since they perceive them directly owing to a merit (धर्म) born of meditation. The self is ubiquitous (विभु). The *manas* is atomic (अणु). So the self can directly perceive all things simultaneously in yogic trance, but the atomic *manas* can never perceive them simultaneously. So consciousness is a property of the self and not of the *manas*. The self is something different from the unintelligent *manas* which is controlled by it¹.

Fifthly, the self is not identical with the vital force (प्राण). Consciousness is not identical with vital processes. Vitality is a name for a particular relation of the self to the body. Vital function is an unconscious effort (जीवनयोनिप्रयत्न) of the self, which is the cause of inhalation and exhalation during sleep, and of the conjunction of the *manas* with an external sense-organ. The vital function arises from the conjunction of the self with the *manas*, which depends on merit and demerit². Thus the vital force depends on the self and cannot therefore be identical with it.

Sixthly, consciousness cannot be the property of an object (अर्थ). If an object were conscious, there would be no memory after consciousness had been destroyed by the destruction of the object. An object is not conscious of its own position. Nor is it conscious of the pleasure it produces. Nor does it move with intelligent purpose³. The self is the subject (आश्रय) of a cognition. An object (अर्थ) is the object (विषय)

1 NS., N.B., iii 1. 16—18 ; iii 2. 20 ; NM., p. 441.

2 PB. & NK., p. 263.

3 NR., iii. 2. 19 ; I.L.A., p. 240.

of cognition. Cognition inheres in the self. It does not inhere in the object.¹

Seventhly, the self is not a stream of momentary cognitions (विज्ञानसन्तान) as the Buddhists wrongly hold. If it were so, recollection (स्मृति) and recognition (प्रत्यभिज्ञा) would be inexplicable. Recollection presupposes the identity of the self. The self that remembers is identical with the self that perceived the object. One cannot remember a thing perceived by another. If the self were a series of cognitions, a thing would be perceived by one past cognition, and remembered by another present cognition. Recognition also presupposes the identity of the self. The self that perceived a thing in the past is identical with the self that recognizes it now². The Buddhists hold that though the self is a series of cognitions, a cognition leaves a disposition (वासना) which modifies the succeeding cognition, so that there is some continuity in the series which can account for recollection and recognition. But this is wrong because dispositions (संस्कार) require a permanent substratum (आश्रय) in the form of the self. The Buddhist hypothesis of transference of dispositions (वासनासंक्रम) is of no avail, since momentary cognitions even modified by dispositions cannot account for memory and recognition. The Buddhist doctrine of *alaya-vijnana* (आलयविज्ञान) also cannot account for memory. If it is an impermanent series of momentary self-cognitions, as distinguished from object-cognitions, it cannot account for memory. If, on the other hand, it is permanent, it is another name for the self. Thus memory proves the existence of the permanent self.

Lastly, the self is the substance in which consciousness inheres. Consciousness is not a property of an object, the body, the external sense-organs, and the *manas*. It is a property of the self. Cognition, pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, and volition are the qualities of the self. Apperception of the different sense-impressions into a percept, synthesis of perception and

1 NM., pp. 540—41.

2 NM., pp. 464—67.

memory, recollection and recognition prove the existence of the self. The body is unconscious. It is the vehicle of the experience of the self (भोगायतन). It is directed by the intelligent self. The sense-organs including the *manas* are the unconscious instruments (करण) of the self which is the agent (कर्ता) controlling them. Hence the self is distinct from the body, the external sense-organs and the *manas*.

27. The Individual Soul's Freedom of the Will.

The Nyaya believes that the individual soul has relative freedom of the will. It can freely realize its ends. But its freedom is limited. It has no absolute freedom. It has relative freedom. God favours the soul's free exertion with fruition¹. If He does not favour it, it bears no fruit. Human freedom unaided by the favour of God cannot realize its end². The human will is subject to the Divine Will. Free exertion of the finite self depends on the aid of the Divine Will for the attainment of its end. Hence success depends on human freedom and divine favour. The finite self cannot revolt against the plan of God. It cannot even command success of its free actions without the divine aid. The freedom of the finite self is limited by the Divine Will.

The finite self earns merit (धर्म) by righteous actions, and earns demerit (अधर्म) by unrighteous actions. Merit brings about enjoyment. Demerit brings about suffering. Hence the free will (पुरुषकार) of the finite self is also subject to merit and demerit acquired by free actions in the past, though they can be counteracted by free actions in the future. Hence the freedom of the finite self is subject to the Law of Karma.

¹ NB., iv. 1. 21

² NB., iv 1. 19.

ETHICS

28. Analysis of Volition.

The Nyaya gives a psychological analysis of volition. Udayana defines volition (प्रवृत्ति) as effort (कृति) of the self. It is its conscious activity or exertion. Volition springs from desire (इच्छा). Desire springs from cognition (ज्ञान). Cognition of a particular object gives rise to desire. Desire gives rise to volition¹. The mere existence of desire brings about volition. The consciousness of desire is not necessary to produce volition². A volition is not the cause of another volition. The consciousness of a volition also is not the cause of another volition. But a desire is the cause of a volition. It may give rise to a volition without being known³.

Gotama defines an end or motive (प्रयोजन) as the idea of the object which induces the self to act.⁴. The motive is the final cause of action. The self acts in order to attain an object of desire or reject an object of aversion. It acts in order to achieve a good or avoid an evil. In order to realize an end the self adopts the proper means. All voluntary actions are motivated by the idea of an end. If it is good, the self acts to achieve it. If it is evil, the self acts to reject it. Voluntary actions are not motiveless or devoid of an end. The idea of an end leads to the idea of the means. Thus a voluntary action involves the idea of an end (प्रयोजन) and the idea of a means (उपाय)⁵. The Nyaya advocates the doctrine of psychological hedonism. The self acts in order to attain pleasure and avoid pain. Pleasure and pain are the consequences (फल) of voluntary actions⁶. Attainment of pleasure and rejection of pain are the ends or motives of voluntary

1 NKS., v, pp. 80—81.

2 NKSP., v, p. 82.

3 NKS., v, p. 102.

4 NS., 1. 24.

5 NB., 1. 1. 24, i. 1, 1.

6 NB., i. 1. 20.

actions. Pleasure is an object of desire. Pain is an object of aversion. (सुखदुःखानिहानी प्रयोजनम् ¹).

Vishvanatha mentions the conditions of desire. The desire to act (चिकीर्षा) depends on the cognition that something *can* be done by the self (कृतिसाध्यताज्ञान) and the cognition that it is not only conducive to its good (इष्टसाधनताज्ञान), but is also incapable of causing it any harm more powerful than the good (बलवदनिष्टाजनकत्वज्ञान). Thus it depends on three conditions : (1) the cognition of an act capable of being done by the self ; (2) the cognition that the object to be attained is conducive to the good of the self ; and (3) the cognition that the good is not accompanied by a stronger evil.² The cognition that the object will cause greater evil to the self counteracts the desire to act.³

Similarly Vishvanatha mentions the conditions of aversion which gives rise to striving away from an object (निवृत्ति). It depends on the cognition that the object to be avoided is conducive to harm (द्विष्टसाधनताज्ञान) and the absence of the cognition that it is conducive to greater good (बलवदिष्टसाधनताज्ञानाभाव). The positive condition is the cognition that the object is harmful to the self. The negative condition is the absence of the cognition that it is conducive to its greater good.⁴ Here the cognition that the act can be done by the self (कृतिसाध्यताज्ञान) is not mentioned.

Vishvanatha mentions the conditions of volition also. Volition, in the sense of striving towards an object (प्रवृत्ति), depends on the following conditions : (1) desire to do something (चिकीर्षा) ; (2) the cognition that the act can be done by the self (कृतिसाध्यताज्ञान) ; (3) the cognition that it is conducive to its good (इष्टसाधनताज्ञान) ; and (4) the perception of the material

¹ NV, 1. 1 24.

² BP, SM, 147, pp 467—70, E. H, p 40

³ BP, 148 p 469

⁴ BP., 149 & SM., p, 471, E. H, p 43

out of which the object is to be produced (उपादान-प्रत्यक्ष). In the absence of any of these conditions volition does not occur. At the time when a volition occurs, there must be confidence in the self's power to act. If it is lacking, volition does not occur. No sane person cries for the moon. No rational person makes an effort to produce rain. A person exerts himself to attain those objects which are within his power. Similarly, the cognition that the object is conducive to the agent's good also must be present to produce a volition. A person always wills to realize his good. He never consciously wills his evil. But how does a person commit suicide? He commits suicide because he considers it to be good at the time in a pathological condition of mind. Or he does not consider it to be a great evil in an abnormal condition. In normal conditions the consciousness that suicide is an evil is present. But in an abnormal condition this consciousness is absent. Volition depends on the consciousness that its object is conducive to good and not injurious to the agent at the time under particular circumstances. Thus what is good to a person in one condition may not be good to him in another condition. A hungry person desires to get food. But one who is full has aversion to food.¹

29. Moral and Non-moral Actions.

Voluntary actions only are the objects of moral judgments. Non-voluntary actions such as instinctive and automatic acts which do not involve the operation of free will are non-moral. Man is responsible for his voluntary actions. Righteous actions produce merit (धर्म). Unrighteous actions produce demerit (अधर्म). Merit brings about enjoyment. Demerit brings about suffering. Man's voluntary actions are determined by the will of God. They are determined by his own free will (पुरुषकार). But his freedom of the will is subject to the control of God.² It is also subject to the Law of Karma. Karma is not blind

¹ E H. pp. 44-46.

² NB., IV. 1. 19-21.

fate. It is the law of moral causation. None can escape from the consequence of his free actions. They produce dispositions in the self for good or evil. But they can be wiped off by free volitions. The Nyaya seems to accept the doctrine of self-determinism. It holds that the agent himself is the determining factor in volition. The self freely wills and acts to realize its own good. The volition is always cognized as determined by the self. It is cognized as a qualification (विशेषण) or determination of the self.¹

30. Classification of Virtues.

The Nyaya recognizes three kinds of actions : (1) bodily ; (2) verbal ; and (3) mental.² Jayanta mentions the following virtues with regard to bodily actions :— (1) charity (दान) ; (2) succouring the distressed (परित्राण) ; (3) social service (परिचारण). The virtues with regard to speech are the following : (1) truthfulness (सत्य) ; (2) agreeable speech (प्रियवचन) ; (3) beneficial speech (हितवचन) ; (4) study of the scriptures (स्वाध्याय). The virtues with regard to mental actions are the following : (1) renunciation of worldly enjoyments (अस्पृहा) (2) compassion (अनुकम्पा) ; and (4) faith in future life (परलोकश्रद्धा) or other-worldliness.³ The Nyaya recognizes the purity of mind and the purity of conduct as essential to moral life. It recognizes both egoistic and altruistic virtues.

31 Classification of Vices.

Jayanta mentions the following vices with regard to bodily actions : (1) violence (हिंसा) ; (2) theft (स्तेय) ; and (3) forbidden acts (प्रतिषिद्धाचरण), *e. g.*, illicit sexual indulgence. The vices with regard to speech are the following : (1) mendacity (अनृत) ; (2) harsh words (परुषवचन) ; (3) insinuation (सूचना) ; and (4) irrelevant talk or gossip (असंबद्धवचन). The vices with

¹ E H. pp.74-75

² NS. I. 1. 17.

³ NM , p 499 ; E. H. p.p. 217-18

regard to mental actions are the following: (1) malevolence (परद्रोह) or ill-will towards others; (2) greed for another's property (परद्व्याभिलाष); and (3) want of faith in future life (नास्तिक्यानुध्यान).¹ Vices are impurities of mind and external conduct. We should not entertain ill-will against others. We should not speak harsh words to others. We should not do injury to others. We should be pure in mind, words, and actions.

32. Intellectualist Ethics : Springs of Action.

Gotama mentions a chain of causes of *samsara* or empirical life. Pain (दुःख) arises from birth (जन्म). Birth arises from activity (प्रवृत्ति). Activity springs from faults (दोष). Faults are due to false knowledge (मिथ्याज्ञान). Voluntary action (प्रवृत्ति) springs from faults (दोष). Attachment (राग), aversion (द्वेष), and delusion (मोह) are faults. These are emotions and passions. They are the springs of action. They move the self to action. They are the efficient causes of action. The motive or the end (त्रयोजन) induces the self to action. It is the final cause of action. Vatsyayana traces attachment and aversion to delusion. Attachment for a favourable object arises from delusion. Aversion to an unfavourable object also arises from delusion. Delusion is stupidity. It is an error of judgment. It arises from false knowledge about the nature of the soul. The soul is erroneously identified with the body, the sense-organs, and the mind. So what satisfies the appetite of the body is regarded as favourable to the soul, and what thwarts the bodily appetite is regarded as unfavourable to it. But, in fact, nothing is attractive or repulsive to the soul. The soul is distinct from the body. Thus the Nyaya regards disorder of the intellect as the root cause of emotions and passions which are the springs of action; it binds us to the chain of *samsara*.

When false knowledge (मिथ्याज्ञान) is destroyed by true knowledge (तत्त्वज्ञान) of the soul and other

1 NM., p. 499; E.H., p. 216.

objects, faults (दोष) or passions are destroyed. When faults disappear, activity (प्रवृत्ति) disappears. When actions disappear, there is no re-birth (जन्म). When birth ceases, pain (दुःख) disappears. Complete cessation of pain is liberation. Thus true knowledge of the reality ultimately leads to liberation. Thus the Nyaya ethics is ultimately intellectualistic.

Attachment (राग), aversion (द्वेष), and delusion (मोह) are the springs of actions. Attachment includes lust (काम), avarice or unwillingness to part with one's possessions (मत्सर), worldliness or desire for worldly possessions (स्पृहा), the will to live (तृष्णा), greed for others' property (लोभ), desire to deceive others (माया), and boastfulness (दम्भ). Aversion includes anger (क्रोध), envy (ईर्ष्या) or intolerance of ordinary advantages of others, jealousy (असूया) or aversion to superior qualities of others, malevolence (द्रोह) or disposition to do injury to others, violence or cruelty (हिंसा), and malice or revengefulness (अमर्ष). Delusion includes error (मिथ्याज्ञान), doubt (संशय), conceit, or false sense of one's own superiority (मान), and inadvertence (प्रमाद) or negligence of duty¹. Delusion is the root cause of emotions and passions which bind us to the chain of *samsara*. It can be removed by true knowledge.

33. The Means to Liberation.

The true knowledge of the soul leads to its liberation. It destroys false knowledge. Destruction of false knowledge leads to destruction of faults or emotions and passions. Destruction of emotions and passions leads to destruction of actions. Destruction of actions leads to destruction of birth. Cessation of birth leads to cessation of pain. Liberation is complete absence of pain².

True knowledge of the soul destroys egoism (अहंकार) or false knowledge of the soul as identical with the

¹ NB, iv. 1 3, also NSV, iv. 1 3.

² NB, iv 1 2 6, 1 1 2, iv 2, 1

body¹. It dispels delusion and destroys attachment and aversion which arise from delusion.² The soul can be known truly by listening to the scriptures (श्रवण), meditation (मनन) and firm conviction (निदिध्यासन)³. Yoga practices are enjoined⁴. When merit (धर्म) born of yoga reaches perfection, excellent disposition of ecstasy gives rise to true knowledge (तत्त्वज्ञान)⁵. Eight-fold yoga practices such as abstinence (यम), observance (नियम), posture of body (आसन), breath control (प्राणायाम), withdrawal of the sense-organs from their objects (प्रत्याहार), fixed attention (ध्यान), contemplation (धारणा), concentration (समाधि) are aids to the realization of true knowledge⁶. Cultivation of virtues with regard to bodily, mental, and verbal actions described above enables the soul to distinguish itself from the body and the sense-organs. Thus true knowledge arises from self-control and self-sacrifice, purity of the inner life and outer conduct and performance of yoga practices.

The realization of true knowledge does not directly lead to liberation. It must destroy the desert or merit and demerit, which bind the soul to the body. When merit and demerit are destroyed, the body and the senses are destroyed. Then the soul attains transcendental freedom or liberation.⁷

34. Liberation (अपवर्ग).

Gotama defines liberation negatively as absolute freedom from pain⁸. At the time of dissolution the soul becomes free from pain. But it does not attain liberation because it assumes a body fit for merit and demerit, which are not yet exhausted, at the time of creation. Liberation is absolute freedom from pain. It is not relative freedom from pain. The Nyaya view of liberation is the same as the Vaisheshika view.

1 NSV, iv. 2. 1.

2 NB., iv. 2. 2.

3 NV., i. 1. 2.

4 NS., iv. 2. 42.

5 NB., iv. 2. 42.

6 NSV., iv. 2. 46.

7 NB., iv. 2. 45.

8 NS., i. 1. 22.

Liberation consists in the complete annihilation of the special qualities of the soul such as cognition, pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, volition, merit, demerit, and disposition. Merit and demerit are the causes of pleasure and pain. They bind the soul to *samsara*. When they are destroyed, the soul can no longer assume a body, and feel pleasure and pain. Desire, aversion and volition also are experienced in connection with the body. When the body is destroyed, they cannot be experienced¹. The soul is free from cognition in the state of liberation. Cognition is cognition of an object, which depends on its intercourse with a sense-organ and the conjunction of the sense-organ with the *manas* and the conjunction of the *manas* with the soul. But the *manas*, the body and the sense-organs are destroyed in liberation. So there can be no cognition in it². In fact, cognition, pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, and volition are accidental qualities of the soul, while ubiquitousness is its natural quality. Liberation consists in the soul's existence in its natural condition. (स्वरूपेण व्यवस्थानमात्मनो मोक्षः)³. It consists in absolute cessation of pain. It does not consist in supreme happiness. Pleasure is always tainted with pain. There is no unalloyed pleasure. There is no transcendental bliss beyond empirical pleasure and pain, which always depend on the connection of the soul with the body. When the body is destroyed, there can be neither pleasure nor pain. Hence liberation is absolute freedom from pain and other empirical contents. It is transcendental freedom of the soul which exists in its natural or intrinsic condition.

The Naiyayika criticizes the other theories of liberation and shows that they admit the truth of the Nyaya view.

The Charvaka holds that independence is liberation and dependence is bondage (पारतन्त्र्यं बन्धः स्वातन्त्र्यं मोक्षः)⁴.

1 NM., pp. 507-08.

2 NM., p. 512.

3 NM., p. 511.

4 SDS., p. 209.

The Naiyayika urges that the Charvaka view contains an element of truth ; independence involves cessation of pain. But independence, in the sense of lordship, cannot be the highest good, since there are different degrees of lordship, higher and lower, and there is rivalry among lords of equal power.¹

The Madhyamika Bauddha holds that the extinction of the soul (आत्मोच्छेद) is liberation. The Naiyayika urges that this view contains an element of truth ; the extinction of the soul involves the extinction of pain. But it is wrong to hold that the soul, like the body, is the cause of pain, and should therefore be extinguished. Is the soul a series of cognitions (ज्ञानसन्तान) or something beyond them ? If it is nothing but a series of cognitions, the Naiyayika also holds that liberation consists in the extinction of all qualities of the soul such as cognition, pleasure, pain and the like. If it is an entity beyond the series of cognitions, it is eternal and therefore cannot be destroyed. Moreover, everything is dear for the sake of the soul. No one can strive for the extinction of the soul which is the dearest of all².

The Yogacara Bauddha holds that emergence of pure cognition is exaltation or liberation (निर्मलज्ञानोदयोमहोदय :³). The Naiyayika urges that there can be no cognition in liberation, since its causal conditions do not exist at the time. Moreover, the soul being impermanent, meditation on the four noble truths (भावनाचतुष्टय) cannot bring about any perfection in it and cause pure cognition. Further, the soul being impermanent, the same soul cannot be in bondage at first, and then attain liberation. So liberation cannot consist in pure cognition free from error and illusion.

The Jaina holds that liberation consists in the soul's transportation to a supra-mundane sphere on the removal of the veil from it⁴. The Naiyayika urges

1 *Ibid* p. 209.

2 *Ibid*, p. 207.

3 *Ibid*, p. 208.

4 *Ibid*, p. 208.

that the Jaina view is right if the veil that covers the soul consists in merit and demerit. The Naiyayika admits that merit and demerit are destroyed in liberation. But the Jaina holds that the soul is transported to a supra-mundane region, when its crust of subtle *karma*-matter is destroyed. The Naiyayika urges that the soul is either corporeal (मूर्त) or incorporeal (अमूर्त). If it is corporeal, it is either with or without parts. If it consists of parts (सावयव), it is non-eternal. If it is destroyed, it is not rewarded for its righteous actions, and punished for its unrighteous actions. If it is devoid of parts (निखयव), it would be like an atom which is corporeal and partless, and hence its qualities would be imperceptible like those of an atom. If the soul is incorporeal, it would be incapable of movement, since a corporeal substance only is capable of movement¹.

The Sankhya holds that the existence of the self (पुरुष) in its intrinsic condition due to its isolation from Prakṛti constitutes its liberation². Its erroneous identification of itself with Buddhi, an evolute of Prakṛti, constitutes its bondage. When the self discriminates itself from Prakṛti and its evolutes, the activity of Prakṛti ceases for it, and it realizes its liberation. The Naiyayika urges that consciousness of difference (विवेकज्ञान) between Prakṛti and Puruṣa resides either in the Puruṣa or in Prakṛti. It cannot reside in the former, since it is unchangeable. Nor can it reside in the latter, since it is unconscious. Moreover, Prakṛti is either active or inactive by its nature. If it is ever active by nature, its activity can never cease, and the soul cannot be liberated. If it is inactive by nature, the soul cannot be in bondage, since the evolution of Prakṛti accounts for the experience and bondage of the self.³

1 *Ibid.*, pp. 208—209.

2 *Ibid.*, p. 209.

3 *Ibid.*, p. 209

The Vedantists hold that liberation consists in eternal happiness (नित्यसुख). The Naiyayika urges that there is no proof for it. No one perceives eternal happiness. We always perceive pleasure mixed with pain. Eternal happiness cannot be inferred from any trace of a sign or mark (लिङ्ग). The scriptures speak of bliss (आनन्द). The Nyaya urges that bliss is absolute freedom from pain. It is not positive enjoyment. If eternal happiness constitutes the essence of the self, it would be experienced along with pleasure and pain brought about by merit and demerit. The Vedantist holds that eternal happiness of the self, which is self-manifest (स्वप्रकाश), is veiled by individual nescience (अविद्या) in empirical life. The Naiyayika urges that individual nescience is insignificant (तुच्छ) and cannot veil the self-luminous eternal happiness of the self. Hence the self is not of the nature of eternal happiness¹.

Tutata Bhatta² holds that liberation consists in the manifestation of eternal happiness (नित्यसुखाभिर्व्यक्ति). In the state of liberation eternal happiness of the self is manifested like its ubiquitousness. The Naiyayika urges that there is no justification for it. Perception, inference, or Vedic testimony does not justify it. If there is eternal happiness, what is the cause of its manifestation or experience? Is the cause eternal or non-eternal? If it is eternal, experience of eternal happiness also would be eternal, and there would be no difference between the bound soul and the liberated soul. If it is non-eternal, it cannot be conjunction of the soul with *manas*, since it cannot by itself produce experience of pleasure. It requires the aid of merit (धर्म). But merit is non-eternal. It is destroyed before liberation can be attained. Non-eternal merit can cause non-eternal pleasure. It cannot produce eternal happiness. Hence liberation cannot consist in manifestation of eternal happiness³.

1 NM. pp. 508—10

2 *Kiranavali*.

3 NB. 1. 1. 22.

Later Naiyayikas hold that liberation can be attained by the true knowledge of the self, which depends on the grace of God¹.

THEOLOGY

Gotama briefly refers to God in a few aphorisms.² Later Naiyayikas, Vatsyayana, Uddyotakara, Vachaspati Mishra, Udayana, Jayanta Bhatta, Gangesha and others are frankly theistic, and elaborately discuss the proofs for the existence of God and the nature of God. The syncretic writers of the Nyaya-Vaisheshika school are theists. The Naiyayikas maintain that individual souls can attain liberation by the grace of God. They can attain true knowledge of the self by hearing the scripture, meditation, and conviction, through the divine favour³. Two main questions are discussed in the Nyaya literature : (1) What are the proofs for the existence of God ? (2) What is the nature of God ?

35. Proofs for the Existence of God.

The Naiyayika puts forward many arguments for the existence of God, of which the principal arguments are the causal or cosmologico-teleological argument, the moral argument, and the argument from the authority of the Vedas.

(1) *The Causal or Cosmologico-Teleological Argument.*

(a) **God as the Creator and Designer of the World**

The world is of the nature of an effect (कार्यं). So it must have an efficient cause (निमित्तकारण). God is the efficient cause of the world (क्षित्यङ्कुरादिकं कर्तृजन्यं कार्यत्वाद् घटादिवत्⁴). The inference may be stated thus :—

Every effect must have an agent *e.g.*, a jar ;

The world is an effect :

∴ It must have an agent.

1 SDS p. 211.

2 NS, iv, I, 19-21.

3 SDS, p. 211

4 TS, p. 12.

This agent (कर्ता) is God. Just as a jar is produced by a potter, so the world is produced by God. This argument involves the following assumptions: (1) Every effect must have a cause; (2) Every effect must have an intelligent agent; (3) the world is an effect; (4) it must be produced by an intelligent agent, *viz.*, God. The Nyaya maintains that God is the efficient cause or agent (कर्ता) of the world. The atoms of earth, water, light, and air are its material cause (उपादानकारण). They are co-eternal with God. They are neither created nor destroyed by God. Composite substances which are made of parts (सावयव) and possess intermediate magnitude (अवान्तरमहत्त्व) are of the nature of effects¹. Ether, space, time, and the self are ubiquitous and devoid of parts. So they are not effects. They are eternal. The atoms of earth, water, light and air are indivisible and infinitesimal substances. The mind (मनस्) also is atomic. So the atoms and minds are not effects. They are eternal. Only composite substances of medium size are effects. They are produced by an intelligent agent (कर्ता) out of their component elements. A pot consists of parts and possesses intermediate magnitude. So it is an effect. It is produced by an intelligent agent, *viz.*, a potter out of clay. Its efficient cause is an intelligent person who has direct knowledge of the material, desire to produce an effect, and effort or volition to produce it. Agency involves direct knowledge of the material, desire to realize an end, and the will to realize it (उपादानगोचरापरोक्षज्ञानचिकीर्षाकृतिमत्त्वं कर्तृत्वम्²). Cognition (ज्ञान), desire (इच्छा), and volition (कृति) are closely related to one another. Cognition gives rise to desire. Desire gives rise to volition. Volition produces motion.

The world is not infinite; it is of intermediate magnitude. It consists of parts. So it is of the nature of an effect. It is produced by an intelligent agent,

1 SDS., p. 212.

2 TD., p. 13.

viz., God who has direct knowledge (अपरोक्षज्ञान) of the material cause or atoms, desire to create the world (चिकीर्षा), and the volition (कृति) to do so. God as the efficient cause of the world has knowledge, desire, and volition (ज्ञान-चिकीर्षा-कृति) requisite to creation.

The Naiyayika regards God as the efficient cause (निमित्तकारण) of the world. God is not its material cause. He does not evolve the world out of His nature. He does not create the world out of nothing by a mere fiat of will. He fashions the world out of the pre-existing atoms in time and space. He combines and arranges them in a particular order. He gives them unity, order and harmony. He does not create the atoms of earth, water, light, and air. He does not create ether (आकाश) time, and space. He combines the atoms into diads, diads into triads, triads into quartrads, quartads into more complex things.

6. God as the Creator of motion in atoms and the Cause of their combination.

The combination (आयोजन) of the atoms is brought about by the agency (कर्तृत्व) of God. They are inactive by nature. They are devoid of motion. The earlier Naiyayikas ascribed the motion of the atoms to the Unseen Principle (अदृष्ट). A diad (द्वणुक) is produced by the conjunction of two atoms. The two atoms are its material or inherent cause (समवायिकारण). Their conjunction (संयोग) is its non-material or non-inherent cause (असमवायिकारण). The Unseen Principle is its efficient cause (अदृष्टादि निमित्तकारणम्). But the later Naiyayikas ascribed the motion of the atoms to the will of God. The atoms are unintelligent. They are inactive in themselves. They can move only when they are supervised by an intelligent agent, like an axe (परमाष्ठ-एवादयोहि चेतनायोजिताः प्रवर्तन्ते अचेतनत्वात् वास्यादिवन्²). Motion

¹ TB., p. 21.

² NKS, Ch. V, pp. 54-55.

of an unconscious thing is known to be due to the activity of an intelligent agent which directs it.¹ Individual souls have finite knowledge. They cannot perceive the atoms. They are incapable of producing motion in them. They cannot combine them into diads, triads, and gross material objects. They are endowed with limited knowledge and limited power of will. They cannot produce mountains, rivers, trees, and the like. They are produced without their effort². God is omniscient and omnipotent. He perceives the atoms. He creates motion in them by His will, even as the individual soul creates action in the body by its will. God creates motion voluntarily and brings about conjunction between two atoms through it, and produces a diad (द्वयगुणक). He voluntarily creates motion, and brings three diads into conjunction with one another, and produces a triad (त्रयगुणक, त्रयगुणक). God is the cause of the motion of the unconscious atoms, which are the objects of His will.³

Fortuitous combination of the atoms with one another cannot produce the world which is characterized by unity, order, and harmony. It is the intelligent will of God that creates motion in the atoms and combines them in an intelligent order. Causality in the world is God's will-causality. God is the efficient cause of the world as an intelligent agent endowed with knowledge, desire, and volition (ज्ञानचिकीर्षाप्रयत्नयोगित्वं कर्तृत्वमाचक्षते तच्चेश्वरे विद्यते⁴). He has direct knowledge of the atoms, desire to create the world out of them, and will to do so. The world is produced by the agency of one omniscient God who is different from individual souls like us, who cannot produce this manifold immeasurable world which produces various pleasures and pains in an infinite number of individual souls.⁵

1 NKS. V, p. 55,

2 SM., pp. 23-24, NM., p. 200.

3 NKSP., V, p. 56

4 NM, p. 202

5 NM., p. 200

(c) **God as the Cause of arrangement in the world.**

The arrangement (सन्निवेश) of mountains, rivers, and other natural objects cannot be accidental. It is similar to the arrangement of jars, cloths, and other things produced by human agents. Whatever objects are arranged in an order are produced by an intelligent agent (यद्यत् सन्निवेशविशिष्टं तत्तद् बुद्धिमत्कृतकम्¹). Just as the arrangement of jars and the like is produced by the will and activity of intelligent human agents, so the arrangement of mountains and other natural objects is produced by the will and activity of God who is omniscient and omnipotent. Their arrangement is designed, willed, and produced by God.

It may be urged that the order and arrangement of the world differs from the order and arrangement of human productions. Therefore from the specific order and arrangement (सन्निवेशविशेष) of the world, we cannot infer the existence of God as its creator. The Nyaya contends that there is an invariable concomitance between 'order and arrangement in general' and 'the existence of a creator,' just as there is an invariable concomitance between 'smoke in general' and 'fire in general.' The smoke and the fire in a kitchen differ from the smoke and the fire in a forest. We disregard their specific peculiarities, and infer the existence of fire from the existence of smoke on the strength of the invariable concomitance between smoke in general and fire in general. Similarly, we infer the existence of God from the order and arrangement in general of the world as its creator on the strength of the invariable concomitance between 'order and arrangement in general' and the existence of a 'creator' (सन्निवेशमात्रं कर्तृमात्रेण व्याप्तम्²).

It may be urged that many effects (*e. g.*, plants) are automatically produced; they are not found to be produced by a creator. The Nyaya contends that

1 NM., p. 197.

2 NM., pp 194-195.

plants are produced by God. It cannot be proved that they are not produced by God. They possess intermediate magnitude; they are neither atomic nor ubiquitous. They are arranged in an order. So they must be produced by a creator; they cannot be produced by human agents. So they are produced by God¹.

The Nyaya combines the causal or cosmological argument with the teleological argument. It may be called the cosmo-teleological argument which proves that God is the creator and designer of the world.

In Western theology the cosmological argument is treated separately from the teleological argument. The cosmological argument proves that God is the creator of the world. The teleological argument proves that God is the designer of the world.

(d) God as the Support of the world

The world is not only created by God, but also supported by His will. The whole world with all its things directly or indirectly requires the will of God to support it in its place and prevent it from falling. The support (धृति) of the world is God who sustains it by His will (विधारकप्रयत्न). Physical objects are unconscious; they cannot support themselves without being directed by an intelligent agent². The unseen agency (अदृष्ट) cannot support the world. It is unintelligent. It cannot act without the will of God³. The world is sustained by God endowed with knowledge, desire and volition. He has knowledge of the world. He has desire to support it. He has also volition to do so. His resolve cannot be obstructed. Thus God is the support or preserver of the world.

(e) God as the Destroyer of the world.

The world is also destroyed by God. Every product

¹ NM., pp 196-97.

² NKS., V p. 58, SPMB., p. 8.

³ NM, p 199.

is destroyed like a jar. The world down to the diads is destroyed by action due to the will of God¹.

God is the creator, preserver, and destroyer of the world. It is produced by God's creative will. It is supported by God's supporting will. It is destroyed by God's destructive will².

The Nyaya also combines the casual argument with the moral argument. God fashions the world out of the pre-existing atoms according to the merits (धर्म) and demerits (अधर्म) of the individual souls for their enjoyment and suffering. God adapts the world to moral agents according to the Law of Karma. Apparent physical causation is spiritual causation. The causality in nature is the will-causality of God. And it is moral causation. The causality in nature serves the purpose of finite selves. The divine will produces effects according to their moral deserts. God produces the world to serve moral ends.

(ii) *The Moral Argument.*

(a) **God as the Moral Governor guiding the Law of Karma**

The Nyaya combines the causal argument with the moral argument as already shown. God fashions the world out of the atoms for the experience of the individual souls. They acquire merits and demerits by righteous and unrighteous actions. Righteous actions produce merits. Unrighteous actions produce demerits. Merits bring about enjoyments. Demerits bring about sufferings. But joys and sorrows depend upon external objects also. They are excited by perception of particular situations in the environment, which are their exciting physical causes. They depend on moral deserts or merits and demerits also, acquired by voluntary actions, which are their predisposing psychical causes. Merits and demerits are acquired by the individual souls through their voluntary actions. They are the soul's own free creations. But the souls have no control over external objects. How

1 NKS., V, p. 59, NM, p. 199.

2 SPMB, p. 4, NM, p. 201, NKS., V pp. 1—36, 51—60

do they bring about their joys and sorrows according to their merits and demerits? External objects are unconscious. They cannot adapt themselves to the merits and demerits of the individual souls, and bring about their pleasure and pain without the guidance of an intelligent agent. God guides them and adapts them to the moral deserts of finite souls¹. Merits and demerits also are unconscious. They cannot make physical objects produce pleasure and pain in the finite souls without the guidance of an intelligent agent. God is the supervisor (अधिष्ठाता) of the unintelligent (अचेतन) merits and demerits. Individual souls are unconscious of them. They cannot be their guide. They are many and have conflicting purposes. They cannot produce the unity of the world². Besides, they have no direct knowledge of the atoms. They cannot fashion them into natural objects such as mountains, trees, and the like. God produces them out of the atoms and adapts them to the moral demands of the finite souls. He produces this manifold world out of the atoms with the aid of their merits and demerits.³ He creates the world according to the Law of Karma. He harmonizes the realm of nature with the realm of spirits. The world is a sphere of moral life. It offers opportunities to the souls to realize their moral values. It is not indifferent to human ends. It is a physical as well as a moral order. God is the creator of the world and its moral governor.

This Nyaya argument reminds us of Kant's moral argument for the existence of God. The complete good is virtue in harmony with happiness. The highest good is virtue. But the complete good is the synthesis of virtue with happiness. Virtue depends on our own will. But happiness depends on external favourable circumstances which are beyond our control. So the virtuous are seldom found to be happy in the world. But the demand of morality must be satisfied. So we believe that virtue is harmonized with happiness by God who is the controller of the moral world and the physical world. God will harmonize virtue with happiness and vice with unhappiness in the next world.

1 NM, p. 199.

2 NM., p. 203.

3 NM., p. 196.

The Nyaya believes that God harmonizes virtue or merit (धर्म) with happiness, and vice or demerit (अधर्म) with unhappiness in a cycle of births (संसार).

The Nyaya traces different lots (वैषम्य) of persons to their own actions (कर्मफल) in the past birth. Inequalities in their fortunes are inevitable consequences of their own free actions. Righteous actions produce merits (पुण्य). Unrighteous actions produce demerits (पाप). Merits and demerits reside in the souls. They do not bear fruits completely in one life. They take time to mature. Just as seeds produce plants at a particular time, in a particular place, under particular favourable circumstances, so merits and demerits mature and bear fruits at the proper time, in the proper place, and under particular favourable circumstances. Some of them fructify in this life. Others cling to the transmigrating souls and fructify in the next birth. The accumulated merits and demerits of the past birth account for inequalities in the lots of individuals in the present life. Some of them fructify and produce enjoyments and sufferings in this life and are thus exhausted. But fresh merits and demerits are acquired by individuals by free voluntary actions, which also partly bear fruits in this life, and are partly accumulated in the souls to fructify in the next birth. The cycle of births continues in this way. When merits and demerits are completely exhausted by true knowledge of the soul aided by self-control, meditation, *yoga*, and devotion, the round of births ceases and the souls attain liberation by the grace of God. The individual souls are governed by the Law of Karma (अदृष्ट). God is the Lord of Karma (कर्माध्यक्ष). He is the Moral Governor (कर्मफलदाता). He rewards the virtuous with happiness. He punishes the vicious with unhappiness. He makes merits produce pleasure. He makes demerits produce pain. Merits and demerits are unintelligent. They can bring about pleasure and pain when they are guided by God.¹ They cannot be guided by the finite selves which are unconscious of

1 NM., p. 196.

them and cannot guide them. God is the distributor of happiness and unhappiness according to merits and demerits. He is the giver of the fruits of moral deserts¹. At the time of dissolution (प्रलय) the merits and demerits of the finite souls retain their power to produce their effects in a dormant (तिरोहित) condition. At the time of creation (सृष्टि) they regain their power to produce their effects in a manifest (अभिव्यक्त) condition. They depend upon the will of God for their latent or manifest power to produce their effects.² God is the supervisor of the Law of Karma. He places the souls in their proper environments according to the Moral Law.

(6) God as the Author of moral injunctions and prohibitions.

The Nyaya gives another moral argument. God is the author of moral injunctions (विधि) and prohibitions (निषेध). Moral laws are of the nature of commands. They are the commands of God. What is commanded by God is right. What is forbidden by God is wrong. The Divine commands as embodied in the injunctions and prohibitions in the scriptures constitute the moral laws. The scriptural prescriptions and prohibitions are the expressions of the commands of God. Moral laws are positive laws. They are commands of God. And these are known from the scriptures. They are not impersonal laws. They are the personal commands of God to imperfect finite beings, compelling their obedience. God is the creator and promulgator (वक्ता) of moral laws or codes of *dharma*. He is the source of moral authority³.

Human freedom is limited by the will of God. Man cannot achieve success by his free volitions (पुरुषकार) without the aid of God. Sometimes his free actions are crowned with success. But sometimes they meet with failure. Sometimes man cannot achieve success in spite of all his moral efforts and free exertions. This

¹ *Ibid.* p. 200

² *Ibid.* p. 193

³ NKS., v, p 139 ; NM., pp. 355ff.

shows that sometimes God favours man's free actions with success, and sometimes he does not favour them with success. Thus man's free will is subject to the Divine Will. It cannot realize its end without the aid of God. Again, human freedom is limited by merit and demerit or psychic predispositions accumulated in the soul. It is limited by the character of the self already acquired by free actions. Human freedom is limited by God in accordance with the Law of Karma².

(iii) *The Argument from the Authoritativeness of the Vedas.*

The Nyaya regards the Vedas as a non-eternal creation of a person (पौरुषेय). The Mimamsa regards them as eternal and impersonal (अपौरुषेय); they are embodiments of eternal laws. The Nyaya infers the existence of God from the authoritative character of the Vedas. God is their creator. They are subject to creation and destruction. They are created and destroyed by God. They embody the moral laws which are the commands of God. The injunctions and prohibitions of God are expressed in the Vedas. They are moral laws. They are the positive laws imposed by God on the finite individuals for their good. The Vedas contain the highest truths which correspond with reality. They are beyond the reach of the discursive reason. They can be comprehended by it through listening to the Vedas, meditating on them, and acquiring a firm conviction by intuition. They are unquestionable and indubitable. They acquire their authoritative character from God who is their creator. God, the perfect and omniscient person, creates the Vedas and imparts them authoritativeness. He reveals the eternal truths and moral laws through them to finite individuals. The Vedas are the embodiments of the eternal knowledge of God.

The Nyaya holds that knowledge is not valid in itself. It has no intrinsic validity (स्वतःप्रामाण्य). Its validity is due to the excellence (गुण) in its generating conditions. Knowledge has extrinsic validity (परतःप्रामाण्य).

Testimony or verbal knowledge owes its validity to the excellence or reliability of the person who makes the statement (वक्तृगुण)¹. Validity of testimony is due to the authority of its author (आप्तप्रामाण्य), which consists in his direct knowledge of the essence of things, compassion for persons, and desire to describe things as they really exist². Just as the validity of the medical science is due to the authority of the scientists, so the validity of the Vedic testimony is due to the authority or reliable character of its author, viz, God. Vedic testimony is due to the authority of God, just as non-Vedic testimony is due to the authority of its human agent.

The Mimamsa urges that the Vedas are authoritative because they are eternal. The Nyaya contends that words are valid because they denote proper objects ; they owe their validity to their denotative capacity, and not to their eternality³. Words are sounds. Sounds are perceived as being produced and destroyed. They are not eternal. Words are utterances of persons. Just as *Kumarasambhava* was composed by Kalidasa, so the Vedas are composed by God. The Vedas consist of sentences. Sentences consist of words. Just as threads cannot arrange themselves into a cloth, so the words of the Vedas cannot arrange themselves into sentences. Just as threads are arranged into a cloth by a weaver, so the words are arranged into sentences by God⁴. It cannot be argued that the composition (रचना) of the Vedas differs from the composition of *Kumarasambhava* and therefore it is eternal. Just as the arrangement (संस्थान) of a mountain differs from the arrangement of a jar, so the arrangement of the Vedas differs from the arrangement of a human composition. A jar is produced by a human being, while a mountain is produced by God. An epic is composed by a human being, while the Vedas are composed by God⁵. The Vedas speak of transcendental principles and supersensible realities. So

1 NKS., 11.

2 NB., ii, 2, 68.

3 NB., ii, I, 67.

4 NM, p. 235 ; NKS., v, p. 63.

5 NM, p. 236.

they cannot be human compositions. Just as different parts of an epic are composed by one poet, so the different branches of the Vedas are composed by one God, since they are connected together by unity of purpose (एकाभिप्रायबद्धत्वम्). There is no evidence for the existence of many composers of the Vedas. Parsimony of hypotheses (कल्पनागौरव) demands one author of the Vedas¹. Just as one seed is the cause of a tree consisting of many branches, so one God is the author of all the Vedas². One omniscient God is the creator of the manifold world, which is the basis of enjoyments and sufferings of the individual souls according to their merits and demerits, and of the Vedas for their instruction and enlightenment. God knows the merits and demerits of the individual souls, creates the world in conformity with them, and creates the Vedas in order to instruct and guide them in achieving their transcendental freedom³. The seers are not omniscient; they are devoid of knowledge of the merits and demerits of the individual souls. So they cannot compose the Vedas for their instruction⁴. God is the omniscient author of the Vedas.

(iv) *The Testimony of the Vedas.*

The Vedas bear clear testimony to the existence of God. "He is the Lord of all, omniscient, the inner controller, the cause of the world, its creator and destroyer."⁵ "He is the supreme Person; He is omniscient."⁶ "He is the Lord of all, the controller of all, the Ruler of all, the Lord of all creatures."⁷ "He is the Lord of all, the Refuge of all."⁸ "He is the controller of all inanimate and animate things."⁹ "He lives in the heart of all and guides them."¹⁰ "He is

1 NM, p. 239.

2 NM, p. 240.

3 NM, p. 238.

4 NM, p. 240.

5 NKS., v. p. 62

6 *Mandukya Upanishad*, 6

7 *Shvetashvatara Upanishad*, III, 19

8 *Bṛhadaranyaka Upanishad*, IV 4. 22

9 *Shvetashvatara Upanishad*, III 17

10 *Ibid*, III. 18

11 *Bṛhadaranyaka Upanishad*, V 6. 1

the Lord of Karma, and the abode of all creatures."¹ "He gives the fruits of merits and demerits to individual souls."² "He is the giver of fruits of actions."³ Thus the Vedas speak of God as the creator, preserver, and destroyer of the world, the inner controller of the souls, the giver of fruits of actions, the moral governor of the universe. The Vedas are authoritative; they bear clear testimony to the existence of God.⁴ Therefore God exists.

But it may be urged that the Nyaya argument is circular. Authoritativeness of the Vedas is inferred from the existence of God who creates the Vedas. And the existence of God is inferred from the authoritativeness of the Vedas. There is mutual dependence in this argument.⁵ The Nyaya may reply that the existence of God is the *ratio essendi* of the Vedas, and the Vedas are the *ratio cognoscendi* of God. In order of existence God is prior to the Vedas. But in order of our knowledge the Vedas are prior to God.⁶ Moreover, the existence of God is known by inference as the efficient cause of the world.

These are the main arguments advanced by the Nyaya for the existence of God. It offers some minor arguments which are stated below.

(v) *God as the Originator of Arts and Language.*

All arts, carpentry, smithy, weaving, speaking, writing, and the like ultimately originated in God. There are degrees of skill in these arts, higher and lower. God is the embodiment of the highest skill. All craftsmen depend upon God who is independent. He is the founder of all arts. He is the instructor of human artists. He is the original artist. How can God, devoid of body, show artistic skill in physical action, and guide human agents in acquiring skill in arts? The Nyaya replies that God assumes a body

1 *Shetashvatara Upanishad*, vi. 11.

2 *Ibid.*, vi. 6.

3 *Brhadaranyaka Upanishad*, iv. 4.

4 N.K.S., v. p. 62.

5 N.M., p. 234.

6 S.D.S., p. 215.

at intervals to manifest His glory and instruct humanity.¹

God is the creator of language. He is the cause of the denotative power of words. Words denote particular objects because they are made to do so by God. He connects different words with different objects, and first acquaints people with the meanings of different words. He is the cause of convention (संकेत)².

(vi) *The Argument from Number.*

Diads, triads and the like have magnitude, since they are substances. The magnitude of a diad is an effect, since it is the quality of a caused substance. The magnitude of an atom is not the cause of that of a diad, since it is eternal and infinitesimal. If the infinitesimal magnitude of an atom were the cause of the magnitude of a diad, it would have a large magnitude like a triad, which also is produced from atoms. Atomic magnitude (अणुत्व) and large magnitude (महत्त्व) are contrary to each other. So the former cannot produce the latter. Magnitude produces better magnitude of its own kind. The large magnitudes of the two halves of a jar produce larger magnitude of a jar. Similarly, the atomic magnitudes of two atoms would produce more minute atomic magnitude of a diad. But the magnitude of a diad is larger than the atomic magnitude of an atom. So the former is not produced by the latter. The magnitude of a diad is caused by the *number* of the atoms. It is not caused by their atomic magnitudes. The Nyaya-Vaisheshika holds that only number one is perceived, but the higher numbers are conceptual products; they depend upon the discriminative intellect (अपेक्षाबुद्धि). At the time of creation the magnitude of a diad is caused by the duality (द्वित्व) of its constituent atoms. This duality depends upon the discriminative intellect (अपेक्षाबुद्धि) of God who is omniscient and is conscious of atoms. It cannot depend upon the discriminative intellect of the individual

1 NKS, pp. 60-61.

2 NM, pp. 240 ff

souls which are unconscious during dissolution, since they are devoid of bodies. The souls are not conscious in themselves ; they acquire consciousness in conjunction with the body. Thus God not only produces motion (क्रिया) in the atoms by will, brings them together and produces diads, triads, and the like, but also thinks of the numbers, duality and the like, which bring about their large magnitudes. This argument rests upon the peculiar Nyaya-Vaisheshika view that duality and other higher numbers are conceptual constructions of the discriminative intellect¹.

36. Motive of Creation

Uddyotakara discusses some theories of creation. Creation is activity. Action is motivated by the idea of attaining a good or avoiding an evil. An unmotivated action is inconceivable. God has no unfulfilled desire or unattained end. He is completely free from pain. So He cannot be motivated by the idea of avoiding an evil. He has no good to attain, and no evil to avoid. Some hold that God creates the world for sport (क्रीडा). A person plays for pleasure ; he does not feel pleasure without sport. He feels discomfort or pain and plays in order to remove it and get pleasure. But God is absolutely free from pain. So He cannot indulge in creative sport for pleasure.² Jayanta Bhatta holds that God is endowed with eternal bliss, and has no need for creative play for the sake of pleasure.³ Some hold that God creates the world in order to demonstrate His infinite powers and glory (विभूतिरूपन). But Uddyotakara urges that God does not gain any thing by creation, and lose anything by lack of creation. He is eternally perfect. He does not pass from imperfection to perfection. He does not achieve any excellence (अतिशय) by demonstration of His powers. He does not deprive Himself of His perfection by lack of it. Uddyotakara concludes that God's creative activity follows

¹ NKS , v, pp. 66-68

² NV , iv 1. 21 p 440.

³ NM , pp 192, 202.

from His very nature (ईश्वरोपि तत्स्वाभाव्यात् प्रवर्तते). It may be urged that if creative activity follows from His nature, it would never cease and there would be no dissolution ; it would produce all effects simultaneously and there would be no order of creation, and it would not produce diversity of effects, and a uniform world would follow from the uniform nature of God. To this Uddyotakara replies that creative activity follows from the nature of God who is endowed with intelligence. God creates the world with the aid of merits and demerits of the individual souls, which mature in particular times. (स खलु प्रवर्तमानो धर्माधर्मयोः परिपाककालमपेक्षते) He produces diverse effects out of the atoms in the presence of diverse merits and demerits. So the nature of God aided by diverse merits and demerits of the individual souls accounts for the creation of the multiform world for their enjoyments and sufferings.¹

37. Anti-theistic Objections.

(1) *The Motive of Creation . Problem of evil.*

The Sankhya, the Mimamsaka, and the Jaina have advanced some anti-theistic arguments against the theistic proofs of the Naiyayika. The Nyaya has refuted some of these objections.

The atheist urges that God is not the creator of the world because He has no end to realize in creative activity. Does He create the world for His self-interest or for the good of others ? If He does it for self-interest, does He do it for the attainment of good or for the avoidance of evil ? He cannot do so for the attainment of good, since He has no unattained ends or unfulfilled desires. He is absolutely free from pain. So He cannot create for the avoidance of pain. Nor can He realize the good of others in creative activity. He who acts only for the good of others without self-interest is not intelligent. It cannot be held that God is motivated by compassion for creatures in creative activity. Compassion is desire to remove sufferings of creatures without self-interest. But no

¹ NV , iv, I, 21, pp. 466—67

intelligent person can act only for the good of others without self-interest. What is left undone by Him if He does not create the world? If God were motivated by compassion for creatures, He would not make them unhappy. But misery abounds in the world. God is, by hypothesis, good and benevolent. He cannot create evil. Besides, there is no suffering before creation. Therefore God cannot create the world out of compassion for creatures.

To this objection the Nyāya replies that God creates the world out of compassion for creatures. But He cannot create a perfectly happy world. He creates it in accordance with merits and demerits of individual souls for their enjoyments and sufferings. Merits are the results of their righteous actions. Demerits are the results of their unrighteous actions. Physical evil and moral evil are ultimately due to the freedom of the individual souls. God creates the world according to the Moral Law (कर्म) He is the governor of the law. He is not subject to it. The finite individuals are subject to it. The Moral Law is rooted in the Divine Will. God wills and acts in harmony with the Law of Karma. He cannot be limited by it which constitutes His nature ¹

God creates sufferings to exhaust the demerits of the finite spirits, chasten them, and help them attain liberation or absolute freedom from pain, just as He creates enjoyments to exhaust their merits and help them achieve their ultimate good. Merits and demerits lie dormant in them during dissolution; they become manifest and active at the time of creation. So though there are no sufferings before creation, there are their causes in the shape of merits and demerits in the souls, and creation and dissolution go on periodically.²

It may be urged that there is no need of the aid of merits and demerits of finite souls to create the world, and that the will of God is adequate for the task. The

¹ SDS., pp. 214 – 15

² NM., p. 202

Nyaya replies that the variety (वैचित्र्य) of the world cannot be accounted for without merits and demerits of finite souls. If God created the world without their aid, He would be charged with cruelty. His injunctions and prohibitions would be unavailing, and no soul would be liberated. The individual souls work out their own destiny; they bring sufferings on themselves by unrighteous actions and the consequent demerits. God is not responsible for them. He gives injunctions and prohibitions to them to realize their moral ends and attain liberation. They freely perform the enjoined acts and do not commit the forbidden acts, and thus acquire merits. Or, they freely neglect the enjoined acts and commit the forbidden acts and thus acquire demerits. They achieve their own bondage or liberation by their free volitions. If God created the world without the help of merits and demerits, He could ever keep a soul in bondage by His will. So it is right to hold that God creates the world with the help of merits and demerits of individual souls. The Lordship of God is not hindered by them. Merits and demerits are subject to the Will of God. They bring about their results when they are impelled by the Divine Will. They fail to bring them about when they are obstructed by it². They are made dormant during dissolution by it. They are made manifest by it at the time of creation. They are unintelligent; they can produce their results only when they are directed by the will of God¹. They cannot mature without the guidance of the Divine Will³. So they depend on God who cannot be said to be limited by them.

(ii) *Can God create the world without body?*

The atheist urges that if God is the creator of the world, He should have a body. A jar is made by a potter with bodily action. But God has no body. So He cannot be the creator of the world. The Nyaya replies that an effect is produced by an agent endowed

1 NM, pp. 203—204.

2 NM, p. 202

3 NM, pp. 193, 203

NM, p. 196

5 NM, p. 203

with knowledge, desire, and will (ज्ञान-चकीर्षा-कृति). In the case of an effect produced by a human agent, the will is expressed in bodily activity. But in the case of the world the Divine Will may not be expressed in bodily activity. Or, the atoms may serve as the body of God; God produces activity or motion in the atoms by His will, just as the human soul produces activity or motion in the body through its will. There is invariable concomitance between volition and effect; bodily activity may be a condition (उपाधि) accompanying volition in some cases. So God, though devoid of body, can create the world out of the atoms by will¹.

(iii) *One God or many Gods?*

It may be urged that many gods produce the world out of the atoms. But the world has a unity. If it is created by many gods, it cannot have a unity. If there are many gods, they have conflicting purposes. They have conflicting volitions. They thwart and curb one another. So they cannot be co-ordinate lords of the world. They all cannot be moved by compassion for creatures. They cannot guide the merits and demerits of the individual souls uniformly, and create the world in accordance with them. This universe, full of order, unity, and harmony cannot be created by plurality of gods with conflicting wills and purposes. If they are held to work in harmony with one another, one of them is enough for creation. Parsimony of hypotheses demands one God instead of many gods. If they are guided by a President, He ought to be regarded as the creator and ruler of the world, and not the republic of gods. Merits and demerits of the finite souls are supervised by one God according to the Moral Law².

If there are many gods, they are either omniscient or not. If they are not omniscient, they cannot create the world like us. If they are omniscient, one God is adequate to the task of creation, and others are redundant. If all are equally supreme, they cannot always have unanimity, and therefore create one world. There is

¹ NM., p. 202, NKS, V.

² NM., p. 203

unity of purpose in the world. So we must infer one God as the creator of one world. If many gods execute the purpose of one God, He should be regarded as real God to the exclusion of others. A republic of gods working in harmony with one another is no God. The unity of the world requires one God as the creator with one purpose. So there is one God¹.

38. The Nature of God.

The Nyaya theism believes in God as a particular soul endowed with knowledge, pleasure, desire, volition, and merit. He is devoid of pain, aversion, demerit and disposition, which also are the qualities of the finite soul. Vatsyayana regards God as a particular soul (आत्मविशेष) endowed with merit (धर्म), knowledge (ज्ञान), and intuition (समाधि), and devoid of demerit (अधर्म), false knowledge (मिथ्याज्ञान) and inadvertence (प्रमाद). He possesses eight kinds of supernatural powers (सिद्धि) due to His merit and intuition. His merit (धर्म), the result of His volitions, directs the material elements and the residual merits and demerits of the finite souls, and makes them produce their results. He is omnipotent in regard to His creation which springs from His creative will. He creates the world out of the pre-existing atoms by the fiat of His will. His omnipotence in creation is the result of His own merit due to His volitions. He is like the father of the finite souls. He acts for their benefit, just as father acts for the benefit of children.²

Jayanta Bhatta recognizes five qualities of God, viz., knowledge, pleasure, desire, volition, and merit. God is omniscient. He has one eternal intuition of all past, present, future, remote, and subtle objects. It is akin to perception, though it is not brought about by the intercourse of the sense-organs with their objects. It is immediate knowledge. God always perceives all objects. So He is devoid of dispositions (संस्कार) and memory (स्मृति).

¹ NK, p. 57.

² NB., iv. 1 21 ; NVTT., iv. 1, 21.

His knowledge is not inferential but perceptual or intuitive. He has eternal happiness. A suffering God would be as good as a magnified human being. He cannot be the creator and moral governor of the world. His desire also is eternal. But if his desire is eternal, His desire to create and His desire to destroy would be eternal, and consequently creation and destruction would be unceasing. Jayanta Bhatta maintains that though God's desire is eternal in its intrinsic nature, it is sometimes directed to creation, sometimes to preservation, and sometimes to destruction of the world. It is eternal, since it is not produced by the conjunction of the soul with *manas*. His volition (प्रयत्न) also is eternal. It consists in a fiat of will, or resolution (संकल्प). God has compassion for finite creatures (भूतानुग्रह). It is the motive of His creative activity. His creative will motivated by mercy for creatures brings about merit which constitutes His nature. His merit also is eternal. It maintains the moral order. It helps merits and demerits of the finite souls bring about their consequences. God is a particular soul endowed with eternal knowledge, happiness, desire, and volition and merit. He is free from pain, aversion, demerit, and disposition. He is also free from false knowledge, attachment, aversion, and delusion arising from it¹. God is a person endowed with the qualities of personality. He is the supreme person. He is not an impersonal substance devoid of qualities.

Uddyotokara holds that God is endowed with six qualities, viz., eternal knowledge, number, magnitude, distinctness, conjunction, and disjunction.² He is devoid of demerit, and consequently, of pain. He has no detachment (वैराग्य), since He is free from pain. He has no aversion owing to freedom from pain. He has unrestricted desire in regard to all objects untainted by afflictions, like His knowledge. First, Uddyotakara does not mention desire among the six qualities of God. Then he refers to His unrestricted desire in regard to all objects like His infinite know-

1 NM., p. 201

2 NV., iv, I. 21, p. 469

3 *Ibid*, p. 470

ledge. He does not refer to God's volition (प्रयत्न). Uddyotakara maintains that God's lordship (ऐश्वर्य) is eternal. But if it is eternal, His merit (धर्म) would be of no use. Uddyotakara urges that God's merit referred to by Vatsyayana does not bring about His lordship, but favours or activates the accumulated merits and demerits existing in the individual souls. In fact, there is no merit in Him. So His lordship is eternal, since it is not brought about by His merit.¹ Uddyotakara does not recognize eternal happiness of God.

Vachaspati Mishra and Udayana hold that God as the efficient cause of the world is endowed with eternal knowledge, eternal desire, and eternal volition in regard to all objects. Without desire and volition God cannot be the creator of the world. Knowledge, desire, and volition are implied by creatorship.² Vachaspati holds that His knowledge and power of action (क्रियाशक्ति) are eternal. So His lordship (ऐश्वर्य) is eternal. God engages in creative activity by His very nature (तत्स्वाभाव्यात्). But though He is intelligent and compassionate to creatures, He creates this manifold world in conformity with merits and demerits of the individual souls according to the inexorable Moral Law.

He cannot transcend the nature of things. Merits and demerits of the individual souls bring about their inevitable consequences. But they can do so only when they are activated and guided by the will of God, who acts according to the Moral Law. He cannot transcend the moral nature of the individual souls. He cannot but help their demerits work out their consequences. He cannot help creating sufferings which inevitably follow from the demerits of the individual souls. He cannot create a perfectly happy world. Though He is omniscient, all-merciful, and omnipotent, He cannot over-ride the Moral Law which

1 *Ibid.*, p. 468

2 NVTT., iv. 1. 21, p. 425; NKS., V; *Atmatattvaviveka*,

is the law of His own being and the being of the individual souls.¹

Vatsyayana recognizes the existence of merit (धर्म) in God, which is the result of His volitions, though they are not expressed in overt actions, and which results in His creation of the world.² His merit is necessary for guiding the merits and demerits of the individual souls. But there is no evidence for the existence of merit in God. Vachaspati holds that all effects are produced by the eternal power of God, and there is no necessity for His merit.³ He can direct the atoms as well as the merits and demerits of the individual souls and help them produce their effects without the aid of His own merit.⁴ Thus Uddyotakara and Vachaspati deny the existence of merit or acquired moral excellence (धर्म) in God. But they do not deny the eternal moral perfection of God from which the Moral Law follows. It is the law of His moral being.

God directs the merits and demerits of the individual souls, which inhere in them. How does God come into relation with them, in order to activate and guide them? God is a ubiquitous substance. The individual souls also are ubiquitous substances. Some hold that two ubiquitous substances are related to each other by uncaused conjunction. God is for ever connected with the individual souls, and through them with their merits. Vachaspati offers another explanation. God is connected with atoms; the merits and demerits inhere in the individual souls. So God is indirectly connected with the merits and demerits of the individual souls through the atoms⁵. This is a queer hypothesis which has no metaphysical significance.

Jayanta Bhatta recognizes the existence of eternal happiness in God⁶. But Vatsyayana, Uddyotakara,

1 NVT., IV. 1. 21, RP. 419-20.

2 *Ibid.*, p. 418.

3 *Ibid.*, p. 420.

4 *Ibid.*, p. 425.

5 NVT., IV. 1. 21, p. 425.

6 NM., p. 201.

Udayana, and Gangesha deny its existence. They hold that God is absolutely free from pain. But Vishvanatha, Nilakantha, and later Naiyayikas recognize the existence of eternal happiness in God. But God is the substrate of eternal happiness, which does not constitute His essence.

God is the efficient cause of the world. He is not its material cause. He is the creator, preserver, and destroyer of the world. He is the Moral Governor. He rewards the virtuous and punishes the vicious. He is the supervisor of the merits and demerits of the individual souls. He is not the creator of atoms. He is not the creator of the souls. Atoms and souls are co-eternal with Him. They can neither be created nor destroyed by Him. He is the creator of the Vedas. He is the promulgator of the moral codes.

39. The Relation of God to the Individual Souls

The individual souls and God belong to the genus 'Soul'. They are substances endowed with spiritual qualities. Knowledge, pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, volition, merit, demerit and disposition are the qualities of the individual souls. They are their acquired qualities which are temporary. Eternal knowledge, happiness, desire, volition and merit are the qualities of God or the supreme soul. Some deny happiness and merit to God. Both individual souls and the supreme soul possess the generic qualities of number, magnitude, distinctness, conjunction, and disjunction. Both are ubiquitous substances. Both are eternal. God is not the creator or destroyer of the individual souls.

There is no identity between God and the individual souls. There is no identity-in-difference between them. There is absolute difference between them. The individual souls are neither parts nor qualities nor modes of God. They are co-eternal substances belonging to the same genus.

But God is omniscient, omnipotent and all-perfect, while the individual souls have fragmentary knowledge, limited powers, and moral imperfections. God is free

from pain, aversion, false knowledge, attachment, aversion, delusion, inadvertence, demerit, and disposition, while the individual souls possess them all. God has eternal supernatural powers, while the individual souls are ordinarily devoid of them, but can acquire them to a limited extent. God has eternal moral perfection, while the individual souls acquire moral perfection by severe moral discipline and true knowledge. God is neither bound (बद्ध) nor liberated (मुक्त), while the individual souls are bound first and then attain liberation. God is never in bondage, and consequently cannot attain liberation¹.

God is like father to the individual souls. He treats them as father treats his children. He rewards them for their virtues and punishes them for their vices to work off the load of their merits and demerits, and favours them with liberation by His infinite grace. He is like our own near and dear one constantly looking after our welfare. (आप्तकल्पश्चायम् । यथा पिताऽपत्यानां तथा पितृभूत ईश्वरो भूतानाम्)².

40. General Estimate of the Nyaya System

The Nyaya advocates realistic pluralism. It recognizes the reality of the atoms, the individual souls, and God. It regards them all as eternal. God makes the world out of the atoms. He directs the individual souls. There is an absolute difference between God and the souls, on the one hand, and the world, on the other. There is an absolute difference between God and the individual souls, though they are of the nature of souls. There is a dualism of God and the individual souls, and a dualism of the souls and the material world. This is not a sound metaphysical system. The world, the finite souls, and God should be brought into more intimate relation with one another in a coherent order.

The Nyaya conception of God is deistic. God is transcendent in relation to the world and the finite souls. He is the world architect. He fashions the world out of the atoms from the outside. He is omni-

¹ NV, iv. 1. 21, p. 470

² NB, iv. 1. 21, p. 242.

potent. Why should He not be credited with the power of creating atoms? He creates motion in the atoms and combines them in a particular order. He sustains the world by His will which creates natural forces which preserve the world. He destroys the world by disjoining the atoms. But He cannot destroy the atoms. Is it not more legitimate to hold that God creates the world out of His nature, sustains it by His will, and re-absorbs it in himself? The world is evolved from God, sustained by Him, and re-absorbed in Him. God is immanent in the world, but not exhausted in it. God is immanent as well as transcendent. This is the logical consequence of the Nyaya position. But the Nyaya does not regard God as the world-soul and the immanent essence of the individual souls.

The Naiyayika holds that God directs the individual souls, supervises their merits and demerits, and helps them produce their consequences in the shape of enjoyments and sufferings. But he does not regard God as immanent in the individual souls. He is external to them and directs them from the outside. The analogy of father and children suggests the external relation between God and the finite souls. God is the *Primus inter pares* in the language of Ward and Howison. He is the Supreme Soul among the finite souls. He is the President of the republic of finite souls. He is omniscient, omnipotent, and perfect. But the finite souls have finite knowledge, limited powers, and imperfection. God and the souls both are ubiquitous. Both belong to the same genus 'Soul'. So it is more proper to hold that God is immanent in the finite souls as their inner controller. There is no absolute difference between them. But there is identity-in-difference between them.

The Nyaya recognizes an external relation between God and the world, and God and the finite souls. It is more proper to hold that there is inseparable relation between God and the world, and God and the finite souls. There is identity-in-difference between them.

The Nyaya starts with the dualism of matter and soul, and then mitigates it by holding that God, as the Supreme Soul, controls matter, imposes His own plan

upon it, and adapts it to the moral demands of the souls. Again it starts with the dualism of body and the soul, and then makes body and the sense-organs instruments of the soul. The logical consequence of the Nyaya doctrine is that God evolves the world from within Himself, and the soul is the entelechy of the body informing and inspiring it as its means. The Nyaya dualism logically leads to spiritualistic monism.

The Nyaya regards the soul as an unintelligent substance which acquires the quality of consciousness in conjunction with *manas* and body. The soul regains its pristine purity in liberation, when it is divested of its acquired qualities of knowledge, pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, volition, merit, demerit, and disposition. If the soul loses consciousness in liberation, the Vedantist rightly objects that its liberation is as good as the condition of a stone which none covets. Consciousness should be regarded as an essential property of the soul as the Sankhya thinks. The soul is an ego rather than a substance. It is the subject or the knower by its very nature. The Nyaya practically admits it when it recognizes the existence of eternal knowledge, eternal desire, and eternal volition in God, though it does not regard them as constituting His essence. If they cannot exist apart from God, and He cannot exist apart from them, practically they constitute His essence. Similarly, knowledge, desire, and volition should be regarded as the essence of the self. Its liberation should be regarded as a state of spiritual illumination and bliss and kinship with God.

The Nyaya ethics is intellectualistic. Emotions and passions are the springs of action. They spring from false knowledge. With the removal of false knowledge, right knowledge enlightens the soul and eradicates the passions. The Nyaya does not attach proper importance to the regulative function of the will in controlling passions. It lays greater emphasis on egoistic virtues than on altruistic virtues. It does not seem to recognize the importance of social virtues. It treats them as the means of realizing liberation. The Nyaya regards the moral laws as commands of God to the finite souls for

their unconditional obedience. Rightness and wrongness are created by the Divine Will. This makes moral laws arbitrary. Moral laws are the laws of the finite souls' own being. They are the laws imposed by their ideal selves upon their actual selves for self-realisation. They are not imposed by God on the finite souls from without. But they are imposed by the finite selves on themselves. They are essentially self-imposed. God has eternal moral perfection. He is the immanent essence of the finite souls. He is their ideal self. Rightness is in harmony with His nature. Wrongness is repugnant to it. The Moral Law is the law of His being and the being of the individual souls.

The Nyaya rightly regards the world as the moral order adapted to the moral deserts of the finite souls, and governed by God who is the Moral Governor. The Nyaya does not bring out the logical implications of its doctrine and develop its pluralistic theism into a coherent spiritualistic theism. It conceives God as a *deus ex machina* who relates the world and the finite souls to each other in a mechanical manner. It does not bring the world, souls, and God into intimate relation with one another in a coherent order. Ramanuja's qualified monism regards them as inseparably related to one another in the synthetic unity of Brahman which is identity-in-difference.

The greatest contribution of the Nyaya to Indian philosophy is its logic and methodology which are adopted by the other systems with slight modifications. The different kinds of inference and fallacies recognized by the Nyaya have become a common place in Indian philosophy. But its ontology is not very profound. It advocates the dualism of matter and spirit, and the dualism of God and the finite spirits. It advocates pluralism and theism. It believes in radical pluralism of the finite spirits with God as the *Primus inter pares*. It believes in God as the Moral Governor of the republic of eternal finite spirits.

References :

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| Nyaya-Bhashya. | Nyayamanjari. |
| Nyaya-Vartika. | Nyayakusumanjali, |
| Nyaya-Vartika-Tatparya-Tika. | Nyayakusumanjali-Prakasha. |

CHAPTER IV.

The Vaisheshika Philosophy.

1. Introduction.

The Vaisheshika system emphasizes the particularity (विशेष) of eternal substances. The atoms of earth, water, fire and air are eternal. Each atom has a particularity which distinguishes it from other atoms. Ether (आकाश) space, time, soul, and mind (मनस्) are eternal substances. Each of them has a particularity. The Vaisheshika derives its name from *vishesh* or particularity. It is a pluralistic system. It lays stress on the plurality of physical things and their ultimate constituents or atoms, and the plurality of the individual souls. It introduces the concept of God at a later stage. But like the Nyaya, it regards God as externally related to the world and the individual souls. It also regards Him as the supreme soul.

Kanada (300 B.C.) was the founder of the Vaisheshika system. He composed the *Vaisheshika Sutra*. Prashastapada (4th century A.D.) wrote a running commentary on it called *Padarthadharvasangraha*. Shridhara (10th century A.D.) wrote a commentary on it called *Nyayakandali*. Udayana (10th century A.D.) also wrote a commentary on Prashastapada's work called *Kiranaavali*. Shankara Mishra (15th century A.D.) wrote a commentary on Kanada's *Vaisheshika Sutra* called *Upaskar*. The later works combined the Vaisheshika with the Nyaya system. They are works of the syncretic school of the Nyaya-Vaisheshika. Shivaditya's (10th century A.D.) *Saptapadarthi*, Keshava Mishra's (13th century A.D.) *Tarkabhaskara*, Annambhatta's (17th century A.D.) *Tarkasangraha*, Varadaraja's (12th century A.D.) *Tarkikaraksha*, Vishvanatha's (17th century A.D.) *Bhashaparichchheda* and a commentary on it called *Siddhantamuktavali* are important syncretic works. Jayanarayana (17th century A.D.) wrote a commentary on *Vaisheshika Sutra* called *Kanadasutrativrtti*.

The Vaisheshikas are realists. They recognize the reality of the individual souls and objective realities.

The souls are eternal entities. They are not mere streams of consciousness or mind-body-complexes as the Buddhists hold. They are eternal substances endowed with qualities, *e.g.*, cognition, pleasure, pain, etc. The physical things are real. They are independent of souls and their cognitions. They are substances which subsist in themselves independent of qualities. The Buddhists do not recognize substances independent of qualities. They regard the so-called substances as mere aggregates of qualities. They are phenomenologists. They do not recognize the reality of permanent entities underlying the changing flux of phenomena. The Vaisheshika advocates realism as distinguished from the Buddhist phenomenism.

The Nyaya and the Vaisheshika are the allied systems (समानतन्त्र). They both recognize the reality of God, individual souls and minds, physical things, atoms of earth, water, light, and air, space, time, and ether. They hold the same views of the nature of the individual soul and its liberation. They both advocate realism and pluralism. They advocate the same deistic view of God.

But they differ from each other in two main points. First the Nyaya recognizes four means of valid knowledge (प्रमाण), *viz.*, perception, inference, comparison, and testimony. But the Vaisheshika recognizes only two means of valid knowledge, *viz.*, perception and inference. Secondly, the Nyaya recognizes sixteen categories (पदार्थ), while the Vaisheshika recognizes seven categories. The Nyaya categories are the main topics of a treatise of logic. The Vaisheshika categories are the main kinds of objects of knowledge. The Nyaya categories are logical, while the Vaisheshika categories are metaphysical. The Nyaya emphasizes logic and epistemology, and incidentally discusses metaphysics. But the Vaisheshika emphasizes ontology or metaphysics, and incidentally discusses logic and epistemology.

1. EPISTEMOLOGY.

2. The Means of Valid Knowledge

The Nyaya recognizes four *pramanas*, *viz.*, perception, inference, comparison, and testimony. But the

Vaisheshika recognizes only two *pramanas*, viz., perception and inference. The Vaisheshika views of perception and inference are the same as the Nyaya views. Substances, qualities, and actions are perceived. Atoms and dyads are imperceptible. Triads and gross substances are perceptible. Atoms can be perceived by yogic intuition. The self can be inferred as the substrate of cognition, pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, and volition. It is not an object of mental perception. But it can be perceived by yogic intuition. The Vaisheshika brings comparison and testimony under inference. The validity of the scriptures is an inference from the authoritative character of the speakers.¹ Their validity is inferred from the reliability of their composers. "The authoritativeness of the Vedas depends on their being spoken by the seers" (तद्वचनादान्नाय-प्रामाण्यम्)² Truths were directly revealed to them. Later the aphorism of Kanada was interpreted in a different way. 'The authoritativeness of the Vedas depends on their being the word of God.' Testimony is inference because it depends upon invariable concomitance between words and their meanings³. Meanings are inferred from words which are their signs. Comparison is verbal knowledge or testimony. An unfamiliar object (e.g., a wild cow) is known as similar to a familiar object (e.g., a cow) on the strength of a statement of a reliable person⁴. Testimony is inference. So comparison is brought under inference. Presumption (अर्थोपपत्ति) also is inference⁵. A person is not found to eat in the day ; but he becomes fat. From his fatness his eating at night is inferred. Gesture (चेष्टा) also is inference. Intentions of persons are inferred from their gestures. One kind of movement of hand is a sign of calling. Another kind of movement of hand is a sign of dismissing. These are signs from which intentions are inferred⁶. Inclusion (सम्भव) is inference, since it

1 P B., p. 213.

2 VS., i 1. 3 ; X. 2. 9.

3 NK. p. 213.

4 PB. p. 220.

5 PB., p. 223.

6 NK., p. 220.

depends on universal concomitance. A hundred is included in a thousand.¹ Negation (अभाव) also is an inference. Non-existence of a cause is inferred from an unproduced effect, even as existence of a cause is inferred from a produced effect². Hence perception and inference are the means of valid knowledge (प्रमाण).

Knowledge (बुद्धि) is of two kinds: (1) Recollection (स्मृति); and (2) apprehension (अनुभव). Apprehension is either valid (प्रमा) or invalid (अप्रमा). Valid apprehension is either perception or inference. Perception is human or divine. Human perception is of six kinds, visual, auditory, tactual, gustatory, olfactory, and mental. Thus perception is either external or internal. Invalid apprehension is of two kinds, doubt (संशय) and illusion (विपर्यय). Inference is of two kinds, *viz.*, inference for oneself (स्वार्थ) and inference for others (परार्थ). Again, inference is of three kinds: (1) *Kevalanvayi* (केवलान्वयि); (2) *Kevalavyatireki*, (केवलव्यातिरेकि), and *Anvayavyatireki* (अन्वयव्यतिरेकि)⁴.

III. ONTOLOGY.

3 The Categories (पदार्थ).

Padartha (पदार्थ) literally means the meaning of a word. A *padartha* is an object of knowledge (ज्ञेय), and capable of being named (अभिधेय)⁵. It is an object of valid knowledge (प्रामाण्यविषय).⁶ All objects of valid knowledge are brought under six categories (पदार्थ) by Kanada. They are substance (द्रव्य), quality (गुण), action or movement (कर्म), generality (सामान्य), particularity (विशेष), and inherence (समवाय)⁷. Kanada does not mention non-existence (अभाव). Shridhara, Udayana, and Shivaditya add the seventh category,

1 PB., & NK., p. 225

2 PB., p. 225.

3 SP., p. 21.

4 SP., p. 22.

5 TD., p. 4

6 SP. p. 9.

7 VS 1. 1. 4.

non-existence. Shridhara says, "Non-existence has not been separately mentioned, because it depends upon existence, not because it does not exist" (अभावस्य पृथक्गणुपदेशः भावपारतन्त्र्यात् त्वभावात्).⁴ Udayana also says, "Non-existence is not mentioned separately, because it is indicated by the categories of existence, which are its counter-entities"⁵. He divides the categories into existence (भाव) and non-existence (अभाव), and then subdivides existence into substance, quality, action, generality, particularity, and inherence⁶. Shivaditya recognizes seven categories including non-existence in his work *Saptapadārthi* (सप्तपदार्थी)⁷. The later Nyaya-Vaisheshika writers recognize seven categories.

The sixteen categories (पदार्थ) of the Nyaya are the divisions of a treatise on logic. But the seven categories of the Vaisheshika are the different classes of the objects of knowledge. They are ontological categories. Hence the syncretic writers of the Nyaya-Vaisheshika school generally adopt the seven categories of the Vaisheshika.

Substance (द्रव्य) is the substratum of quality and action. A jar is a substance. Its colour is its quality. Its movement is its action. Quality is static or passive. Action is dynamic or active. Quality (गुण) is comparatively permanent. Action (कर्म) is temporary. The genus of jar (घटत्व) subsists in individual jars. It is a generality (सामान्य). An eternal substance has an ultimate individuality or particularity (विशेष). Ether (आकाश) is one, ubiquitous, and eternal. It has a particularity

4 NK., p. 7.

5 KV., p. 6.

6 लक्षणावली p. 1.

7 SP., p. 10.

which distinguishes it from other eternal substances, space, time, etc. Inherence is the inseparable relation between the whole and its parts, quality and substance, action and substance, a generality and an individual, particularity and an eternal substance. Whiteness inheres in chalk. The genus of jar (घटत्व) inheres in a jar. Non-existence (अभाव) is not a logical category, but an ontological category. It is not mere negation of a substance in thought, but actual absence of a substance. When a jar is destroyed, there is a kind of non-existence of the jar. Substance is the main category. All categories depend on it for their existence. Substance is the substratum of all other categories. So it is first mentioned. (आदौ द्रव्यस्योद्देशः सर्वाश्रयत्वेन प्राधान्यात्).¹

The first six categories have the common characters of existence (अस्तित्व) nameability (अभिधेयत्व), and knowability (ज्ञेयत्व)². Existence consists in possession of intrinsic nature (स्वरूपवत्त्व)³. The three categories of substance (द्रव्य), quality (गुण), and action (कर्म) are related to beinghood (सत्तासम्बन्ध); beinghood (सत्ता) subsists in them⁴. The three categories of generality, particularity, and inherence are related to themselves (स्वात्मसम्बन्ध); they are self-subsistent. They are known by the intellect (बुद्धिलक्षण). They are neither causes (कारण) nor effects (कार्य). They have no generality (सामान्य) or particularity. (विशेष). They are eternal (नित्य). They cannot be expressed by the word 'object' (अर्थ).⁵ Generality, particularity, and inherence are not logical categories. They are ontological categories. Kanada regards generality and particularity as concepts

1 PB., p. 7.

2 PB., p. 16.

3 NK., p. 16.

4 PB., p. 17.

5 PB., p. 19.

relative to the intellect (सामान्यं विशेष इति बुध्यपेक्षम्).¹ But the later Vaisheshikas regard them as objective existences. Inherence is treated by all Vaisheshikas as a real, objective, inseparable relation. Substance, quality, and action are related to beinghood by inherence, whereas generality, particularity, and inherence are self-subsistent entities independent of time and space.² Substance, quality, and action are capable of producing effects and liable to destruction.³ They are existences in time and space. Generality, particularity, and inherence are timeless self-sufficient existences.

The Vaisheshika categories may be considered in their inter-relation to one another. They may be divided into existence (भाव) and non-existence (अभाव). Existents are of two kinds, properties and the substratum in which they reside, which is called a substance (द्रव्य). Some properties reside in many substances together. They are called generalities (सामान्य). The latter reside in individual substances singly. They are either permanent or transient. The former are qualities (गुण). The latter are actions (कर्म). Inherence (समवाय) or inseparable relation is a separate category. It is the relation between a quality or an action and a substance. Particularity (विशेष) also is a separate category. It is the ultimate individuality of an eternal substance. Inherence is one and eternal. Particularities are many and eternal. They are assumed to explain the special theories of the Vaisheshikas.⁴

4. The Vaisheshika Categories and Aristotle's Categories.

Aristotle recognizes ten categories : (1) Substance; (2) Quantity; (3) Quality; (4) Relation; (5) Place; (6) Time; (7) Posture; (8) Appurtenance or Property; (9) Activity; (10) Passivity. Of these the last nine are predicable of substance, but substance itself being independent of all attributes, cannot be predicated of anything. Kanada's categories (पदार्थ) stand for different kinds of things. They are metaphysical

1 VS., 1. 2. 3.

2 KV., pp. 30—31

3 VSV., 1. 1. 8.

4 TSP., p. 75.

categories. Aristotle's categories are mainly logical. They are mainly predicables or classes of terms which can be used as predicates. Kanada's categories include not only things which are predicable of other things, but also subjects capable of having things predicated of them. Aristotle's categories are mainly different kinds of predicables. Kanada's categories are mainly different kinds of objects of knowledge. The former are concerned with propositions. The latter are concerned with real objects. Kanada's categories may be brought under the categories of Aristotle. Both recognize substance (द्रव्य) and quality (गुण). Aristotle's quantity may be brought under the qualities of Kanada. Relation is of two kinds, *viz.*, conjunction and inherence. Conjunction is a quality. Inherence is a separate category. The remaining categories fall under relation in a wide sense. Time and space are substances according to Kanada. Activity is *Karma*, while passivity is negation of activity. Property may be generality or particularity. Lastly, posture is disposition, which is a quality. Aristotle does not mention non-existence (अभाव) as he deals only with positive being.¹

5. Substance (द्रव्य).

The Vaisheshika recognizes the existence of substances. They are not mere aggregates of qualities as the Buddhist realist holds. They are not mere ideas as the Buddhist idealist holds. They are real and objective. They exist independently of the cognitions that apprehend them.

Substances are substrates of qualities and actions, and are the material cause of their products (क्रियागुणवत् समवायिकारणमिति द्रव्यलक्षणम्)². A substance is different from qualities. If it does not differ from qualities, it cannot possess qualities. Qualities and actions do not possess qualities.³ We predicate qualities of a substance, which only can possess qualities. We do not predicate qualities of qualities or a group of

1 TSP., pp. 73—74.

2 V. S., i. 1. 15.

3 VSU., i. 1. 15.

qualities. A substance, therefore, is something over and above qualities. It is the substrate of qualities. They inhere in a substance. The relation between a substance and its qualities is said to be inherence (समवाय) which will be discussed later.

Actions or movements also inhere in a substance. They cannot subsist by themselves. They are dynamic and temporary features of a substance, while qualities are its static and permanent features. Qualities and actions both inhere in a substance. They are not self-subsistent entities. Apart from a substance they have no existence.¹

The Vaisheshika holds that a substance does not possess qualities at the first moment of its production. If the qualities are produced simultaneously with the substance, they would be indistinguishable from each other.² If they are not so produced, then the substance is devoid of qualities at the moment of its production. So substance is the substrate of qualities either in the relation of inherence (समवाय) or prior non-existence (प्रागभाव) or future existence. Qualities inhere in a substance in the second moment after its production and continue to do so till its destruction. A substance is the substrate of qualities, actual or potential.

A substance is a material cause (समवायिकारण) of its composite product. Threads are the material cause of cloth which is made by their combination. Conjunction (संयोग) of threads, which is a quality, is the non-material cause (असमवायिकारण) of cloth. A substance only can be a material cause.

A substance has a genus (द्रव्यत्व) which inheres in it. It is the substrate of qualities and actions. It is the material cause of its composite product.

The whole (अवयविन्) is different from its parts (अवयव). It is not a mere aggregate of parts as the

¹ VSU., i. 1, 15.

² TSP, p. 77.

Buddhist realist holds. It is something over and above its parts. The parts are the material cause of the whole, which inheres in them. The relation between the whole and its parts is inherence (समवाय) which will be discussed later.

Substance is the fundamental category. Quality and action inhere in substance. Generality inheres in an individual substance. Particularity inheres in an eternal substance. Inherence is a relation that subsists in a substance. It is the relation between a quality and a substance, an action and a substance, a generality and an individual, a particularity and an eternal substance, and a whole and its parts, or a composite product and its material cause. So the Vaisheshika mentions substance as the first category. (द्रव्यस्य सर्वपदार्थाधारत्वेन समवायिकारणत्वेन च प्राधान्यात् प्रथममुद्देशः).¹

Substances are eternal or non-eternal. Composite substances are produced by the combination of their parts. They are destroyed by the separation of their parts. They are non-eternal. They depend on their parts. But simple substances are eternal, independent, and endued with ultimate individuality or particularity.² They are neither produced nor destroyed. They are eternal. They do not depend upon anything else. They are self-existent. They are independent. They possess ultimate individuality which distinguishes them from other simple eternal substances. Non-eternal substances are produced and destroyed by something different from themselves.³

6 Kinds of Substances.

There are nine kinds of substances, viz., earth, water, light, air, ether, time, space, soul, and mind (मनस्). The souls are of two kinds, viz., the individual soul (जीवात्मन्) and the supreme soul (परमात्मन्) or God.

The Vaisheshika is an advocate of realism. It recognizes the existence of substances independent of the apprehending cognitions. But it does not advocate materialism. It recognizes the reality of finite souls and God. It advocates the dualism of matter and

¹ SPMBh., p. 11.

² NK., p. 21

³ VS, i. 1. 9—10, 12, 15, 18, x. 2. 1.

spirit. It advocates pluralism. It recognizes the reality of an infinite number of eternal atoms of earth, water, light, and air, an infinite number of eternal finite souls and minds, independent of one another, each having an ultimate individuality or particularity which distinguishes it from other eternal substances. It recognizes the individuality of composite products of earth, water, light, and air, which is determined by their parts. It recognizes the reality of ether, space, and time, each of which is one, ubiquitous, and eternal, having a particularity which distinguishes it from other eternal substances. It recognizes the reality of God distinct from the world of atoms, composite things and finite souls. God creates the world out of the pre-existing atoms which are eternal. Atoms are the material cause of the world. God is its efficient cause. Finite souls are distinct from, and independent of, God. They are neither produced nor destroyed by God. They are eternal. So the Vaisheshika is a system of pluralism.

7. Earth, Water, Light, and Air

Earth, water, light, air, and ether are the five elements (पञ्चभूत). Each of them has a specific quality (विशेषगुण). Smell is the specific quality of earth. Taste is the specific quality of water. Colour is the specific quality of light. Touch or temperature is the specific quality of air. And sound is the specific quality of ether. The organ of smell or nose is made of earth, and therefore can apprehend smell. The organ of taste or tongue is made of water, and therefore can apprehend taste. The organ of vision or eye is made of light, and therefore can apprehend colour. The organ of touch or skin is made of air, and therefore can apprehend touch or temperature. The organ of hearing or ear is made of ether, and therefore can apprehend sound. This is a peculiar doctrine of the Nyaya-Vaisheshika. A sense-organ must be constituted by that element, whose specific quality it can apprehend.

¹ SPMBh, p. 11,

² NK, p. 21.

³ VS., i. 1. 9-10, 12, 15, 18, X. 2. 1.

Earth (पृथिवी) is eternal or transient. The atoms of earth are eternal. Products of earth are transient. Earth has the qualities of odour, taste, colour, touch, caused fluidity, gravity, velocity, number, magnitude, distinctness, conjunction, disjunction, remoteness, and proximity. Odour is its specific quality. The olfactory organ is an earthy organ. The colour, taste, odour, and touch of both eternal and transient earth are transient and due to heat. The genus of earth subsists in earth.

Water (जल) is eternal or transient. The atoms of water are eternal. Products of water are transient. Water has the qualities of taste, colour, touch, natural fluidity, viscosity, gravity, velocity, number, magnitude, distinctness, conjunction, disjunction, remoteness, and proximity. Taste is the specific quality of water. The gustatory organ is a watery organ. The qualities of atoms of water are eternal, and those of products of water are transient. The genus of water subsists in water.

Light (तेजः) is eternal or transient. The atoms of light are eternal. Products of light are transient. Light has the qualities of colour, touch, fluidity, velocity, number, magnitude, distinctness, conjunction, disjunction, remoteness, and proximity. Colour is the specific quality of light. The visual organ is made of light. The genus of light subsists in light.

Air (वायु) is eternal or transient. The atoms of air are eternal. Products of air are transient. Air has the qualities of touch, velocity, number, magnitude, distinctness, conjunction, disjunction, remoteness, and proximity. Touch is the specific quality of air. The genus of air subsists in air.

There are atoms of earth, water, light, and air. They produce composite substances by combination. Atoms are eternal. But composite products are transient. The qualities of atoms are eternal. But those of composite products are transient.¹

¹ TB., pp. 20-21 ; SP., pp. 13-16 ; TR., pp. 134-37 ; TS , pp. 13-19 ; BP., 30-32, p. 138 ; KR., pp. 8-25 ; VS., ii. 1, 1-4 ; PB., pp. 27-44.

8 The Vaisheshika theory of Atomism.

The Vaisheshika advocates the theory of atomism. He holds that earth, water, light, and air are eternal as atoms, and transient as composite products. Either is one, ubiquitous and eternal. Composite substances of earth, water, light, and air are made up of parts. They are divisible into smaller parts, which are divisible into more minute parts, until we come to the indivisible atoms. They are the minutest parts of things. They are divisible and eternal, while composite products are divisible and non-eternal. The atoms mark the limit of division. They have the minutest magnitude. They are said to be globular (पारिमाण्डल्य), though they have no parts. They do not interpenetrate one another. They combine with one another and produce larger magnitudes. They combine with one another through the medium of ether (आकाश).

The atoms are eternal. They are neither created nor destroyed by God. They are co-eternal with God. They constitute the stuff of the world. They are its material cause. God is the efficient cause of the world.

The atoms are inactive or motionless in themselves. Their motion is due to an external agent. During the dissolution of the world the atoms remain isolated and motionless. The earlier Vaisheshikas hold that the unseen agencies (अदृष्ट) residing in the individual souls produce motion in the atoms which produce composite products for their experience. The later Vaisheshikas hold that God produces motion in the atoms and combines them into composite products with the aid of unseen agencies (अदृष्ट) or merit (धर्म) and demerit (अधर्म) residing in the individual souls for their enjoyments and sufferings.

There are four kinds of atoms, viz., atoms of earth, atoms of water, atoms of light, and atoms of air. Ether is one, all-pervading and eternal. There are no atoms of ether. Ether does not enter into combination

with other elements. The atoms of earth have odour, taste, colour, touch, fluidity, gravity, and velocity. The atoms of water have taste, colour, touch, fluidity, viscosity, gravity, and velocity. The atoms of light have colour, touch, fluidity, and velocity. The atoms of air have touch and velocity. These four kinds of atoms have also the general qualities of number, magnitude, distinctness, conjunction, disjunction, remoteness and proximity. These qualities are eternal. The qualities of composite products are due to the atoms of which they are composed. Colour, odour, taste, touch or temperature, are said to be secondary qualities by Locke. Gravity, velocity, number, magnitude, remoteness, proximity, etc., are said to be primary qualities by him. Thus the atoms have both primary and secondary qualities.

The Vaisheshika holds that a dyad (द्वयणुक) is produced by the conjunction of two atoms (परमाणु). These atoms are its inherent cause. Conjunction is its non-inherent cause. Unseen agency (अदृष्ट) is its efficient cause. A triad (त्रयणुक) is produced by the conjunction of three dyads. These dyads are its inherent cause. Conjunction is its non-inherent cause. Unseen agency is its efficient cause. A quartrad (चतुरणुक) is produced by the conjunction of four triads. The quartrads combine into larger and larger substances, till we have the great earth, the great water, the great light, and the great air. The qualities of the composite substances are produced by the qualities of their constituent atoms¹

Atoms are spherical. They are the minutest spheres. They are not absolutely without magnitude. They are not non-spatial, but devoid of parts. Because they have no parts, they have no within or without.² They are too minute to be perceived. They are supersensible. They can be perceived by seers and God. Dyads also are imperceptible. Only a triad (त्रसरेणु, त्रयणुक) is perceptible. It has magnitude large enough to be perceived.

1 TB. p. 21.

2 I.L.A. pp. 218—19

The smallest visible particle is the mote in a sun-beam, which is a triad composed of three dyads. The magnitude of an atom (परमाणु) is minute (अणु). The magnitude of a dyad (द्वयणुक) also is minute (अणु). But the magnitude of a dyad must be greater than that of an atom, which is said to be spherical (परिमाणुद्वय). The magnitude of a triad (त्रयणुक) is great (महत्) enough to be perceived. The magnitude of a product is produced by any one of the three causes, viz, the number, the magnitude, or the arrangement of its parts. The large magnitude of products from triads upwards is produced by the magnitude of their causes or constituent parts as well as their arrangement. But the magnitude of a dyad is produced by the number of its constituent atoms!

Some proofs for the existence of atoms are given. First, ether is the highest limit of magnitude; it has the greatest magnitude (परममहत्त्व). So atoms mark the lowest limit of magnitude (अणुत्व). There must be a definite limit to a sub-division in the atom just as there is a definite limit to extension in ether². Secondly, composite products are transient; they are produced and destroyed; they are changeable and divisible. Therefore they are composed of ultimate constituents or atoms which are eternal, unchangeable, and indivisible³. Thirdly, composite products are divisible into parts, which also are divisible into smaller parts. But we cannot go on sub-dividing them into smaller and smaller parts *ad infinitum*. We must stop at the minutest atoms which are indivisible units in order to avoid infinite regress⁴. They are called atoms. They cannot be divided into parts. They are indivisible and eternal. Fourthly, if composite substances were infinitely divisible into minuter and minuter parts without end, they would all be composed of an equally infinite number of parts, and therefore would be of equal magnitude. If they were endlessly divisible into parts,

1 TSP., p. 123.

2 SM, on BP., 36, p 152.

3 BP., 36, p, 146.

4 S. M. on BP., 36.

differences in their magnitudes could not be accounted for. Even a mountain and a mustard seed would be of equal dimension, because they are equally divisible into an infinite number of minute parts¹. So we must admit that atoms are the minutest parts of composite substances, which are indivisible.

9. Is the Vaisheshika Atomism materialistic ?

The Vaisheshika recognizes the reality of atoms, individual souls, the Law of Karma, and God. The souls are not material ; they are not composed of atoms. God also is not material. God and souls are spiritual entities. God produces the world out of the pre-existing atoms according to the Law of Karma. He is the efficient cause of the world. The atoms are its material cause. The world is a physical order subservient to the moral order. God produces the world out of atoms according to merits and demerits of the individual souls for their enjoyments and sufferings. Merit brings about pleasure and joy. Demerit brings about pain and sorrow. Thus the Vaisheshika atomism cannot be branded as materialistic.

10 The Vaisheshika Atomism and the Greek Atomism.

Some suggest that the Vaisheshikas borrowed the doctrine of atoms from the Greeks, when India came into contact with Greece. Probably this is a wrong surmise. The Vaisheshika atomism widely differs from the Greek atomism, though both recognize the reality of indivisible and imperceptible atoms, which constitute material things. First, Democritus and Leucippus believed in an indefinite number of atoms devoid of qualities, but endued with quantities. Atoms do not possess qualities, but differ in figure, size, weight, position, and arrangement. They have no qualitative differences but only quantitative differences. But Kanada recognized qualitative differences in the atoms. The atoms of earth have the qualities of odour, colour, taste, and temperature. The atoms of water have the qualities of colour, taste, and temperature. The atoms of

¹ *Ibid*, pp. 150—51.

light have the qualities of colour and temperature. The atoms of air have the quality of temperature. Thus the different kinds of atoms have different kinds of secondary qualities. Colour, taste, odour, and temperature are said to be secondary qualities. Besides, they have the common qualities of number, magnitude, distinctness, conjunction, disjunction, remoteness, and proximity, which may be said to be primary qualities. Democritus and Leucippus reduced qualitative differences to quantitative ones. But Kanada recognized the qualitative and quantitative differences in the atoms, though they are equally indivisible and possess the same minutest magnitude (अणुत्व) or spherical size (परिमाणुत्व). Kanada did not accept the Greek view that the atoms are devoid of secondary qualities. He did not reduce their qualitative differences to quantitative differences. Secondly, Democritus and Epicurus held that the atoms are by nature in motion, while Kanada held that the atoms are by nature inactive and motionless (निष्क्रिय), and motion is produced in them by unseen agencies (अदृष्ट), merit (धर्म) and demerit (अधर्म) residing in the individual souls. The later Vaisheshikas held that motion is produced in the atoms by God. Thirdly, Democritus held that even souls are composed of subtle atoms, while Kanada distinguished between souls and atoms and regarded them as co-eternal entities, which are not reducible to one another, each of them possessing an ultimate individuality or particularity (विशेष, which distinguishes it from all other eternal substances. Fourthly, Democritus and Leucippus were advocates of materialism, and explained the universe by atoms and their combination according to mechanical laws. But Kanada recognized souls as quite distinct from the atoms, and explained the universe by the atoms and their combination according to the Law of Karma. He did not advocate materialistic and mechanical conception of the universe. The later Vaisheshikas believed in God as the efficient cause of the world, who creates it out of the pre-existing atoms according to the Law of

Karma. Thus, the Greek atomists were materialists and atheists, while the Vaisheshikas were dualists and theists. The former believed in a mechanical structure of the universe, while the latter believed in a teleological constitution of the universe. The Vaisheshikas believed that the universe is not merely a physical order but also a moral order. It is a sphere of moral life. It is not indifferent to human values. It gives us joys and sorrows according to our merits and demerits. God adapts the world to the moral deserts of the individual souls. Thus, there is a wide divergence in out-look between the Greek atomism and the Vaisheshika atomism. Hence, we cannot accept the hypothesis of Kanada borrowing his doctrine of 'atomism' from the Greek atomists¹.

11. The Vaisheshika Atomism and the Jaina Atomism

The Vaisheshika atomism differs from the Jaina atomism. The Vaisheshika holds that there are different kinds of atoms which have different qualities. The atoms of earth have odour, colour, taste, and touch. The atoms of water have colour, taste, and touch. The atoms of light have taste and touch. The atoms of air have touch only. Besides, they have other general qualities. Thus, the atoms of earth, water, light, and air are not homogeneous. They possess different qualities. The qualities of the atoms are eternal. But the Jaina holds that each atom has colour, taste, odour, and touch; it is soundless, but can produce sound in combination with many other atoms. The atoms are homogeneous; there are not different kinds of atoms corresponding to the elements of earth, water, light, and air. The homogeneous atoms become heterogeneous by varying combinations and develop into the different elements. The homogeneous atoms are differentiated into the different kinds of elements, earth, water, light, and air². There are no qualitative differences among the primary atoms. They possess the same qualities. But their qualities are not permanent; they are subject to mutation. So the atoms of the Jaina differ from

1 See also TSP., pp. 125—26, I. P., vol. II. pp. 202-03.

2 PK., 78, p. 132.

those of Kanada. But there are fundamental similarities between them. The atom of the Jaina is one, ultimate, indivisible, eternal unit of the physical elements like that of Kanada.

12. Ether (आकाश).

Ether is one, eternal, and all-pervading. Sound is its specific quality. Colour, taste, smell, and touch do not belong to it. Sound is a specific quality (विशेष गुण). It is perceived through the ear only. A quality must inhere in a substance. Smell is perceived through the nose or the olfactory organ only. Colour is perceived through the eye or the visual organ only. Taste is perceived through the tongue or the gustatory organ only. Touch is perceived through the skin or the tactual organ only. So, by the process of elimination sound is proved to be a specific quality of ether. The ear is made of ether. The organ of hearing is ether in the cavity of the ear. So, sound, the specific quality of ether, is perceived through it. It cannot be a special quality of space, time, and mind which are devoid of any special quality. Experience shows that sound is not a quality of the self. So ether must be the substance in which sound inheres. It is the inherent cause of sound.¹

Ether is one individual. It has no genus. It has a particularity (विशेष) which distinguishes it from other eternal substances. It is inactive. It appears to be diverse owing to its limiting adjuncts (उपाधि). Ether limited by a jar is not different from that limited by a house. Ether is one, simple, continuous substance. Atoms are infinitely small. They combine with each other through ether and produce a substance of larger magnitude. Atoms do not interpenetrate one another. They combine through the medium of ether. Ether is the connecting medium. It binds together the atoms. It is not discrete but continuous. If it were discrete

¹ TB, pp. 22-23 VS, II 1 24—27.

and analysable into atoms, we should assume another medium to bind together the atoms.¹

Ether is all-pervading. It is in contact with all corporeal objects which have limited magnitude and have motion. Its effects are perceived everywhere. So its magnitude is infinitely large.²

Ether is eternal. It is ubiquitous and therefore eternal. It is neither produced nor destroyed. It is one, ubiquitous, eternal substance. It has no genus. It is ubiquitous and therefore incapable of movement.³

Ether has the qualities of sound, number, magnitude, distinctness, conjunction and disjunction. It is one, eternal, and ubiquitous.⁴

Ether (आकाश) is different from space (दिक्). It is the inherent cause of sound which is its special quality. Space (दिक्) is the general cause of all effects. Sound is not its special quality. Ether fills all space. But it is not itself space. Space is a reality which holds things in their places.

13. Space (दिक्).

Space is one, eternal, and all-pervading. It is an individual. There is no genus of space. It has an ultimate individuality or particularity (विशेष) which distinguishes it from ether, time, souls, minds (मनस्), and atoms of earth, water, light, and air. All material things exist in space. They maintain their relative positions in space. If there were no space, they would interpenetrate one another. Space is the basis of the notions of 'far' and 'near,' 'east' and 'west.' It is one, but appears to be many owing to limiting conditions (उपाधि).⁵ A spatial position is to the east of a person or a thing, if it is near the mount of sun-rise; it is to the west, if it is far from it; it is to the north, if it is near the north pole; it is to the south, if it is far from

1 I. P., Vol. 11, p. 193.

2 TB., p. 23; TSD p. 11.

3 TB., p. 23

4 TB., p. 22

5 TB., p. 23.

it¹. Space is one. Its apparent diversity is due to the diversity of effects. One space is the substrate of conjunction which is the non-inherent cause of spatial remoteness and proximity. Spatial remoteness involves conjunction of a body with a large number of space-points. Spatial proximity involves its conjunction with a small number of space-points. This conjunction is a non-inherent cause of spatial remoteness and proximity. It subsists in body and space. Space is one. Space-points are fixed positions in one space. Space is imperceptible. It is inferred from spatial remoteness and proximity.²

Space is that which is not time, but is extensive and devoid of any special quality. Ether is one, eternal, and all-pervading. But it has a special quality, *viz.*, sound. Space has no special quality. Time also is one, eternal, and all-pervading. It also has no special quality. But space is not time. Space is the cause of spatial relations such as spatial remoteness and proximity. Time is the cause of temporal remoteness and proximity. Thus space (दिक्) is different from time (काल).

Space (दिक्) differs from ether (आकाश). Ether is an elemental substance (भूतद्रव्य), like atoms of earth, water, light, and air. These together with ether constitute the stuff of the world. Ether has a specific quality, *viz.*, sound. It is the specific cause of sound. Space is a general cause. It does not produce sound, and has no specific quality. "Space resembles time in being the general cause of all effects, while ether, like earth and other material substances, produces one kind of effect only, namely sound."³ Ether is the specific inherent cause of sound. Space is a general cause of all effects. It is the instrumental cause of the spatial relations of remoteness and proximity. Thus space is different from ether.⁴ But both are real and objective. It is wrong to suppose that space is a subjective form of experience. The Vaisheshika advocates uncompromising realism, and recognizes the objective existence

1 Times BP., 46—47; SM., pp. 203—04.

2 TB., p. 25.

3 TSP., 133.

4 I.L.A., pp. 236—37.

of earth, water, light, air, ether, space, and time.

Space has the qualities of number, magnitude, distinctness, conjunction, and disjunction.¹

14. Time (काल)

Time is one, eternal, all-pervading. It is an individual. There is no genus of time. It has a particularity (विशेष) which distinguishes it from ether, space, souls, minds, and atoms of earth, water, light, and air. Time is a substance. It is real and objective. It is not subjective. It is not a mere form of experience. Time is the basis of the notions of temporal remoteness and proximity, simultaneity and non-simultaneity, slowness and quickness.² Time is the non-inherent cause of these qualities. It is the cause of all produced things. It is the abode of the world.³ Time is the cause of all effects. We have no notions of eternal substances (*e. g.*, atoms) being produced soon or late, quickly or slowly, simultaneously or successively. But we have notions of transient things being so produced. So time is the cause of all transient things which are of the nature of effects⁴. It is the cause of production, persistence, and destruction of transient things⁵. It pervades the whole world and is the general cause of all changes. Without time there can be no change. All changes occur in time. But time is not identical with change as the Buddhist wrongly supposes⁶. Time is the non-inherent cause of temporal remoteness and proximity. It is their specific efficient cause.⁷ Time is one. It appears to be many owing to its limiting conditions (उपाधि) Moment, hour, day, month, year, etc., are due to the limitation of one all-pervading time by adjuncts which limit it. Its apparent diversity is due to limiting adjuncts⁸. It appears to be diverse owing

1 TB., p. 23

2 TB., p. 23, BP, 45—46, VS, II 2,6

3 BP, 45, p. 195.

4 VSV., II. 2,29.

5 SP, p. 16.

6 NM., p. 136

7 TB, p. 23; TR., p. 138.

8 BP, 46, p. 197.

to its limitation by the motion of the sun and diverse effects. One time is inferred from simultaneity, succession, slowness, quickness, etc., which do not differ in different effects. They are identical in all effects. So time is one.¹ But time is said to be three-fold, past, present, and future. The future of a thing is indicated by its coming into existence, the present by its persistence, and the past by its destruction.² The past of an individual is the time characterized by its destruction, the future that characterized by its prior non-existence, the present that characterized by its existence.³ So the distinction of past, present, and future depends on these three limiting conditions. So time is one. Its apparent diversity is due to adjuncts (उपाधि) limiting it.

The Vaisheshika makes a distinction between space (दिक्) and time (काल). Space is the specific cause of spatial remoteness and proximity. Space deals with co-existence. Time deals with succession. Space is the ground of the spatial order. Time is the ground of the temporal order. Time is the specific cause of temporal remoteness and proximity.⁴ Space is one, but appears to be many owing to its limiting conditions (उपाधि). Time also is one, but appears to be many owing to its limiting conditions (उपाधि). The *upadhi* which diversifies time is production or action, while the *upadhi* which diversifies space is contact with corporeal things.⁵ Divisions of time are determined by production and destruction of things, while those of space by the greater or smaller number of corporeal things that intervene between two spots. The relations of time are constant and irreversible (नियत), while those of space are reversible (अनियत). A moment of time which is present or future in relation to an event, is always so. But a point of space which is to the east of an object at one time, may be to the west of it at another time.

1 VSV., ii, 2, 8.

2 SPMB, p. 16,

3 VSV., p. 101,

4 TB. p. 23,

5 Siddhantachandrodaya,

The divisions of time are fixed while those of space are relative.¹

Time has the qualities of number, magnitude, distinctness, conjunction and disjunction.² Space also has the same qualities. Space and time are the efficient causes of all produced things.³

15. Mind (मनस्).

The mind (मनस्) is the internal organ.⁴ It is an atomic substance. It comes into contact with the soul. It is the organ through which the self perceives cognition, pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, and volition. The qualities of the self are perceived through it. The self cannot perceive its qualities without it. Again, the mind supervises the functions of the external sense-organs. If the mind does not come into contact with them, they cannot perceive external objects. External perception depends on the four-fold contact of the self and the mind, the mind and an external sense-organ, and the external sense-organ and an object. Without the mind there can be neither internal nor external perception.⁵

The mind is atomic. The soul is all-pervading. If the mind also were all-pervading, the soul would have cognitions and volitions simultaneously. But it has cognitions and volitions in succession. So the mind is atomic. It comes into contact with the soul in succession and is responsible for non-simultaneity of cognitions and volitions.

The mind is eternal. It is neither produced nor destroyed. There is one mind in each body. So there are many minds. The genus of mind subsists in them. Each mind has a particularity (विशेष) which distinguishes it from other minds. There are as many minds as there are souls. The same mind is always associated with the same soul and accompanies it through its suc-

1 VS U, 11, 2, 10,

2 TB., p, 23.

3 PB., p, 25,

4 VS., IX, 1, 13,

5 TB., p, 23,

cessive births. The distinctiveness of the soul is determined by the distinctiveness of the mind.

The mind is an intangible substance, like ether, space, time, and soul. But having a limited magnitude it can act. But the other four substances cannot act or have a motion because they are all-pervading¹

The mind has no specific quality. It has the general qualities of number, magnitude, distinctness, conjunction, disjunction, remoteness, proximity, and velocity².

The mind is complementary to the self. It is its internal organ. It is a sense-organ. It is not an external sense-organ but an internal sense-organ. It is not physical (भूत) but corporeal (मूर्त). It is a substance, since it has qualities.³

16. The Individual Soul (जीवात्मन्).

The Vaisheshika theory of the finite soul (जीवात्मन्) is the same as the Nyaya theory. The soul has the special qualities of cognition, pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, effort, disposition, merit, and demerit. Disposition (भावना) is subconscious impression brought about by apprehension. It is the cause of recollection and recognition. It is a kind of faculty (संस्कार) which will be explained later. Number, magnitude, distinctness, conjunction, and disjunction also subsist in the soul. They are its general qualities.

There are many individual souls. There are as many souls as there are bodies. Each soul is eternal and all-pervading⁴. It is neither created nor destroyed. The souls are co-eternal with God. Many Western philosophers hold that God creates the souls which are immortal, so that they have a beginning but no end. Some hold that God creates the souls and can destroy them if He likes. But the Nyaya-Vaisheshika holds that the souls are without a beginning or an end. The

1 TD, p. 13 ; SP., p. 43.

2 BP., 34, p. 139 PB, p. 89.

3 VS., ix, 1. 13 : PB, p. 89.

4 TB., p. 23 :

souls are eternal. It would be misleading to speak of the souls as immortal only. Each soul is all-pervading. But it knows, feels, and wills in connection with the body. A disembodied soul can have no consciousness of objects. The genus of soul subsists in the souls. Each soul has a particularity (विशेष) which distinguishes it from other souls. But it cannot be known. It has a particular mind (मनस्) attached to it throughout its career through different births. The mind gives individuality to the soul. It determines its distinctive character¹.

The following proofs are given of the existence of the soul. First, consciousness is not an essential quality of the soul. It acquires consciousness in conjunction with the mind (मनस्) and body. Consciousness is a quality which inheres in the soul. It cannot be a quality of the body, the sense-organs, or the *manas*. It is a special quality of the soul in which it inheres². Secondly, the activity of organs (करण) requires an agent (कर्ता) which uses them, even as an instrument (e.g., an axe) requires an agent to use it. The external sense organs and the internal organ or *manas* require the soul which uses them as instruments of knowledge³. Thirdly, cognition, pleasure, pain, etc., are not the qualities of earth, water, light, air, ether, space, time and *manas*. Therefore, they inhere in another substance, namely, the soul⁴. Fourthly, voluntary actions of the body which achieve good and avoid evil prove the existence of the soul which directs the body, even as the actions of a chariot are guided by a charioteer. Fifthly, the vital acts of inspiration and expiration, opening and closing of the eyelids, growth of the body, the healing of its injuries, the movement of the *manas*⁵ and the stimulation of the external senses prove the

1 PB., p. 89,

2 TS., p. 23, TB., p. 23, VS, III, 1. 2., PB., p. 69.

3 PB., p. 69. BP 47,

4 PB., 70.

5 PB., p. 69,

existence of the soul¹. Lastly, a person perceives different qualities of an object through different sense-organs, remembers some of its qualities perceived in the past, and combines them into a group, and refers it to one object. This synthetic act of apperception proves the existence of the soul².

The Vaisheshika recognizes the plurality of souls. Each soul has particularity (विशेष) which distinguishes it from other souls. The pluralistic bias leads the Vaisheshika to recognize the plurality of souls as ultimate. They are not appearances of one soul as the Advaita Vedantist holds. The plurality of souls is inferred from the variety of experiences and conditions of different souls. Some are happy. Others are miserable. Some are rich. Others are poor. Some are learned. Others are ignorant. These differences in the status of individuals prove the existence of many souls³. If there were only one soul, the bondage of one soul would lead to the bondage of others, and the liberation of one soul would lead to the liberation of others. The scriptures also recognize the plurality of souls. Each soul reaps the consequences of its own deeds. It continues its identity in the midst of all its experiences. The scriptural texts emphasizing the identity of the individual soul with the supreme soul is intended to convey similarity (साम्य) but not identity between them. The individual souls attain similarity with God, when they achieve perfect freedom from suffering. Even in the state of liberation the individual souls retain their distinctiveness, and are not merged in God. The differences among the souls are eternal. The difference between the souls and God also is eternal⁴. It cannot be done away with. The nature of the supreme soul or God will be discussed under theology.

17. Quality (गुण).

A quality (गुण) inheres in a substance. It is devoid of quality or action. White colour inheres in chalk,

1 PB., 69-70, VS, iii, 2.4.

3 VSU., iii-2-21,

2 PB, p. 70, TSD., p. 13

4 VSU., iii-2-22,

It cannot exist by itself. It is devoid of quality or action. But a substance exists by itself. Thus a quality is different from a substance. A quality is a passive feature of it. But an action is an active feature of it. A quality is static, while an action is dynamic. A quality is a permanent feature of a substance, while an action is a transient feature of it. Heaviness is the quality of a stone, while its fall to the ground is its action or movement. Thus though both a quality and an action inhere in a substance, they are different from each other.

Kanada defines a quality as inhering in a substance, devoid of quality, and not the direct and immediate cause of conjunction and disjunction like an action.¹ A quality inheres in a substance. It cannot exist by itself. It is devoid of quality. Only a substance is endued with a quality. But an action also inheres in a substance, and is devoid of quality. So in order to distinguish a quality from an action, it is said to be not the direct and immediate cause of conjunction and disjunction. An action is the cause of conjunction and disjunction. The movement of a ball upward from the ground to the sky brings about its disjunction from the ground and conjunction with a particular region of the sky. But the colour of the ball, which is a quality, cannot bring about either conjunction or disjunction.

Vishvanath defines a quality as residing in a substance, devoid of quality or action². Keshavamishra defines a quality as that which is endowed with generic character, is the non-material cause of things, is not of the nature of motion, and always resides in a substance³. A quality inheres in a substance. A substance is a material cause. But a quality is a non-material cause. For example, the two halves of a jar, which are substances, are its material cause (समवायिकारण). But conjunction of them, which is a quality, is its non-material cause (असमवायिकारण). A quality is not of the nature of action. A quality is static and perma-

¹ VS., i, 1, 16.

² BP., 86, p. 399.

³ TB., p. 24,

nent, while an action is dynamic and transitory. The genus of quality (गुणत्व) subsists in a quality (गुण). A quality possesses generality, and at the same time differs from substances and actions, which also possess generality.

Thus a quality is different from a substance. A substance exists by itself. A quality inheres in a substance. It cannot exist apart from it. Still a quality is an independent category. A substance is not a mere aggregate of qualities. It also is an independent category. Again, a quality is different from an action, though both inhere in a substance. A quality is a permanent and static feature of a substance, while an action is a transient and dynamic feature of it. Colour is a quality of a ball, but its motion is an action. A quality is not of the nature of motion. But an action is of the nature of motion.

Kanada mentions seventeen qualities, viz., colour (रूप), taste (रस), odour (गन्ध), touch (स्पर्श), number (संख्या), magnitude (परिमाण), distinctness (पृथक्त्व), conjunction (संयोग), disjunction (विभाग), remoteness (परत्व), nearness (अपरत्व), cognition (बुद्धि), pleasure (सुख), pain (दुःख), desire (इच्छा), aversion (द्वेष), effort or volition (प्रयत्न)¹. Prashastapada adds seven more, viz., heaviness (गुरुत्व), fluidity (द्रवत्व), viscosity (स्नेह), faculty (संस्कार), merit (धर्म), demerit (अधर्म), and sound². Twenty four qualities are generally recognized by the Vaisheshika. Some add lightness (लघुत्व), softness (मृदुत्व), and hardness (कठिनत्व). Some add laziness (आलस्य). But these four should not be regarded as separate qualities. They are contradictories of some of the twenty four qualities. Lightness (लघुत्व) is the contradictory of heaviness (गुरुत्व). Laziness (आलस्य) is the contradictory of effort

1 VS., i. 1. 6

2 PB., p. 162.

or volition (प्रयत्न). Softness (मृदुत्व) and hardness (कठिनत्व) are different degrees of conjunction (संयोग). Thus there are only twenty four qualities.

It cannot be argued that merit (धर्म) and demerit (अधर्म), conjunction (संयोग) and disjunction (विभाग), remoteness (परत्व), and nearness (अपरत्व), and pleasure (सुख) and pain (दुःख), should not be mentioned separately since they are contradictories of each other. They are pairs of contrary qualities. They are not mere contradictories of each other. Demerit (अधर्म) is not mere absence of merit (धर्म). It is a positive quality. Pain (दुःख) is not mere absence of pleasure (सुख). It is a positive quality. Nearness (अपरत्व) is not mere absence of remoteness (परत्व). It is a positive quality. Disjunction (विभाग) is not mere absence of conjunction (संयोग). It is a positive quality. So all these qualities should be distinctly mentioned.¹ Some include merit (धर्म) and demerit (अधर्म) under one head-an unseen principle (अदृष्ट).

Note. Qualities are divided into general (सामान्य) and special (विशेष). General qualities are those which reside in two or more substances jointly. Number, magnitude, distinctness, conjunction, disjunction, remoteness, nearness, derived fluidity, gravity, and velocity are general qualities.² Special qualities are those which reside in one substance only at one time, and not in two or more substances jointly. Colour, taste, odour, touch, sound, viscosity, natural fluidity, cognition, pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, effort or volition, merit, demerit, and faculty, are special qualities.³

Qualities are divided into those which can be perceived through one external sense-organ (एकेन्द्रियग्राह्य), viz., colour, taste, odour, touch, and sound; and those that can be perceived through two external sense-organs, eyes and the skin (द्वीन्द्रियग्राह्य), viz., number, magnitude, distinctness, conjunction, disjunction, remoteness, nearness, fluidity, and viscosity; and those that cannot be

¹ TSP., pp. 83—84

² BP., 91—92, pp. 403—4.

³ BP., 90—91, pp. 402—3.

perceived through any sense-organ (अतीन्द्रिय), viz., gravity, merit, demerit, and faculty¹. The qualities of the self, e.g., cognition, pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, and volition are perceived through the mind, (मनस्).

Qualities are divided into eternal (नित्य) and non-eternal (अनित्य). The qualities of eternal substances are eternal. The qualities of non-eternal substances are non-eternal (अनित्य).

Colour, taste, odour, touch, remoteness, nearness, fluidity, viscidty, and velocity are qualities of corporeal substances (मूर्तगुण), Cognition, pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, effort, faculty, merit, and demerit are qualities of incorporeal substances (अमूर्तगुण). Sound also is added to the list by Vishvanatha. Number, magnitude, distinctness, conjunction and disjunction are qualities of both corporeal and incorporeal substances (मूर्तामूर्तगुण).²

Conjunction, disjunction, duality and other numbers, and distinctness between two or more substances are qualities which reside in many substances (अनेकश्रितगुण). Colour, taste, odour, touch, sound, oneness (number), distinctness (of one substance), remoteness, nearness, cognition, pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, gravity, fluidity, viscidty, faculty, merit, and demerit are qualities which reside in one substance (एकैकवृत्ति).³

Colour is a special quality (विशेषगुण) perceived by the visual organ only. It resides in earth, water, and light. There are seven kinds of colour, viz., white, blue, yellow, red, green, brown, and motley. All these colours reside in earth. Colour is produced in earthy substances by the application of heat. So their colour is transient. The colour of the atoms of water and light is eternal. The colour of composite aqueous and luminous substances is transient. The colour of light is bright white, and is not due to the application of heat. The colour of water is white but not bright.

Taste is a special quality (विशेषगुण) perceived by the gustatory organ only. It resides in earth and water. The tastes of earthy substances are due to the application of heat, and are of six kinds, viz., sweet, sour, salty,

1 BP, 93, p. 404.

2 BP., pp. 401—2.

3 BP. 89—90, p. 402.

pungent (कटु), astringent (कषाय), and bitter. The taste of water is sweet and not produced by the application of heat. It is eternal in atoms of water. It is transient in the composite aqueous substances.

Odour (गन्ध) is a specific quality (विशेषगुण) perceived by the olfactory organ only. It resides in earth only. It is always transient. There are two kinds of odour, good and bad.

Touch (स्पर्श) is a specific quality (विशेषगुण) perceived by the tactual organ only. It resides in earth, water, light, and air. There are three kinds of touch, viz., cold, hot, neither cold nor hot. This shows that touch is regarded as temperature. Water is cold. Light is hot. Earth and air are neither cold nor hot. It is transient in earth. It is eternal in atoms of water, light and air, but transient in their composite products.¹

Sound (शब्द) is a specific quality (विशेषगुण) perceived by the auditory organ only.

Number (संख्या) is a generic quality (सामान्यगुण). It is the cause of the use of the terms, one, two, three, etc. Of the numbers, unity is eternal in eternal substances, and transient in transient substances. In the latter case, unity is produced by the unities in the substances in which it inheres. Plurality is transient. When we perceive a jar, we know its unity. When we perceive another jar, we know its unity. Then by the relating activity of thought (अपेक्षाबुद्धि) we think together the two unities and produce duality. The two jars are the material cause, their unities are the non-material cause, and the relating activity of thought (अपेक्षाबुद्धि) is the efficient cause of duality. The knowledge of all numbers beyond unity is due to the activity of thought.

Magnitude (परिमाण) is the specific cause of measurement. There are four kinds of magnitude, viz., minuteness, largeness, length, and shortness. Ether has extreme largeness. An atom has extreme minuteness.

A composite substance like a jar has medium largeness. Magnitude is eternal in eternal substances, and transient in composite products. The magnitude of ether (परममहत्त्व) is eternal. The magnitude of an atom (पारिमारदित्य) also is eternal. The magnitude of composite products is determined by the number, magnitude, and aggregation of parts,

Distinctness (वृथक्त्व) is the quality of a substance by which it is distinguished from another substance. The distinctness of a pen distinguishes it from a pencil. Distinctness is the basis of distinction of things from one another. It is real and objective. It is not a mere mental product. Distinctness is eternal in eternal substances, and transient in transient substances. It is different from particularity (विशेष). Distinctness refers to the numerical differences of things, while particularity, in eternal things, refers to the qualitative peculiarities of things. Distinctness is eternal or transient, according as the substance in which it resides is eternal or transient. Distinctness is different from mutual non-existence (अन्योन्याभाव). The judgment 'the pen is not a pencil' expresses mutual non-existence of the two things. It is different from the judgment 'the pen is distinct from the pencil.' It shows that the two things are positively distinguished from each other.

Conjunction (संयोग) is the union of two substances which existed separately. It subsists in two substances, and does not pervade its entire substrates. It is of three kinds—(1) due to the movement of one of the things conjoined, *e. g.*, the perching of a flying kite on a fixed pole; (2) due to the movement of both things conjoined, *e. g.*, the contact of two wrestlers fighting with each other; (3) due to another conjunction, *e. g.*, the contact of a body with a tree due to the contact of a hand with the tree. Conjunction affects only parts of the things conjoined. It is destroyed by separation or by the destruction of things conjoined.

Disjunction (विभाग) is separation of two substances

which were united. It subsists in two substances disjoined. It is of three kinds—(1) due to the movement of one of the things disjoined, *e.g.*, the flying away of a kite from a fixed pole ; (2) due to the movement of both things disjoined, *e.g.*, moving away of two wrestlers fighting with each other ; (3) due to another disjunction, *e.g.*, separation of a body from a tree due to disjunction of a hand from the tree.

Remoteness (परत्व) and proximity (अपरत्व) are the basis of the notions of 'remote' and 'near'. Each of them is of two kinds, spatial and temporal. Spatial remoteness and proximity are expressed as farness and nearness. Temporal remoteness and proximity are expressed as oldness and youngness. Spatial remoteness involves a large number of contacts with space-points between the object and the body of the person. Spatial nearness involves a small number of contacts with space-points between the object and the body of the person. Similarly temporal remoteness involves a large number of contacts with time-points between the object and the body of the person. Temporal proximity involves a small number of contacts with time-points between the object and the body of the person. Prashastapada does not regard remoteness and proximity as ultimate qualities of things, but as relative to each other depending on the relating activity of thought (अपेक्षाबुद्धि)

Gravity (गुरुत्व) is the quality of things by which they tend to fall to the ground. Falling is due to gravity, when conjunction, velocity, or effort is absent. It exists in earth and water. It is eternal in atoms of earth and water, and transient in the products.

Fluidity (द्रवत्व) is the cause of flowing. It exists in earth, water, and light. It is natural in water. It is caused or derived in earth and light. Gold and butter become fluid in contact with fire.

Viscosity (स्नेह) is smoothness. It is cohesion by virtue of which particles of a substance come together and form a lump. It exists in water only.¹

1 TB , pp 24-26.

Cognition (बुद्धि) consists in the manifestation of objects. It is apprehension of them. It is eternal in God, and transient in finite selves. Pleasure (सुख) is an agreeable feeling. Pain (दुःख) is a disagreeable feeling. Pleasure is felt by all souls as something desirable. Pain is felt by all as something undesirable. Desire (इच्छा) is attachment to a thing. Aversion (द्वेष) is anger towards a thing. Desire is a tendency towards a thing. Aversion is a tendency away from a thing. Effort (प्रयत्न) is exertion of the self. Three kinds of effort are distinguished, viz., striving towards an object (प्रवृत्ति), striving away from an object (निवृत्ति), and vital act (जीवनयोनिप्रयत्न). Cognition, pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, and effort, are the qualities of the finite soul. They can be perceived by the mind (मनस्).

Merit (धर्म) and demerit (अधर्म) are the specific causes of pleasure and pain. They are the qualities of the finite soul by virtue of which it enjoys pleasure and suffers pain. Merit is the effect of the performance of the enjoined duties. Demerit (अधर्म) is the effect of the commission of forbidden acts. Merit and demerit are imperceptible. They are inferred from the body and other organs of enjoyment and suffering, which are brought about by merit and demerit. They are not brought about by effort. Merit and demerit are also known from the authority of the scriptures.

Faculty (संस्कार) is of three kinds, viz., velocity (वेग), disposition (भावना), and elasticity (स्थितिस्थापक). Velocity (वेग) is the cause of motion. It keeps a thing in motion. It exists in earth, water, light, air, and mind (मनस्). Disposition exists in the finite soul only. It is caused by apprehension. It is the cause of recollection. Disposition (भावना) is subconscious impression. When it is aroused or brought to the level of consciousness, it brings about memory. It is aroused by perception of similarity, unseen agency, constant thought, and other conditions. Elasticity (स्थितिस्थापक) exists in certain tangible things. It is the quality which makes a thing

revert to its original state even when disturbed. The bow reverts to its original condition by virtue of its elasticity when an arrow is discharged from it. Elasticity is the quality of the substances which contract and expand¹. These are the twenty four qualities of substances. They are simple passive qualities.

18. Action. (कर्म).

Action (कर्म) is physical movement. It inheres in a limited corporeal substance (मूर्तद्रव्य). A quality (गुण) also inheres in a substance. But an action is different from a quality. An action is *dynamic*, while a quality is static. An action is *transitory*, while a quality is permanent. A quality continues to exist in a substance. But an action ceases to exist after some time. An action is transient. It is brought to an end by a subsequent conjunction with another substance or by the destruction of its basic substance. The movement of a ball is its transitory feature. But its colour is a permanent feature. Its movement is dynamic, while its colour is static. A substance (द्रव्य) is the substratum of both quality and action. Thus an action is different from both substance and quality. It is an independent category.

Kanada defines an action (कर्म) as that which inheres in one substance, but is not a quality, and is the direct and immediate cause of conjunction and disjunction². The movement of a ball inheres in the ball, which is one substance. It is not a quality, which is a permanent feature. It is devoid of quality, since only a substance can have a quality. The ball was lying on the ground. Its movement brings about its disjunction from the ground. The ball falls on the roof of a house. Its movement brings about its conjunction with the roof. Action or movement is the non-material cause (असमवायि कारण) of conjunction and disjunction.

The genus of action (कर्मत्व) subsists in an action (कर्म) which is non-eternal. The highest genus (सत्ता)

¹ TB., pp. 27-28.

² VS., i, 1. 17.

subsists in substance (द्रव्य), quality (गुण), and action (कर्म) of which the first two are sometimes eternal; but action is never eternal. Action is always transitory. It is said to last only for five moments. So the genus of action (कर्मत्व) is said to reside in a transitory entity¹.

All movements subsist in limited corporeal substances (मूर्तद्रव्य), e.g., earth, water, fire, air, and mind. No movement can subsist in ubiquitous (विभु) substances, e.g., ether, space, time, and the soul. A ubiquitous substance cannot change its position, and is, therefore incapable of movement. Ether, space, time, and soul are incorporeal substances and therefore devoid of motion².

Five kinds of movement are distinguished, viz., (1) upward movement (उत्क्षेपण); (2) downward movement (अवक्षेपण); (3) contraction (आकुञ्चन); (4) expansion (प्रसारण); (5) locomotion (गमन).³ "Motion is primarily divided into three kinds according to its direction, namely, vertical, horizontal, and slanting or miscellaneous. The vertical motion may be from below upwards (उत्क्षेपण), or from above downwards (अवक्षेपण). Horizontal motion also may be two-fold, motion nearer to oneself (आकुञ्चन), or motion farther from oneself (प्रसारण). All other motions are relegated to the comprehensive class of *gamana* (locomotion)"⁴.

Upward motion (उत्क्षेपण) brings a body into contact with a higher region, e.g., throwing a stone upward. Downward motion (अवक्षेपण) brings a body into contact with a lower region, e.g., throwing a stone downward from a tree to the ground. Contraction (आकुञ्चन) brings the parts of a body closer to one another, e.g., rolling a sheet of paper. Expansion (प्रसारण) makes the parts of a body farther from one another, e.g.,

1 VSU., i-1-17; TSP, p. 88.

2 VSU., V. 2. 21; VS., V. 2. 21.

3 TB., p. 28; TS., 94; BP., 6.

4 TSP., p. 89.

unfolding a sheet of paper. All other kinds of motions are comprised in locomotion (गमन). Walking (भ्रमण), evacuation (रेचन), flow (स्यन्दन), flaming up (ऊर्ध्वज्वलन), and slanting motion (तिर्यग्गमन) are various forms of locomotion (गमन)¹.

19. Generality (सामान्य).

Kanada defines generality and particularity as mental concepts ; they depend on the intellect (सामान्यं विशेष इति बुद्ध्यपेक्षम्)². He lays stress on the activity of thought in relation to generality and particularity. By generality he means a quality by which the intellect assimilates a number of objects and forms a group or class. By particularity he means a quality by which the intellect differentiates one object from others. Thus generality and particularity are mental concepts. But Kanada admits that the common quality (सामान्य) exists in external things. So Kanada may be regarded as an advocate of *conceptualism*, which regards generality as a mental concept.³

But Prashastapada, Shridhara, Udayana, Shankara Mishra, and others advocate the doctrine of realism and recognize generality as real and objective. They regard generality as eternal, one, and inhering in many individuals belonging to the categories of substance, quality, and action.

Annambhatta defines generality (सामान्य) as one, eternal, and inhering in many individuals. (नित्यमेकमनेका-नुगतं सामान्यम्)⁴. It is the universal class-essence common to many individuals. There is the class-essence of man in all individual men. It is *one*, though the individuals in which it inheres are many. It is *eternal*, though the individuals in which it inheres are born and die. It is *common* to many individuals. There is the same universal or class-essence in all the individuals of a class. There is the same universal class-essence of cow

1 BP, 7.

2 VS., I, ii. 3.

3 J. Sinha : *Indian Psychology : Perception*, p 181.

4 TS., p 94.

(गोत्व) in all individual cows. There is the same universal class-essence of jar (घटत्व) in all individual jars. The universal or generality is the basis of a general idea or concept of a class. It is the basis of the notion of sameness with regard to all the individuals of a class. We know individual men as belonging to the same class because there is the same universal or class essence of man (नरत्व) in all men. (अनुवृत्तिप्रत्ययहेतुः सामान्यम्)¹ Thus the Vaisheshika is a *realist*. He recognizes the reality of the universal or generality (सामान्य) corresponding to a concept in our mind.

The universal subsists in substances, qualities, and actions (द्रव्यगुणकर्मवृत्ति).² Jar-ness (घटत्व) or the class essence of jar subsists in individual jars which are substances. Colourness (रूपत्व) or the class-essence of colour subsists in individual colours which are qualities. The class-essence of movement (कर्मत्व) subsists in all individual movements which are actions.

The universal does not subsist in another universal. There is a single (एक) universal subsisting in all individuals of the same class. All individual cows have the same essential qualities because the same class-essence (गोत्व) subsists in them all. If there were two or more universals (e.g., गोत्व, अश्वत्व) in them, they would possess contrary qualities of different classes. The universal does not subsist in particularity (विशेष), inherence (समवाय), and negation or non-existence (अभाव.)

What subsists in a single individual is not a universal³. Etherness (आकाशत्व) subsists in ether (आकाश) which is one. So it is not a universal. Conjunction inheres in many substances. But it is not eternal. So it is not a universal (जाति). The dimension of ether (आकाश) is eternal because ether is eternal, and it inheres in ether. But it does not inhere in many individuals. So it is not a universal. Absolute non-existence is eternal and subsists in many individuals. But it does not inhere in them.

1 TS., p. 94.

2 TB., p. 28.

3 SM., p. 73.

Hence the universal must be one, eternal, and inherent in many individuals. These are the characteristics of the universal or generality.¹

The universal does not subsist in another universal. If there were such a universal, it would have another universal, and so on *ad infinitum*. So, in order to avoid infinite regress (अनवस्था) the universal subsisting in another universal is not recognized.

The universal exists in each individual wholly. It can never exist partly in each individual, because it has no parts. When a particular individual comes into existence it comes to be related to the universal. "Though the universal is eternal, its relation to a particular individual comes into existence only at the moment when the individual comes into being."²

"The universal is related to the individual by the relation of inherence. There is one universal in all the individuals belonging to the same class. Though it exists in them, it is independent of them. It is eternal; it is unborn and imperishable. The universal is one and eternal, while individuals are many and non-eternal; the universal subsists before the individuals are born and after the individuals are destroyed."³

Thus the Vaisheshika is a *realist*. He recognizes the reality of the universal as distinct from the individual

The Buddhists deny the reality of the universal. They admit the reality of individuals (स्वज्ञत्वं) only. They regard the universal as an unreal abstraction of the mind (विकल्पमात्र), All individual cows are spoken of as *cow*, since all of them agree in being *the negation of the non-cow*.—i.e. the negation of all animals other than cows. Thus the Buddhists are *nominalists*.

The Vaisheshika recognizes three classes of universals in respect of their extent, *viz.*, the highest (पर) or the widest, the lowest (अपर), or the narrowest, and the intermediate (परापर). 'Being-hood' (सत्ता) is the highest universal, since it is of the widest extent, and comprehends all other universals under it. The genus

1 *Ibid.*, pp. 72—73.

2 J. Sinha: *Indian Psychology : Perception*,

3 *Ibid.*, p. 182 ; also NM p. 313.

of substance (द्रव्यत्व) is of wider extent than the genus of earth (पृथिवीत्व), but of narrower extent than 'being-hood' (सत्ता), which is the highest genus. So it is an intermediate (परापर) genus. The genus of jar (घटत्व) is of the narrowest extent. It is narrower than 'substantiality' (द्रव्यत्व) and 'being-hood' (सत्ता). So it is the lowest species. Here the 'highest' and the 'lowest', 'higher' and 'lower' refer to wide and narrow extent ¹

Every common quality does not constitute a generality (जाति). Some persons are fair, blind, or deaf, but fairness, blindness, or deafness does not constitute an independent class. If blindness be recognized as a class, blind men, blind cows, and blind horses will be grouped under the same class. Again, if men are grouped according to their language, race or religion, the same persons may belong to several classes. So generality (जाति) is distinguished from *upadhi* (उपाधि). Generality is a 'natural kind' or class, while *upadhi* is an artificial class. Generality is eternal, while *upadhi* is transitory. Generality is the basis of natural or scientific classification. *Upadhi* is the basis of artificial or unscientific classification.²

Udayana mentions six conditions which prevent a mere generality or common quality from becoming a true generality, viz., oneness of the individual, co-extensiveness, cross-division, infinite regress, self-contradiction, and absence of relation. Ether is one individual substance. So there is no genus of ether or etherness (आकाशत्व). A generality inheres in many individuals. If there is only one individual, it can have no generality inhering in it. Potness (घटत्व) and pitcherness (कलशत्व) are not two different classes, because they are co-extensive. They are two different names of the same class. They inhere in the same individuals. If there is a cross division between two classes, they cannot be recognized as true universals or generalities. Four kinds of atoms (e.g., earth, water, fire, and air), and ether are physical substances (भूतद्रव्य); the same four atomic substances and the mind (मनस्) are corporeal substances (भूतद्रव्य). Ether is physical (भूत) but not corporeal (सूत). Mind is corporeal (सूत) but not physical (भूत). So physicality (भूतत्व)

¹ SM., p. 75.

² TSP. pp. 92-93.

and corporeality (मूर्तत्व) are not generalities (जाति), because they involve cross division. Nor can there be a class of a class. No generality can subsist in another generality, since it would lead to infinite regress. No generality can subsist in particularities, since it would contradict their nature. Generality is inclusive ; particularity is exclusive. So particularity absolutely refuses to allow of inherence of generality in it. Nor can generality subsist in inherence, since there is no relation of inherence between that generality (समवायत्व) and inherence (समवाय). So there is no generality of inherence. (समवायत्व)

व्यतिरिक्तस्तुल्यत्वं सङ्करोऽथानवस्थितिः ।

रूपज्ञानिरसम्बन्धो जातिबाधक संग्रहः ॥¹

20. Particularity (विशेष).

The term Vaisheshika (वशेषिक) is derived from the term *vishesha* (विशेष). The Vaisheshika recognizes particularity (विशेष) as a distinct category. It is the opposite of generality (सामान्य).

Generality is inclusive ; particularity is exclusive. Generality is the basis of assimilation of different individuals to one another. Particularity is the basis of discrimination of eternal individuals from one another.

Kanada makes generality and particularity mental concepts depending on the intellect.²

Prashastapada makes particularity an independent reality which inheres in eternal substances and distinguishes them from one another.³

The Vaisheshika recognizes the existence of souls, minds, space, time, atoms of earth, water, fire, and air. He is a realistic pluralist. He recognizes the existence of particularity (विशेष) as the distinctive character of eternal substances. It is the unique individuality of an eternal substance, which distinguishes it from other eternal substances. Space is one, eternal substance. It has a particularity which distinguishes it from time, souls, minds, etc. Time is one eternal substance. It has a particularity which distinguishes it from space

¹ VSV., 1-11-3 ; SM., Dānakarī, pp. 74—77 , TRD., p 276,

² VS , I. ii. 3.

³ PB , p 24.

and other eternal substances. One soul, which is an eternal substance, has a particularity which distinguishes it from other souls. One mind (मनस्), which is an eternal substance, has a particularity which distinguishes it from other eternal substances. Ether is one eternal substance. It has a particularity which distinguishes it from other eternal substances such as time, space, etc. An atom of earth, which is an eternal substance, has a particularity which distinguishes it from other atoms of earth. An atom of water, which is an eternal substance, has a particularity, which distinguishes it from other atoms of water. Thus particularity (विशेष) inheres in *eternal substances* only. It is the *ultimate* (अन्त्य) peculiarity¹ of an individual, eternal substance.

Particularities inhere in the eternal substances and distinguish them from one another². There is a relation of inherence (सनञ्जय, between particularity and its substratum, i.e., an eternal substance. A particularity distinguishes itself from any other particularity (स्वतोव्यावर्त्तक). It does not require any other particularity to distinguish it from other particularities. If it did, it would lead to infinite regress. Particularities are *eternal* (नित्य), since they inhere in the eternal substances. As the atoms are innumerable, so are the particularities.³

Composite substances such as jars, books, chairs and the like down to dyads, can be distinguished from one another by the differences of their parts. The constituent parts distinguish them from one another. They do not require any particularities (विशेष) to distinguish them from one another.

But atoms, which are without parts and eternal, require particularities to distinguish them from one another. Without them, they would be indistinguishable from one another. There are innumerable eternal substances. So there are innumerable particularities

1 SM, p. 78.

2 TS, p. 95.

3 SM, pp. 79-80

inhering in them which distinguish them from other eternal substances.¹ They distinguish individuals from one another, but they are distinguished by themselves. Thus they perform a double function. They distinguish their substrates or eternal substances from other eternal substances, and they distinguish themselves from other particularities.

They are the causes of discrimination of eternal substances. So they are distinct from these substances. Particularity is a distinct category. The Vaisheshika recognizes it as an independent category to emphasize the individuality of eternal substances. It advocates realistic pluralism.

Generality is the basis of a comprehensive notion or concept of a class. Particularity is the basis of an exclusive notion of an ultimate eternal substance.³ They are extreme opposites of each other. There is no generality subsisting in the infinite number of particularities. If there were any, they would contradict their nature.⁴

The modern Naiyayika does not recognize particularity as an independent category. He holds that if particularities can distinguish themselves from other particularities without the aid of other particularities, then atoms themselves may distinguish themselves from other atoms without particularities inhering in them. The Vedantists and the Mimamsakas, Kumarila and Prabhakara, do not accept particularity as an independent category.

21. Inherence (समवाय).

Kanada defines inherence (समवाय) as the relation between the material cause and its effect through which it is said that one abides in the other (literally that 'this is here').⁵ He brings only causal ties under it. But Prashastapada brings non-causal ones also under it. He defines inherence as the relation which subsists among inseparable things, which are related to one another as the container and the contained, and which

1 SM., p. 80.

2 TRD., 278.

3 TB, p. 28.

4 TRD., p. 276.

5 VS., vii. 2, 26.

is the basis of the idea, 'this is in that.' Inherence is one only. There are not many inherences. It is *eternal*. It subsists in things which cannot exist separately. It subsists in inseparable things. Inseparable things are those, *one* of which abides in the other, without being destroyed. The whole and the parts, quality and substance, action and substance, generality and the individual, particularity and an eternal substance are inseparable things (अयुतसिद्ध). The whole inheres in the parts; quality inheres in a substance; an action inheres in a substance; generality inheres in an individual; particularity inheres in an eternal substance. Inherence is one eternal relation¹.

A composite substance (*e.g.*, a chair) inheres in its parts. The parts can exist in themselves before the production of the chair and after its destruction. But the chair cannot exist apart from its parts, without destroying itself. As soon as the chair is broken into pieces, it ceases to exist. Thus the whole (अवयविन्) cannot exist apart from its parts (अवयव), but the parts can exist apart from the whole. The colour of a jar inheres in the jar. It cannot exist apart from the jar. But the jar can exist without its colour at the first moment of its production. It acquires its colour in the second moment. This is the peculiar doctrine of the Vaisheshika. An action or movement inheres in a substance (*e.g.*, a fan). It cannot exist apart from the substance. But the substance can exist apart from its movement. Generality inheres in an individual. The genus of man (नरत्व) inheres in an individual person. He cannot exist apart from the genus of man subsisting in him. But the genus of man can subsist apart from him. Before his birth it subsisted, and after his death it will subsist. It is eternal, while an individual is born and destroyed. Likewise particularity inheres in an eternal substance. The distinctive character of one soul inheres in that soul. Particularities inhere in eternal substances only. So they cannot subsist apart from each other.

1 TS., p. 95.

Thus inherence is the relation subsisting between two things, *one* of which cannot exist without the other. Inseparable things (अयुतसिद्ध) are those, one of which cannot exist without the other. Separable things (युतसिद्ध) are those which can exist apart from each other. Inherence is the intimate relation between inseparable things.

Inherence is *one*. There are many generalities. There are many particularities. But there is only one inherence. Prabhakara, a Mimamsaka, recognizes many inferences. When an individual is born, a new relation of inherence is generated, by which the individual is brought into relation with the generality subsisting in other individuals. Inherence is many, because the inseparable things, among which it subsists, are many. Prabhakara recognizes inherence as eternal or non-eternal according as the things in which it subsists are eternal or non-eternal¹. But the Nyaya-Vaisheshika recognizes inherence as *one* and eternal.

The Nyaya-Vaisheshika argues that inherence is *eternal*, since all positive products (भवकार्य) are produced in their material cause by the relation of inherence, and if inherence is produced, it will require another inherence, and so on *ad infinitum*. So in order to avoid infinite regress inherence is regarded as eternal. "Inherence is eternal in the sense that it can neither be produced nor destroyed without producing or destroying the product."² It is eternal in the relative sense, whereas an atom is absolutely eternal.

Inherence is an *eternal* relation. Conjunction (संयोग) is a *temporary* relation. It is a relation that exists between two things which can exist apart from each other, but which are for a time brought into contact with each other. A pen comes into contact with an inkpot. This contact is conjunction. It is a temporary relation. The pen and the inkpot existed apart from each other before their conjunction and will exist apart from each other after they are separated

1 PP, pp. 26-27.

2 TSP., p. 97.

from each other. Thus conjunction is an *accidental* relation. It is a *quality* of the things conjoined. It is an adventitious quality. It is destroyed when there is disjunction of the things conjoined. The things which are conjoined have a separate existence prior to conjunction and after disjunction. Therefore, conjunction is an *accidental, temporary, external* relation between two things which can exist separately from each other. Inherence, on the other hand, is *necessary, eternal* relation between two things, *one* of which cannot exist apart from the other. It is an intimate relation between two relata which form one whole. It is a necessary connection between them. They cannot be separated from each other without themselves being destroyed. So Dr. Radhakrishnan regards inherence as an *internal* relation. He says, "Conjunction is external relation, while inherence is internal relation. In conjunction two different things are joined together without forming a real whole which enters into each. Inherence is real coherence."¹

But it is misleading to regard inherence as an internal relation. An internal relation is one which enters into the being of the relata and constitutes their nature. The relata cannot exist apart from each other. An internal relation implies mutual dependence of the relata on each other. But we have seen that the whole cannot exist apart from its parts, but parts can exist apart from the whole; a quality cannot exist apart from a substance, but a substance can exist apart from a quality; an activity cannot exist apart from a substance, but a substance can exist apart from an activity; an individual cannot exist apart from a generality, but a generality (जाति) can subsist apart from an individual. So only *one* term of the relation depends upon the other. There is no mutual dependence of the members of the relation on each other. So inherence may be regarded as an intimate or necessary relation, but not an internal relation. Hiriyanna regards it as an external relation². It

¹ I. P., II, p. 217.

² O. I. P., p. 236.

is an external relation, since one of its terms can exist apart from the other.

Conjunction is a *quality* (गुण) of conjoined things. But inherence is a distinct category (पदार्थ). It is the relation that subsists between the whole and its parts, a quality and a substance, an activity and a substance, a generality and an individual, and a particularity and an eternal substance. Inherence does not require any other inherence to relate itself to its members. It binds its members with each other into a concrete whole. If it requires another inherence to relate itself to its members, that would require another, and so on *ad infinitum*.

Shankara severely criticizes the category of inherence and identifies it with identity (तादात्म्य).

22. Non-existence (अभाव)

We have discussed the nature of substance, quality, activity, generality, particularity, and inherence which are the six positive categories. Kanada does not mention non-existence (अभाव) as an independent category. But he mentions it as a possible object of knowledge.¹ But the later Vaisheshikas recognized non-existence (अभाव) as an independent category. It is a negative category.

Non-existence (अभाव) is of four kinds : (1) prior non-existence (प्रागभाव) ; (2) posterior non-existence (ध्वंसभाव) ; (3) mutual non-existence (अन्योन्याभाव) ; (4) absolute non-existence (अत्यन्ताभाव)²

Prior non-existence (प्रागभाव) is the non-existence of a thing before its production. It is without a beginning. But it has an end. It is destroyed by the production of the thing. A jar is produced. Before its production there was the prior non-existence of the jar. It had no beginning. But it had an end. It was brought to an end, when the jar came into existence. Thus prior non-existence is without a beginning, but has an end.

1 VS., i, 1, 4, IX. 1. 1—10.

p. 230.

Posterior non-existence (प्रध्वंसाभाव) is the non-existence of a thing after its destruction. It has a beginning, but no end. A jar is destroyed. The posterior non-existence of the jar comes into being. It will never be destroyed, since the same jar cannot be produced again. Thus posterior non-existence is produced by the destruction of the thing, but the non-existence cannot itself be destroyed. It is said to have a beginning, but no end.

Mutual non-existence (अन्योन्याभाव) is the non-existence of one thing (*e.g.*, a jar) as another (*e.g.*, a cloth) which is different from it. A jar is not a cloth. Here there is mutual non-existence of the jar and the cloth. They exclude each other. In other words, there is non-existence of either as the other. Mutual non-existence has for its counter-entity the identity of things¹. Identity is the opposite of mutual non-existence.

Absolute non-existence (अत्यन्त्याभाव) is the absence of a connection between two things in the past, the present, and the future. Colour did not exist in the air in the past, does not exist at present, and will not exist in future. So there is absolute non-existence of colour in the air².

Sometimes two main kinds of non-existence are recognized, *viz.*, non-existence of correlation (संसर्गाभाव) and mutual non-existence (अन्योन्याभाव). The former means non-existence of something *in* something else (*e.g.*, non-existence of a jar on the ground). The latter means non-existence of one thing *as* another thing (*e.g.*, non-existence of a jar as a cloth). The non-existence of correlation can be expressed by a judgment: 'S is not *in* P.' Mutual non-existence can be expressed by a judgment: 'S is not P.' Non-existence of correlation is divided into three kinds: (1) prior non-existence (प्रागभाव); (2) posterior non-existence (प्रध्वंसाभाव); (3) absolute non-existence (अत्यन्ताभाव)³.

1 TB., p. 29.

2 TS., p. 96; TB., p. 29

3 SM., p. 89; TB., p. 29.

Mutual non-existence (अन्योन्याभाव) is the absence of one thing as another, and its opposite is their identity (तादात्म्य). Non-existence of correlation (संसर्गभाव) is the absence of a connection or relation between two things, and its opposite is their connection. Mutual non-existence is a negation of *identity* between two entities. Non-existence of correlation is a negation of *connection* or relation between two entities. The opposite of mutual non-existence is *identity*, while that of absolute non-existence is connection.¹

Prior non-existence has no beginning, but it has an end. Posterior non-existence has beginning, but no end. Absolute non-existence is without a beginning or an end. Mutual non-existence is non-eternal, since it ceases to exist as soon as one of the two entities is destroyed.²

If non-existence of things is denied, then all things would be eternal. If prior non-existence is denied, then all things would be beginningless. If posterior non-existence is denied, then all things would be endless. If mutual non-existence is denied, then all things would be indistinguishable. If absolute non-existence is denied, then all things would be existing always and everywhere. This is the philosophical significance of the Vaisheshika category of non-existence and its various forms.³

The Mimamsa (Prabhakara) rejects the category of non-existence (अभाव). It urges that if non-existence were a reality, then the negation of non-existence also must be another reality, and so on *ad infinitum*. To avoid this infinite regress the ancient Nyaya maintained that the negation of a negation was equivalent to the positive. The modern Nyaya repudiates this view and holds that a negation can never be equivalent to a positive; but it admits that the negation of the negation of the first negation is equivalent to the first negation⁴. The Vedanta also rejects the category of non-existence. The Mimamsa and the Vedanta regard it as simple substratum (अधिकरण). The so-called non-existence of a jar on the ground is nothing but the ground.

1 I.P., pp 273—74.

2 SP., p. 189.

3 I.P., II, p. 221.

1 I. L. A., p. 206.

III. ETHICS.

23. Moral and Non-moral Actions.

Effort (प्रयत्न) of the soul is of three kinds, *viz.*, (1) striving towards an object (प्रवृत्ति), (2) striving away from an object (निवृत्ति), and (3) vital function (जीवनयोनि). Effort to attain an object and effort to avoid an object are voluntary. But vital functions such as inhalation and exhalation are non-voluntary¹. Voluntary actions are actuated by desire (इच्छा) and aversion (द्वेष). Vital acts are adapted to organic ends. Voluntary acts aim at the attainment of good (हितप्राप्ति) and avoidance of evil (अहितपरिहार)². Desire and aversion are the springs of voluntary actions. Desire is of two kinds, *viz.*, desire for an end (फल), and desire for a means (उपाय). The end is pleasure and negation of pain. The cognition of the end is the cause of desire for it. The cognition of the means for the attainment of the end is the cause of desire for it.³ Pleasure is an agreeable feeling. Pain is a disagreeable feeling. Desire is a yearning for the attainment of a pleasant object. Aversion is a yearning for the avoidance of a painful object³. Voluntary actions only bring about merit (धर्म) and demerit (अधर्म). Non-voluntary acts such as random movements of the child's hands and feet cannot bring about merit and demerit. Voluntary acts are moral ; non-voluntary acts are non-moral⁴.

The performance of enjoined acts produces merit in the soul. The performance of forbidden acts produces demerit in it. The former is due to attachment (राग) for enjoined acts. The latter is due to aversion (द्वेष) to them. Desire and aversion are springs of

1 BP., 149—50, SM, p. 471.

2 SM, p. 467, PB., p. 263.

3 TS., p. 91.

4 VSU., V. 1, 11.

voluntary actions. They produce merit and demerit through voluntary actions. They are the ultimate cause of the cycle of births and deaths (संसार)¹.

Dharma is the peculiar quality of the soul which produces welfare (अभ्युदय) and liberation (निश्चयेस)². *Abhyudaya* or welfare is interpreted in different ways. Some take it in the sense of pleasure (सुख). Some take it in the sense of heaven (स्वर्ग). Some take it in the sense of good (मंगल). Others take it in the sense of true knowledge of reality (तत्त्वज्ञान)³. *Abhyudaya* should be taken in the sense of pleasure or worldly enjoyment, or happiness in heaven. Merit (धर्म) is the cause of pleasure. Demerit (अधर्म) is the cause of pain. Merit and demerit are the cause of embodied existence. Merit cannot give abiding peace. Destruction of merit and demerit brings about complete separation of the soul from body. Liberation is complete absence of pain. It is brought about by the total destruction of all the special qualities of the soul-cognition, pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, effort, merit and demerit. Hence merit due to the performance of duties must be destroyed before liberation is attained. Only true knowledge of the reality can lead to the attainment of liberation. Spiritual insight is the cause of liberation⁴.

24. Duties.

Duties are acts enjoined by the scriptures. Some duties are universally obligatory. They ought to be performed by persons of all castes. Other duties are specific. They are different for different castes and for different conditions of life.

The universal duties are : (1) faith in virtue (धर्मश्रद्धा) ; (2) non-injury (अहिंसा) ; (3) kindness for all creatures (भूतहितत्व) ; (4) truthfulness (सत्यवचन) ; (5) non-stealing (अस्तेय) ; (6) celibacy (ब्रह्मचर्य) ; (7) purity of mind (अनुपधा) ; (8) conquest of anger (क्रोधवर्जन)

1 VSU., vi, 2, 14.

2 VS., i. 1. 2

3 VSV, VSU., VSB . i. 1. 2

4 VSU., i. 1. 2—4.

(9, bath or bodily cleanliness (अभिषेचन); (10) use of purifying objects (शुचिद्रव्यसेवन); (11) devotion to a deity (विशिष्टदेवताभक्ति); (12) fasting (उपवास); and (13) non-neglect of duties (अप्रमाद). Besides these universal duties, there are specific duties of the different castes and the different stages of life (आश्रम). The specific duties of the Brahmins are : (1) acceptance of gifts (प्रतिग्रह); (2) teaching; (अध्यापन); (3) conducting sacrifice (याजन); and (4) performance of the special rites of the caste (स्ववर्णविहितसंस्कार). The specific duties of the Kshatriyas are : (1) protecting subjects well (सम्यक् प्रजापालन); (2) chastising the vicious (असाधुनिग्रह); (3) non-withdrawal from military operations (युद्धेष्वनिवर्तन); and (4) performance of the special rites of the caste (स्वकीय-संस्कार). The specific duties of the Vaishyas are : (1) trade and commerce (क्रयविक्रय); (2) agriculture (कृषि); (3) tending cattle (पशुपालन); and (4) performance of the special rites of the caste (स्वकीयसंस्कार). The common duties of the Brahmins, the Kshatriyas, and the Vaishyas are : (1) the act of sacrifice (इज्या); (2) study of the Vedas (अध्ययन); and (3) charity (दान). The specific duties of the Shudras are : (1) service of the higher castes (पूर्ववर्णपारतन्त्र्य); and (2) performance of rites without uttering *mantras* (अमन्त्रिक-क्रिया). Again, duties differ in different stages of life. Students (ब्रह्मचारिन्) should wait on the preceptors, make offerings to sacrificial fires, beg for livelihood, eschew luxuries such as honey, meat, sleep during the day, collyrium, oils, etc. House-holders (गृहस्थ) should offer food to creatures (भूतयज्ञ), entertain guests (मनुष्ययज्ञ), make offerings to the sacrificial fire (देवयज्ञ), make oblations to the ancestors (पितृयज्ञ), study the Vedas (देवयज्ञ), procreate children for spiritual benefit. Recluses (वानप्रस्थ) should make offerings to the sacrificial fire, entertain guests, and then

live on fruits and roots of the forest. Ascetics (संन्यासिन्) full of faith, should give food to all creatures regularly, give up all actions, observe *yamas* (यम) *e.g.*, non-injury (अहिंसा), truthfulness (सत्य), non-stealing (अस्तेय), celibacy (ब्रह्मचर्य), and non-acceptance of gift (अपरिग्रह), and perform *niyamas* (नियम) *e.g.*, bodily cleanliness (शौच), contentment (सन्तोष), penance (तपः), study of the Vedas (स्वाध्याय), and meditating on God (ईश्वरप्रणिधान) steadfastly, and acquire insight into the nature of reality and the self which is necessary for liberation. The observance of duties with purity of mind in disregard of visible results produces merit (धर्म).¹

Desire, attachment, negligence, absence of faith, pride, conceit, etc., are impurities of mind. They produce demerit. Faith, contentment, determination to perform enjoined duties, and ascertainment of duties are purities of mind. They produce merit.² Purity of conduct without self-restraint does not lead to welfare (अभ्युदय)³ Self-restraint without purity of conduct also does not lead to welfare.⁴ Both purity of mind and purity of conduct are necessary for acquisition of merit.

Merit and demerit cause re-birth in a higher or lower plane of bodily existence.⁵ They bring about conjunction of a soul with a particular kind of body, which is called birth. They also bring about disjunction of the soul from the body, which is called death.⁶ Bondage is the cycle of birth and death.⁷

Merit and demerit are destroyed by the intuition of the Self and God, which is acquired by hearing the scriptures (श्रवण), meditation (सनन), practice of *yoga* (योगाभ्यास), firm conviction (निदिध्यासन), and

1 PB. pp., 272-73; NK., pp. 273-78; VS., vi. 2.2-9.

2 VSU., vi. 2.4.

3 VS., vi. 2.8.

4 VS., vi. 2.9. & VSV.

5 VS., vi. 2.16.

6 VS., vi. 2.15.

7 VSV., vi. 2.15.

yogic practices.¹ Liberation is due to true insight into reality (तत्त्वज्ञान).

25. Liberation.

Liberation (मोक्ष) is absolute cessation of pain, which is due to cessation of re-birth, which is due to cessation of activity, which is due to destruction of merit and demerit. When merit and demerit are worn out, the soul is separated from mind and body, and persists in its natural condition, devoid of cognition, pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, potencies, merit and demerit. Liberation is the natural condition of the soul, free from consciousness which is acquired by it in conjunction with body and mind. Liberation is free from bliss, because it depends upon its conjunction with mind. It is absolute freedom from pain.² Liberation does not consist in merging in God. The individual soul retains its identity in the state of liberation, though it attains similarity (साम्य) with God.³ This is the nature of liberation according to the Vaisheshika. The Vedantist criticizes this conception of liberation as equivalent to the condition of a stone.⁴

IV. THEOLOGY.

26. The Supreme Soul or God. (परमात्मन्)

Kanada does not distinctly refer to God in the aphorisms. The famous aphorism which is repeated twice by him has no reference to God. 'The authority of the Vedas is due to the authority of him or them' (तद्वचनादान्मायस्य प्रामाण्यम्).⁵ Probably Kanada traces the authority of Vedas to the authority of the seers. But the later commentators, Shankaramishra and others regarded the Vedas as the work of God, who is free from error, inadvertence, and the desire to deceive. The Vedas are the composition of eternal, omniscient,

1 VSV., vi. 2.16

2 VSU., vi. 2. 16 ; i. 1-4.

3 VSU., iii. 2.21.

4 SSSS., v, 36.

5 VS., i. 1.3; x.2.9.

and all-perfect God.¹ They speak of supernatural entities which are known by God only.² This interpretation is put upon the aphorism by the commentators. Prashastapada refers to God in the opening verse and the closing verse of *Padarthadharmasangraha*.³ He describes how the world is created and destroyed by God (महेश्वर).⁴ Shridhara and Udayana give arguments for the existence of God. They openly advocate theism. Kanada probably thinks that the unseen principle (अदृष्ट) can account for the activity of atoms and souls, the order of the universe, and enjoyments and sufferings of souls. Shankara also does not mention God as the creator of the world in criticizing the Vaisheshika doctrine. He mentions the unseen principle (अदृष्ट) as the cause of the motion of atoms which combine with one another to bring about the world, and as the cause of the variety of the souls' experiences. But the unseen principle (अदृष्ट) is unintelligent. It must be supervised by God who is omniscient. God is the Lord who acts according to the Law of Karma.

The syncretic writers of the Nyaya-Vaisheshika school are frankly theistic. They make a distinction between the individual soul (जीवात्मन्) and the supreme soul (परमात्मन्).⁵ There are innumerable individual souls. But the supreme soul is one. God is the supreme soul. God has the general qualities of number, magnitude, distinctness, conjunction, and disjunction. He is one. He is all-pervading. He is distinct from other souls. He has conjunction and disjunction, which are necessary in creation and dissolution. He has three special qualities, cognition, desire, and volition. His cognition is eternal, universal, and absolute, while human cognition is transient, particular,

1 VSU., i., 1.3.

2 VSU., x. 2-9.

3 PB., pp., 329.

4 PB., pp., 48-49.

5 SP., p. 18 ; TS., p. 23 ; KR., pp. 39-42.

and relative¹. He is devoid of pleasure, pain, aversion, merit, demerit, and disposition (संस्कार).

God is omniscient. He has eternal knowledge. He is free from ignorance. So He cannot have attachment and aversion which arise from false knowledge. He cannot have any activity which may produce merit and demerit, and through them pleasure and pain. Nor can He have dispositions (संस्कार), since His knowledge is immediate and eternal².

The modern Naiyayikas hold that God has eternal happiness, while the ancient Naiyayikas held that God has absolute negation of pain.³ His knowledge is perceptual, though not derived through sense-organs. He perceives the universe at an intuitive glance. His knowledge is neither derived from inference nor from memory. It is intuitive.⁴

God is the efficient cause of the world. Atoms are its material cause. God is not its material cause. God produces the world out of the pre-existing atoms for enjoyments and sufferings of the individual souls according to the Law of Karma. Atoms and souls are co-eternal with God. They are not created by God. This is the deistic view of God advocated by the later Vaisheshikas.

V. GENERAL ESTIMATE OF THE VAISHESHIKA PHILOSOPHY.

27. Criticism of the Vaisheshika system

The Vaisheshika recognizes seven categories : (1) Substance ; (2) Quality ; (3) Action ; (4) Generality ; (5) Particularity ; (6) Inherence ; and (7) Non-existence. These are separate realities. But the Vaisheshika admits that quality and action cannot exist apart from a substance, though a substance can exist apart from its qualities and actions. So substance is the fundamental category. Quality and action are the phases of a

1 NK., p. 56 ; I.L.A., p. 262.

2 NK., p. 57 ; I.L.A., p. 270.

3 TSP., p. 142

4 NM., p. 201.

substance. They cannot be treated as co-ordinate with a substance.

The relation between a substance and its qualities and actions is said to be inherence. Inherence is said to be inseparable relation. It is the relation between a whole and its parts, a quality and a substance, an action and a substance, a generality and an individual, a particularity and an eternal substance. The Vaishe-shika himself admits that a substance is devoid of qualities at the first moment of its production, so that it is independent of qualities which depend on it. A substance can exist apart from actions, so that a substance is independent of actions which always depend on it. A generality can subsist apart from individuals which are produced and destroyed, so that it is independent of them which cannot exist apart from it. The component parts of a composite substance exist apart from it, but the composite product cannot exist apart from its component parts. The parts are independent of the whole; but the whole is not independent of the parts. Thus a substance has a separate existence apart from its qualities and actions; a generality apart from its individuals; component parts apart from the composite product. Thus inherence cannot be said to be inseparable relation. In this relation only one term depends upon the other and is inseparable from it. There is one-sided dependence in it. In inseparable relation both the terms should depend on each other. There should be mutual dependence of both the terms of the relation. Inseparable relation is internal relation. But inherence is not an internal relation.

Shankara urges that if inherence is recognized as a separate category to relate two terms, then it will require another inherence to relate itself to the terms, and the second inherence will require a third inherence to relate it to the first inherence, and so on *ad infinitum*. This infinite regress (अनवस्था) can be avoided by admitting that inherence (समवाय) is identity of nature (तादात्म्य). Shankara reduces inherence to identity.

The Vaisheshika recognizes the existence of generality as the basis of assimilation, and the existence of particularity as the basis of discrimination. He takes a scientific view of the universe. He analyses the material things in to atoms existing in time, space, and ether, and seeks to connect them with one another by finding out their similarities and generalities. The Vaisheshika atomism is an evidence of great advance in thought. The Vaisheshika recognition of generalities and particularities also is an evidence of scientific outlook. But the Vaisheshika does not relate the things of the world to one another and trace them to a common principle. He does not explain the relation of space, time, ether, and atoms to one another clearly. His view of the reality is empirical, scientific, realistic, and pluralistic.

The Vaisheshika conceives of the soul as unconscious in itself. The soul is regarded as a substance. Consciousness is not its essence or property. It is an accident of the soul. In the state of dissolution the soul remains in an unconscious condition. In the state of liberation also it remains in its natural condition devoid of consciousness, though it attains similarity with God. All its special qualities are destroyed. This conception of the soul-substance is extremely unsatisfactory. The Vaisheshika does not seem to realize the social nature of the individual soul as a member of the moral organism or society.

The Vaisheshika conception of God as *Deus ex machina* external to the atoms and the finite souls which are co-eternal with Him is unsatisfactory. God is the efficient cause of the world. The atoms are its material cause. God creates the world out of the pre-existing atoms in conformity with merits and demerits of the finite souls for their enjoyments and sufferings. Thus the Vaisheshika relates the world to the finite souls through the Law of Karma as an external agency, but does not recognize their integral relation. The finite souls are related to finite things externally, and they are related to God externally. The finite things are

related to one another externally. God is externally related to the Law of Karma. The pluralistic attitude of the Vaisheshika compels him to recognize only external relations among realities. If the implications of the Vaisheshika theory of the reality are fully drawn out, the realm of nature and the realm of spirits should be regarded as integral members of the moral order which is the expression of God. The Law of Karma is the internal law of His will or being. God is the embodiment of the Moral Law which governs the natural and spiritual universe. Nature is the expression of the divine spirit. The finite souls are members of the divine commonwealth. They are integral members of Absolute.

The Vaisheshika's recognition of ultimate individuality or particularity (विशेष) of eternal substances is a great advance in thought. The modern problem of the principle of individuation is adumbrated in it. But the Vaisheshika does not explain the nature of particularity. What, for example, individuates a particular soul and distinguishes it from others is not explained. Individual souls never lose their integrity. They retain their identity and unique individuality even in the state of liberation. But what constitutes their uniqueness is not clear.

The Vaisheshika's recognition of non-existence (अभाव) is another advance in speculation. The problem of negation is a problem of modern logic. A implies not-A. B implies not-B. Not-A is different from not-B. Thus non-existence is a separate category. The four kinds of non-existence have metaphysical significance. If there were no prior non-existence, there would be no production of transient things. If there were no posterior non-existence, there would be no destruction of transient things. Without prior and posterior non-existence things would be eternal. If there were no mutual non-existence, all things would be indistinguishable from one another. If there were no absolute non-existence, things would exist always and everywhere. The recognition of the four kinds

of non-existence is based on the empirical, realistic, and pluralistic conception of the universe

Affirmation implies negation. Negation implies affirmation. Existence implies non-existence. Non-existence implies existence. Existence is thesis. Non-existence is antithesis. The Vaisheshika does not admit the reality of synthesis which reconciles thesis with anti-thesis. The reality is a system in which all contractions are reconciled. The Vaisheshika fails to recognize it. But this is the logical implication of its ontology.

CHAPTER V.

The Mimamsa Philosophy.

1. Introduction

The Mimamsa is called the Purva Mimamsa, while the Vedanta is called the Uttara Mimamsa. The Purva Mimamsa is earlier than the Uttara Mimamsa in the sense that the former is concerned with rituals (कर्म), while the latter is concerned with knowledge (ज्ञान). The performance of rituals which are acts of duty (धर्म), leads to knowledge of the reality. So the Purva Mimamsa is logically prior to the Uttara Mimamsa. It is generally called the Mimamsa. The Uttara Mimamsa is generally called the Vedanta.

The Mimamsa mainly deals with the Vedic injunctions about rituals. It supplies the rules of interpretation of the texts, by which the apparent contradictions among them can be removed, and they can be harmonized with one another. It also deals with the philosophical justification of the beliefs underlying ritualism. The Mimamsa believes in the reality of the souls (आत्मन्), the external world, and the Law of Karma. It believes in many gods. It does not recognize the existence of one God, the creator of the world. It believes in the eternality and infallibility of the Vedas. It does not believe in the Divine authorship of them as the Nyaya-Vaisheshika does. The Mimamsa is sometimes called Karma Mimamsa, since it primarily deals with *Karma* or rituals. The Mimamsa philosophy is the philosophy of ritualism.

There are two main schools of Mimamsa founded by Kumarila Bhatta and Prabhakara. They are called the Bhatta (भाट्ट) school and the Prabhakara (प्राभाकर) school. They hold different views on many philosophical problems. The differences in their views will be noted in course of our discussion of the main problems.

Jaimini (400 B.C.) was the founder of the Mimamsa philosophy. He was the author of the *Mimamsa Sutra*. Shavara (100 B.C.) wrote a commentary on it. It is known as *Shavara-Bhashya*.

Kumarila (7th. century A.D.) wrote an independent treatise on *Shavara-Bhashya* in three parts: *Shlokavartika*, *Tantravartika*, and *Tuptika*. *Shlokavartika*, which deals with the first part of the first chapter known as *Tarkapada*, is of great philosophical importance. Kumarila was a staunch advocate of Brahmanical orthodoxy and Vedic ritualism. Shankara vigorously attacked his ritualism and defended rationalism. He inculcated the cult of knowledge (ज्ञान) as distinguished from Kumarila's cult of ritualism (कर्म). Parthasarathi Mishra (9th. century A.D.) wrote a commentary named *Nyayaratnakara* on Kumarila's *Shlokavartika*. He wrote an independent treatise named *Shastradipika* on the lines of Kumarila. It is a popular manual of the Bhatta school of Mimamsa. Ramakrishna Bhatta wrote a commentary on the *Tarkapada* of *Shastradipika* called *Yuktisnehaprapurani-siddhanta-chandrika*.

Prabhakara (7th. century A.D.) wrote a commentary called *Brhati* on *Shavara-Bhashya*. Shalikanatha Mishra wrote a commentary on *Brhati*. He wrote also an independent treatise called *Prakaranapanchika* on the lines of Prabhakara. It is a popular manual of the Prabhakara school of Mimamsa.

Tradition says that Prabhakara was a pupil of Kumarila. The doctrine of Prabhakara is often referred to as *gurumata*, the view of the teacher. Prabhakara closely follows Shavara in his commentary. But Kumarila rejects some of his views. Some hold that Prabhakara preceded Kumarila.

The third school of Mimamsa is said to be founded by Murari Mishra. The works of this school seem to have been lost.

The Mimamsa philosophy may be discussed under four heads : Epistemology, Metaphysics, Ethics, and Religion.

1. Epistemology.

The Mimamsa recognizes the self-validity (स्वतःप्रामाण्य) of knowledge. Kumarila recognizes six *pramanas* or means of valid knowledge, *viz.*, perception, inference, comparison, Vedic testimony, postulation, and non-perception. Prabhakara rejects non-perception as an independent means of valid knowledge. He recognizes the first five *pramanas*. Kumarila holds that cognitive act is inferred from cognizedness (ज्ञानता) in the object. Prabhakara holds that the self, the cognition, and the object are perceived simultaneously (त्रिपुटीप्रत्यक्ष) in every act of perceiving an object.

2. The Nature of Valid Knowledge (प्रमा).

Kumarila holds that the validity of a knowledge consists in its being an apprehension, which can be set aside by the knowledge of any defect in the cause of knowledge, which gives rise to a knowledge of a contrary object (तस्माद्बोधात्मकत्वेन प्राप्ता बुद्धेः प्रमाणात् । अर्थान्यथात्वहेतू-त्थयदोषज्ञानादपोचते). Parthasarathi;Mishra, a follower of Kumarila, defines valid knowledge as the apprehension of an object which has not already been apprehended, which is free from contradiction, and which arises from causes free from defects (कारणदोषबाध-ज्ञानरहितमऽगृहीतत्र-दि-ज्ञानं प्रमाणम्)². He also defines it as the apprehension of an object, which has not already been apprehended, and which truly represents the real nature of the object (यथार्थमऽगृहीतत्राहिज्ञानं प्रमाणम्)³. Memory is apprehension of an object which has already been apprehended. It does not yield new knowledge. So it is excluded from

1 SV., ii. 53.

2 SD., p. 123.

3 SD., p. 126.

valid knowledge which is characterized by novelty. Valid knowledge is free from contradiction. Non-contradiction or coherence is a test of truth. Non-contradiction is not merely negative. It implies coherence or self-consistency. It is also a positive test. Valid knowledge truly represents the real nature of its object. It reveals its object in its real nature. So it must be generated by causes which are not tainted by defects. Novelty, non-contradiction, and correspondence with reality are the characteristics of valid knowledge.

Prabhakara regards apprehension (अनुभूति) as valid knowledge. Apprehension is direct and immediate knowledge of an object. Apprehension *per se* is valid. Prabhakara says, "It is strange indeed how a cognition can be said to apprehend an object, and yet be invalid¹." Shalikanatha, a follower of Prabhakara, defines valid knowledge as apprehension. It is different from recollection, which arises from the impression (संस्कार) of a prior cognition. Recollection is not valid, since it depends upon a prior cognition.² Prabhakara agrees with Kumarila in excluding memory (स्मृति) from valid knowledge.

3. Self-validity of knowledge (स्वतःप्रामाण्य).

The Mimamsa holds that knowledge is valid in itself. Kumarila says, "The validity of knowledge consists in its apprehending an object; it is set aside by such discrepancies as its disagreement with the real nature of its object."³ The validity of knowledge is intrinsic; it is falsified by a contradicting knowledge (बाधकज्ञान), and the knowledge of any defects in its causes (कारणदोषज्ञान). The validity of knowledge arises from the causes of knowledge, untainted by any defects. It arises from the essential nature of the causes of knowledge. It does not arise from any special excellence (गुण) in the causes of knowledge, as the Nyaya holds. It is not due to any other extraneous

1 Brhati, MS, p. 3.

2 PP., p. 42.

3 SV., ii, 53.

conditions. The validity of knowledge is ascertained by itself. It is not known by any other subsequent knowledge of fruitful activity (अर्थक्रियाज्ञान), or the absence of contradicting knowledge (बाधकज्ञान). Knowledge is *per se* valid. It is not validated by any other knowledge. It has intrinsic validity. Its validity arises from its own generating conditions free from all defects, and is known by itself. Self-validity of knowledge consists in its being generated by the causal conditions of knowledge, and not being caused by any other extraneous conditions besides them. The knowledge of validity also is generated by the same causal conditions which make the knowledge known. (विज्ञानसामग्रीजन्यत्वे सति तदतिरिक्तहेत्वजन्यत्वं प्रमायाः स्वतस्त्वम् । तथा प्रमाज्ञप्तिरपि ज्ञानज्ञापकसामग्रीत एव जायते)¹

Prabhakara also holds that all apprehension (अनुभूति) is valid in itself. Its intrinsic validity is disproved only when it is found to be not in agreement with the real nature of its object. All cognitions as cognitions are valid; their invalidity is due to their disagreement with the real nature of their objects. Thus Kumarila and Prabhakara both recognize the intrinsic validity (स्वतःप्रामाण्य) of knowledge.

Madhavacharya groups the theories of validity and invalidity of knowledge under four heads. The Sankhya holds that the validity (प्रामाण्य) of knowledge and the invalidity (अप्रामाण्य) of knowledge are self-evident; they are inherent in the knowledge itself. The Buddhist holds that knowledge is intrinsically invalid, but it owes its validity to extraneous conditions. The Naiyayika holds that both the validity and the invalidity of knowledge are adventitious and due to extraneous conditions. The Mimamsaka holds that knowledge is intrinsically valid, but it owes its invalidity to extraneous conditions². The Advaita Vedantist also holds this view.

The Sankhya holds that the validity and the invalidity of knowledge are known by the knowledge it-

¹ SDS., pp. 234-35.

² SDS., p. 232 ; NM., p. 160 ; SV., ii, 33 NR ; SD., p. 54.

self ; they are intrinsic in knowledge ; they are not its adventitious characters. They cannot be made known by any extraneous conditions. The Mimamsaka urges that the same knowlege cannot simultaneously manifest the real nature of its object or its contrary nature. It is self-contradictory to hold that the same knowlege is valid and invalid at the same time, and as such apprehends its object as agreeing and disagreeing with it¹. The Sankhya may argue that the same knowledge is not valid and invalid at the same time. But some knowlege is valid, and some other knowledge is invalid. Valid knowledge itself makes its validity known. Invalid knowledge itself makes its invalidity known. Valid knowledge reveals its validity. Invalid knowlege reveals its invalidity. The Mimamsaka urges that this argument is wrong. If knowledge can reveal its validity or invalidity without depending on other conditions, we cannot distinguish between valid knowledge and invalid knowledge².

The Buddhist holds that knowledge is intrinsically invalid ; but its validity is due to extraneous conditions. As soon as knowledge emerges, it cannot apprehend the real nature of its object, because it is uncertain at the time and liable to contradiction. So it should be regarded as invalid. Its validity is subsequently known by the knowledge of the excellence of its generating causes (कारणगुणज्ञान), or the knowledge of its harmony with the knowledge of practical efficiency (संवादज्ञान, अर्थक्रियाज्ञान). When its validity is known, its intrinsic invalidity is set aside³.

The Mimamsaka urges that if the validity of knowledge is due to other extraneous conditions, the validity of the knowledge of the excellence of its generating causes, or the knowledge of its harmony with the knowledge of its practical efficiency which are said to validate the first knowledge, must be due to other extraneous conditions, and so on *ad infinitum*. If the latter knowledge is valid in itself, the first knowledge also

1 S V. II 35, S D., pp. 54-55.

2 S D. pp. 55-56.

3 S V., II 38, S D., pp. 56-58.

may be regarded as valid in itself. If knowledge is not intrinsically valid, it cannot be validated by any other knowledge. The validity of knowledge cannot be due to extraneous conditions. Knowledge cannot be validated by some other knowledge¹.

The Naiyayika holds that knowledge is neither valid nor invalid in itself. Its validity and invalidity are due to extraneous conditions. Its validity is due to the excellence of the causes of knowledge (कारणगुण). Its invalidity is due to defects in the causes of knowledge (कारणदोष). Knowledge is neither valid nor invalid in itself.

The Mimamsaka urges that if validity and invalidity are due to extraneous conditions, then prior to the knowledge of its validity or invalidity, the knowledge would be devoid of any logical value, since it does not apprehend the nature of its object in any other form². We experience only valid knowledge or invalid knowledge. But we never experience neutral knowledge. If all knowledge cannot by itself apprehend the real nature of its object, but must depend upon some other knowledge to manifest its object, then the latter knowledge also must depend upon some other knowledge to prove its validity. The Naiyayika holds that the validity of knowledge depends upon the knowledge of excellence of its causes (कारणगुणज्ञान), or the knowledge of its harmony (सवाद्) with the knowledge of its practical efficiency (अर्थक्रियाज्ञान). If the first knowledge depends upon the second knowledge for its validity, the latter also would depend upon some other knowledge for its validity, and so on. If second the knowledge is valid in itself and does not require any other knowledge to validate it, the first knowledge also is valid in itself; it can never be validated by any other knowledge, since it would lead to infinite regress³.

The Naiyayika holds that validity of knowledge is due to excellence (गुण) of its causes. The Mimamsaka

1 SD., pp. 58-59.

2 SD., p. 56.

3 SD., pp. 58-59.

contends that the so-called excellence of the sense-organs and the like can never be known through any source of valid knowledge. The validity of perception depends merely upon the essential nature of the sense-organs, free from all taint of imperfection, but not upon any special excellence of the sense-organs. If there were three kinds of knowledge, *viz.*, valid knowledge, invalid knowledge, and neutral knowledge, they would be accounted for by three kinds of causes. Valid knowledge would be due to excellence in its cause. Invalid knowledge would be due to defects in its cause. Neutral knowledge would be due to the essential nature of its cause, which is neither endued with excellence nor tainted with any defects. But, in fact, there are not three kinds of knowledge, valid, invalid, and neutral. We experience only two kinds of knowledge, valid and invalid. Invalid knowledge, no doubt, arises from causes tainted by certain defects. Valid knowledge, therefore, must be held to arise from causes free from all defects. It is needless to assume certain special excellences (गुण) in the causes of a knowledge to account for its validity. Hence knowledge owes its validity not to any special excellence in its causes, but to their essential nature; knowledge owes its invalidity to certain defects in its causes and disagreement with the real nature of its object¹. (तस्मात् कारणशुद्धत्वं ज्ञानप्रामाण्यकारणम्²).

Validity of knowledge cannot be ascertained by the knowledge of special excellence in its cause (कारणगुणज्ञान). There are no special excellences in the causes of knowledge except their essential nature. Therefore there can be no knowledge of any excellence in the causes of knowledge.

Nor can validity of knowledge be ascertained by the knowledge of the absence of a contradicting knowledge (बाधकप्रत्यय). The absence of contradicting knowledge cannot be exhaustively known by us, since we are not omniscient. Further, the absence of contradicting knowledge is known either at the time of

¹ SD, p. 60.

² SV., ii. 44, p. 58.

ascertaining the validity of a knowledge or at a subsequent time. Very often a contradicting knowledge does not arise at the time when the knowledge it contradicts arises, but appears subsequently. Therefore the validity of knowledge cannot be ascertained by the knowledge of the absence of a contradicting knowledge.

Nor can validity of knowledge be ascertained by knowledge of harmony (संवाद). Harmony, according to the Nyaya, is the agreement of a knowledge with the knowledge of fruitful activity initiated by it. (अर्थक्रिया). Validity of the first knowledge of an object (e.g., water), which prompts activity, cannot be said to be ascertained by its agreement with the subsequent knowledge of fruitful activity. For, unless the validity of the second knowledge is determined, it cannot determine the validity of the first knowledge. If the validity of the second knowledge is determined by another knowledge of fruitful activity, then the validity of that knowledge would be determined by another knowledge of fruitful activity, and so on *ad infinitum*. If the validity of the knowledge of fruitful activity be said to be determined by the first knowledge, then there would be circular reasoning. The validity of the first knowledge would be determined by the knowledge of fruitful activity, and the validity of the knowledge of fruitful activity would be determined by the first knowledge that gives rise to activity. If the validity of the knowledge of fruitful activity is held to be determined by itself, the validity of the first knowledge also prompting activity, should be regarded as determined by itself¹.

The Naiyayika holds that knowledge of fruitful activity (अर्थक्रियाज्ञान) is valid in itself, since it is not contradicted. A person perceives water, drinks it, and quenches his thirst. The knowledge of drinking water is not contradicted. It determines the validity of the knowledge of water. The Mimamsaka contends that the knowledge of fruitful activity is contradicted. In dream we have knowledge of drinking water and quenching our thirst. But the knowledge of fruitful

1 NM, pp. 160—65 ; SV. ii. 34—37 ; S. D., pp. 56—59.

activity is invalid, since it is contradicted by waking perception. So knowledge of fruitful activity is not valid in itself. The Naiyayika may argue that fruitful activity (अर्थक्रिया) consists in experience of pleasure (सुखज्ञान), which is not liable to contradiction. In the absence of pleasure there is no experience of pleasure. The Mimamsaka urges that in dream the knowledge of union with the beloved wife gives rise to experience of pleasure, but it is invalid. So experience of pleasure cannot determine the validity of the antecedent knowledge which gives rise to it¹.

Hence the Mimamsaka concludes that the validity of a knowledge is known by itself, and it arises from the essential nature of its cause untainted by any imperfection, but the invalidity of a knowledge is determined by the knowledge of a contradicting knowledge or the knowledge of any defects in its cause. The validity or the invalidity of a knowledge is not determined by its agreement or disagreement with the subsequent knowledge of fruitful or fruitless activity prompted by the initial knowledge. All kinds of valid knowledge are intrinsically valid. (स्वतः सर्वप्रमाणान्नां प्रामाण्यामिति गम्यताम्)².

The Mimamsaka differs from the Naiyayika in two respects. In the first place, the Mimamsaka holds that the validity of knowledge is self-evident and inherent in it, and the invalidity of knowledge is inferred from the knowledge of defects in its causes, and the knowledge of its disagreement with its object; whereas the Naiyayika holds that both validity and invalidity of knowledge are adventitious, being due to extraneous conditions, and are inferred from the knowledge of fruitful activity and fruitless activity respectively. In the second place, the Mimamsaka does not appeal to the pragmatic test, while the Naiyayika appeals to the pragmatic criterion of truth. The former advocates realism, pure and simple, while the latter advocates realistic pragmatism. The Mimamsaka regards the

1 S. D., pp. 59—60.

2 S. V. ii, 47, p. 59.

validity of knowledge as self-evident or self-validating ; it does not require any extraneous evidence for its validity, but it regards the invalidity of knowledge as adventitious, which cannot be known by itself ; it can be known through the knowledge of its discrepancy with the real nature of its object, the knowledge of defects in its causes, *e. g.*, sense-organs, etc. The Naiyayika, on the other hand, regards both validity and invalidity of knowledge as adventitious, which can be proved only by fruitful and unfruitful activity respectively ; both are not inherent characteristics of knowledge ; they are accidental marks of knowledge due to extraneous circumstances.

4. Kinds of Valid Knowledge (प्रमाण).

The Mimamsaka regards knowledge (ज्ञान) itself as *pramana* or means of valid knowledge. Prabhakara defines *pramana* as apprehension (प्रमाणमनुभूतिः)¹. Apprehension is self-luminous. A cognition directly reveals itself and the self as the cogniser. It sometimes directly reveals its object as in perception, and sometimes indirectly, as in inference and other kinds of knowledge. Apprehension is not inferred from apprehendedness produced by it in the object as Kumarila holds. Parthasarathi Mishra, a follower of Kumarila, defines *pramana* as the knowledge of an object which has not already been known, which is not contradicted by any other knowledge, and the causes of which are free from defects². He also defines it as the knowledge of the real nature of an object, which has not previously been known. (यथार्थमगृहीतप्राहिज्ञानं प्रमाणम्). Kumarila also regards knowledge itself as *pramana*, and apprehendedness (ज्ञातता) in the object produced by the knowledge as the result (फल) of *pramana*. He holds that knowledge is of the nature of activity (ज्ञानक्रिया), and the cognitive activity is inferred from its result in the form of apprehendedness in the nature of its object. He regards cognitive activity as the instrument of valid knowledge (प्रमाण)³. Both Kuma-

1 PP., p. 42

2 SD., pp. 122-23.

3 SD., p. 126.

mila and Prabhakara regard knowledge itself as *pramana*.

Jaimini recognizes the three *pramanas* of perception, inference, and testimony. Prabhakara adds comparison, and postulation. Kumarila further adds non-perception. Prabhakara recognizes five *pramanas*. Kumarila admits six *pramanas*. Prabhakara rejects non-perception as an independent *pramana*.

5. (I) Perception (प्रत्यक्ष).

Shavara defines perception as the knowledge produced in the self by the right intercourse of the sense-organs with existing objects. (सत्संप्रयोगे पुरुषस्येन्द्रियाणां बुद्धिजन्म तत् प्रत्यक्षम्¹). It is produced by objects existing at present and stimulating the sense-organs. Kumarila says, "It is due to the intercourse of the sense-organs with the present objects, not vitiated by any defects."² The self comes into contact with the mind (मनस्); the mind comes into contact with an external sense-organ; the sense-organ comes into communion with an external object. This self-mind-sense-object-contact gives rise to perceptual knowledge³. A sense-organ is an instrument of perception. It produces clear and distinct knowledge, when it has right intercourse with a present object. The sense-organs are either external or internal. The olfactory organ, the gustatory organ, the visual organ, the tactual organ, and the auditory organ are the external sense-organs. The mind is the internal sense-organ. The Mimamsaka, like the Naiyayika, holds that the olfactory organ is made of earth; the gustatory organ, of water; the visual organ, of light; and the tactual organ, of air. But the Mimamsaka differs with the Naiyayika as to the nature of the auditory organ. The former holds that it is the space (दिक्) limited by the ear-hole, while the latter holds that it is made of ether (आकाश) within the ear-hole. The Mimamsaka agrees with the Naiyayika in regarding the mind as the inter-

¹ SB, i. 1-4.

² SV, i. 1-4. 38.

³ SV, i. 1-4. 60.

nal organ. It acts independently in the perception of the qualities of the self, cognition, pleasure, pain and the like. It is the organ of internal perception. The external sense-organs are organs of external perception. But they can produce perception of colour, smell, etc., when they are supervised by the mind.¹ Kumarila explains the contact of a sense-organ with its object as its capacity to reveal the object². Perception can apprehend sensible objects. It cannot apprehend supersensible objects.

Prabhakara defines perception as direct apprehension. (साक्षात्प्रतीतिः प्रत्यक्षम्³). It relates to an object (मेय), the self (मातृ), and the cognition (प्रमा). Prabhakara holds that in every act of perception of an object, the self, the cognition, and the object are perceived. Prabhakara is an advocate of the doctrine of triple perception (त्रिपुटीप्रत्यक्ष). In regard to objects, perception is due to the intercourse of the sense-organs with objects, substances (द्रव्य), universals (जाति), or qualities (गुण). Prabhakara, like Kumarila, admits six sense-organs, the internal organ or mind, and the five external organs, viz., the nose, the eye, the tongue, the skin, and the ear, with the same functions.⁴

Kumarila and Prabhakara both recognize two stages of perception, indeterminate perception (निर्विकल्प प्रत्यक्ष) and determinate perception (सविकल्प प्रत्यक्ष). Kumarila defines indeterminate perception as simple apprehension of an object, pure and simple, similar to the apprehension of a baby or a deaf person. It apprehends an individual object which is the substrate of generic (सामान्य) and specific (विशेष) characters. The self apprehends the pure object (शुद्ध वस्तु) endued with generic and specific characters in indeterminate perception. But it does not apprehend the generic and specific characters. It apprehends an individual object only, which has a

1 S D , 100.

2 S D., pp. 400-01.

3 P P., p. 51.

4 P P., p. 52.

two-fold aspect, generic and specific. It does not apprehend the object as having generic and specific characters¹. Kumarila defines the nature of the object of indeterminate perception by mentioning its two-fold aspect, generic and specific. Parthasarathi Mishra defines indeterminate perception as a non-relational apprehension of an object with its various properties, viz., genus, substance, quality, action, and name, just after the sense-object-intercourse. It apprehends an individual object with its generic and specific characters, but cannot distinguish them from each other, (अविविक्तसामान्यविशेषविभागं संमुग्धचस्तुमात्रगोचरमालोचनज्ञानम्)². Thus Parthasarathi Mishra slightly differs from Kumarila's view. Parthasarathi holds that there is apprehension of generic and specific characters in indeterminate perception, but there is no discrimination of them from each other at this stage. They are discriminated from each other by determinate perception. But Kumarila clearly says, "Neither the specific character nor the generic character is apprehended at the time; only the individual object, which is the substrate of generic and specific characters, is apprehended." (न विशेषो न सामान्यं तदानीमनुभूयते । तयोराधारभूता तु व्यक्तिरेवावसीयते)³.

Prabhakara holds that indeterminate perception is simple apprehension of the bare nature (स्वरूपमात्र) of an individual object with its generic character (सामान्य) and specific character (विशेष). It apprehends its generic and specific characters, but cannot distinguish them from each other. It apprehends a single individual object; it does not involve recollection of other similar and dissimilar objects; so it does not apprehend the distinction between the generic character and the specific character of its object. Apprehension of two distinct objects does not necessarily involve apprehension of their distinction. So indeterminate perception is the simple apprehension

1 S V., iv. 112, 113, 118 ; cf I. P. P., pp. 33-34.

2 S D., p. 109.

3 S V., N. 113.

of an individual object with its generic and specific characters undiscriminated from each other. It is not merely simple apprehension of an individual object, pure and simple, in which generic and specific characters subsist, as Kumarila holds. It apprehends the generic character and the specific character of its object, but does not distinguish them from each other, (निर्विकल्पेन सामान्यविशेषौ द्वे वस्तूनी प्रतिपाद्यमानेनापि तयोर्भेदो ग्रहीतुं न शक्यते)¹ Substance, generality, and quality are objects of indeterminate perception which apprehends their bare nature.² Indeterminate perception is free from recollection of other objects. It is devoid of discrimination. It is a purely presentative process. But it is not an object of inference. It is the first conscious stage of perception. The self directly apprehends an object itself alone which stimulates a sense organ, without remembering other objects, when its mind is fixed upon it, and is not otherwise occupied. This simple apprehension is proved by our own experience. It is proved by self awareness (समाहितमनस्को विषयान्तरानुसन्धानशून्य इन्द्रियसंयुक्तं वस्तु साक्षादुपलभत इति स्वसंविदेवात्र प्रमाणम्,³

Kumarila defines determinate perception as apprehension of an object as belonging to a class, and possessing particular qualities. It apprehends its generic character as generic and specific character as specific. It apprehends the inclusiveness of its generic character, and the exclusiveness of its specific character. It apprehends the community of its object with other similar objects, and its distinction from other dissimilar objects. Determinate perception apprehends an object and its properties, generality and the like, in a subject predicate relation⁴. Parthasarathi Mishra defines determinate perception as apprehension of an object with its multiform forms such as genus, substance, quality, action, and name, with their discrimination from each other. It apprehends its object and

1 PP., p. 55.

2 PP., p. 54.

3 PP., p. 54.

4 SV., iv. 119-20.

its properties in a subject-predicate relation. Indeterminate perception is non-relational and undiscriminated apprehension of an object with its multiform properties. Determinate perception analyses its object into the qualified object and the qualifying properties, *e.g.*, genus, substance, quality, action, and name, distinguishes them from and relates them to one another, and integrates them into the unity of a percept. "It apprehends an object as belonging to a particular class (*e.g.*, 'this is a cow'), as being qualified by a particular substance (*e.g.*, 'this is with a staff'), as being endowed with a particular quality (*e.g.*, 'this is white'), as doing a particular action (*e.g.*, 'this is going'), and as bearing a particular name (*e.g.*, 'this is Dittha') "' (निर्विकल्पकमने-काकारं वस्तु संमुग्धं गृह्णाति, सविकल्पकत्वेकैकाकारं जात्यादिकं त्रिविच्य विषयीकरोति) ² Prabhakara holds that indeterminate perception apprehends the bare nature of the generic character and the specific character of its object, but not the difference between them. But determinate perception apprehends its generic character as generic and its specific character as specific, and apprehends its object as qualified by them. It apprehends its object as qualified by its generic and specific characters. Indeterminate perception apprehends the generic character and the specific character of its object, but cannot apprehend them as generic and specific, because it is free from recollection of other objects. But determinate perception involves recollection of other objects, and therefore apprehends the generic character as generic, and the specific character as specific. The generic character is inclusive. It is common to many objects. The specific character is exclusive. It is peculiar to an individual object. In determinate perception the self remembers other similar and dissimilar objects. It compares its object with other similar objects, and apprehends its generic character as common to many objects. It compares its object with other dissimilar objects, and apprehends its specific character as peculiar to it. It apprehends its

object as qualified by its generic and specific characters. It apprehends the qualified object and its qualifying properties in the subject-predicate relation.¹ (सामान्य-विशेषौ द्वे वस्तुनी प्रणिपद्यमानं प्रत्यक्षं प्रथममुत्पद्यते किन्तु वस्त्वन्तरानु-मन्धानशून्यतया सामान्यविशेषरूपता न प्रतीयते । सविकल्पन्तु तत्पृष्ठ-भावि ते एव वस्तुनी सामान्यविशेषात्मना प्रतिपद्यते । सविकल्पकन्तु विशेषणविशेष्यभावमनुगच्छति).²

Kumarila and Prabhakara both recognize the validity of indeterminate and determinate perception. Both hold that the validity of knowledge consists in its being direct apprehension of an object, which has not been apprehended by a prior cognition. It consists in directness and immediateness of apprehension. Valid knowledge is direct and immediate apprehension of the real nature of an object, which has not been apprehended before.³ Prabhakara holds that the self has direct and immediate apprehension of the bare nature of an object which stimulates a sense-organ supervised by the mind which is fixed on this object alone, and this direct and immediate apprehension is valid because it apprehends itself. It is free from any element of recollection of other objects perceived in the past. It is a purely presentative process. It directly reveals the bare nature of its object and itself. It is self-luminous and self-evident. This simple apprehension which manifests itself is the sole criterion of its validity ; its validity is not proved by any extraneous circumstances. (अविकल्पा बुद्धिः स्वरूपविया । स्वरूपमात्रज्ञानं स्वानुभवसिद्धम् । स्वसंविदे-वात्र प्रमाणम्). Prabhakara recognizes the validity of determinate perception also. There are presentative and representative elements in determinate perception. Some object that the representative factor invalidates determinate perception, since memory is invalid according to Prabhakara. But Prabhakara refutes the objection. He holds that determinate perception is valid, like an uninterrupted serial perception (धारावाहिक-

1 I PP., pp. 34—36.

2 PP., pp. 54—55.

3 SV., ii, 53 ; SD., p 126 , PP., p 42.

4 PP., p. 54

ज्ञान), inasmuch as it apprehends certain new factors which did not enter into indeterminate perception, *viz.*, the relation between the qualified object and its qualifying properties, both of which were indeed apprehended by indeterminate perception, but not as related to each other. Though determinate perception follows in the wake of indeterminate perception and apprehends the same object which has already been apprehended by indeterminate perception, it must be regarded as valid, since it apprehends something new in the object, *viz.*, the subject-predicate relation between the qualified object and its qualifying properties (विशेषणविशेष्यभाव). The representative factor in determinate perception does not pertain to the thing perceived but to the other things with which it has certain characters in common or from which it differs in certain characters, and this cannot invalidate the determinate perception of the thing itself. Thus Prabhakara concludes that determinate perception, though presentative-representative in character, is valid. (सन्निकल्पस्य गृहीतग्राहित्वेऽपि धारावाहिकन्यायेन प्रामाण्यं वेदितव्यं, विशेषणविशेष्यभावातिरेकेणागृहीतग्राहितापि सम्भवत्येव)¹. Determinate perception is direct apprehension. It is produced by the sense-object-intercourse. It cannot be produced by the mere stimulation of a sense-organ by an object. It is produced by peripheral stimulation with the aid of subconscious impressions of past experience.²

Kumarila also recognizes the validity of indeterminate perception and determinate perception. Indeterminate perception reveals the bare nature or *thatness* of an object. It is direct apprehension (अपरोक्षावभास)³ or clear and distinct cognition (विरादावभास)⁴ of an object in itself, unrelated to other objects. So it is valid. Its validity consists in its directness and immediateness⁵. Indeterminate perception is characterized by novelty. It yields new knowledge not acquired

1 PP., p. 65

2 PP., p. 65

3 SD., p. 104.

4 SD., p. 105.

5 SD., Yuktisnehaprapurani, p. 110,

before. Though it is devoid of subject-predicate relation, it is valid. Kumarila recognizes the validity of determinate perception also. The Buddhist holds that directness or indirectness of a cognition is due to the nature of its object; a cognition is direct, if it apprehends the specific individual (स्वलक्षण), and a cognition is indirect, if it fails to apprehend the specific individual. Parthasarathi, a follower of Kumarila, contends that, if it were so, then generality (सामान्य) would always be known by an indirect cognition (*e. g.*, inference), and the specific individual would always be known by a direct cognition or perception. But, in fact, we know generality both by perception and by inference, and the specific individual also both by perception and by inference¹. Even the same object may be apprehended both by a direct cognition and by an indirect cognition. When it is known through the sense-organs, it is known by direct cognition, and when it is known through marks of inference, words and the like, it is known by an indirect cognition. Hence the directness or indirectness of a cognition is not due to the nature of its object, but to the instrument of cognition. When the cognition of an object is produced by the sense-object-intercourse, it is direct, and when it is generated by marks of inference, words and the like, it is indirect. Determinate perception is produced by the sense-object-intercourse, though it is aided by the subconscious impressions of the previous perceptions of other objects, and so it must be regarded as a direct cognition, just as indeterminate perception, which is produced by the sense-object-intercourse, is regarded as a direct cognition. Hence directness is not the special characteristic of indeterminate perception alone, but also of determinate perception, since both are produced by the sense-object-intercourse, and both are valid in as much as both are of the nature of direct and immediate apprehension². (न हि परोक्षापरोक्षविभागो विषयकृतः³ ।

1 SD., pp. 104-105.

2 SD., pp. 103-06.

3 SD., p. 105.

विकल्पस्यापि विशदावभासित्वमिति प्रत्यक्षत्वोपपत्तिः ¹ । सविकल्पकमप्यनुपरतेन्द्रियव्यापारस्य जायमानमपरोक्षावभासत्वात् प्रत्यक्षमेव) ²

6. (II). Inference (अनुमान).

Shavara defines inference as the knowledge of an unperceived object not present to a sense-organ on the perception of another object, when a certain permanent relation has been known to subsist between them. (अनुमानं ज्ञातसम्बन्धस्यैकदेशदर्शनादेकदेशान्तरेऽसन्निकृष्टेऽर्थे बुद्धिः) ³. Kumarila explains the relation to be invariable concomitance (व्याप्ति) between the middle term (व्याप्य) and the major term (व्यापक) ⁴. The middle term is called *gamaka* (गमक) because it enables us to know the major term. The major term is called *gamyā* (गम्य) because it is known through the medium of the middle term. The middle term is called *vyāpya* (व्याप्य) because it is co-extensive with, or narrower than, the major term in time and space. The major term is called *vyāpaka* (व्यापक) because it is co-extensive with, or wider than, the middle term in time and space. When the object denoted by the middle term (e.g., smoke) is perceived, the object denoted by the major term (e.g., fire) is inferred. The knowledge of the middle term is the means of the knowledge of the major term; otherwise there would be no relation of invariable concomitance between them ⁵. Smoke has been perceived to be accompanied by fire in the kitchen and other places at definite times and places. Smoke is subsequently perceived in a mountain exactly in the same form. So the existence of fire in the mountain in the same form is inferred from it. The middle term proves the existence of the major term ⁶. The major term alone is not the object of inference because it is already known. The minor term (e.g., a mountain) as qualified by the major term (e.g., fire)

1 SD, p. 106.

2 SD, pp 103-04.

3 SB., p. 6.

4 SV., *Anumanaparichcheda*, v. 4.

5 SV., v. 4-5.

6 *Ibid.*, v. 6.

7 *Ibid.*, v. 10-11.

is the object of inference. Independently of the major term, the minor term alone can never be the object of inference. Nor can the minor term, or both the major term and the minor term, taken singly or collectively, be the object of inference, independently of the other.¹ It is the minor term (पक्ष), as qualified by the major term (साध्य, व्यापक), that forms the object of inference. The mountain as qualified by fire is inferred from the smoke perceived in it.² 'तस्माद्वस-विशिष्टस्य धर्मिणः स्यात् प्रमेयता)'.³

Vyapti (व्याप्ति) is the ground of inference. It is the universal proposition expressing invariable concomitance between the middle term and the major term. Kumarila holds that the universal proposition is the result of inference. We know it by induction by simple enumeration. The invariable concomitance is known by repeated observation of the concomitance of the two general properties of the objects denoted by the middle term and the major term, strengthened by non-observation of contrary instances of their non-concomitance. Sometimes there is an invariable concomitance between two particular objects also (e.g., the constellations of *Krttika* and *Rohini*), so that when one is perceived, the other is inferred from it. (भूयोदर्शनगत्या च व्याप्तिः सामान्य धर्मयोः । ज्ञायते भेदहानेन क चिच्चापि विशेषयोः ।)⁴. The knowledge of invariable concomitance is inferential, since the concomitance of the middle term with the major term in the past, the present, the future, and the remote can never be perceived. Perception is confined to 'here and now'. We can never have direct apprehension of all cases of smoke and all cases of fire and invariable concomitance between them. The perceptual character of the knowledge of invariable concomitance is contradicted by consciousness. (यत्र यत्र धूमः तत्र तत्राग्नि रिति योऽवगमः सोऽप्यानुमानिक एव परोक्षरूपत्वात्, तस्य तु प्रत्यक्षत्वं संविद्विरुद्धम् आपरोक्ष्याभावात्)⁵. Parthasarathi

1 *Ibid.*, v. 27-28.

2 *Ibid.*, v. 47-48.

3 *Ibid.*, v. 47.

4 *Ibid.*, v. 12.

5 *Ibid.*, v. 12, NR., p. 350.; SD., YSP., p. 171.

Mishra also holds the same view. A person who has frequently observed the concomitance of smoke with fire in a third thing (e.g., kitchen), and who has never observed smoke in non-fiery objects observed carefully, infers the existence of fire in a mountain from the smoke perceived in it¹. He need not observe the fieriness of all smoky objects nor the absence of smoke in all non-fiery objects. He should observe the concomitance of smoke with fire in numerous instances, and not observe any contrary instance of their non-concomitance. This is sufficient for inference. We observe the concomitance of smoke with fire in the kitchen and the like in numerous cases, and infer from them the concomitance between them in the past, the future, and the remote. (दृष्टान्तधर्मिष्वेव बहुशोऽग्निसाहित्यमुपलब्धवतोऽनग्नौ च क्वचिदपि प्रयन्तेगान्बिष्यमाणे धूममदृष्टवतः साध्यधर्मिष्वग्निमत्ताज्ञानमुत्पद्यते अनुमित्सता न सर्वेषां धूमक्तामग्निमत्ताऽवगन्तव्या, नाधिसर्वत्राऽनग्नौ धूमस्याऽभावः। भूयोऽग्निसाहित्यं व्यभिचाराऽदर्शनमित्येतावदेवानुमानार्थिभिरभ्यर्थनीयं नाधिकं किंचित्। यत्त्विदं यन्न यत्र धूमस्तत्राग्निरिति ज्ञानं तदनुमानमेव)² Hence the universal major premise of a syllogism is the result of induction by simple enumeration. It expresses the permanent relation, either co-existence, causality, identity, or any other relation, between two things in a third thing, which has been observed in a large number of cases, so that when one of them is perceived, the other is inferred from it. There is co-existence between the constellation of Kṛttika and the constellation of Rohini, so that when the appearance of the former is perceived, that of the latter in proximity to it is inferred. There is a causal relation between fire and burning, so that when fire is perceived, its burning power is inferred. There is identity (तादात्म्य) between a genus and species, so that from a species (e.g., *shimshapa* tree) we can infer the existence of a genus (e.g., tree)⁴.

1 SD, p. 172-73

2 SD, YSP, p. 175

3 SD, pp 172—73.

4 सिद्धान्तचन्द्रिकागूढार्थविवरणम्, pp. 60—61.

The Naiyayika recognizes five members of a syllogism, viz., (1) the proposition (प्रतिज्ञा); (2) the reason (हेतु); (3) the example (उदाहरण); (4) the application (उपनय); (5) the conclusion (निगमन) as follows :

1. The mountain is fiery ;
2. Because it is smoky ;
3. Whatever is smoky is fiery, e.g., a kitchen ;
4. The mountain is smoky ;
- ∴ 5. The mountain is fiery ;

But Kumarila rejects two members of a syllogism and recognizes only its three members, either the first three or the last three. The syllogism may be stated as follows :—

- ∴ 1. The mountain is fiery ;
2. Because it is smoky ;
3. Whatever is smoky is fiery, e.g., a kitchen.
1. Whatever is smoky is fiery, e. g., a kitchen ;
2. The mountain is smoky ;
- ∴ 3. The mountain is fiery.

Shavara recognizes two kinds of inference, viz., *Pratyakshatodrshatasambandha* (प्रत्यक्षतोद्दृष्टसम्बन्ध) and *Samanyatodrshatasambandha* (सामान्यतोद्दृष्टसम्बन्ध). In the former there is invariable relation between objects which are perceptible, as smoke and fire. In the latter the invariable relation is not perceived between two concrete objects, but known between two general notions, as motion of the sun is inferred from its change of position in the sky¹. Vatsyayana's *Purvavat* and *Sheshavat* inferences correspond to Shavara's *Pratyakshatodrshata* inference, while his *Samanyatodrshata* inference is identical with Vatsyayana's first explanation of *Samanyatodrshata*². Kumarila also admits these two kinds of inference. He calls them *Drshatasvalakshanavishaya* (दृष्टस्वलक्षणविषय) and *Adrshtasvalakshanavishaya* (अदृष्टस्वलक्षणविषय). In the former the specific character of the object of inference

¹ SD, YSP., p. 194

² IP., Vol., II, p. 386.

is perceived, as fire is inferred from smoke. In the latter the specific character of the object of inference is not perceived, as motion is inferred from change of position in space¹.

Kumarila recognizes novelty as an essential characteristic of valid knowledge. Novelty is the characteristic of not being already apprehended (अगृहीतग्राहित्व). It is objected that inference presupposes the memory of the invariable concomitance (व्याप्ति) between the mark and the inferred object, as smoke and fire. Memory is not valid knowledge, since it apprehends an object apprehended before. So it invalidates inference. Kumarila urges that though the co-existence of two things (*e. g.*, smoke and fire) in a third thing (*e. g.*, a kitchen) is certainly known already in a general way, yet the relation between the present subject of inference (*e. g.*, the present mountain) and the inferred property (*e. g.*, fieriness) is not already known. The present mountain was not already known, far less its fieriness. What is not apprehended already in this inference? The generic nature of fire is indeed already known. The present mountain also is perceived. But the present mountain as qualified by fieriness is not already known by any means of valid knowledge. It is an object of inference. (सामान्येन हि धूमवतामग्निमत्ताऽवगता पर्वतादेस्तु देशविशेषस्य स्वरूपमपि प्रागनवगतम् न तरामग्निमत्त्वम्² । किमत्राऽगृहीतम् ? अग्निसामान्यं तावद् गृहीतमेव, पर्वतोऽपि प्रत्यक्षेणावगतः, अग्निविशिष्टस्तु न केनाप्यवगत इति स अनुमेयः³). The subject as qualified by the inferred property is the object of inference. So inference is valid.

Prabhakara accepts Shavara's definition of inference. He defines inference as the knowledge of an object in another place on the perception of another object, between which an invariable relation is known to subsist, if the knowledge is not contradicted by any other knowledge.⁴

1 SD., p. 194.

2 SD., p. 174.

3 SD., pp. 177—78.

4 PP., p. 64

Inference is based upon the permanent relation between the mark of inference and the inferred property. Prabhakara holds that this relation must be true, permanent, and unfailing, such as that which subsists between the cause and its effect, the whole and its parts, the substance and its quality, the class and the individual, and qualities inhering in the same substance¹. There is invariable concomitance between smoke and fire; wherever there is smoke there is fire. But there is no invariable concomitance between fire and smoke; wherever there is fire, there is no smoke. The causal relation between smoke and fire is invariable. The relation of inherence between smell and earth is invariable. But the relation between taste and earth is not invariable. The relation between taste and colour is invariable, which inhere in the same substance. But the relation between colour and taste is not invariable. Wherever there is taste, there is colour, for instance, in water. But wherever there is colour, there is no taste, for instance, in light². A permanent invariable relation is the basis of inference.

Prabhakara does not lay any stress on the knowledge of the permanent relation between two things in a third thing in which they both subsist. He holds that the knowledge of the permanent relation between two things is the ground of inference, whereas the things in which they subsist together and the time and place are taken only as adjuncts which qualify the two things³. But Kumarila lays stress on the knowledge of the permanent relation between the mark and the inferred object in familiar instances.

How is the permanent relation known? How is the invariable concomitance (व्याप्ति) between the middle term and the major term known? It is a general principle. It cannot be known by perception through the external sense-organs, since it can apprehend only those things which exist at the present time and in the proximate place, and which are in contact with the

1 PP., p. 68 ; PSPM., p 43.

2 PP., p. 68.

3 HIP., Vol. I, p. 390.

sense-organs. Perception deals with particular times and places. It cannot operate in regard to things existing in all times and places. The general principle cannot be known by inference, since it is the ground of inference. If it is held to be known by inference, it would lead to infinite regress. It cannot be known by Vedic testimony, which gives us knowledge of duty (धर्म). Nor can it be known by comparison, since it has only similarity for its object. Nor can it be known by presumption, since it also depends upon a constant relation like inference, and therefore would lead to infinite regress. Nor can it be perceived by the mind (मनस्), since if it could perceive external objects in all times and places without the help of the external sense-organs, every person would be omniscient. The mind cannot be held to perceive the general principle with the help of the impression (संस्कार) of repeated observation (भूयोदर्शन) of the two things, since impression can bring about memory only, and cannot produce knowledge of more objects¹. The general principle is known by induction by simple enumeration. It is established on the basis of uniform and uncontradicted experience.

Prabakara holds that smoke and fire are perceived by themselves through the sense-organs ; the relations between them such as contact also are perceived through them ; the particular time and place also are perceived through them. But the relations and the particular time and place are perceived as qualifying adjuncts of the things, and the things are perceived as qualified by a certain qualifying relation and by particular times and places. We observe that wherever there is smoke there is fire, but wherever there is fire there is not necessarily smoke. So the relation of smoke with fire is constant, but the relation of fire with smoke is not constant. The concomitance of smoke with fire is invariable and unconditional. But the concomitance of fire with smoke is variable and conditional ; it depends upon the presence of wet

1 PP , pp 68—69

fuel. In the absence of wet fuel, fire is not accompanied by smoke. The invariable and unconditional concomitance is known by repeated observation of concomitance between the two things in numerous instances and non-observation of variable concomitance between them. Hence the general principle is known by uniform and uncontradicted experience¹. So Prabhakara's view is practically the same as that of Kumarila on this point.

Like Kumarila, Prabhakara recognizes three members of a syllogism : (1) the proposition to be proved (प्रतिज्ञा) ; (2) the major premise, which states the permanent relation illustrated by a familiar example (उदाहरण) ; (3) the minor premise, which may be stated in any order². Prabhakara, like Kumarila, recognizes two kinds of objects of inference ; that which has its specific individuality perceived (दृष्टस्वलक्षण) as fire inferred from smoke, and that which has its specific individuality unperceived (अदृष्टस्वलक्षण) as motion inferred from the change of position in space . Motion is imperceptible. Prabhakara admits inference for oneself (स्वार्थानुमान) and inference for others (परार्थानुमान). Both consist of three members only. Inference for others does not consist of five members as the Naiyayika holds³. "Prabhakara and Kumarila are agreed in insisting on the use of positive instances only, rejecting the process of argument from such a general proposition as, 'Where there is no fire, there is no smoke, as in a lake', though Kumarila himself recognizes its utility, though not its necessity, or, as in the Buddhist view, sole validity"⁴.

Prabhakara does not regard novelty as the essential feature of valid knowledge. He regards apprehension (अनुभूति) as valid knowledge. So the objection that the knowledge of smoke includes within itself the know-

1 PP., pp. 70-71 ; PSPM., pp. 43-44.

2 PSPM., p. 49.

3 PP., p. 78.

4 PP., pp. 82-83 ; PSPM., pp. 48-49.

5 KM., p. 30.

ledge of fire related to it at the time when the permanent relation between smoke and fire is known, and therefore inference of fire from smoke does not contain any new knowledge, has no force against Prabhakara who does not regard novelty as an essential feature of valid knowledge. Perception of smoke gives rise to the cognition of fire, which is of the nature of apprehension, though it is inferential and pertains to things already known¹. Kumarila, on the other hand, holds that inference is valid, because it contains new knowledge, *viz.*, the knowledge of the subject (पक्ष) as qualified by the inferred property (गम्य).

6. (III) Comparison (उपमान).

Shavara defines comparison as the knowledge of similarity in an unperceived object (*e. g.*, a cow) on the perception of a similar object (*e. g.*, a wild cow). Kumarila accepts Shavara's view. He defines comparison as the knowledge of similarity of a perceived object (*e. g.*, a wild cow) in a remembered object (*e. g.*, a cow), which was perceived in the past. (पूर्वदृष्टे स्मर्यमाणार्थे दृश्यमानार्थसादृश्यज्ञानमुपमानम्)². 'The cow which was previously perceived by us in the town is similar to this wild cow perceived now'. This is an example of comparison. Prabhakara also defines comparison as the knowledge of similarity which arises from the perception of similarity. (सादृश्यदर्शनोत्थं ज्ञानं सादृश्यविषयकमुपमानम्). A person, who previously perceived a cow in a town, perceives a wild cow in a forest and perceives its similarity with the cow. Then he remembers the similarity of the cow with the wild cow. This knowledge of similarity of the remembered cow with the perceived wild cow is of the nature of comparison. Prabhakara's view of comparison is identical with that of Kumarila. Both regard similarity as an object of comparison. Both regard similarity of a remembered object with a perceived object as apprehended by comparison. But Prabhakara,

1 PP., p. 71.

2 SD., n. 208

unlike Kumarila, regards similarity as an independent category.¹

The Mimamsaka differs from the Naiyayika in regard to the nature of comparison. The Naiyayika holds that comparison is the knowledge of similarity of an unknown object with a known object. (प्रसिद्धसद्व्यसाधर्म्यात् साधनमुपमानम्².) A person learns from a forester that a wild cow (गवय) is like a cow (गो). He goes to a forest, perceives an animal like a cow, and knows by comparison that it is a wild cow. The knowledge of the similarity of the perceived wild cow with the remembered cow is of the nature of comparison. The Mimamsaka refutes the Naiyayika's view. The so-called comparison apprehends either the peculiar nature of the wild cow (गवयस्वरूप) or the similarity with the cow existing in the wild cow (तद्गतगोसादृश्य). It cannot apprehend the former, since it is in contact with a sense-organ, and perceived through it. Nor can it apprehend the latter, since it is known through recollection of what was learned from the authority of a forester. The knowledge that the wild cow is similar to the cow is obtained from recollection of the past verbal cognition. Nor is the wild cow qualified by similarity with the cow (सादृश्यविशिष्टगवय) apprehended by comparison. If the knowledge of it is not in excess of the recollection of the verbal cognition, it is nothing but recollection. If, on the other hand, it is in excess of the recollection, it is nothing but perception, since it is produced by the sense-object-intercourse. It is of the nature of perception, since it is produced by a sense-organ with the aid of recollection. The element of recollection is merely an auxiliary factor which helps the sense-organ in giving rise to the perception. The knowledge that 'this animal perceived is denoted by the word *gavaya*' also is not of the nature of comparison. The relation between the word and its denotation (संज्ञासंज्ञिसम्बन्ध) is known by authority or verbal cognition. It is not known by comparison. So the simi-

1 PP., p. 110.

2 NS., i, 1. 6.

larity of the wild cow perceived in the remembered cow is apprehended by comparison. Or the remembered cow is qualified by similarity with the perceived wild cow and is known by comparison. (तस्य स्मर्यमाणैव गौर्गवयसादृश्यविशिष्टा प्रमेयं स्मर्यमाणगोगतं वा गवयसादृश्यं प्रमेयम्)¹. Though similarity with the cow in the wild cow is perceived, and the cow is remembered, yet the cow as possessing similarity with the wild cow is known by comparison².

Comparison is not perception, since its object known to be similar (*e. g.*, a cow) is not in contact with a sense-organ. It is not inference, since it does not depend upon the knowledge of invariable concomitance between the two things similar to each other. Comparison may be reduced to inference in the following manner. 'The cow is similar to the wild cow, because it is the substratum of similarity with the wild cow and whatever is the substratum of similarity with another thing, is found to be similar to that thing, as one of the twins is similar to the other'. This is wrong because the wild cow and the cow which are similar to each other were never perceived together in the past. A person, who perceived a cow in a town, subsequently perceives a wild cow in a forest, and knows that the cow is qualified by similarity with the wild cow by comparison. So comparison is not inference. Nor is it testimony, since it does not depend on verbal authority. Nor does it come under memory, since the similarity of the cow with the wild cow was not perceived when the cow was perceived, and therefore cannot be remembered now. Comparison is an independent means or kind of valid knowledge³.

8. (IV) Testimony (शब्द).

Shavara defines testimony as the knowledge of an object not present to a sense-organ, produced by the knowledge of words. (शास्त्रं शब्दविज्ञानादसन्निकृष्टेऽर्थे विज्ञानम्)⁴.

1 SD., YSP, p 210.

2 SD., YSP., pp 209—10.

3 SD., pp. 212—13.

4 SD., pp. 212-13.

Testimony is verbal authority. Kumarila defines it as the knowledge of objects, which are not within the range of sense-perception, derived from sentences by comprehending the meanings of the constituent words. (वाक्यार्थे तु पदार्थेभ्यः सम्बन्धानुभवाद्देते । बुद्धिरुत्पद्यते तेन भिन्नाऽ-सावत्तुबुद्धिवत्)¹. Parthasarathi also defines it as the knowledge of objects conveyed by sentences with the help of the meanings of the known words composing them. (विज्ञाताच्छब्दात् पदार्थाभिधानद्वारेण यद्वाक्यार्थविज्ञानं तच्छब्दाच्च नाम प्रमाणम्)². Kumarila divides testimony into human (पौरुषेय) and super-human (अपौरुषेय). The former is testimony of trustworthy persons (आप्रवाक्य). The latter is the testimony of the Vedas (वेदवाक्य). The former is valid, if it is uttered by persons of trustworthy character. The latter is valid in itself. Both are valid, since they are sentences free from the defects of being composed by untrustworthy persons, and words are valid in themselves. Again, testimony may either give us knowledge of existing objects (सिद्धार्थवाक्य), as 'A jar exists'; or it may direct us to perform an action (विधायकवाक्य), as 'Bring the jar'. The former gives us knowledge of existential propositions. The latter gives us knowledge of injunctive propositions³. Vedic testimony gives us knowledge of our duties (धर्म). *Dharma* is super-sensible; it cannot be perceived through the sense-organs. Inference, comparison, and other means of valid knowledge also cannot yield knowledge of *dharma*, since they presuppose perception. They cannot give us the knowledge that the performer of the Agnishtoma sacrifice will go to heaven. Vedic testimony is the only source of our knowledge of duties relating to super-sensible things. The Vedic texts which enjoin us to perform certain actions which lead to beneficial results are authoritative. Injunctive sentences (विधि) in the Vedas are authoritative. Prohibitions

¹ SV., v. 109, p. 432.

² SD., p. 203.

³ SD., pp. 203-04.

(निषेध) are injunctions in disguise. The other Vedic texts are authoritative in so far as they help persons to perform their duties.

Kumarila holds that human testimony is valid, if the sentence is uttered by a person of trustworthy character. It is not valid in itself. Its validity is inferred from the trustworthy character of the person. Noncontradiction (अबाधितत्व) is a test of truth. A knowledge is invalid, which is contradicted by a subsequent knowledge. But the Vedic testimony is never contradicted; the Vedic injunctions are not contradicted by any subsequent knowledge. The objects denoted by them can never be known by perception, inference, and other means of valid knowledge. So Vedic testimony is valid in itself. But non-Vedic or human testimony is not valid in itself; its validity is due to the trustworthy character of the person who utters the sentence. Vedic testimony has intrinsic validity. But human testimony has no intrinsic validity. It may be vitiated by carelessness, deliberate desire to cheat, and other defects of the 'speakers. The Vedas are not composed by human agency. So they are free from these defects. The Vedic sentences have inherent authority. They are valid in themselves.

Prabhakara regards testimony as the knowledge of objects which are not within the range of sense-perception due to the intercourse of the self with them depending on the knowledge of words. His definition follows Shavara's definition. Shavara defines it as the knowledge of unperceived objects, which is derived from the knowledge of words. Prabhakara does not recognize human testimony. Sentences uttered by persons cannot by themselves guarantee the real existence of the objects denoted by them. They often contain falsehood and do not agree with real objects. So there is no testimony other than scriptural testimony. (शब्दविज्ञानापेक्षादात्मनः सन्निकर्षाद्यददृष्टार्थविषयं ज्ञानं तच्छास्त्रानामप्रमाणम्¹ । न शास्त्रव्यतिरिक्तं शाब्दमस्ति)². Only the Vedas are

¹ PP, p. 87.

² PP, p. 94.

verbal authority or testimony. Only those sentences in the Vedas which contain injunctions as to the performance of certain duties are authoritative.¹ Human testimony is inference. The validity of a human utterance is inferred from the trustworthy character of the person who makes the utterance. So it is not distinct from inference.² Only Vedic testimony is verbal authority. The sentences in the Vedas are not composed by persons. They are super-human. They possess inherent validity. Their validity is not inferred from the character of the persons composing them, since they are eternal and have no origin. They reveal objects which cannot be known by any other means of valid knowledge. They comprehend objects which cannot be known by perception, inference, comparison, presumption, or non-perception. They constitute an independent means of knowledge.³ Prabhakara regards human testimony as inference. The validity of human testimony is inferred from the knowledge of the person's trustworthy character. The knowledge of the person is the cause ; the sentence uttered by the person is the effect. The effect is inferred from the cause. So human testimony is included in inference.⁴ But the Vedas are not composed by any person. God is not their author. Any agent of the Vedas is not known. The sentences in the Vedas manifest their own meanings by their inherent powers. The manifestation of their meanings does not presuppose any previous knowledge. (न च वेदे कर्ता पुरुषोऽस्ति⁵ । वेदेषु तु साक्षात्कर्ता नोपलब्धः । तेन स्वमहिमानुसारेण तावदर्थो बोद्धव्यः । स चापूर्वात्मकः प्रतीयते).⁶

All Mimamsakas regard testimony as an independent means of valid knowledge. Kumarila divides it into human and super-human. Human testimony is valid, if its author is of trustworthy character. Vedic testimony is super-human. It is valid in itself. It has intrinsic validity. Prabhakara recognizes the

1 PP., p. 91

2 PP., p. 96.

3 PP., Shlokas. 47—48, p. 16.

4 PP., pp. 96—97.

5 PP., p. 97.

6 PP., p. 99.

Vedic testimony only as verbal authority. He regards human testimony as inference.

Testimony is verbal cognition. It is knowledge derived from a sentence composed of words. Jaimini holds that the relation of a word to its meaning is natural and eternal. Words directly denote their meanings. Testimony is verbal knowledge derived from a sentence. It is an independent source of knowledge.

The Vaisheshikas and the Buddhists do not regard testimony as an independent *pramana* or means of valid knowledge. They include it in inference. Testimony is identical with inference, since it depends upon the knowledge of a permanent relation between words and their meanings, of which words are perceived and meanings are inferred from them.¹

Parthasarathi Mishra, a follower of Kumarila, refutes this view. The knowledge of the meanings of words is of the nature of recollection.² The objects denoted by words were apprehended in the past. So the knowledge of the meanings of words is not valid, since it is not characterized by novelty. (यत् पदार्थज्ञानं तदवगतार्थ-विषयत्वात् प्रमाणमेव न भवति).³ The knowledge of the meaning of a sentence cannot be inference, since it is directly brought about by the meanings of the constituent words without depending upon the knowledge of the permanent relation between the words and their meanings. Absolutely new meanings of sentences pertaining to remote objects are known by means of the meanings of the words composing them. The validity of human testimony is inferred from the knowledge of the trustworthy character of the person. But the meaning of a sentence uttered by a person is not inferred from the knowledge of the trustworthy or untrustworthy character of the person. Just after hearing a sentence its meaning is known through the meanings of the words which are independent of the

1 SV. V. 35-37, p. 416, SD., p. 205.

2 SV., V 107, p. 432.

3 SD., pp. 205-06.

knowledge of the trustworthy or untrustworthy character of the person. The knowledge of the meaning of a sentence does not depend upon the knowledge of the character of the person. The meaning of a sentence composed even by an absolutely unknown person is comprehended just after hearing it by means of the constituent words which directly denote their objects. Then a doubt arises whether it is valid or invalid. If the person composing it is known to be of reliable character, it is inferred to be valid, and if he is known to be of unreliable character, it is inferred to be invalid. But the meaning of a sentence is known by testimony which is distinct from inference. The meaning of a sentence uttered by a person is known by testimony. But the validity of such a sentence is known by inference. Vedic texts are without any personal creator. They are super-human. So they are valid in themselves. Vedic testimony can never be regarded as inference.¹ (वाक्यश्रवणानन्तरमेव ह्याप्तानाप्तज्ञानानपेक्षैरेव पदार्थैर्वाक्यार्थोऽवगम्यते).² Kumarila holds that the knowledge of the meaning of a sentence is directly brought about by the meanings of the constituent words without apprehension of the relation between the words and their meanings, like perception. (वाक्यार्थे तु पदार्थेभ्यः सम्बधानुभवाद्देते । बुद्धिरुत्पद्यते तेन भिन्नासावच्चबुद्धिवत्).³ So testimony is an independent *pramana*.

Prabhakara includes human testimony in inference. He regards Vedic testimony only as verbal authority (शब्दप्रमाण). The meanings of the Vedic texts are not known by inference. They are not inferred from the knowledge of the invariable concomitance between the constituent words and their meanings.⁴ No words except those in the Vedic texts can yield any knowledge of objects which are not already known by other means of knowledge. All words used by persons denote things that can be known by perception and inference also. The things denoted by such words can be rightly

1 SD-, pp. 205-07.

2 SD., p. 207.

3 SV., V. 109. p. 432.
PP., p. 109.

known only when they are spoken by persons of trustworthy character. Non-Vedic words have no intrinsic validity. They yield recollection of the objects perceived already. They merely translate the thoughts and intentions of the speakers. But Vedic words are inherently authoritative; they yield invariably valid cognitions, since they are not of human origin. Only the Vedic texts which contain an injunction (नियोग) are valid in themselves. All words naturally denote their objects. They are endowed with inherent denotative potency. But this potency is obscured by suspicion as to the trustworthy character of the speaker in the case of the words spoken by a person. But this potency is not obscured by any suspicion in the case of Vedic words, since they are not spoken by persons. They are superhuman, and therefore intrinsically valid¹. All Vedic words are eternal, since they give us knowledge of super-sensible things as *Dharma*, the *Apurva* (अपूर्व), and the like. The *Apurva* is the invisible potency produced in the soul by the performance of duties, which brings about the attainment of beneficial results. No person can have any knowledge of this potency except through the Vedas. Therefore the Vedas are not the work of a personal author.

The Mimamsakas hold that words are eternal, and their relations to their meanings also are eternal. The inherent validity of the Vedas is challenged by the Naiyayikas who raise several objections to the eternal character of all words in general, and of the Vedas in particular. (1) All words are brought about by human effort; they have a beginning. they had no existence prior to this effort. (2) They are evanescent, they enjoy a very brief existence. they are destroyed as soon as they are uttered. (3) Men talk of producing words, just as they speak of producing ordinary articles. If words were eternal, they would not be produced. (4) The same word is uttered, at one and the same time, by many persons, at different places. If it were an eternal and omnipresent entity, it would not be possible. (5) The volume of the same word is increased or decreased, when it is uttered by one person or many persons. If the word were eternal, its volume would not increase or decrease.²

1 PSPM., pp. 63-66.

2 G. N. Jha : *Introduction* to E. T. of SV., p. Vii ; MS i. 1. 6-11.

Jaimini refutes these objections and establishes the eternal character of words. (1) Words are not created by human effort. They are only manifested by it. The Nyaya regards the human utterance of a word as a creation. The Mimamsaka regards it as a manifestation of a pre-existing entity. (2) Words are not destroyed after being uttered. They revert to their original unmanifested condition, when the manifesting agency of the human effort in the shape of utterance has ceased. They are neither created nor destroyed. They are manifested by human effort. They become unmanifested again when human utterance has ceased. (3) People do not produce words. They merely produce sounds which manifest words. This manifesting agency is certainly due to human effort, which can never produce words. (4) Just as many persons, at different places, can simultaneously perceive the single sun, so they can simultaneously utter and hear the same word at different places. (5) The volume of the word uttered by one person or many persons is never decreased or increased. It is only the sound proceeding from men that increases or decreases¹. Thus Jaimini refutes the Nyaya view of the non-eternal character of words.

Jaimini gives positive arguments in favour of his theory. (1) The word is eternal: it is not created by human utterance; it is only manifested by it. Human effort can manifest it only because it already exists. A non-existent thing cannot be manifested. (2) When people utter the word 'cow' at different times and places, they always recognize it to be the same word. Therefore the word is ever present; but it is manifested at different times and places by different agents. (3) People speak of uttering the word 'cow' three or four times, and not of uttering three or four such words. So the word is one and ever present: it is manifested three or four times. (4) We perceive the causes of production and destruction of transient things. But we do not perceive such causes of production and destruction of words. So they are neither produced nor destroyed. (5) The word is said to be produced from air. But this is wrong. The sound is produced from the air. The word is quite different from the sound which only serves to manifest it. (6) Besides, there are many Vedic texts which lay down the eternal character of words. Hence the word is eternal.² A word denotes its meaning by nature. Its denotative power belongs to it by its very nature. It naturally denotes an object. Its denotative capacity is not determined by convention (संकेत). The Nyaya holds that God is the author of convention. He fixes the meanings of words by convention. But the Mimamsa does not believe in the conventional meanings of words. They have natural and eternal relationship to their meanings. Prabhakara holds that the meanings of proper names are fixed by convention. But the meanings of common words are not determined by convention.

¹ *Ibid.*, pp. VII—VIII; MS., I. I. 12—17.

² *Ibid.*, p. VIII; MS., I. I. 18—23.

They are independent of human agency. The Vedas are not created by God. Nor are they composed by seers. They are super-human. They are eternal and without any origin. The words in the Vedic texts denote their proper objects by their very nature. Their denotative power does not depend on any convention determined by God or men. The Vedas are self-sufficient and independent of all personal agency. They mainly enjoin that the performance of certain duties generates an *apurva* (अपूर्व)—an invisible subtle potency,—leading to a desirable result. No person can have any knowledge of it, independently of the Vedas. Therefore the denotative powers of the Vedic words are eternal and independent of conventions, human or divine.¹

There is a difference between Prabhakara and Kumarila as to the comprehension of the meaning of a sentence. Prabhakara advocates the doctrine of *Anvitatbhidhanavada* (अन्वितभिधानवाद)². He holds that the meanings of words can be known only when they occur in a sentence enjoining us to perform a duty. Therefore the words can express their meanings only when they are related to one another in an injunctive sentence. They cannot express any meanings apart from their relation to one another in an injunctive sentence. Words themselves have no meanings, and acquire them only in an injunctive sentence in their syntactical combination; they express an action or something connected with an action. But Kumarila advocates the *Abhihitanyayavada* (अभिहितान्वयवाद)³. He holds that words themselves can express their separate meanings by their denotative power (अभिधा) independently of combination in an injunctive sentence; they are subsequently combined into a sentence expressing a connected meaning. The meaning of a sentence is due to the combination of the meanings of the constituent words.⁴ The Nyaya also believes in the *Abhihitanyayavada*.

The Nyaya holds that a word denotes an individual (व्यक्ति), the genus (जाति), and the form (आकृति), or the characteristic mark of a class. The Mimamsa holds that a word denotes a class (जाति). Prabhakara holds that a word denotes a class; it refers to an individual through a class. If words denoted individuals, such a sentence as, "one should pile the fire altar in the form of a kite," would be meaningless. This sentence plainly refers to the class "kite," and not to an individual kite. All injunctions would be meaningless, if they did not refer to classes. Kumarila also holds the same view. The word "cow" denotes the class "cow." If individuals were denoted by words, a generic idea of "cow" would not be possible. Words are the expressions of generic ideas or

1 PS PM, pp. 54—56.

2 वाक्

3 SD., pp. 431 ff.

4 PS PM., pp 62—63.

concepts. They denote classes. If individuals were denoted by words, and a generic idea were possible, it would merely consist of the impressions of all the peculiarities of the known individual cows. Again, the word cannot denote a single individual, an aggregate of individuals, or all the individuals. If a single individual only were denoted by the word, there could be no eternal relation between the word and its meaning, and it would render action impossible, since one cannot make sure which individual is meant by the word. Nor can an aggregate of individuals be denoted by the word, since all the individuals cannot be known, and therefore an aggregate of them cannot be known. Even if the aggregate of individuals could be known, the meaning of the word would constantly change, since some individuals are born and others perish. Nor can all the individuals be denoted by the word, since they can never be known and therefore the word can never be fully comprehended.¹ Therefore the word denotes a class (जाति) ; it does not denote an individual (व्यक्ति).

9. (V) Presumption (अर्थोपपत्ति).

Presumption is also called postulation or implication. Shavara defines presumption as assumption of some unperceived fact in order to reconcile some inconsistency in perceived facts. For instance, on perceiving the absence of Devadatta in the house, who is known to be alive, a person assumes that he must have gone out of the house. (अर्थोपपत्तिरपि दृष्टः श्रुतो वाऽर्थोऽन्यथा नोपपद्यत इत्यर्थकल्पना).² Prabhakara and Kumarila give different interpretations of Shavara's view. Prabhakara holds that presumption is the assumption of some fact without which the apparent discrepancy between two perceived facts cannot be reconciled. (दृष्टेनार्थेन दृष्टस्यार्थस्यार्थान्तरकल्पनायामसत्यामनुपपत्तिमापादयता याऽर्थान्तरकल्पना साऽर्थोपपत्तिः).³ If we know that Devadatta is alive, and perceive that he is not in his house, we cannot reconcile his being alive and non-existence in his house unless we presume his existence somewhere outside his house. This presumption of an unperceived fact which reconciles two apparently inconsistent well-known facts is called *Arthapatti*. Prabhakara holds that there must be an element of doubt as to the truth of

1 KM., pp 40-41.

2 SD, p. 214.

3 PP., p. 213.

the two irreconcilable facts of perception. The assumption of another fact removes the doubt and reconciles the apparently inconsistent facts. Presumption removes the element of doubt. The perceived facts remain inconsistent and therefore doubtful in the absence of something else. We assume the existence of that other thing in order to remove this element of doubt. We know that Devadatta is living, and perceive his absence from home. This perception brings about a doubt as regards my knowledge that he is living. In order to remove this doubt we assume that he must be living somewhere outside his house. The perception of the absence of Devadatta from his house produces a doubt as to his living. This doubt leads to the presumption of his living somewhere else. This presumption removes the doubt.

The element of doubt, according to Prabhakara, distinguishes presumption from inference. In inference there is no element of doubt. When the existence of smoke is perceived beyond any shadow of doubt, we can infer the existence of fire from it. But in presumption the perceived absence of Devadatta from his house leads to the presumption of his living somewhere else only when it has made the fact of his living doubtful and uncertain. Thus there is an element of doubt in presumption, while there is no element of doubt in inference. Presumption removes the doubt and reconciles two apparently inconsistent facts. Therefore presumption cannot be regarded as inference.¹

Parthasarathi, Kumarila's follower, defines presumption as assumption of some fact in order to reconcile the apparent inconsistency of two well-ascertained facts. (प्रमितस्यार्थस्योर्थान्तरेण विनाऽनुपपत्तिमालोच्य तदुपपत्तये याऽर्थान्तरकल्पना साऽर्थापत्तिः :).² There is no element of doubt in presumption as Prabhakara holds. If the knowledge of Devadatta's living were doubtful, it could not be the sound basis of presumption. We perceive the absence of Devadatta from his house. We know for certain

that he is alive. In order to reconcile these two well-known facts as his being alive and absence from his house we assume that he has gone out of his house.¹ Without this presumption the inconsistency between the knowledge of his absence from home and that of his being alive cannot be reconciled. Again, there is inconsistency between the knowledge of a person's fasting by day and that of his becoming fat. This inconsistency cannot be reconciled without the presumption of his eating at night. The presumption in each case is valid, since the fact assumed is the only one which can explain the apparent inconsistency between the two facts which are known to be certain.

According to Kumarila, doubt is not the basis of presumption, but the mutual inconsistency of two well-ascertained facts. Presumption of a third thing removes the inconsistency. There is no such inconsistency between two well-ascertained things in inference. This is the difference between presumption and inference.² Therefore presumption cannot be regarded as inference.

Can inference be regarded as presumption? It may be argued that we know that wherever there is smoke, there is fire, and then we perceive that there is smoke in the hill. If there were no fire in the hill, then either the invariable concomitance between smoke and fire would be false, or the existence of smoke in the hill would be false. How can both of them be valid? The existence of smoke in the hill is actually perceived. The universal concomitance of smoke with fire is already known to be certain. These two apparently inconsistent facts can be reconciled by the presumption of the existence of fire in the hill. So inference may be regarded as presumption.³ Parthasarathi urges that this argument is not valid. It would be valid, if the universal concomitance of smoke with fire could be known by some other kind of knowledge than inference. But this is known by inference. The concomitance of smoke with fire in individual instances only was actually perceived; from these the universal concomitance of

1 SD., p. 216-19.

2 PSPM., p. 71.

3 SD., p. 121.

smoke with fire was known by inference. The perception of concomitance of smoke with fire in the individual instances was perfectly certain ; it did not suffer any contradiction without presumption of the universal concomitance of smoke with fire. So presumption is of no avail here. We must admit that inference is necessary in such cases. If presumption cannot serve the purpose of inference in some cases, we must recognize inference as an independent *pramana*. Hence we may know the existence of fire in the hill from the existence of smoke perceived in it either by inference or by presumption. But inference cannot be regarded as a case of presumption, because there is no inconsistency between two well-established facts in inference, while in presumption there is inconsistency between two well-ascertained facts, which cannot be reconciled without presumption of a third fact. In inference we perceive the *probans* (हेतु) and then infer the existence of the *probandum* (साध्य) from it. We do not apprehend both of them at the same moment. There is no inconsistency between two equally certain facts. But in presumption two facts are well-known at the same time, which are irreconcilable with each other, and they are reconciled with each other by the presumption of some other fact. The knowledge of Devadatta's absence from his house and the knowledge of his being alive cannot be reconciled with each other without presumption of his living outside his house. The conflict of the present perception of Devadatta's absence from his house with a previously acquired certain knowledge of his being alive can be reconciled only by the presumption of his living outside his house. Presumption reconciles the apparent inconsistency of two equally certain well-known facts. But in inference there is no inconsistency between two well-ascertained facts. Hence inference cannot be regarded as presumption.¹ Presumption may be compared with the disjunctive-categorical syllogism of Western Logic to which it can be reduced :

1 SD., pp. 121-22 ; HIP., Vol. I, p. 393.

Devadatta, who is alive, is either in his house or outside his house;

Devadatta is not in his house :

Therefore, Devadatta is outside his house.

This is *modus tollendo ponens*. By denying one alternative in the minor premise, we affirm the other in the conclusion. The major premise is a disjunctive proposition, the minor premise is a categorical proposition, and the conclusion is a categorical proposition.

10. (VI) Non-apprehension (अनुपलब्धि).

Shavara recognizes non-apprehension as an independent means of valid knowledge. He defines it as the absence of any means of valid knowledge (प्रमाणाभाव), which apprehends the non-existence of an object which is not present to a sense-organ. (अभावोऽपि प्रमाणाभावो नास्तीत्यस्यार्थस्याऽसन्निकृष्टस्य)¹. Non-apprehension apprehends the non-existence of an object, the conditions of whose apprehension are present. If the object had been present, it would have been apprehended. The conditions of its apprehension are present: the object is non-existent; therefore there is no apprehension of it. Non-apprehension apprehends non-existence. 'There is no pot on the ground'. It is apprehended by non-apprehension.

Kumarila follows Shavara and recognizes non-apprehension as an independent means of valid knowledge. He holds that non-apprehension is the means of knowing the non-existence of an object, which cannot be known by perception, inference, comparison, testimony and presumption². Non-existence (अभाव) is real; it is apprehended by non-apprehension (अनुपलब्धि). The non-existence of curd in milk is prior non-existence (प्रागभाव). The non-existence of milk in curd is posterior non-existence (प्रध्वंसाभाव). The non-existence of the horse in the cow is mutual non-existence (अन्योन्याभाव). The non-existence of horns in a hare is absolute non-existence (अत्यन्ताभाव). If non-apprehension were not recognized as an independent means of knowledge, there would be the existence

¹ SD., p. 233.

² SV., V. I, p. 473.

of curd in milk, of milk in curd, of the jar in a piece of cloth, of horns in a hare.¹ Non-existence is real. There are four kinds of non existence, prior non-existence, posterior non-existence, mutual non-existence, and absolute non-existence. Non-existence is the object of non-apprehension, just as existence is the object of perception, inference, comparison, testimony, and presumption. Non apprehension is non-appearance of perception, and the like. It is a modification of the self. It is a cognition of the non-existence of an object. (प्रत्यक्षादेरनुत्पत्तिः प्रमाणाभाव उच्यते । स आत्मनः परिणामो वा विज्ञानं बोध्यवस्तुनि)². Just as non-existence is ontologically real, so non-apprehension is subjectively real. Kumarila regards consciousness as a modification of the self ; it is a modal change in it. He regards non-apprehension as a modification of the self ; so it has a subjective existence in the self ; it is not a pure non-entity. It is of the nature of cognition (विज्ञान). Only it is the cognition of non-existence which has ontological reality. Non-apprehension is a valid mode of knowledge, since it apprehends non-existence which cannot be known by any other kind of valid knowledge. Kumarila holds that an object is always existent and non-existent,—it is existent with reference to its own form, and non-existent with reference to some other object³. A pot is existent as a pot, but it is non-existent as a cloth. The existence of the pot on the ground is apprehended by perception and the like. But the non-existence of the pot on the ground is apprehended by non-apprehension.⁴ Perception and the like apprehend the positive existence (भाव) of an object. But non-apprehension apprehends its non-existence (अभाव) ; it consists in the non-appearance of perception and the like.⁵ When there is a contact of a sense-organ with the object, we perceive its form and apprehend its existence. When there is absence of such contact of a sense-organ with the object, we apprehend its non-existence as 'it is not

1 *Ibid.*, 25, pp. 473-74

2 *Ibid.*, 11, p. 475.

3 *Ibid.*, 12, p. 476

4 *Ibid.*, 17, p. 478.

5 *Ibid.*, 26, p. 481.

here.' How is the non-existence of a pot on the ground apprehended? First, the ground, which is the locus of the non existence of the pot, is perceived. Then the counter-entity of the non-existence, the pot, is remembered ; then arises a purely mental cognition of the non-existence of the pot (मानसं नास्तिज्ञानम्), which does not depend on the contact of the sense-organs with the object. A person first perceives the bare ground, and then remembers a pot which existed on it. Then if he is asked as to the non-existence of another object in that place, he at once becomes cognisant of the non-existence of the pot on the ground by means of non-apprehension.¹ Non-apprehension differs from perception and the like, because it is negative in character. Perception, inference, comparison, testimony, and presumption are positive modes of knowledge. They apprehend positive form or existence of objects. Non-apprehension is the absence of perception and other positive means of knowledge. It apprehends the negative form or non-existence of the objects of valid knowledge. Negation or non-existence is apprehended by a means of knowledge similar to itself, negative in character. (प्रमाणानामभावो हि प्रमेयाणामभाववत् । अभावो वा प्रमाणेन स्वानुरूपेण मीयते. ²)

Parthasarathi Mishra holds like Kumarila that all objects have a two-fold character, positive and negative, existence and non-existence. Their positive characters are apprehended by perception and the like. But their negative characters are apprehended by appropriate non-apprehension. (योग्यानुपलब्धि). 'The pot does not exist on this ground.' This is known by non-apprehension.³

But Prabhakara, like the Naiyayika and the Vaisheṣika, does not recognize non-apprehension as an independent means of knowledge. He does not accept the category of non existence (अभाव). So he does not admit non-apprehension (अनुपलब्धि) as a distinct means

¹ *Ibid.*, 27-28, pp. 482-83.

² *Ibid.*, 54-55, p. 491.

³ *SD.*, p. 234.

of knowledge. He rejects both non-existence as an ontological reality, and non-apprehension as a distinct mode of knowing it. There is no non-existence (अभाव) over and above existence (भाव). Sometimes the mere existence of an object is apprehended; sometimes the existence of an object is apprehended along with the existence of some other object. The mere existence of an object unrelated to any other object is its mere form. (न भावातिरिक्तोऽभावोऽङ्गीक्रियते भाव एवत्वेकाकी सद्वितीयश्चेति द्वयीमवस्थामनुभवति । तत्रैकाकी भावः स्वरूपमात्रमुच्यते)¹. When we perceive the existence of a pot on the ground, we perceive the existence of the ground as related to the existence of the pot. But when the pot is absent, we perceive the bare ground only. The non-existence of the pot is nothing but the existence of its bare locus, the ground. The apprehension of the mere locus (तन्मात्रधी) is erroneously called non-apprehension by Kumarila. The so-called non-apprehension of the non-existence of the pot on the ground is nothing but perception of its mere locus, the bare ground. When we say 'the pot is not on this ground', we mean that 'if the pot were present, we should perceive it; but what we perceive is the bare ground' (तेनेह भूतले घटो नास्तीति किमुक्तं भवति दृश्येऽपि घटे भूतलमात्रमुपलभ्यते इति)². Perception of the ground is a positive cognition. It depends on the contact of a sense-organ with the ground. It cannot be of a negative character. It is not of the nature of non-cognition. It is not non-apprehension. There is nothing that can be cognized by non-apprehension. There is no necessity for non-apprehension. Every means of valid knowledge is invariably accompanied by an object. There is no distinct object of non-apprehension. In the absence of a distinct object of knowledge there can be no distinct means of knowing it. So non-apprehension is not an independent means of cognition. There is a triple consciousness,—a conscious-

1 PP., p. 122

2 PP., p. 123

knowledge. (सर्वं प्रमाणं प्रमेयाविनाभावित्वाभावाद्यस्य प्रमाणस्य प्रमेयं किञ्चित् प्रतीतिवत्सिद्धम्¹ प्रमेयासद्भावान् न प्रमाणान्तरभक्त्यते)².

Prabhakara identifies non-apprehension with perception of the mere locus of the non-existence of an object. The non-existence of a pot on the ground is apprehended by the perception of the bare ground, since the non-existence of the pot is nothing but the existence of its mere locus, the bare ground. Parthasarathi Mishra, a follower of Kumarila, refutes Prabhakara's view and proves the validity of non-apprehension as a distinct means of knowledge. What is the object of the cognition of the non-existence of a pot on the ground after the perception of the pot has ceased? The ground is not its object, since the ground was perceived even while there was the pot on it. If the non-existence of the pot on the ground is identical with the existence of its mere locus, the bare ground, then we should perceive its non-existence even while the pot exists on it, since we do not cease to perceive the ground when it is occupied by the pot. The perception of the ground is common to both the perception of the existence of the pot on the ground and the perception of the non-existence of the pot on the ground. If the perception of the bare ground (भूतलमात्र) or the ground alone (एकाकिभूतल) be the cause of the notion of the non-existence of the pot on the ground, there cannot be the knowledge of the non-existence of the pot on the ground, while it is occupied by a piece of cloth, since there is no perception of the bare ground in it. If the perception of the ground non-associated with the pot (घटविविक्तभूतलोपलम्भ) be said to be the cause of the notion of the non-existence of the pot on the ground, what is the meaning of non-association with the pot (घटविवेक)? It cannot mean the bare ground (भूतलरूप), since it is present even when the pot exists on the ground. It cannot mean the absence of conjunction with the pot (घटसंयोगाभाव), since it is in

¹ PP., p. 118.

² PP., p. 125.

the nature of non-existence (अभाव) which is not admitted by Prabhakara. Kumarila holds that non-perception of a perceptible object is the cause of the cognition of its non-existence; non-perception is the negation of perception, which cannot be admitted by Prabhakara who rejects the category of non-existence. If he admits non-perception, he may as well admit non-existence¹. It may be argued that first there is the perception of the ground; then there is the cognition of non-existence. So the perception of the ground prior to the cognition of non-existence leads to the knowledge of non-existence. This is wrong. At the moment when there is cognition of the mere form of the ground (भूतलस्वरूपज्ञान), and there is non-cognition of the pot and its non-existence, there is the knowledge of the bare ground without the knowledge of the pot and its non-existence. The knowledge of the mere ground (भूतलमात्र) implies the absence of the knowledge of the pot and its non-existence. When the mere ground is known, neither the pot nor its non-existence is known. If Prabhakara also admits the knowledge of the ground together with the absence of the knowledge of the pot, he admits non-cognition (ज्ञानाभाव). If he admits non-cognition, he must also admit non-existence (अभाव). Non-cognition is nothing but non-apprehension (अनुपलब्धि)². Therefore perception of the mere locus cannot by itself constitute the perception of the non-existence of something in it.

Non-existence cannot be perceived, since there can be no contact of it with a sense-organ. Nor can it be inferred, since its nature being unknown its invariable relation with a mark of inference also is unknown. It cannot be inferred from the knowledge of a mark of inference whose invariable concomitance with it is known³. Nor can non-existence be known by testimony, comparison, and presumption.⁴ In the

¹ SD, pp. 235—36.

² *Ibid.*, p. 237.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 244.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 245.

knowledge of non-existence there is no verbal cognition through words. So it is not known by testimony. In it there is no knowledge of similarity. So it is not known by comparison. In it there is no inconsistency between two perceived facts which may be reconciled by presumption. So it is not known by presumption. It is known by non-apprehension. The non-existence of an object is known by appropriate non-apprehension (योग्यानुपलब्धि)¹, which is therefore a distinct means of knowledge.

The Nyaya-Vaisheshika does not accept non-apprehension as an independent means of knowledge. It accounts for the perception of the non-existence of a pot on the ground by its peculiar doctrine of a kind of sense-object-intercourse called visheshanata (विशेषणता), the relation of qualification and the qualified. The ground is perceived as qualified by the absence of the jar. Non-apprehension is a kind of perception².

Kumarila and Prabhakara reject other means of knowledge. Inclusion (सम्भव) *e. g.*, a thousand includes a hundred, is a form of inference, since it depends upon the knowledge of invariable concomitance between the two numbers. A large number has invariable concomitance with a small number. Tradition (ऐतिह्य) is not a means of valid knowledge, since its source is not certain. If it is known to be certain, it is included in testimony. Intuition (प्रतिभा) *e. g.*, 'Tomorrow your brother will come' arises from the appearance of a mark of inference. It is not valid, since it is not certain. The intuition of the sages (आर्षज्ञान) born of excess of merit due to intense meditation is not valid. The Mimamsa does not believe in yogic intuition. Universal assent (लोकप्रसिद्धि) is included in perception and other means of knowledge³. The Mimamsa ignores gesture (चेष्टा) which is recognized by the Tantra school as a distinct means of knowledge.

1 *Ibid.*, pp. 245-46

2 *IPP.*, pp. 77-79.

3 *SD.*, p. 246 ; *PP.*, p. 125.

11. Kumarila's Theory of Knowledge : Cognition inferred from Cognizedness of its Object. (ज्ञाततावाद).

Kumarila holds that cognition is not perceptible. It is neither perceived by itself as Prābhakara holds, nor by another cognition as the Nyaya-Vaisheshika holds. An act of cognition is inferred from cognizedness (ज्ञातता) or manifestness (प्राकट्य) of its object. The self can know an object through an act of cognition which relates the self to the object and manifests it. Cognition intervenes between the self and the object. Without cognition the self cannot be related to the object and cognize it. Cognition reveals the object. The self cannot directly reveal it. But cognition cannot directly reveal itself; it is not self-luminous (स्वप्रकाश). It is inferred from cognizedness or manifestation of the object. Kumarila says, "If there were no cognition, then we could not, in any other way, account for the cognizedness of an existing object; hence after the object has been cognized, we know the existence of the cognition as a means of knowing the object."

(नाऽन्यथा ह्यर्थमद्वाचो दृष्टः सञ्जुपपद्यते । ज्ञानं चेन्नैतत्ततः पश्चात् प्रमाणमुपजायते ।).¹ Parthasarathi Mishra explains it thus : Presumption proves the existence of cognition. The cognizedness of an object cannot be accounted for without the existence of a cognition. First an object is cognized, then the existence of a cognition is known by presumption. If there were no cognition, cognizedness of the object could not be accounted for. In the absence of cognizedness of an object the existence of a cognition cannot be known by presumption. (अर्थापत्तिर्ज्ञानस्य प्रमाणं, सा चाऽर्थस्य ज्ञातत्वाऽन्यथानुपपत्तिप्रभवा)².

Parthasarathi sets forth the following arguments to prove Kumarila's doctrine. Firstly, just as an action involves four factors, viz., an agent of action (कर्ता), an object of action (कर्म), an instrument of action (करण), and a result of action (फल), so an act of cognition involves four factors, viz., a cognizing self

¹ SV., V. 182, p. 315

² SV. V. 182, NR, p. 318.

(ज्ञाता), an object of cognition (ज्ञेय), an instrumental cognition (करणज्ञान), and a result of cognition or cognizedness (ज्ञातता) in the object. An act of cognition (ज्ञानक्रिया) produces a result (फल), viz., cognizedness (ज्ञातता) or manifestness (प्राकट्य) in its object, even as the act of cooking produces cookedness in rice. The act of cognition is the cause; cognizedness is the effect. The cause is inferred from the effect. The cognitive act is inferred from cognizedness of its object. It is not an object of perception. The objects of knowledge are either perceptible (अपरोक्ष) or inferable (परोक्ष). Perceptibility (आपरोक्ष्य) and inferability (पारोक्ष्य) are produced by sense-perception and inference respectively in their objects. They are the effects of perception and inference respectively. An object is perceptible or inferable, because perception or inference produces an effect in it. Cognizedness is the effect of cognition, produced by it in its object. From cognizedness, cognition is inferred (ज्ञानक्रिया हि सर्वमिका कर्मभूतेऽर्थे फलं जनयति [पाकादिवन्, तच्च फलमैन्द्रियकज्ञानजन्यमापरोक्ष्यम्, लिङ्गादिज्ञानजन्यं तु पारोक्ष्यम् । तदेव च फलं कार्यभूतं कारणभूतं विज्ञानमुपकल्पयतीति सिद्धयत्यप्रत्यक्षमपि ज्ञानम्]).¹ Secondly, cognition is inferred from the relation between the self and the object, which is apprehended by mental perception. (ज्ञानक्रियाद्वारको यः कर्तृभूतस्यात्मनः कर्मभूतस्य चार्थस्थ परस्परं सम्बन्धो व्याप्तुव्याथत्वलक्षणः स मानसप्रत्यक्षावगतो विज्ञानं कल्पयति, न ह्यागन्तुककारणमन्तरेणात्मानोऽर्थं प्रति व्याप्तुत्वमुत्पत्तुमर्हति)². The self is the knower; the object is known. The self can know the object when it is related to the object. The relation of the self to the object is brought about by cognition. Cognition or consciousness is the *tertium quid* between the self and the object, which relates them to each other. It is the adventitious condition which brings about a relation between the self and the object. From the specific relation between the self (आत्मन्) and the object (अर्थ) we infer the existence of cognition (ज्ञान).

1 SD, p. 157,
160

The self appropriated cognition 'the jar is cognized by me' is not possible, unless the relation between the cognizing self and the cognized object, and the relation between the cognition and its object are known. It cannot be urged that a cognition is self-luminous (स्वप्रकाश), and its object is manifested by the cognition.

If so, then by what is the relation between the cognition and the object manifested? It cannot be manifested by the same cognition, since when the cognition is produced, the relation between the cognition and its object does not yet come into existence. The relation of a cognition to its object consists in its manifesting the object; it is nothing but this manifesting power; the cognition manifests its object; the object is manifested by the cognition. So when a cognition is produced and its object is manifested by it, the relation between the cognition and the object, that is produced, cannot be manifested by that cognition as it has ceased to operate. Further, the cognition is momentary, and therefore cannot be said to manifest its object first, and then manifest its relation to the object. The relation between the cognition and the object cannot be said to be self-luminous, since there is no proof for its self-luminosity. Hence, the existence of cognition is inferred from the relation between the self and the object, which is apprehended by mental perception. There is certainly a relation between the self and object, without which the self cannot know the object, and this relation is known by mental perception. This relation proves the existence of cognition. Without cognition the relation between the self and the object is not possible. Cognition is a modal change (परिणाम) in the self, which brings about a relation between the self and the object. Without this adventitious condition (आगन्तुक कारण) the self cannot be related to the object. (मानसप्रत्यक्षगम्योऽर्थेन सहात्मनः सम्बन्धं ज्ञानं कल्पयति). Thirdly, a cognition is inferred from the peculiarity (अतिशय) produced by the cognition in its object (अर्थगतो वा ज्ञानजन्योऽतिशयः

कल्पयति ज्ञानं)¹. This peculiarity must be admitted even by Prabhakara who holds that the cognizing self, the cognized object, and the cognition itself are manifested by cognition. So he admits that manifestation (प्रकाशन) is produced in the object by the cognition. In other words, cognizedness (ज्ञातता) is produced in the object by the cognition. The peculiar property of manifestation is produced in the object by the cognition from which the cognition is inferred. That the object is manifested by the cognition is disputed by none. So it cannot be admitted that cognition is perceived. It is inferred from the cognizedness in the object or the relation between the self and the object, which enables the self to know the object.² Prabhakara holds that perception apprehends the self, the object, and itself; the self and the object are manifested by the cognition; they are not self-luminous; but the cognition is self-luminous (स्वप्रकाश). So Prabhakara admits that the object is manifested by the perceptual cognition. Kumarila agrees with Prabhakara in holding that manifestation (प्रकाश) is produced in the object by the cognition. But he differs from Kumarila in holding that cognition is not self-luminous, but inferred from manifestation or cognizedness (ज्ञातता) of the object. We infer the existence of past, future, and remote objects which do not exist at present. So we must admit that the inferential cognition produces the property of manifestation (प्रकाशनधर्म) or cognizedness (ज्ञातता) in these objects, though they do not exist at present. So the cognition is inferred from the manifestation of objects; it is not self-luminous. It cannot be argued that we do experience that cognition is perceived, because when the object is manifested to consciousness the cognition is not manifested, nor is its perceptibility (आपरोक्ष्य) manifested. (न च प्रतीतिबलादपि प्रत्यक्षत्वम् अर्थावभाससमये संविदः प्रतिभास एव नास्ति न तस्मात्परोक्ष्यम्).³ Hence, Kumarila concludes that cognition

¹ SD., p. 159; S. V., 182, N. R., p. 319.

² SD., pp. 157—60.

³ SD., p. 160.

is inferred from the manifestation of its object or the relation between the self and the object.¹

12. Prabhakara's Theory of Knowledge : Triple Perception of the Self, the Cognition, and the Object (त्रिपुटीप्रत्यक्षवाद).

Prabhakara holds that perception apprehends the self (मातृ), the object (मेय), and the cognition (प्रमा). These three factors are apprehended in every act of perception. Perception is direct apprehension (साक्षात् प्रतीतिः प्रत्यक्षं मेयमातृप्रमासु सा)². It manifests itself. It manifests its object. It manifests the self. Every object-cognition reveals the object, itself, and the self. This view is called the doctrine of triple perception (त्रिपुटी प्रत्यक्ष). Cognition is self-luminous (स्वप्रकाश); it manifests itself. A cognition is not manifested by any other cognition, since it is self-luminous. But the self and the object are not self-luminous ; they do not manifest themselves. They depend upon a cognition to manifest them. They are manifested by a cognition. (अप्रकाशस्वभावानि मेयानि माता च प्रकाशमपेक्षन्ताम् । प्रकाशस्तु प्रकाशात्मकत्वज्ञान्यमपेक्षन्ते)³. In waking life both the self and the object are manifested. But in dreamless sleep both are not manifested, though they continue to exist during the period, since they are recognized on waking from sleep. If they were self-luminous, they would be manifested during deep sleep. They are not manifested at the time, because there is no cognition to manifest them. So the self and the object are not self-luminous ; they are not manifested by themselves. But cognition or consciousness is self-luminous. The self and the object are manifested by cognition which is self-luminous. (मेयानां मातृश्च स्वतः प्रकाशो नोपपद्यते इति युक्ता तयोः परापेक्षा । स्वयंप्रकाशैव मितिः).⁴ The self is directly manifested by every cognition, presentative or representative. There can be no cognition of an object apart from the cognition of the self. In every object-

1 IPP. pp. 199—201.

2 PP., p. 127.

3 PP., p. 57.

4 PP., p. 57.

ness of the self (अहंवित्ति), a consciousness of an object (विषयवित्ति), and a consciousness of a cognition or self-conscious awareness (स्वसंवित्ति). In the cognition 'I know the jar', there is a triple consciousness, a cognition of the jar, a cognition of 'I' or the self, and a self-conscious cognition. (घटमहं जानामीत्यत्र त्रयप्रतिभामो घटमिति विषयः प्रकाशते अहमित्यात्मा जानामीति संविदिति)¹.

Prabhakara holds that the self is always cognized as the knower (ज्ञाता) of an object, a cognition is cognized as a cognition (ज्ञान), and an object is cognized as a known object (ज्ञेय). The self is the knower: it can never be known as an object. A cognition also can never be known as an object. A cognition is known as cognition. It is self-luminous.

Prabhakara refutes Kumarila's doctrine of the inferability of cognition. There is no mark of inference. The existence of an object (अर्थसत्ता) cannot serve as the mark of inference; since it is not invariably accompanied by a cognition. An object exists without being known by a cognition. The cognition of an object (अर्थज्ञान) cannot serve as the mark of inference. It cannot be a mark of inference as soon as it is produced. It can be a mark of inference only when it is manifested. If it is not manifested, it cannot be distinguished from an object-cognition which has not yet come into being. A cognitive act cannot be inferred from non-manifestation (अनवभासन) of the object-cognition (अर्थज्ञान). The manifestation of the object-cognition does not depend upon any other cognition, since it is not known to exist. Thus, there is no mark of inference from which cognition is inferred. Hence, we must admit that the cognition of an object is self-illuminated. (तस्मादर्थज्ञानं स्वयंप्रकाशमेवाभ्युपन्तव्यम्)². The so-called cognizedness (ज्ञातता) or manifestness (प्राक्तन्य) of an object is nothing but the cognition of the object

¹ NM., p. 432.

² pp., p. 63.

(अथज्ञान) which is self-luminous. A cognition manifests an object, but the cognition manifests itself.

The Buddhist idealist holds that there is no external object. A cognition with a form is perceived; no perception is possible without a form, and the form of blue or the like belongs to the cognition, and not to an external object. The Yogachara advocates subjective idealism. But the Mimamsaka is a realist. He is opposed to subjectivism. Shavara says, "It is certainly the object that is perceived,—not the cognition". (अर्थविषया हि प्रत्यक्षबुद्धिः, न बुद्धिविषया).¹ It does not mean that a cognition is not cognized. It means that a cognition is not cognized as an object (कर्म) of another act of cognition, but that it is certainly cognized as cognition. Prabhakara says, "A cognition is cognized as a cognition,—not as an object of cognition". (संवित्तयैव संवित् संवेद्या न संवेद्यतया).² If it were cognized as an object of another cognition, it would require another cognition to cognize it, and so on *ad infinitum*. So we must admit that cognition is self-cognized or self-luminous. If it were cognized by another cognition, it would not be self-luminous. Cognition is self-luminous; it cognizes itself as cognition; it is self-conscious awareness.

But Prabhakara holds that, though a cognition is self-cognized, its existence is inferred from the apprehension of its object. Prabhakara says, "What is known by inference is not any object, but the existence of an object". (नाप्यनुमानाद् रूपग्रहणं, सन्मात्रग्राह्यनुमानं भवति).³ So we know by inference that the cognition exists there, and not that it is cognized. We infer the existence of the cognition from the apprehension of its object. Thus the cognition is known to exist by inference. Cognition is a '*prameya*' or an object of right knowledge. But it is not a '*samvedya*' or an object of perceptual cognition. Dr. G. N. Jha remarks, "Prabhakara draws a subtle distinction between '*prameya*'

1 *Brhati* quoted in PSPM., p. 26.

2 PSPM., p. 26.

3 PSPM., p. 27.

and '*samvedya*'; the '*samvedya*' is that where the form of the object is manifested and apprehended; and this can occur only in the case of objects perceived by the senses; in the case of '*prameya*', on the other hand, it is not necessary for a form to be present in consciousness; thus as having no form, cognition cannot be '*samvedya*' (and hence also it cannot be perceptible); but as having its presence apprehended by means of inference,—which is one of the '*pramanas*',—it has to be regarded as a '*prameya*'".¹

Both Prabhakara and Kumarila admit that the *existence* of cognitions, which are modifications of the self, is known by inference. Kumarila holds that it is inferred from cognizedness (ज्ञातता) or manifestness (प्राकट्य) of objects. Prabhakara holds that it is inferred from the apprehension of objects. But Prabhakara holds that cognitions are self-aware or self-luminous,—they are self-cognized or cognized as cognitions, but not as objects, while Kumarila holds that cognitions are not self-cognized, but inferable from their effects in the form of cognizedness of objects.

Murari Mishra holds a different view. (मुरारे स्तुतीयः तथाः). He does not accept the doctrine of triple consciousness (त्रिपुटीभान). Nor does he hold that cognition is known by inference. According to him, at first, there arises a cognition of an object, for instance, 'this is a jar,' (व्यवसाय), and then there is appropriation of the cognition by the self such as 'I know the jar' (अनुव्यवसाय). Murari Mishra holds that the knowledge of the cognition of an object (अनुव्यवसाय) is an after-effect of the cognition (व्यवसाय) itself.² (मुरारिमिश्रानां मतेऽनुव्यवसायेन ज्ञानं गृह्यते).³

13 Theories of Error : Psychology of Illusion.

Prabhakara advocates the theory of *Vivekakhyati* (विवेकाख्याति) or *Akhyati* (अख्याति). He holds that in an

1 PSPM., p. 27.

2 *Tattvachintamani, Pratyakshakhanda*, (Bib. Ind), p. 151.

3 BP. SM., p. 447.

Prabhakara refutes Kumarila's theory of illusion. Kumarila wrongly holds that an illusion is a single false perception ; the nacre is misperceived as silver ; the falsity of the perception is recognized when it is superseded by a contradicting perception (बाधक प्रत्यय), 'this is nacre'. Prabhakara urges that an illusion is not a single cognition ; it consists of two cognitions which are not distinguished from each other. In the illusion 'this is silver' the perceived element of 'this' is never contradicted. It persists when the contradicting perception appears. Silver is not perceived, since it is not present to the visual organ. It is remembered owing to the revival of the subconscious impression of silver brought about by the perception of a similar object as nacre. One object cannot be manifested to consciousness as another object. A nacre cannot be perceived as silver.¹

Prabhakara defines valid knowledge as apprehension (अनुभूति). Then all apprehension is valid. Is the illusion 'this is silver' valid ? There are two cognitions in it,— the perception of 'this' and the recollection of 'silver'. The perception of 'this' is valid ; it is not contradicted. The recollection of 'silver' is invalid, since it is contradicted by the sublating cognition. Further, Prabhakara does not regard recollection as valid knowledge. The illusory perception of bitter sugar is invalid, because of non-apprehension of the distinction between the perception of bitter taste and the perception of tasteless sugar, each of which is valid. The illusion is invalid because of coalescence of the two elements. Again, in the doubtful perception, 'Is this a post or a man', the perception of 'this' or some tall object is valid, but the recollections of 'a post' and 'a man' revived by the perception of the tall object are invalid. The elements of memory invalidate the doubtful perception.

Prabhakara holds that the element of apprehension involved in illusion is valid. But a cognition, which

1 PP., p 43.

is found not to agree with the real nature of its object, *as cognition*, is valid. Prabhakara does not recognize error as error. He regards it as mere non-apprehension of distinction of the given element and the ideal element. Therefore, he does not distinguish between truth and error from the logical point of view. But he distinguishes between them from the practical standpoint. Knowledge is a means to an end. It is subservient to practical action. All knowledge prompts activity. The knowledge that leads to successful activity is true. The knowledge that leads to unsuccessful activity is false. We cannot speak of truth or falsity of knowledge prior to activity prompted by it. Prabhakara appeals to the pragmatic test to distinguish between truth and error. We cannot brand a knowledge as false until it leads to unsuccessful activity. (यत्र तु व्यवहारविसम्बादो नास्ति तत्र भ्रान्तिरपि न व्यपदिश्यते)¹. True knowledge is not the knowledge that apprehends the real nature of its object, but it is the knowledge that leads to the attainment of the object which is capable of fruitful activity. (न वयं यथावस्थितार्थ-ग्राहकमविसंवादकमभिदध्महे किन्त्वर्थक्रियासमर्थवस्तुपरिप्रापकम्).² Thus Prabhakara distinguishes between truth and error from the standpoint of practical utility.³

Kumarila recognizes error as such, and regards it as false perception or misperception of one object as a different object. He is an advocate of *Anyathakhyati* (अन्यथाख्याति) or *Viparitamkhyati* (विपरीतख्याति).

In the illusion 'this is silver' 'this' or the brightness of a nacre, which it has in common with silver, is perceived owing to sense-object contact; the peculiar qualities of the nacre are not perceived owing to some defect in the visual organ; then 'silver' is remembered owing to the revival of the subconscious impression of silver. So far Kumarila agrees with Prabhakara. But Kumarila holds that the nacre then is *perceived* as silver owing to some defect; the individual nacre is

¹ PP., p. 43

² PP., p. 39.

³ Cf. OIP., p. 317.

perceived as silver, though it is remembered. The illusion is a single false perception. It is a single perceptual cognition. Kumarila holds that illusion is not mere non-apprehension of distinction between the perceived element and the remembered element, but positive wrong knowledge due to false identification of the remembered element with the perceived element. Prabhakara holds that illusion is non-apprehension of distinction (भेदाग्रह). But Kumarila holds that illusion is false perception of identity (अभेदग्रह) of the remembered element with the perceived element. (इन्द्रियसंप्रयोगाच्छुक्तिशकलं रजतसाधारणेन भास्वरत्वादिरूपेण गृहीतम्, असाधारणं तु शुक्तिकात्वं मिन्द्रिय दौर्बल्यादऽगृहीतम्, अनन्तरं च संस्कारोद्बोधाद्रजतं स्मृतम्, ततः स्मृतरजतात्मना शुक्तिव्यक्तिर्दोषवशाद् गृह्यते).¹ The cognition of identity (तादात्म्यग्रहण) of the nacre present to the visual organ with the silver remembered is of the nature of perception or direct and immediate knowledge due to the immediate proper intercourse of the object with the visual organ, since the sense-organ does not cease to operate at the time.²

Kumarila holds that an illusion as a cognition *per se* is valid; so long as a person experiences the illusion, it is quite valid for him. But its validity is destroyed by the subsequent knowledge of its disagreement with its object and defects in the causes of the cognition.³ If a defect in the causes of a cognition is not known, even after a careful search, or a sublating cognition does not appear, a cognition is valid. But if a cognition is superseded by the knowledge of the contrary nature of its object or the knowledge of some defect in its causes, it is invalid. But an invalid cognition is valid as cognition *per se*; its intrinsic validity is destroyed by the extraneous conditions mentioned above. (यत्र प्रयत्नेनान्विष्यमाणोऽपि कारणदोषो बाधकज्ञानं वा नोपलभ्यते तत्प्रमाणम्, इतरच्चाऽप्रमाणम्)⁴.

Kumarila refutes Prabhakara's doctrine of *Viveka-khyati* or *Akhyati*. Prabhakara regards non-apprehen-

1 SD., p. 136.

2 SD., p. 139.

3 SV., ii, 53, p. 61 ;

4 SD., pp. 139-40.

sion as illusion. But Kumarila urges that non-apprehension (अग्रहण) is negation (अभाव) of apprehension (ग्रहण). Prabhakara does not admit negation as an independent category. So negation of apprehension cannot constitute illusion. Recollection, which does not appear as recollection to the self, cannot be said to be non-apprehension, since, in that case, every recollection would be non-apprehension and illusion. But we do not experience an illusion whenever we recollect. Again, there is no rule that a person, who remembers silver, should exert himself to pick it up only when he perceives a nacre, and nothing else. It is right to hold that when he perceives a nacre as silver, he exerts himself to pick it up. It cannot be argued that a person exerts himself to pick up a nacre, because he perceives it to be similar to silver: for in that case, he would have a cognition 'this is similar to silver', but he would not have a cognition 'this is silver'. The illusion 'this is silver' is contradicted by the sublating cognition 'this is not silver'. It is ridiculous to argue that the sublating cognition (बाधकप्रत्यय) does not really contradict the illusion, but simply distinguishes the two cognitions, perception and recollection, which were not distinguished from each other before. So it is right to hold that an illusion, which is wrong perception of one object as a different object (अन्यथाख्याति), is contradicted by a sublating cognition. The visual organ in contact with a nacre can produce the wrong perception of silver owing to some defect in it. This defect is the cause of wrong perception. So an illusion is not mere non-apprehension of distinction, but positive wrong knowledge¹. "The difference between the two views is that while, according to *akhyati* (अख्याति), error is due to losing sight of the fact that the presentative and the representative factors stand apart unrelated (असंसर्गाग्रह), here in *viparitakhyati* (विपरीतख्याति) it is ascribed to a wrong synthesis of them (संसर्गाग्रह)"²,

1 SD., YSP, pp 137—38.

2 OIP. p. 316

*Prabhakara regards illusion as a composite psychosis made of a presentative element and a representative element, while Kumarila regards it as a single psychosis—a false perception. Prabhakara regards error as due to omission, while Kumarila regards it as one of commission.

2. Ontology.

14. The Nature of the Reality : The Categories.

The Mimamsa recongnizes the reality of the external world and the individual sōuls. It does not recognize the existence of God. There is a great resemblance between the Mimamsa doctrine of categories and the Vaisheshika doctrine. But there are some differences between them. Prabhakara and Kumarila hold different views as to the nature and number of categories.

Prabhakara is credited with the recognition of eight categories, *viz.*, (1) substance (द्रव्य), (2) quality (गुण), (3) action (कर्म), (4) generality (सामान्य), (5) subsistence or inherence (परतन्त्रता), (6) force (शक्ति), (7) similarity (सादृश्य), and (8) number (संख्या), by *Sarvasiddhantarahasya*. The mention of number as a separate category seems to be wrong, since Shalika-natha mentions number as a quality in *Prakarīnapanchika*, which is a work on the philosophy of Prabhakara.¹ Thus Prabhakara recognizes seven categories; *viz.*, substance, quality, action, generality, inherence, force, and similarity. The Vaisheshika admits seven categories, *viz.*, substance, quality, action, generality, particularity, inherence, and non-existence. Prabhakara does not admit particularity (विशेष) and non-existence (अभाव) as independent categories. The Vaisheshika postulates the existence of particularity in eternal substances in order to distinguish them from one another. But Prabhakara thinks that eternal substances can be distinguished from one another by their distinctness (पृथक्त्व). Particularity is not distinct from distinctness.

¹ PSPM, pp. 88—89 PP, p 54.

² PP., p 110

The Vaisheshika admits the category of non-existence (अभाव). But Prabhakara denies its existence as he rejects non-apprehension (अनुपपत्तिः) as a means of valid knowledge.

Prabhakara explains the nature of substance, quality, and action on the lines of the Vaisheshika theory. He recognizes the existence of generality (सामान्य). It subsists in the individuals entirely and is distinct from them. It is perceptible by the sense-organs (जातिराश्रयतो-भिन्ना प्रत्यक्षज्ञानगोचरा). It is common to many individuals which are different from one another. The genus of man is common to many individual men. Thus generality is the basis of our conception of some form of non-difference among a number of individuals which are known to be different. It is the basis of our conception of sameness or community.¹ Prabhakara admits that generality inheres in the individuals. There is a relation of subsistence or inherence (परतन्त्रता) between the universal and the particular. But he holds that when an individual is born, a new relation of inherence is generated which brings it into relation with the universal which subsists in the other individuals of the same class. When an individual is destroyed, the relation of inherence between the individual and the universal is destroyed.

Prabhakara does not admit that inherence is one and eternal as the Vaisheshika holds. Inherence is eternal in eternal substances and non-eternal in non-eternal substances. It is not one. It is as many as there are substances. It is perceptible in perceptible substances, and imperceptible in imperceptible substances.

Prabhakara admits the generalities of substance, quality, and action. But he does not admit the reality of the *summum genus* or Beinghood (सत्ता) as the Vaisheshika does. We admit the existence of a generality (जाति), since we perceive a number of individual objects as endowed with certain characters in common. It is the basis of our consciousness of com-

1 PP., p. 17.

munity among a number of individuals. But we are not conscious of a number of individual objects as merely 'existing'. We are conscious of individual objects as having specific existence (स्वरूपसत्ता). "When we speak of a thing as existent (सत्), we do not mean that it is possessed of any such 'class-character' as beinghood (सत्ता); what we mean is that it has an individual existence of its own."¹ An individual thing has its specific existence; it has no mere existence or beinghood. So Prabhakara denies the existence of the highest genus or beinghood which is admitted by the Vaisheshika.

Prabhakara recognizes the existence of subsistence or inherence (परतन्त्रता). The Vaisheshika regards inherence (समवाय) as one and eternal. But Prabhakara regards inherence as many, and eternal in eternal substances and non-eternal in non-eternal substances, perceptible in perceptible things, and non-perceptible in non-perceptible things. Prabhakara accepts the Vaisheshika doctrine of inherence with modifications.

In addition to the Vaisheshika categories of substance (द्रव्य), quality (गुण), action (कर्म) generality (सामान्य), and inherence (परतन्त्रता), Prabhakara admits the existence of potency or force (शक्ति), and similarity (सादृश्य). Force is the imperceptible energy which produces an effect. Substances, qualities, actions and generalities are regarded as causes of effects. They can produce effects by virtue of the potency or force inherent in them. "*Shakti* or 'force' is the common name given to that by virtue of which, substances, qualities, actions and generalities come to be regarded as the 'cause' of things; it is to be inferred from the effects: it is eternal in eternal things, and non-eternal in perishable things".² Potency or force inherent in all things, which is the cause of an effect is imperceptible; it is inferred from its effect (सर्वभावानां च शक्तिरदृष्टस्वलक्षणापि कार्येणानुमीयते).³ There is an imperceptible force in fire by virtue of which it burns. Some-

1 PSFM, p. 161

2 PSPN, p. 89.

3 IP, p. 81.

times fire burns : sometimes it does not burn. It fails to burn under the influence of incantations. The visible form of fire is common to both cases. So there must be something in fire by virtue of which it can burn, and in the absence of which it cannot burn. Similarly there is something in all objects which are regarded as causes, by virtue of which they can produce their effects, and being deprived of which they cannot do so. This imperceptible something is called potency or force (शक्ति) by Prabhakara. It is imperceptible. It is inferred from its effect. It is eternal in eternal things, and transient in transient things. It is brought into existence along with the transient things in which it exists. Potency differs from velocity (संस्कार) in that the latter is transient in eternal things also, and dependent on other causes in transient things.¹

Prabhakara recognizes similarity (सादृश्य) as an independent category. It is distinct from substance, quality, action, generality, and inherence. It is not a substance, since it abides in qualities and actions also. But a substance cannot abide in qualities and actions. We apprehend similarity in qualities and actions. We are conscious of similar odours and similar motions. So similarity, which abides in qualities and actions, cannot be a quality or an action. A quality cannot abide in qualities. Nor can an action abide in actions. Similarity is not a generality, since it is not the cause of the conception of sameness or community among a number of individuals. Similarity exists in generalities also. We apprehend similarity between the genus of a cow and the genus of a buffallow. Similarity abides in generalities. But generality does not abide in generalities. So similarity is different from generality. Inherence is a kind of relation between a substance and its quality or action, the universal and the individual, and material cause and its effects. So similarity is not inherence. Particularity (विशेष) is not an independent category. It is nothing but distinctness (पृथक्त्व) Similarity cannot be identified with non-existence, since there is no non-existence. So similarity is a

distinct category. It is perceived in perceptible things through the perception of the qualities, actions, and constituent parts as common to two or more things.¹

Prabhakara rejects the Vaisheshika categories of particularity (विशेष) and non-existence (अभाव). He admits the Vaisheshika categories of substance (द्रव्य), quality (गुण), action (कर्म), generality (सामान्य), and inherence (समवाय). In addition to these five categories, he recognizes the categories of force (शक्ति) and similarity (सादृश्य).

Substance is that in which qualities inhere. It is the abode of qualities. Prabhakara admits the reality of nine substances : earth, water, fire, air, ether, self, mind, time, and space.² Earth, water, fire, and air are visible and tangible. Ether is not visible because it is devoid of colour. It is not tangible because it is colourless ; colourless things are not tangible. It appears to be white owing to the particles of fire in it. It appears to be dark at night owing to the absence of light. Ether cannot be perceived ; it is inferred as the substratum of sound.³ Air is neither hot nor cold. It appears to be cool owing to the particles of water in it. It appears to be hot owing to the particles of fire in it.⁴ Kumarila recognizes darkness as a substance. But Prabhakara regards it as mere absence of light. It is neither a substance nor a quality.⁵ Earth, water, fire, and air are perceptible in non-atomic state. But ether, the self, mind, time, and space are only inferable.

Prabhakara mentions the qualities of colour, taste, smell, touch, number, dimension, distinctness, conjunction, disjunction, remoteness, proximity ; pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, and effort or volition as perceptible.⁶ He recognizes three kinds of conjunction as due to the action of one or both of the things concerned, or due

1 PP., pp. 110-111, PSPM., p. 90.

2 PP., pp. 24, 143-45, 149.

3 *Ibid.*, pp. 143-45.

4 *Ibid.*, pp. 77-78.

5 *Ibid.*, pp. 143-45.

6 *Ibid.*, p. 54.

to another conjunction.¹ Prabhakara is indebted to the Vaisheshika in his doctrine of categories.

Kumarila divides all categories into positive (भाव) and negative (अभाव). He admits four positive categories: (1) substance (द्रव्य); (2) quality (गुण); (3) action (कर्म); (4) generality (सामान्य). He recognizes four kinds of non-existence (अभाव), like the Vaishe-shika. They are prior non-existence (प्रागभाव), posterior non-existence (प्रध्वंसाभाव), absolute non existence (अत्यन्ताभाव), and mutual non-existence (अन्योन्याभाव). Kumarila recognizes four positive categories: (1) substance (द्रव्य); (2) quality (गुण); (3) action (कर्म); (4) generality (सामान्य). He rejects the category of particularity (विशेष) like Prabhakara.

Unlike Prabhakara, he denies the category of inherence (समवाय). Inherence is said to be an extraneous relation that subsists between two inseparable things. It is said to be a relation between substance and quality, substance and action, the whole and the constituent parts, the universal and the individual, which are inseparable. Kumarila regards inherence as identical with the things themselves in which it exists. If inherence is different from the objects such as the universal and the individual, it cannot subsist as a relation between them. If, on the other hand, it is identical with them, they cannot be different from each other. So Kumarila regards inherence as identity between two inseparable objects. It is a particular phase of the inseparable things. If inherence is regarded as an extraneous relation between substance and quality, or the like, which relates them to each other, then this relation would require another relation of inherence to relate it to each of the two relata, and so on *ad infinitum*. This infinite regress can be avoided, if inherence is regarded as identity.² Kumarila admits the existence of generality (जाति) like Prabhakara. A single generality subsists in many individuals. Generality is partless. So it cannot be said to subsist in the individuals either in its entirety or in its

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 151.

² SV., NR., iv. 146—50.

parts. This question is meaningless with reference to generality. But we are cognizant of the fact that generality subsists in the individuals.¹ Relation subsists between distinct things. But inherence is said to be a relation between two inseparable things like the universal and the individual, which is inconceivable. Kumarila holds that generality is not different from the individuals.² In perceiving an object, when we apprehend the class as identical with the individual, what is manifest to consciousness is the individual only,—the class character lying latent in it; when, on the other hand, we apprehend the individual as identical with the class, it is the class-character that is manifest to consciousness,—the individual character being latent in it.³ Like Prabhakara, Kumarila holds that generality is perceptible by the senses.⁴ But there is a difference between Prabhakara and Kumarila in their views as to the relation between the universal and the individual. According to Prabhakara, the universal is different from the individual; there is a relation of inherence between them. But according to Kumarila, the universal is both different from, and identical with, the individual. According to the former, there is difference between the universal and the individual, while according to the latter, there is identity-in-difference between them.⁵

Kumarila rejects the categories of force, number, and similarity recognized by Prabhakara. Force is an unperceived property in a substance, which is inferred from its effect. It is brought into existence along with the substance. Kumarila, therefore, brings force under substance. Number is a quality. Shalikanatha, a follower of Prabhakara, treats number as a quality.⁶ Similarity is a quality which consists in the possession of the same arrangement of parts by two objects. It is not a distinct category, since it admits of degrees. There is a considerable similarity between a cow and a

1 SV. *Vanavada*, 32—34.

2 SV. *Akṛitāda*, 52—62 *Vanavada*, 75—76.

3 SV. *Akṛitvāda*, 59—62, PSPM., p. 95.

4 SV. *Vanavada*, 24.

5 IPP., p. 188.

6 PP. p. 54.

buffalow. But similarity between a cow and a boar is slight. If similarity were a distinct category, it would not admit of degrees.¹ Thus force, number, and similarity are not distinct categories.

Kumarila recognizes eleven substances: earth, water, fire, air, ether, self, mind, time, space, darkness, and sound. Kumarila, unlike Prabhakara, recognizes darkness and sound as substances. Darkness is a substance, since it has the quality of blueness and is capable of motion². Quality and action or motion can exist in a substance only. Sound is an eternal substance. Though it is generally observed to follow an effort, it is not produced by it. It is merely manifested by an effort. It is not produced. It is eternal.³ Kumarila like Prashastapada, enumerates twenty-four qualities: colour, taste, odour, touch: number, dimension, distinctness, conjunction, disjunction, remoteness, proximity: gravity, fluidity, viscosity: cognition, pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, effort, impression (including velocity, elasticity, and mental impression), tone (ध्वनि), manifestation (प्राकट्य), and potency. Kumarila departs from Prashastapada's list by substituting tone for sound, manifestation for merit, and potency for demerit. Kumarila differs from Prabhakara in asserting that distinctness applies both to eternal substances and to transient substances, while the latter asserts that it applies to eternal substances only. Remoteness and proximity are spatial and temporal. But Prabhakara regards them as special qualities of space and time. The Vaisheshika takes action in the restricted sense of motion. Kumarila recognizes action in the form of motion with its five-fold divisions of throwing upward, throwing downward, contraction, expansion, and locomotion.⁴ But he recognizes also action in the self. Physical motion (परिस्पन्द) is not the only form of action.⁵ Kumarila maintains that motion is perceived, while Prabhakara maintains that it is inferred from the

1 KM, p. 53.

2 SD, p. 381.

3 KM., pp 54-56.

4 SV., *Atmananda*, 74

conjunction and disjunction of a thing with points of space in which they subsist, and not in the moving thing. Kumarila replies that we perceive motion in the thing, which brings about conjunction and disjunction in space.¹

Kumarila rejects the category of inherence, while Prabhakara recognizes it as a distinct category. Kumarila identifies inherence with the things in which it subsists. Inherence is nothing but identity. Prabhakara admits the reality of inherence as an independent category and regards it as eternal in eternal substances, and non-eternal in non-eternal substances².

Both Prabhakara and Kumarila recognize the reality of the external world independent of our cognitions'. The Mimamsa does not believe in the periodic creation and dissolution of the world by God³. Things come into being and pass away. Production and destruction of things are constant. Prabhakara denies a creator of the world. He admits that the constituent parts of the world have a beginning and an end, but he denies that the world, as a whole, has a beginning or an end in time⁴. Kumarila also denies the creation and dissolution of the world as a whole⁵. He denies the existence of a creator of the world⁶.

15. The Nature of the Self (आत्मन)—Prabhakara's view.

The Mimamsa emphasizes ritualistic morality and religion. It lays stress on the performance of sacrifices enjoined by the Vedas. The performance of sacrifices generates an unseen potency (अपूर्व) in the self, which matures in course of time and leads it to the attainment of the desired good in another world. The potency subsists in the incorporeal soul which enjoys rewards and suffers punishment. The soul leaves its mortal coil and passes to another world where it enjoys

1 PP, pp. 78-79 SD, p. 274, PSPM, pp. 91-92, KM., p. 56, IPP., pp. 146-47.

2 PP, pp. 26-27 SV., iv. 146-50, PSPM, p. 92, KM., p. 58.

3 J. N. Sinha *Indian Realism*, ch. vi.

4 SV, p. 673.

5 SV., *Sambandhakshcāparihara* 47, 68, 113.

6 *Ibid.*, 47-59; 114-16.

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and suffers the consequences of its actions. Jaimini does not give proofs for the existence of the self. He assumes the existence of the permanent self which reaps the fruits of its actions. He regards the self (पुरुष) as distinct from cognitions (बुद्धि) and the sense-organs (इन्द्रिय)¹. Shavara also regards the self as a permanent entity distinct from the body, the vital forces, the sense-organs, and cognitions. The self is apprehended by itself: it cannot be perceived by others or shown to others (स्वसंवेद्यः स भवति, नास्मावन्येन शक्यते द्रष्टुं कथमस्मै निदर्शयेत्)². The self is illumined by itself (आत्मज्योतिः). It is apprehended by itself, but not by others. The self is permanent, while cognitions are transient. So the self is different from cognitions. It is not a series or stream of cognitions. It is the subject of cognitions. Cognitions are not self-aware. They are apprehended by the self. But the self is apprehended by itself. It is the agent that has cognition, pleasure, desire, memory, and the like. A series of cognitions cannot have memory. The permanent self only can have memory. Memory implies the identity of the self that perceived an object in the past and remembers it at present. The self is an object of I-consciousness (अहंप्रत्यय) which is not illusory, since it is not contradicted by any sublating cognition⁴.

Shalikanatha, a follower of Prabhakara, mentions different views of the self. Some identify the self with the body; some with the external sense-organs; some with the intellect. Some regard the self as distinct from the body, the sense-organs, and the intellect, which is inferable. Some hold it to be an object of mental perception. Some regard it as self-luminous (स्वयंप्रकाश). Others regard it as revealed in all consciousness. Some hold the self to be impermanent and transient. Others hold it to be eternal and immutable (कृदस्थ). Some hold it to be atomic; some hold it to be co-extensive with the body, while others hold it to be ubiquitous. Some

1 MS, i. 1. 4.

2 SB, i. 1. 5.

3 *Ibid.*, i. 1. 5.

4 SB, i. 1. 5.

hold the self to be one in all individuals. Others recognize the existence of many selves, one in each body¹.

Prabhakara regards the self as distinct from the body, the sense-organs, and the intellect. It is eternal, ubiquitous, and manifold. There is a distinct self in each body. It is revealed in all cognitions of objects. (बुद्धीन्द्रियशरीरेभ्यो भिन्न आत्मा विभुर्बुधः । नानाभूतः प्रतिक्षेत्रमर्थवित्तिषु भासते)². Madhusudana Sarasvati credits Prabhakara with the view that the self is an omnipresent unconscious agent and enjoyer. (कर्ता भोक्ता जडो विभुरिति प्राभाकरवराः)³. How can it be unconscious (जड)? It is unconscious, since consciousness does not constitute its essence ; the self appears as the substrate (आश्रय) of the cognition 'I know,' but not as consciousness. (स च ज्ञानस्वरूप-भिन्नत्वाज्जडः, जानामीति ज्ञानाश्रयत्वेन स भाति, न ज्ञानरूपत्वेन)⁴. Prabhakara regards the self as a substance, which is not of the nature of consciousness, but a substrate of consciousness. Cognition is not a modification (परिणाम) of the self, as Kumarila holds, but a quality of the self, as the Nyaya-Vaisheshika holds. The self is manifested as the knower (ज्ञाता) of all cognitions of objects. It is an ego or knower, and apprehended as such. It is never apprehended as an object.

The self is the knower (ज्ञाता). It is distinct from the body, which can never be the knower. The body is made of earth. Cognition is a specific quality. Specific qualities, in order to be present in any product, must abide in its constituents. But cognition, which is a specific quality, is not present in particles of earth. Cognition is not present in such earthy substances as the jar and the like. So it cannot be present in any substance composed of particles of earth. Consciousness is not admitted to exist in any atom of the body. Therefore cognition cannot be a specific quality of the body. It must be a specific quality of the immaterial self which is different from the material body⁵. Further, we are

1 PP., p. 141

2 PP., p. 141

3 *Siddhantavindu*, IPM, p. 95.

4 *Nyayaratnavali*, IPM, pp. 95-96.

5 PP., 146-147.

conscious of the self in all cognitions of objects as the knower. In the cognition 'I know the jar,' the self is apprehended as the cognizer of the jar. (ज्ञाता ह्यात्मा न देहस्य ज्ञातृता सम्भवति).¹ It is not possible for the body to be the knower. Neither the body as a whole nor any of its parts enters into consciousness in the cognition of an object. So the body or the sense-organs cannot be the knower of objects. The knower must be distinct from the body and the sense-organs. We are conscious of past and future objects which are non-existent at the time. So cognition cannot be a quality of material objects. It must be a quality of the self, which is different from the body. The self is the experiencer (भोक्ता). The body is the vehicle of experience (भोगायतन). The self is the agent (कर्ता). The body is the instrument of action. The agent cannot be identified with its instrument.²

The self cannot be identified with the sense-organs. It can perceive the same object with the visual organ and the tactual organ. The object known is the same. The self that knows it also is the same. It is the synthesizer of different kinds of perceptions of the same object. Further, a blind person remembers what he had seen before he became blind. The visual organ is destroyed, and yet the object seen is remembered. This proves that it is the self that remembers the object which it perceived in the past with the visual organ. If the visual organ were the perceiver, the object could not be remembered, since the visual organ is destroyed.³

The self is distinct from the intellect or a series of cognitions. The Buddhist idealists, the Yogacharas, hold that cognitions alone are real. They are aware of themselves. They are the cogniser (ग्राहक), and the cognized (ग्राह्य), which are identical with each other, since they are perceived together. There is no permanent self apart from an impermanent series of momentary cognitions. There are no objects apart from them. The

1 PP, p. 143.

2 PP., pp. 142-43.

3 PP., p. 143

duality of self and not-self, subject and object, is illusory¹. The so-called self cannot be a cogniser apart from cognitions. It can cognize only when there is a cognition. Cognition is self-luminous. It apprehends itself. So cognition itself should be regarded as the self (बुद्धिरेवात्मा). The self is a beginningless series of cognitions (स चायमनादिबुद्धिसंतानः)². The apparent duality of self-cognitions and object-cognitions is due to a beginningless series of nescience (अविद्या).

Prabhakara urges that the self is the cogniser (बोद्धा), and cognitions are cognized by the self. The difference between the self and cognitions is established by consciousness. It can never be disproved. Simultaneous perception (सहोपलम्भ) of the self and cognition does not prove their identity (अभेद). The self is apprehended by immediate consciousness (साक्षात् प्रतीतिसिद्ध). So it cannot be disproved. The self perceives objects and cognitions in the waking state. It persists in its pure nature in deep sleep, when all cognitions cease³.

Prabhakara holds that the self is the enjoyer (भोक्ता), the body is the vehicle of enjoyment (भोगायतन), the sense-organs are the instruments of enjoyment (भोगसाधन), pleasure and pain are the internal objects of enjoyment, earth and the like are the external objects of enjoyment (भोग्य), and feeling (वेदना) is enjoyment (भुक्ति)⁴. So the self cannot be identified with any of them. It is quite different from the body, the sense-organs, and the series of cognitions and feelings. It is the substance which is the substrate of the qualities of cognition, pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, effort, impression, merit and demerit⁵. During dreamless sleep the self exists in its essential condition devoid of cognitions which are produced during the waking condition, when it comes into contact with the *manas* and the sense-organs⁶.

1 PP., p. 141.

2 PP., p. 142.

3 PP., p. 142.

4 PP., p. 151.

5 PP., p. 149.

6 PP., p. 142.

In the state of liberation the self is divested of all its special qualities and acquires its pristine purity. Liberation is due to complete exhaustion of merit and demerit which are the subjective conditions of pleasure and pain.¹ Cognitions, feelings, and volitions are destroyed, and merit and demerit are worn off during liberation. Consciousness is not the essence of the self. It is its adventitious quality which it acquires in conjunction with the *manas* and the body. Conjunction of the self with the *manas* depends upon merit and demerit.² These are exhausted during liberation. So the self cannot come into conjunction with the *manas*, and acquire consciousness. The self, in its pure essence, is an unconscious substance. Consciousness does not constitute its essence. It is its accidental quality. Prabhakara agrees with the Nyaya-Vaisheshika in holding that the self is an unconscious substance in its pure condition. Cognition, pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, volition, merit, and demerit are its special qualities³. They are not modifications of the self, as Kumarila holds. Cognition is self-luminous. It apprehends itself. It is not apprehended by any other cognition. But pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, and volition are apprehended by mental perception. Merit and demerit are known by means of the authority of the Vedas. Impression is inferred from recollection⁴.

How can the self be known? Prabhakara holds that the self is known as the subject or knower (ज्ञाता) in all cognitions of objects. It is a knower or ego. It can never be known as an object. Cognition is self-luminous. It manifests itself. It manifests the self as the knower. It manifests the known object. This is called the doctrine of triple perception or triple consciousness (त्रिपुटोपलक्षण, त्रिपुटीभान) discussed already. The self, the object, and the cognition itself are apprehended by a cognition. The self is not self-luminous. It is not apprehended by itself apart from a cognition. But a

1 PP., p. 156.

2 PP., p. 151.

3 PP., p. 149.

4 PP., p. 149.

cognition is self-luminous. It apprehends itself. (अवश्यं ज्ञातुरवभासो मेयानुभवेष्यनुवर्तते ।¹ बुद्धिः स्वसंवेदनसिद्धा ।² प्रमाणफलभूता संवित्तिरवश्यं स्वयंप्रकाशाभ्युपगमनीया)³. Objects are not apprehended, unless the self apprehending them is apprehended. The self also is not apprehended in the absence of cognitions of objects. (नात्मा विषयाननुविद्धोऽवभासते न च विषया बोद्धर्यनवभासने भासन्ते)⁴. Cognitions manifest themselves, the objects which produce them, and the self in which they exist. (तत्र यदेतद्विषयेषु प्रमाणं तज्जनितैव या संवित् सा पुरुषं विषयांश्च विषयीकुर्वन्तो समुदीयते)⁵. The self is apprehended as the knower of objects. It is manifested as the subject in all cognitions of objects. It cannot be the subject as well as the object of a cognition, since it is self-contradictory. (पुरुषस्य न कर्मता किन्तु कर्तृत्वैव । कर्मकर्तृत्वे नात्मनः संभवतः)⁶. The self cannot be an object of mental perception as the followers of Kumarila and some Naiyayikas hold. The same self cannot be subject as well as object. It is self contradictory to hold that the same self is the knowing subject and the known object. (न ह्येकस्य कर्तृत्वं कर्मत्वं च स्वापेक्षमुपपद्यते । स्वात्मनि क्रियावृत्तिविरोधात्)⁷. In the cognition 'I know the jar' the self-luminous cognition manifests the jar as an object, and the self as its substrate. (घटमहं जानामीत्यत्र स्वप्रकाशविज्ञानं घटादीन् विषयत्वेनात्मानं चाश्रयत्वेन स्फोरयति).⁸

Some Naiyayikas hold that the self is an object of mental perception. Kumarila's followers also hold this view. The Vaisheshikas hold that the self is an object of inference. But Prabhakara holds that the self is apprehended as the knower of objects ; it is manifested as the subject of object - cognitions ; it is never known as an object. The self is an ego or subject. Prabhakara thus differs from the Naiyayika. But if egohood constitutes the essential nature of the self, it can hardly be regarded as a substance. But Prabhakara does not reject the Nyaya-

1 PP, p. 148.

2 PP, p. 149.

3 TP., p. 151.

4 PP., p. 152.

5 PP., p. 152.

6 PP., p. 153.

7 PP, p. 151 ; IPP., pp. 241-42.

8 VPS., p. 53 , IPP., pp. 241-42. -

Vaisheshika theory of soul-substance. The Advaita Vedanta, on the other hand, holds that the self is of the nature of consciousness which constitutes its essence, and as such it is self-luminous. Egoism (अहंकार) is not the essence of the self. It is an evolute of nescience (अविद्या). The self appears to be an ego since it strongly identifies itself with egoism (अहंकार) which is of the nature of not-self. The self is of the nature of consciousness. Egoism is not of the nature of consciousness. The self is the revealer. Egoism is revealed by the self which is self-luminous (अहंकारस्यान्तःस्वभावेन चान्तोऽनुभवरूपत्वात्).¹

Prabhakara refutes the Advaita Vedanta doctrine that the self is self-luminous. He urges that if the self were self-luminous, it would be manifest to consciousness during deep sleep, as it appears in consciousness during the waking condition dream and ecstasy. If the self were by nature self-luminous, it would never cease to be so even during deep sleep. In the state of liberation there is complete cessation of cognitions: so the self does not appear in consciousness, but it remains in its pure condition devoid of all cognitions. All states of consciousness can be explained by the hypothesis of the self luminosity of cognitions. So it is needless to assume the self-luminosity of the self, which is distinct from cognitions. Prabhakara rejects the Advaita Vedanta doctrine that the self is self-luminous. He holds that cognitions only are self-luminous.² The self is not of the nature of consciousness, but it is the substrate of consciousness.³

Prabhakara rejects the Advaita Vedanta doctrine of the oneness of self. It regards the self as one, eternal, immutable, undifferenced consciousness. It is one in different individuals.⁴ Though it is one, it appears to be many owing to the variety of the media in which it is reflected, even as the sun, which is one,

1 VPS., p. 56

2 PP., p. 152.

3 IPP., p. 242.

4 PP., p. 141.

appears to be many when it is reflected in different mirrors. The body, the sense-organs, and the internal organs are evolutes of nescience (अविद्या). The one eternal self appears to be many owing to the plurality of the internal organs (अन्तःकरण) in which it is reflected. Just as the luminous sun, which is one, is endued with distinct qualities, such as dirtiness, when it is reflected in different mirrors, so the self-luminous self, which is one, is endued with diverse qualities such as pleasure, pain and the like, when it is reflected in different internal organs in different bodies. Prabhakara refutes this doctrine of the Advaita Vedanta. He contends that this analogy is false. As in the case of the sun, dirtiness and other qualities that appear different are only those that belong to the reflecting mirrors, and not to the sun which is reflected in them, so if the analogy were true, the diverse qualities of pleasure, pain, and the like perceived by different individuals would belong to the different bodies in which the self is reflected, and not to the self. But pleasure and pain are not qualities of the body. They are qualities of the self. If they belonged to one self, pleasure and pain of one individual would lead to pleasure and pain of all others. But this is contradicted by experience. So they must belong to different souls, and not to their adjuncts (उपाधि) or bodies.¹

There are many souls. Their experiences are different. They acquire different merits and demerits. Their pleasures and pains are different due to the variety of their merits and demerits. If there were one soul only, there would be no variety of merits and demerits. If there were no variety of merits and demerits, there would be no variety of enjoyments and sufferings, which is a fact of experience. So there are many souls, one in each body. Oneness of the soul would lead to oneness of experience, which is contradicted by experience (नानाव्यवस्थाना नानाभूताः प्रतिक्षेत्रं पुरुषाः । धर्माधर्मसुखादिव्यवस्थादर्शनात्).²

1 PP., pp 159-60; PSPM., p 83.

2 PP., p 159.

The soul has nine special qualities, *viz.*, cognition (बुद्धि), pleasure (सुख), pain (दुःख), desire (इच्छा), aversion (द्वेष), effort (प्रयत्न), merit (धर्म), demerit (अधर्म), and impression (संस्कार), which are produced by its conjunction with the *manas*, the internal organ. Cognition is two-fold, *viz.*, apprehension and recollection. It is self-illuminated: it is self-aware. Pleasure, pain, desire and aversion are apprehended by mental perception. Pleasure is a positive feeling. It is not a mere negation of pain. Impression is a peculiar quality of the soul, which is the cause of recollection. It is inferred from recollection. It is not perceptible. Unseen power (अदृष्ट) is either merit or demerit. It is not perceptible. It is inferred from pleasure and pain. Merit is the subjective cause of pleasure. Demerit is the subjective cause of pain. Merit is inferred from enjoyment. Demerit is inferred from suffering. Merit is the result of right actions. Demerit is the result of wrong actions. The self is the substrate of cognition, pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, effort, impression, merit, and demerit. Prabhakara's conception of the self closely resembles the Nyaya-Vaisheshika conception of it.

Prabhakara holds that the self is the inherent cause (समवायिकारण) of cognitions. It depends upon the conjunction of the self with the *manas* as the non-inherent cause (असमवायिकारण) to bring about cognitions. This mind-soul-contact is brought about by a movement of the mind (मनस्) due either to the effort of the soul or to its merit and demerit brought about by the previous actions of the soul. These efforts and merits and demerits are the effects of previous mind-soul-contacts, and so on without a beginning. The action of the mind is not the non-inherent cause of cognitions, since it would depend upon another action of the mind as its non-inherent cause. So the self is the inherent cause of cognitions which inhere in it, and the mind-soul-contact is their non-inherent or auxiliary cause.²

1 PP., p. 149.

2 PP., p. 149 PSPM., p. 76.

The mind (मनस्) is the internal organ of the self. It is atomic. The specific qualities of the soul, cognition, pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, and effort, are apprehended by the mind. They are objects of mental perception. The mind supervises the functions of the external sense-organs, viz., the visual organ, the auditory organ, the tactual organ, the olfactory organ, and the gustatory organ. It is an atomic substance.

The soul is ubiquitous (विभु). It comes into contact with the atomic mind and brings about cognitions. If the mind were ubiquitous like the soul, there would be no contact between them. Two ubiquitous substances devoid of parts cannot come into contact with each other. Therefore the mind must be an atomic substance. It is eternal. It quickly moves and comes into contact with different sense-organs in quick succession. Its quick movement accounts for the emergence of different cognitions in quick succession. Cognitions are never simultaneous. They appear to be simultaneous owing to the quick movement of the mind and its rapid contacts with the soul and different sense-organs. The contacts of the soul with the mind are due to its merits and demerits brought about by its past actions.¹

The soul is ubiquitous. It is not atomic. It is not co-extensive with its body. The soul is the constituent cause (समवायिकारण) of all its qualities. The mind-soul-contact is their non-constituent cause (असमवायिकारण). This conjunction cannot exist elsewhere than in the soul and the mind. The mind cannot exist apart from the body. The effect is produced where the non-constituent cause exists. The qualities of the soul are not perceived apart from the body which is animated by the soul. The body is capable of movement. But the soul is incapable of movement. The soul comes into contact with all things without movement. So it is all-pervading. It is neither atomic nor of the dimension of its body. But though the soul is ubiquitous, it can experience cognition, pleasure, pain and the like in connection with its own body. It cannot experience cognitions of

¹ PP p. 149 PSPM pp. 77-78,

other souls in other bodies. Experience depends upon a particular body, which is the vehicle or experience (भोगायतन) and its sense-organs, which are the instruments of experience (भोगसाधन). The particular body and its sense-organs are brought about by the merits and demerits of the particular soul, acquired by it by its past actions. The soul can have experience through its own body and sense-organs only, which are the fit media of its experience. It cannot have experience through others' bodies and sense-organs.¹

Though the soul is ubiquitous, it is not one. There are many souls, one in each body. Its unique experience depends upon its own body and sense-organs brought about by its merits and demerits due to its past actions. It can have experience through its own body and sense-organs only in order to reaal the fruits of its own past actions. There is an irreducible plurality of souls with unique experiences. They are moral agents experiencing diverse objects in accordance with their moral deserts. The Advaita Vedanta doctrine of oneness of the soul flatly contradicts the testimony of consciousness and undermines morality.² Just as the actions of my body are due to the volitions of my soul, so the actions of other bodies are due to the volitions of other souls. The actions of other bodies are not due to the effort of my soul. I experience the effort of my soul producing actions of my body. But I never experience the effort of my soul producing actions of other bodies. So I infer that they must be due to the effort of other souls. I have inferential knowledge of other souls. I infer them from the actions of their bodies, which are brought about by their efforts. One soul cannot be perceived by another soul.³

The soul is immortal. It is eternal (नित्य). It is not produced by a cause. It is not destroyed by anything. It is uncaused and indestructible. It is without a beginning. It is without an end. It achieves its pristine purity by exhausting all merits and demerits

1 PP., pp. 157-58 PSPM, p. 81.

2 PP., p. 158.

3 PP., pp. 158-59.

brought about by its past actions. This is the state of its liberation.

16 The Nature of the self (आत्मन्) — Kumarila's view.

Kumarila agrees with Prabhakara in holding that the self is different from the body, the sense-organs, and the intellect or a series of cognitions¹. It is of the nature of the potency of cognition. It is eternal and ubiquitous. It is capable of transmigration from one body to another². It is not a mere stream of cognitions. It is a knower (ज्ञाता), enjoyer (भोक्ता), and active agent (कर्ता)³. It is an incorporeal substance. It is the substrate of cognition, pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, volition, impression, merit, and demerit, which are its particular modes. It undergoes modification, and is yet eternal⁴. Its modal changes do not compromise its eternal character. It is imperishable—in its essential nature, but its sense-organs and cognitions produced by them are perishable⁵.

Cognition is a modal change (परिणाम) of the self. It is an action of it. The act of cognition is inferred from cognizedness (ज्ञातता) or manifestness (प्रोक्तव्य) of the object. It is not perceptible. It is inferable. It is not self-luminous (स्वयंप्रकाश) as Prabhakara holds. If it were self-luminous,—if cognitions apprehended themselves—external objects would not be necessary. Kumarila rejects Prabhakara's doctrine of self-luminosity of cognitions to guard against subjectivism. Cognitions apprehend external objects. The self is of the nature of potency of cognition (ज्ञानशक्तिस्वभाव). In deep sleep there is no cognition, but there is a potency to know. There is no feeling of pleasure in deep sleep. The so-called memory of pleasure during sleep on waking from sleep is due to the absence of pain at the time.⁶ Kumarila sometimes speaks of the self as self-illuminated.⁷

1 SV., *Ātmavada*, 7

2 *Ibid.*, 73.

3 *Ibid.*, 4, 8, 20, 29, 76.

4 *Ibid.*, 21—22.

5 *Ibid.*, 147

6 SD., pp. 352—53.

7 *Ibid.*, 42—43.

Sometimes he speaks of it as an object of 'I'-consciousness or self-consciousness.¹

Madhusudana Sarasvati credits Kumarila with the view that the self is partly conscious and partly unconscious. (जडो बोधात्मकश्च इति भाट्टाः).² It has two parts, conscious and unconscious. It is the knower through its conscious part. It is transformed into cognition, pleasure, and the like through its unconscious part, and becomes an object of knowledge as 'I know me.' (आत्मनोऽस्ति अंशद्वयं चिदंशोऽचिदंशश्च चिदंशेन द्रष्टृत्वं अचिदंशेन ज्ञानसुखादिपरिणामित्वं जानामीति ज्ञेयत्वञ्च).³ Sadananda Yati also states Kumarila's view in the same manner. The self, according to him, is both conscious and unconscious (चिदचिद्रूप). It is the knower through its conscious part, and an object of self-consciousness through its unconscious part. Cognition, pleasure, pain, volition, and the like are modifications (परिणाम) of the unconscious part of the self.⁴ Vidyaranya refutes this view of Kumarila. He holds that the self is the object of perception, like a jar. There is no contradiction in it. The self, as conscious, is the knower, and, as a substance, is an object of knowledge. The conscious part of it is the subject, its unconscious part is the object. (आत्मा ज्ञानकर्म प्रत्यक्षत्वान् धटवन् । न च कर्मकर्तृविरोधः द्रव्यांशस्य प्रमयेत्सं बोधांशस्य प्रमातृत्वमिति व्यवस्थितत्वात्).⁵ This view is wrong. The self is partless. It cannot transform itself into subject and object at the same time. The unconscious part is not the self; it is non-spiritual. The conscious part only is the self.

Kumarila regards the self as different from the body, the sense-organs, and the intellect or cognitions. It is eternal, while the body, the sense-organs, and cognitions

1 *Ibid.*, 107, 110, 126.

2 *Siddhantavindu*, IPM, p. 95.

3 *Nyayaratnavali*; IPM., p. 95.

4 *Advaitabrahmasiddhi*, EH, p. 260

5 VFS., p. 54.

are perishable. (शरीरेन्द्रियबुद्धिभ्यो व्यतिरिक्तत्वमात्मनः । नित्यत्वं चेज्यते, शेषं शरीरादि विनश्यति).¹ The self is the agent (कर्त्ता). The body and the sense-organs are its instruments (करण). They can act only when they are guided by the self. They are material and non sentient ; they cannot move of themselves. They are supervised by the intelligent self, and act in order to realize its purpose. The actions of the body and the senses are due to the activity of the self, which realizes its ends through the actions of its instruments. The self is not capable of physical movement. It can produce it only through its body and sense-organs, which it has acquired by virtue of its own merits and demerits due to its past actions² The self cannot be identical with the body. The self is of the nature of 'I' (अहम्), while the body is of the nature of 'this' (इदम्). The body is an object of knowledge. But the self is the knower or subject. The body is perceived by others. But the self is not perceived by others. The self is ubiquitous. But the body has a limited dimension. The self is eternal. But the body is perishable.³

Life of the body is due to its being animated by the soul. It is not a quality of the body. A quality is destroyed when the substance in which it abides is destroyed, or when a contradictory quality is produced in the substance and destroys it. But life departs from a body which is not destroyed, or in which a contradictory quality is not produced. So it must be due to the effort of the soul, which guides the body. Further, pleasure is inferred from a beaming face. So it may be urged that pleasure is a quality of the body, but it is not perceived owing to its internal existence. But Kumarila urges that pleasure cannot be perceived inside the body even when it is torn open. When we dissect the body, we can perceive the colour of its interior, but we cannot perceive pleasure. But pleasure is a quality, and must abide in a substance and the substance in

1 SV , *Atmavada*, 7.

2 *Ibid*, 76—79.

3 SD , pp. 344—47.

which it abides is the soul. Thus cognition and the like are the qualities of the soul. The self is the substrate of these qualities¹. Moreover, consciousness cannot be a property of the material elements composing the body and the sense organs either distributively or collectively. It is not found to exist in earth and other elements, when these exist separately by themselves. Nor can it exist in all the elements, taken collectively, since that which does not belong to the parts cannot belong to the whole. For the same reason, consciousness cannot be regarded as a property of these elements modified into a particular corporeal shape, for the purpose of being distinguished from other bodies, since the constituents of the body remain the same elements of earth and the like, which are devoid of consciousness². If consciousness belonged to all the elements constituting the body, then all being equal could not be related to one another. If consciousness belonged to one of them, other elements would be subordinate to it. But this is contradicted by experience³. Thus consciousness cannot belong to the body or the sense-organs, which therefore cannot be the knower.

Kumarila cites the Sankhya arguments for the distinction of the self from the body. The self is pure, while the body is impure. The self is simple, while the body is a complex whole. The self is incorporeal, while the body has a corporeal shape. The self is immaterial, while the body is material, like other external material things. The self is disembodied, while the body is embodied, like a dead body⁴. Kumarila argues like the Sankhya that an aggregate (*संघात*) and an arrangement of parts (*सन्निवेश*) can never exist, except for the purpose of some other entity or the self which is conscious. The self is the conscious (*चेतन*) enjoyer (*भोक्ता*). It has experience through its body which is an aggregate of parts arranged in a particular manner to realize its ends⁵. Therefore the self is distinct from the body.

1 *Ibid.*, 98-101

2 *Ibid.*, N R, 111.

3 *Ibid.*, 113.

4 *Ibid.*, 112

5 *Ibid.*, 114

The self is distinct from the sense-organs. The senses are perishable. But the self is eternal. The senses are unconscious. But the self is conscious. The self is the intelligent agent that supervises its sense-organs as its instruments and makes them function. They cannot function without its guidance. The sense-organs are unconscious and perishable. The self is conscious and eternal.¹ Further, even on the destruction of a sense-organ, e. g., the eyes, the self can remember objects perceived in the past through them. If the eyes were the cogniser (ज्ञाता), there would be no recollection of visible objects on their destruction. Moreover, the self synthesizes the impressions received through the different sense organs. 'I touch the object that I saw.' One sense-organ cannot synthesize the impressions received through the other sense-organs. The *manas* also cannot be the cogniser. It is the internal organ by which the self can perceive its qualities such as pleasure and the like. It also supervises the function of the external senses in the perception of colour, taste, smell and the like. The self is the agent. The mind is its organ.² So the self cannot be identified with the mind and the external senses.

The self is distinct from a series of ideas. The Buddhist wrongly holds that it is a series of momentary ideas (विज्ञानसन्तान), each of which is modified by the impression (वासना) of the preceding idea. The idea that performs an action and the idea that reaps its fruit belong to the same series. Therefore the agent of an action (कर्ता) is the same as the enjoyer of its consequence (भोक्ता). Kumarila urges that the first idea that acts and the last idea that enjoys must have a common substratum. The Buddhist believes in transmigration. But if the soul is a mere series of momentary ideas, it cannot transmigrate from one body to another, and enjoy the fruits of actions done in the previous birth.

¹ *Ibid.* 147.

² *SD.*, p 351.

Ideas are momentary. So they can neither be a doer (कर्ता) nor an enjoyer (भोक्ता).¹ Ideas are immaterial and devoid of motion. They are not ubiquitous. So one and the same idea cannot transmigrate from one body to another.² There is no subtle body through the medium of which an idea may pass into another body. Even if it existed, an idea could not pass with it.³ An idea cannot exist in the germ-plasm. It is devoid of sense-organs. So it cannot have cognitions. An idea can exist in the form of a cognition only. A cognition of an object is produced by a sense-organ in intercourse with it.⁴ The Buddhist may contend that an idea exists in the embryo in a state of a latent potentiality (शक्ति). But Kumarila urges that a potentiality cannot exist without a substratum (आश्रय) in the embryo. If the material sense-organs were the substratum of the potentiality of ideas, then the sense-organs would be conscious and there would be no rebirth, since the material sense-organs would be destroyed with the body, and on their destruction, the potentiality of ideas would be destroyed. Further, if the sense-organs were the substratum of the potentiality of ideas, they would manifest the potentiality and produce ideas. This would contradict the Buddhist doctrine that an idea is produced by a preceding idea only. Similarly there is no evidence to prove that the first cognition of a new-born child is produced by a preceding idea. Kumarila holds that it is produced by a sense-organ in intercourse with an object. If the potentiality of ideas be supposed to exist without any substrate in an embryo in order to produce subsequent ideas, then the so-called potentiality is another name for the soul. In fact, potentiality of ideas can exist in the permanent soul only, which is its substrate. It cannot exist without a substratum.⁵

Kumarila concludes that the self must be eternal, ubiquitous, and possess potentiality of knowledge,

¹ *Ibid.*, 32—34.

² *Ibid.*, 34.

³ *Ibid.*, 62, 64.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 65—66.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 67—72.

and be capable of transmigrating into another body, without actually itself moving, but uniting with it (ज्ञानशक्तिस्वभावोऽतो नित्यः सर्वगतः पुमान् । देहान्तरक्षमः कल्प्यः सोऽगच्छन्नैव योद्ध्यते)¹. The soul is immaterial and devoid of motion. But even without motion, it can trans-migrate into another body, since it is ubiquitous. Physical motion (परिस्पन्द) is not the only form of action (कर्म), as the Vaisheshika holds. The self can act in directing the movements of its body. Without the superintending activity of the self, there can be no movements of the body. The soul assumes a particular body in accordance with its merits and demerits acquired in the past life, and directs its actions. When its merits and demerits are exhausted, it ceases to have any body and direct its actions, and attains liberation.²

The Buddhist theory of the self as a series of momentary ideas cannot account for recollection (स्मृति) and recognition (प्रत्यभिज्ञा). An object perceived by Devadatta cannot be remembered by Yajnadatta. * So an object perceived by a past idea cannot be remembered by a present idea. The Buddhist argues that the two ideas belong to the same series (सन्तान), and therefore a later idea can remember an object perceived by a past idea, since they are members of the same series; the identity of the perceiver and the rememberer is never observed; the so-called one, permanent self is never perceived. So mere cognitions (ज्ञान) are the cogniser (ज्ञाता). There is no permanent self as the cogniser apart from cognitions. Were cognitions are self-subsistent. They are not qualities of a permanent substratum. Feelings of pleasure and pain also, which are objects of cognitions, are self-subsistent. Cognitions themselves are the cogniser. There is no evidence for the existence of any other cogniser apart from momentary cognitions³

1 *Ibid.*, 73.

2 *Ibid.*, 74—79.

3 *SD.*, pp. 342—343

Parthasarathi, a follower of Kumarila, urges that the permanent self is recognized as subsisting in the past and the present, which is quite different from momentary cognitions. It is the same self that perceived an object in the past and recollects it at present: the personal identity of the self is distinctly recognized. while there is no identity of the perception and the recollection, which are momentary.¹ There is a distinct recognition of personal identity of the self in the form 'I recognize the object which I perceived in the past.' The identity of the self is recognized; ideas are momentary; they cannot account for recognition, though they belong to the same series.² Recollection is due to revival of an impression (संस्कार). Impressions cannot abide in ideas which are momentary. The permanent self only can be the substratum of impressions; when the impressions generated by previous perceptions are revived by suggestive forces, the permanent self remembers the objects perceived in the past. Memory is inexplicable without the permanent self. The Buddhist tries to account for memory and recognition by the theory of impressions (वासना); the self is a series of momentary ideas, which have impressions as they pass away, which modify the succeeding ideas. Kumarila urges that momentary ideas cannot be the substratum of impressions. The permanent self only can be the substratum of impressions. Therefore, a series of momentary ideas cannot account for recollection and recognition by their impressions (वासना) which modify the succeeding ideas. Recollection and recognition of objects cannot be explained by momentary ideas and their impressions. Even if they can be explained by them, recognition of the cognizing self (ज्ञाता) can never be explained by them³. 'I recognize what I perceived before.' 'I know now' and 'I knew before.' Here there is a distinct recognition of the identity of the self that knows now and that knew before: 'I am the same self to-day as I was yesterday.' So the permanent identical self, distinct

1 SD., p. 343.

2 SD., p. 344.

3 SV., *Atmavada*, 109

From momentary cognitions, is proved by *I*—consciousness in the form of recognition of the cogniser (ज्ञातृरूपेण प्रत्यभिज्ञारूपेणाहंप्रत्ययेन ज्ञानादन्यस्य स्थिरस्य ज्ञातुः सिद्धिः)¹.

If the knower (ज्ञाता) were a mere cognition, then it would be momentary, and there could be no present recognition of the previous knower in the form: 'I knew this before; and I know it now.' Which momentary cognition would be the object of this recognition? The past cognition cannot be apprehended by the present cognition, since it no longer exists. The present cognition also cannot be apprehended by the past cognition which is past. Therefore the object of the recognition is neither the past cognition nor the present cognition. Both of them cannot be the object of recognition, since both of them did not apprehend it in the past, nor do they apprehend it at present².

The permanent self only can be the substratum of impressions. It only can account for recollection and recognition of objects. It only can account for recognition of the identity of the self. 'I am the same self as I was yesterday' This is recognition of personal identity. It proves the existence of the permanent self. It is distinct from an impermanent series of ideas³.

How can the self be known? Kumarila sometimes speaks of the self as self-illuminated (आत्मज्योतिः). It is manifested by itself. It is like light which is self-luminous. The self is self-luminous. Sometimes Kumarila speaks of the self as of the nature of potency of knowledge (ज्ञानशक्तिस्वभाव)⁴. When it is spoken of as imperceptible (अग्राह्य), it means that it is apprehended by itself, and cannot be perceived by others. (आत्मनैव प्रकाश्योऽयमात्मा ज्योतिरितीरितम् । अग्राह्य इतिसामान्यात् सर्वेणेति प्रतीयते । आत्मज्योतिष्ट्ववचनात्परैरित्यवतिष्ठते).⁵ Kumarila follows Shavara who says, "The self is apprehended by itself, but not by others."⁶ But sometimes he speaks of the self as known by *I*—consciousness. The self

1 *Ibid.*, 109, NR p 717.

2 *Ibid.*, 115—19

3 *Ibid.*, 115.

4 *Ibid.*, 73.

5 *Ibid.*, 142—43.

6 SB, 1. 1. 5.

as an object of 'I'—consciousness or self-consciousness is proved by itself. 'I know'—this 'I'—consciousness apprehends the knowing self. The self is always apprehended as an object of 'I'—consciousness. (अहंप्रत्ययविज्ञेयः स्वयमात्मोपपद्यते¹ । अहंवेद्मीत्यहंबुद्धिर्ज्ञातारमधिगच्छति² । अहंप्रत्ययविज्ञेयो ज्ञातानः सर्वदैव हि).³ Kumarila regards the self as both self illumined and an object of 'I'—consciousness. He clearly states in a passage that the 'I'—consciousness always points to the mere existence of the self, which is of the nature of pure consciousness.⁴

But Parthasarathi holds that the self or the knower, which is distinct from the body, is an object of self-consciousness in the form of mental perception. (शरीरातिरिक्तो मानसप्रत्यक्षरूपाहंप्रत्ययगम्यो ज्ञाता).⁵ He denies the self-luminosity of the self. If it were self-luminous, it would be manifested in deep sleep. But it is not manifested in dreamless sleep. So it is an object of mental perception. (तस्मात् सुषुप्तावप्रकाशान्नात्मनः स्वप्रकाशत्वम्, अतो मानसप्रत्यक्षगम्य एवायमिति स्थितम्).⁶ 'I'—consciousness (अहंप्रत्यय) is self-consciousness. It is mental perception (मानसप्रत्यक्ष). Parthasarathi agrees with the Naiyayika in holding that the self is an object of mental perception.

Prabhakara urges that the same self cannot be the knower and the known, subject and object. It is self-contradictory to hold that the same self is the knowing subject and the known object. How can the knower be a known object? So Prabhakara holds that the self is known as the subject of all cognitions of objects. There is no 'I'—consciousness or self-consciousness in addition to consciousness of objects. Hence the self cannot be the object of self-consciousness; it is manifested as the knower (ज्ञाता) of all object-cognitions. (नाहंवित्तिर्नाम घटादिवित्तिव्यतिरेकेण काचिदस्ति, घटादिवित्तावेव तु विषयवदात्मा भासते).⁷ Cognitions manifest their objects

1 SV., *Atmavada*, 107.

2 *Ibid.*, 110.

3 *Ibid.*, 126.

4 TV., E, T., p. 516.

5 SD, p. 347.

6 SD, p. 353.

7 SD., p. 347—48

as objects (विषय), and the self as the knower (ज्ञाता) of objects, or the substrate (आश्रय) in which they inhere.

Parthasarathi refutes the objection of Prabhakara. What does he mean by self-contradiction in the self which knows itself as an object of 'I'—consciousness or mental perception? "Prabhakara evidently means that the self is simply the agent of the act of cognition; in other words, the act of cognition cannot produce its result (स्वफल) in the self. Parthasarathi asks: What is the result of the act of cognition? It is manifestation (भासन). And it exists in the self which is the agent of the act of cognition. The self is manifested by the act of cognition. And since it is manifested by the act of cognition, it is the object of consciousness. If it is not manifested by the act of cognition, it cannot be said to be revealed by it. Thus if the self is revealed by an act of consciousness, as Prabhakara holds, then it is both subject and object of consciousness, and so Prabhakara also cannot avoid self-contradiction."¹ Parthasarathi holds that object-consciousness is not always accompanied by 'I'—consciousness. Sometimes it is appropriated by the self, and the self is known as the object of this 'I'—consciousness or self-consciousness which is distinct from object-consciousness. The self is not always manifested as the subject (ज्ञाता) of object-cognitions, as Prabhakara holds. Further, if the self is always manifested as the subject or knower, there can be no recollection or recognition of the self. Both in recollection and in recognition it is the object perceived in the past, that is represented to consciousness,—and not their subject. Hence in the recollection and recognition of the self it is the self perceived in the past as an object of mental perception, that is represented to consciousness as the object of present recollection and recognition. If, in the recognition of the self, it is not known as the object of recognition, then the act of recognition would have no object, but no cognition can be without an object. Hence Parthasarathi concludes that the self is an object of 'I'—consciousness or mental perception.²

1 IPP., p. 239, SD., p. 348.

2 IPP., pp. 239—40; SD., p. 352.

But how can the self be subject (कर्ता) and object (कर्म) at the same time? Kumarila holds that the self is a conscious substance, and that, as conscious it is the subject and, as a substance, it is the object (द्रव्यस्वरूपमात्मनो ग्राह्यं ज्ञातृरूपं च ग्राहकम्).¹ Or the self is partly conscious (चिन्) and partly unconscious (अचिन्). It is the subject or knower (ज्ञातृ) through its conscious part, and the object of knowledge (ज्ञेय) through its unconscious part². We have not found any passage in Kumarila's works, which confirms this view ascribed to him by the Naiyayikas and the Advaita Vedantists. The Vedantist urges that the self is partless, and so cannot bifurcate itself into subject and object. The self is not partly conscious and partly unconscious. It is self-luminous pure consciousness³. Kumarila struggled between two concepts of the self,—the self as self-luminous pure consciousness and the self as a substance, partly conscious and partly unconscious, subject as well as object.

The self is implicitly involved in all consciousness of objects. So far Prabhakara is right. But the self is not always explicitly manifested in all consciousness of objects. All consciousness of objects does not contain self-consciousness. All consciousness is not self-consciousness. Self-consciousness is a higher degree of consciousness. The self is distinctly manifested in self-consciousness. So far Kumarila is right. But the self is always a knower or subject (ज्ञाता). It can never be an object (ज्ञेय) of consciousness. The knower cannot be a known object. The self is an ego or knower. So far Prabhakara is right. The self is not known as an object of self-consciousness. It is immanent in experience. But it is not an object of experience. It is not even an object of self-consciousness. So far Kumarila is wrong, when he holds that the self is an object of mental perception or 'I'—consciousness.⁴

1 NM, p. 430 VPS, p. 54.

2 *Advaitabrahmasiddhi* and *Nyayaatmakāli*

3 VPS, p. 54.

4 IPP., p. 239.

III. ETHICS.

17. Prabhakara's Analysis of Voluntary Action.

Prabhakara analyses a voluntary action into the following steps : (1) the cognition of something to be done or the sense of duty (कार्यताज्ञान); (2) the desire to do it (चिकीर्षा), which includes the cognition that it can be done by an effort of will (कृतिसाध्यताज्ञान); (3) the act of volition (कृति); (4) the motor impulse in the body (चेष्टा); (5) the overt action (क्रिया). The desire to act is brought about by the knowledge that the action can be done by the agents' volition. If there is the knowledge that the action cannot be done by his will, it cannot give rise to the desire to act.¹ The agent must identify himself with the idea of the act chosen by him in order to execute it into action. If he does not identify himself with the idea of the act, he cannot desire to perform it. The idea of the act is appropriated by the self. A voluntary act is determined by the self. It involves self-determination. It involves the consciousness that the act is to be done by the self. (स्वविशेषण-वत्ताप्रतिसन्धानजन्यकार्यताज्ञानस्य प्रवर्तकत्वात्).² The action is not yet existent. It is to be done, and it has to be done by the self. The self represents the idea of the act, identifies itself with it, appropriates it, and executes it into action. The cognition of duty leads to will through desire. It does not depend upon any other factor, for instance, the cognition that it is conducive to the agent's good (इष्टसाधनताज्ञान), or the cognition that it is not accompanied by stronger undesirable consequences (बलवदनिष्टाननुबन्धित्वज्ञान) as the Naiyayika holds. The desire to act involves the consciousness that the act can be done by an effort of the will. The cognition that something is to be done (कार्यताज्ञान) leads to will or volition through the desire to act. It does not depend upon the knowledge that it is conducive to the agent's good. (चिकीर्षा हि कृतिसाध्यत्वप्रकारिकेच्छा । नत्विष्ट-

¹ SM., pp. 471-73.

² SM., pp. 472-73.

साधनताज्ञानं तत्र हेतुः).³ Prabhākara holds that a volition is determined by the sense of duty,—not by the knowledge of the agent's good or the knowledge of the absence of stronger undesirable consequences. The sense of duty is due to the self's representation of the act to be done and identification with it. (अत्र गुणः । स्वविशेषणवत्ताप्रतिसन्धानजन्यकार्यताज्ञानस्यैव चिकीर्षाद्वारा प्रवृत्तिहेतुत्वं नेष्टसाधनत्वबलवदनिष्टानुबन्धित्वज्ञानयोरपि).⁴

Thus a voluntary action consists of the following steps: (1) the cognition that something is to be done (कार्यताज्ञान); (2) the cognition that it can be done by an effort of will (कृतिमाध्यताज्ञान); (3) the self's identifying itself with the act represented by it (स्वविशेषणवत्ताप्रतिसन्धान); (4) the desire to do the act (चिकीर्षा). The act of self-appropriation is common to both prudential acts for material gain or conditional duties (काम्यकर्म) and unconditional duties or necessary (नित्य and occasional (नैमित्तिक) duties. Conditional duties are prudential acts prompted by desires for material gain. They involve empirical volitions. They fulfil desires for selfish ends. But, according to Prabhākara, the mere cognition of conduciveness to the agent's good (इष्टसाधनताज्ञान) does not bring about volition (प्रवृत्ति). The desire for the realisation of the good as appropriated by the self is the real incentive for volition. Mere desire for pleasure is not the real motive force. But the self as qualified by the desire for pleasure is the spring of action. In unconditional duties there is no desire for pleasure. They are free from empirical motives. They involve purely rational will undetermined by any considerations of material gain or desire for pleasure. But the self's representation of the acts to itself and identifying itself with them prompt it to will. In conditional duties there is the cognition that the acts are conducive to the self's good, unaccompanied by the cognition of stronger undesirable consequences. But unless the self

identifies itself with the desire for the realisation of the good, there can be no volition. In unconditional duties there is no desire for the realisation of any good. But there is the desire to perform an action, determined by the pure sense of duty, undetermined by any empirical motive. But the mere desire to perform the action cannot lead to volition. The self represents the act to itself and identifies itself with it. The desire to act as specifying the self leads to volition. In a conditional duty for material gain there is an empirical motive. In an unconditional duty there is no empirical motive. But in both there is self-appropriation of desire. Prabhakara emphasizes this element of self-reference in all voluntary acts. (काम्ये च पाकयागादौ कामनास्वविशेषणं ततश्च बलवदनिष्ठाननुबन्धिकाम्यसाधनताज्ञानेन कार्यताज्ञानं ततश्च प्रवृत्तिः । नित्ये च शौचादिकं पुरुषविशेषणं तेन शौचादिज्ञानाधीनकृतिसाध्यताज्ञानात् तत्र प्रवृत्तिः).¹

18. Prabhakara's doctrine of Self-determinism or Freedom of the Will.

Prabhakara holds that in every voluntary action there is the consciousness of freedom or the cognition that it *can* be done by the self's will. If there is no effort of its volition, the action cannot be done. The volition of the self, again, is determined by its own free will. It is not determined by any other person's will. The act of cooking, for instance, is to be accomplished by my will, since it cannot be accomplished except through my will, while it is conducive to my good. (पाको मत्कृतिसाध्यः मत्कृतिं विनाऽसत्त्वे सति मदिष्टसाधनत्वात्).² The will to accomplish the act itself is determined by the self's free will. It depends on its undetermined freedom. The will to accomplish an act is determined by the pure will of the self, which is undetermined. The cognition of duty implies the cognition of the self's free or undetermined will to will. The freely willed will is known by an act of self-appropriation on the part of the self. (स्वेच्छाधीनकृतिसाध्यताज्ञानमेव प्रवर्तकम् ।³ पाकः स्वेच्छा-

¹ SM., pp. 473-74 ; E. H., pp. 30-39.

² SM., *Dinakarī*, p. 472.

³ *Ibid*, p. 472

धीनमत्कृतिसाध्यः स्वेच्छाधीनमत्कृतिं विनाऽसत्त्वान्).¹ Thus freedom of the will is implied by a voluntary act. It is a psychological implicate of volition. There can be no volition without freedom. If an act is done under coercion of another person's will, it is not a voluntary act. Prabhakara holds that an act of will (कृति) is determined by the pure undetermined will of the self (स्वेच्छा), which is appropriated by the self. He believes in freedom as self-determinism. There are two moments of will in a voluntary action. An act of will (क्रानि) is determined by the pure or undetermined will (स्वेच्छाधीन) appropriated by the self.² Dr. S. K. Maitra observes, "The Prabhakaras urge that this indeterminism is itself a moment in self-determinism. They admit that the will to accomplish is itself freely willed, *i. e.*, depends on the agent's undetermined freedom, but they hold that this undetermined freedom is itself determined or established by a process of mediation through self-reference. Thus according to them the cognition of duty implies the cognition of the will to will (स्वेच्छाधीनकृतिसाध्यताज्ञान), but they contend that this freely willed will is itself established by a process of mediation through self-appropriation or self-reference. But this self-mediation of freedom is not pure indetermination but self-determination in so far as it implies an act of self-reference or self-appropriation in the form of representation of the act as a specific determination of the self."³ Prabhakara also gives the moral proof of freedom. The Moral Law is the injunction of the Vedas. It *ought* to be done. Therefore, it *can* be done. The Vedic injunctions are imperatives. They enjoin conditional duties and unconditional duties. The former are hypothetical imperatives, since they are means to the realisation of the good. The latter are categorical imperatives. They are ends in themselves. They are not means to ulterior ends. But both are imperatives. They

1 *Ibid.* p. 473 ; E. H. , pp. 65-68.

2 *Ibid.* pp. 472-73.

3 E. H. , pp. 68-69.

ought to be done. They produce moral obligation in the self to accomplish them. They do not compel the agent to execute them. They do not involve constraint, but moral obligation. Therefore, they imply freedom of the will in the moral agent to accomplish them. (प्रवर्तनारूपो हि विधिः अर्थात् समीहितसाधनाशक्तिं बोधयति).¹ This argument reminds us of Kant's moral argument for freedom of the will : Thou *oughtest*, therefore thou *canst*.

19. Prabhakara's Conception of Dharma (धर्म).

The Nyaya-Vaisheshika regards *Dharma* as a specific quality of the self. The Sankhya regards it as a specific mode of the intellect which is an internal organ. The Jaina regards it as pure atoms (पुण्यपुद्गल) of subtle matter, which produce effects. The Buddhist regards it as a good disposition (चित्तवासना) of the mental continuum. The old Mimamsaka regards it as *Apurva* (अपूर्व) or unseen agency generated by the performance of enjoined duties. Kumarila regards it as the performance of the duties themselves. Prabhakara regards it as an objective Moral Imperative (नियोग) called *Apurva* (अपूर्व) or unseen agency which is indicated by the Vedic injunction. (वाक्यार्थ एव नियोगात्माऽ पूर्वशब्दवाच्यो धर्मशब्देन स एवोच्यते इति प्राभाकराः कथयन्ति).² He holds that *Dharma* is not a subjective category. It is not a quality of the self. Nor is it a quality or mode of the intellect (बुद्धि). It is an objective category. But it is not an external act enjoined by the scripture as Kumarila holds. A person, who performs sacrifices, is said to be virtuous (धार्मिक) because he executes the Moral Imperative (नियोग). He cannot be said to be virtuous if he does not execute it. The accomplishment of the moral imperative (नियोगसिद्धि) is inferred from the performance of sacrifices enjoined by the Vedas. Shavara says, "*Dharma* is conducive to the highest good (श्रेय :) of the moral agent." Prabhakara points out that *Apurva* (अपूर्व) or the super-

¹ SD, E. H., pp. 39.

² NM., p. 279, SD., YSP, pp 69-70.

sensuous Moral Imperative (नियोग) is conducive to the highest good, and it is indicated by the Vedic injunctions. (श्रेयस्करो धर्म इत्युक्ते कथं कार्यस्य धर्मत्वम् ? अपूर्वाधिकरणे तस्यैव श्रेयस्करस्य ज्ञापितत्वान् । अत्र च पक्षे यागाद्यनुष्ठातरि धार्मिकशब्दप्रयोगो नियोगानुष्ठाननिमित्तकः । तथा हि अनधिकृते यागाद्यनुष्ठातर्यपि धार्मिकशब्दो न प्रयुज्यते नियोगसिद्धिमन्तरेण ; नियोगसिद्धिश्च चोदितयागाद्यनुष्ठानसमधिगम्या).¹ Thus *Dharma* is an objective category. It consists in *Apurva* or a super-sensuous verity revealed by the authoritative suggestion (प्रेरणा) produced in the self by the Moral Imperative (नियोग). Kumarila holds that the acts enjoined by the scripture constitute *Dharma*. They are enjoined by the scripture, and therefore must conduce to the agent's highest good. They constitute *Dharma* because they are conducive to the highest good. Both conditional and unconditional duties are conducive to beneficial results. They derive their authoritativeness from their conduciveness to the agent's good, which is inferred from their being enjoined by the Vedas. But Prabhakara holds that the ceremonial acts are the contents of duty. They fulfil the Moral Imperative (नियोग), which is a transcendental verity revealed by the Vedic injunctions. They do not derive their authoritativeness from their conduciveness to any ulterior end or good (फल), but from their intrinsic validity as self-revealing, transcendental Moral Law. It is revealed by the moral obligation (प्रेरणा) produced by the Moral Law (नियोग) in the self. Moral obligation is a self-revealing experience. The Moral Law is revealed to the self by the unique feeling of moral obligation which differs from physical compulsion and psychical impulsion. The prescribed duties do not derive their authority from the Vedas as Kumarila thinks, but from the *Apurva* (अपूर्व) or the Moral Imperative (नियोग) which is indicated by the Vedic injunctions. The Moral Imperative is a transcendental verity of the Moral order. It is not a personal command. It is not

1 Rjuvimala Panchika, p. 33.

a command of God as the Naiyayika thinks. It is an Impersonal Law which has intrinsic validity. It is revealed by the Vedas without a law-giver. It is self-authoritative. It does not derive its authority from a personal being. It is a self-revealing and self-authoritative Impersonal Law independent of any personal origin. It does not derive its authority from the will of a person. Nor does it derive its authority from any ulterior end or good or desirable consequences. It is a transcendental Impersonal Moral Law.

The relation of the Moral Imperative to the agent is the relation of a command to the agent commanded (प्रैष्यप्रेषासम्बन्ध). It differs from causation (भावना) which is the relation of the act of willing to the willing agent (क्रियाकर्तृसम्बन्ध). Moral obligation is revealed through the relation of a command (प्रेषा) to the agent commanded (प्रैष्य). It is a primary factor in moral obligation. The relation of the act (क्रिया) to the active agent (कर्त्ता) is only a secondary factor in it. The person knows the Moral Imperative through the unique relation of a command to the agent commanded involved in moral obligation. Then he accomplishes the Moral Imperative. The accomplishment of it involves the relation of the act to the agent. Thus moral obligation involves both the relations. But the first relation is the primary factor, while the second relation is the derivative factor (अत्र हि प्रैष्यप्रेषयोः संबन्धोऽवगम्यते । किमन्यश्चात्र क्रियाकर्तृसम्बन्धो नावगम्यते । न ब्रूमः नावगम्यते इति किं तु प्रैष्यप्रेषलक्षणोऽपि संबन्धः प्रथममवगम्यते ।...प्रेषितोऽहमिति हि विदित्वा क्रियायां प्रवर्तते । तेनायमाद्यः सम्बन्धः पाश्चात्त्यस्तु क्रियाकर्तृसम्बन्धः । तद्योऽयं लिङ्गार्थः प्रथममवगम्यते प्रेषो नाम सा प्रेरणा स नियोगः स वाक्यार्थः ।...लिङ्गधर्मो हि नियोगो वाक्यार्थः स धर्म एव स च न प्रमाणान्तरगम्य इति).¹

The Moral Imperative is an accomplished fact. It cannot be brought into being by an act of will. So the relation of the Imperative to the agent is not the relation of an act to the doer (क्रियाकर्तृसम्बन्ध) or a relation of causation or becoming (भावना) as Kumarila holds.

1 N.M., pp. 347—49.

It is a unique relation of a command to the agent commanded (प्रेष्यप्रेषासम्बन्ध). The former is a relation of causation, while the latter is a relation of revelation, and causation differs from revelation. The Moral Imperative is revealed by the unique relation of authoritative suggestion to the reason of the agent.¹ It produces moral obligation in the self, which reveals the Moral Law through authoritative suggestion, but does not compel obedience. Moral obligation is of the nature of enlightenment or revelation of the Moral Law. It is of the nature of *Ought*. It is not of the nature of *Must*. It does not imply physical constraint. It does not interfere with the agent's freedom. The Moral Imperative is its own end. It is not a means to any ulterior end or good. It has intrinsic validity. It is the command and the object of the command. (नियोग एव प्रेरको नियोग एव चानुष्ठेयः² न हि लिङ्गादियुक्तवाक्येषु भावना भाव्यान्तरमपेक्षते अपूर्वस्य भाव्यस्य स्वशब्देनाभिहितत्वात्).³

Prabhakara recognizes two kinds of duties : (1) conditional duties prompted by desires for fulfilment of ends (काम्यकर्म); (2) unconditional duties which are obligatory in themselves. Unconditional duties are necessary daily duties (नित्यकर्म) and occasional duties (नैमित्तिककर्म). Both of them are done out of the sense of duty (कार्यताज्ञान). They involve self-determination. The self represents them to itself, identifies itself with them, and chooses them.⁴ They are authoritative because they embody Moral Imperatives (नियोग) indicated by the Vedic injunctions. Their authoritative-ness is not due to their conduciveness to any ulterior end or consequences. They are ends in themselves. They ought to be performed for their own sake. Prabhakara advocates rigorism in ethics. Morality consists in following the Moral Imperative (नियोग) irrespective of any desire for pleasure and any consideration of ends

¹ N M., p. 347

² NM., p. 349

³ PP., p. 5.

⁴ SM., pp. 471-74.

and consequences. Prabhakara resembles Kant in this respect. But Kant's Categorical Imperative is a subjective Law of practical reason, while Prabhakara's Moral Imperative is a super-sensuous verity of the Moral order. Kant's Categorical Imperative is an *Ought*. But Prabhakara's Moral Imperative is a transcendental *Being* or an accomplished fact. The similarity between Kant and Prabhakara should not be pushed too far. Any way, Prabhakara is an exponent of rationalism and rigorism.¹

20. Kumarila's conception of Dharma (धर्म).

Jaimini defines *Dharma* as a good which is of the nature of a command. (चोदनालक्षणोऽर्थो धर्मः).² Shavara defines it as an utterance which prompts the self to act and carry it out. It is a command which leads it to the attainment of the highest good. It is a prescription of the Vedas, which indicates the nature of good (अर्थ) and evil (अनर्थ), and impels the self to realize its highest good (निःश्रेयस). It is revealed by the Vedas only. It is not apprehended by perception, inference, or any other means of knowledge. The prescription of the Vedas reveals past, present, future, subtle, remote, and super-sensuous objects. *Dharma* can be revealed by the Vedic prescriptions only. It is beyond comprehension of secular means of knowledge (प्रमाण). (चोदनालक्षणोऽर्थः श्रेयस्करः। य एव श्रेयस्करः, स एव धर्मशब्देनोच्यते। यः पुरुषं निःश्रेयसेन संयुनक्ति, स धर्मशब्देनोच्यते। उभयमिह चोदनया लक्ष्यते अर्थोऽनर्थश्चेति).³ *Dharma* is non-temporal and super-sensuous Duty or Moral Law. It is revealed by the Vedas and impels the self to obey it.⁴

Kumarila defines *Dharma* as a command of the Vedas, which impels the self to act.⁵ What leads to the attainment of the good (श्रेयस) is *Dharma*. The good is the happiness of the self (पुरुषप्रीति). The performance of sacrifices and other rites and ceremonies is

1 E. H., ch. II, PP., pp. 170 ff

2 SB., i 1. 2.

3 SDS., pp. 288-89.

4 SV., *Chodanasutra*, 2,1.

5 Ibid, 14.

conducive to its happiness. Certain substances, qualities, and actions are the material of these ceremonies. So Kumarila regards the acts enjoined by the Vedas, and all the ingredients necessary for them as *Dharma*.¹ He does not regard it as a subjective quality of the self, which is the result of the performance of duties. (धर्म इत्युपसंहार्ये यच्छेयस्करभाषणम् । श्रेयो हि पुरुषप्रीतिः सा द्रव्यगुणकर्मभिः चोदनालक्षणैः साध्या तस्मात्तेष्वेव धर्मता).² External acts (क्रिया) prescribed by the Vedas and the substances, qualities, and actions which are required for them constitute *Dharma*. Though the latter are objects of perception, they are means to the performance of duties. So they are regarded as *Dharma*. The prescribed acts or ceremonies lead to the highest good. So they are regarded as *Dharma*. The conduciveness of the acts and the auxiliary substances, qualities, and actions to the highest good is always known from the Vedas. (द्रव्यक्रियागुणादीनां धर्मत्वं स्थापयिष्यते । श्रेयःसाधनता ह्येषां नित्यं वेदात्प्रतीयते).³ Vedic prescriptions are of two kinds : (1) Injunctions (विधि) ; (2) Prohibitions (निषेध). Injunctions point to the good (अर्थ) to be realized. Prohibitions point to the evil (अनर्थ) to be avoided.⁴ Right actions are enjoined by the Vedas. Wrong actions are prohibited by them. The scriptures are the only source of right and wrong actions. They determine rightness and wrongness of actions. They are the only means of ascertaining right and wrong actions. We can know our positive and negative duties through them only.⁵ In Vedic injunctions *Dharma* in the form of positive good is enjoined ; the performance of certain acts for the attainment of happiness here or hereafter or for the realisation of transcendental freedom (मोक्ष) is enjoined. In Vedic prohibitions *Dharma* in the form of abstention from evil or sin is enjoined. The prohibition of an evil is itself a good, and therefore *Dharma*. The performance of *Jyotishtama* sacrifice leads to the attainment of un-

1 *Ibid.*, 190-92.

2 *Ibid.*, 190-91.

3 *Ibid.*, 13-14 ; SD., p. 67.

4 *Ibid.*, 213-14 ; SD., p. 70.

5 *Ibid.*, 242-43.

alloyed bliss in heaven. The killing of life leads to intense suffering in hell.

Kumarila regards the external acts prescribed by the Vedic injunctions and prohibitions as *Dharma*. He advocates the ethics of ritualism and ceremonialism. He holds an external and legalistic view of morality. The moral law is of the nature of a command. Vedic injunctions and prohibitions determine the rightness and wrongness of actions. But they are not commands of a superior person. They are impersonal (अपौरुषेय). Kumarila does not regard the Divine Law as the moral standard as Descartes does.

Kumarila advocates also non-secular egoistic hedonism and eudaemonism. Empirical duties (काम्यकर्म) are conducive to happiness of the individual on earth or in heaven. They are enjoined by the Vedas. It is the happiness of the individual himself which is the good (श्रेयस्). It is the end of empirical duties. *Dharma* is a means to happiness. This is non-secular egoistic hedonism. Unconditional duties or necessary daily duties (नित्यकर्म) and occasional duties (नैमित्तिककर्म) are conducive to transcendental freedom (मोक्ष) or complete extinction of all empirical contents. This transcendental freedom is the individual's highest good (निःश्रेयस). This is non-secular eudaemonism unknown to Western philosophers.

Kumarila repudiates utilitarianism. Some hold that rightness consists in conduciveness to others' happiness, and wrongness consists in others' pain and suffering. (अनुग्रहाच्च धर्मत्वं पीडातश्चाप्यधर्मता)¹ They are advocates of utilitarianism. For them recitation of *mantra* would not be right, since it does not lead to others' happiness, and drinking liquor would not be wrong, since it does not lead to the pain of others. But the former is regarded as right, and the latter is regarded as wrong. Again, illicit sexual indulgence would be regarded by

the utilitarians as right, since it gives intense sensual pleasure to the agent which outweighs a little pain or remorse of conscience, and it gives intense pleasure to the woman. But it is condemned by all as wrong. If the utilitarians urge that the compunction or remorse of conscience (हृदयकोश) makes it wrong, they commit the fallacy of mutual dependence (इतरेतराश्रय), since wrongness of the act depends upon remorse and remorse depends upon its wrongness. Further, savages (म्लेच्छ) do not feel remorse of conscience, and should therefore be devoid of morality. Therefore, rightness and wrongness are not determined by conduciveness to one's own or other's happiness and misery, social utility or inutility.¹ They are determined by Vedic injunctions and prohibitions. They are independent of empirical hedonism or utilitarianism. Therefore, leaving aside pleasure and pain of others, and their opposites, social utility or inutility, those who wish to know right actions (धर्म) and wrong actions (अधर्म) ought to look out for injunctions and prohibitions in the Vedas. (तस्मादनुग्रहं पीडां तदभावमपास्य च । धर्माधर्मार्थिभिनित्यं मृग्यौ त्रिधि-निषेधकौ).² So Kumarila's ethical doctrine cannot be branded as utilitarianism. It is not egoistic hedonism, like that of Aristippus or Epicurus. It is a mixture of non-secular egoistic hedonism, eudaemonism, and impersonal legalism. He holds that what is good or the cause of happiness and transcendental freedom has the character of *Dharma*, only when it is distinctly enjoined by the Vedas. (अर्थस्य सतो यद्धर्मत्वं तच्चोदनालक्षणस्येत्युच्यते).³

The Mimamsakas recognize two kinds of duties, secular (लौकिक) and scriptural (शास्त्रिक) or non temporal (पारमार्थिक). The secular duties fulfil perceptible secular ends (दृष्टार्थक). The scriptural duties fulfil imperceptible super-sensuous ends (अदृष्टार्थक). The scriptural duties are of two kinds *viz.*, conditional

1 *Ibid.*, 243—47, NR.

2 *Ibid.*, 248—49.

3 *Ibid.*, 286, NR., p. 132.

duties and unconditional duties. The former are empirical duties for the realisation of desired ends (काश्यकर्म). The latter are obligatory daily duties (नित्यकर्म,) e. g., morning and evening prayers, and obligatory occasional duties (नैमित्तिककर्म) e. g., bath in the Ganges on the occasion of the solar eclipse or the lunar eclipse. The performance of conditional duties leads to happiness. The performance of *Jyotishtoma* sacrifice leads to happiness in heaven. This happiness is supreme bliss unalloyed with unhappiness. The non-performance of unconditional duties gives rise to sin, and consequent punishment. But the performance of them does not give rise to merit, and lead to happiness. Nor does it give rise to demerit, and lead to pain and suffering. It purifies the mind and gives rise to the knowledge of the self. It wipes off past sins and prevents sins which would accrue from the omission of unconditional duties. The conditional duties are obligatory only when there is desire for a particular end. The unconditional duties are obligatory independently of any desire. They are unconditionally obligatory. The scriptural duties are positive or negative. They are either positive injunctions or mere prohibitions. The former enjoin the performance of right actions. The latter prohibit the commission of wrong actions.¹

21. The Apurva (अपूर्व).

The acts enjoined by the Vedas lead to the attainment of their ends or fruits. The performance of the *Jyotishtoma* sacrifice leads to happiness in heaven. The enjoined act is performed at one time. The fruition of the act follows much later. What connects the act with its fruition? The *Apurva* (अपूर्व) is the link between them. The performance of duties generates an unseen agency or *Apurva* which generates their fruition at a later time. The deferred fruition of prescribed duties is due to the mediation of *Apurva*. The Mimamsakas posit *Apurva* as a *tertium quid* between the prescribed acts and their deferred fruition or fulfilment of ends.

¹ SD., YSP., pp. 32 ff.; E. H., pp. 19—20.

The connection between them is possible only through the medium of this unseen agency.

Kumarila and Prabhakara hold different views as regards the nature of *Apurva*. Kumarila holds that the *Apurva* is a capability in the principal action, or in the agent, which did not exist prior to the performance of the action, and that its existence is proved by the authority of the Vedas.¹ Before the prescribed sacrifices are performed, there is an incapability in them for leading to heaven, and there is an incapability in the self for attaining heaven. Both these incapacibilities are removed by the performance of the sacrifices, which creates a positive force or capacity, by virtue of which heaven is attained. This unseen force is called *Apurva*, which is known by presumption (अर्थापत्ति). The hypothesis of *Apurva* removes the apparent inconsistency between the performance of the prescribed sacrifice at one time and the attainment of heaven at a later time. There is an apparent inconsistency between the performance of the prescribed act and its deferred fruition.² Dr. G. N. Jha observes, "This can be explained only by the hypothesis that the sacrifice, on its completion, produces directly a certain potency in the agent, which resides in him throughout life, at the end of which it leads him to heaven. Without such intervening potency—as the connective link between the sacrifice and the ultimate result,—the causal relation between these two cannot be explained."³ The *Apurva* is an unseen potency generated in the self by the performance of prescribed acts which is the immediate cause of their final results, which cannot be due to the acts. (यागादेरपूर्वस्वर्गादिसाधनशक्तिकल्पमूहनीयम् । कथं पुनः शक्तिमति यागे विनष्टे निराधारा शक्तिरवतिष्ठते ? न निराधारा भविष्यति—आत्माधारत्वात्).⁴ This view is similar to the Nyaya-Vaisheshika view that merit (धर्म) is a subjective disposition of the self (आत्मसंस्कार) generated by righteous acts. But Kumarila also regards the *Apurva* as an

1 *Tantravartika*, E.T., p. 504.

2 PSPM, p. 166.

3 PSPM., pp 166—67.

4 S.D., p. 225.

objective potency of the prescribed act itself (क्रियाशक्ति).¹

Prabhakara rejects Kumarila's view. A prescribed act is transient; it cannot bring about its final result, the attainment of heaven, at a subsequent time. The *Apurva* is *Ought* (कार्य) or Duty, which is different from the act and is revealed by the Vedic injunctions. The *Ought* is the end of volition. Volition is the effort or exertion of self. The conscious self knows the *Ought* through moral obligation, and accomplishes it by its own effort or volition. The *Apurva* or *Ought* is to be accomplished by the self's volition, which is subordinate to it. The volition is the process of causation (भावना), since it is the exertion of the self by which it can accomplish the *Ought*. All volitions of the self must be directed towards an Ideal or *Ought* (भाष्य) which is accomplished by them. They are determined by the *Ought*, without which they cannot exist. If the *Ought* (अपूर्व) or the Moral Imperative or *Niyoga* is not the object of volition, there can be no knowledge of the Imperative. The *Niyoga* prompts the agent and induces him to put forth volition and exertion to accomplish the act. But it is difficult to explain how the *Niyoga* or the *Apurva* can lead the self to attain the final result of the prescribed act done by it without producing a potency or disposition in the permanent self. Dr. Jha says, "while Prabhakara appears to assume a *Niyoga* intervening between the *action* and *something lasting* that is produced in the agent, he does not call it a 'faculty' (disposition), but which comes to the same thing. In order to meet the difficulty, Shalikanatha has been forced to call in the aid of 'Fate'; he says that it is only when the *Niyoga* is aided by *Fate*, that it brings about the result"² Prabhakara holds that the *Niyoga* produces an effect in the self in the form of a disposition which inheres in it, and cannot be known by any other means of knowledge except moral obligation. The act or its potency is not permanent. But the dis-

1 E.H., p. 172, *Tantravarttika*, E.T., p. 504.

2 PSPM., p. 165.

position of the self is permanent. It can bring about the accomplishment of the final result.¹

22. Liberation (मोक्ष).

Jaimini and Shavara enjoined the performance of duties as a means to the attainment of happiness in heaven. They did not attach any importance to the conception of liberation (मोक्ष). Prabhakara and Kumarila consider the nature of liberation and the means to it. Their conception of liberation does not differ from the Nyaya-Vaisheshika conception.

Prabhakara describes heaven as unalloyed bliss free from pain, which is coveted by all persons.² He defines liberation as the complete disappearance of merit and demerit and the consequent total destruction of the body. The self is born in different bodies owing to merit and demerit. (इत्यन्तिकस्तु देहेच्छेदो निःशेषवर्माधर्मरिक्त्य-
निवन्दना मोक्षः)³ Final release is complete cessation of pain of empirical life: this is due to complete destruction of the self's contact with the body and the sense-organs; the body and the senses are destroyed by the complete disappearance of merit and demerit. (तयो-
रेकान्तोच्छेदेऽप्यपतद्देहेन्द्रियसम्बन्धः समुत्खाननिरहितसांसारिकदुःखबन्धनो
मुक्त इत्युच्यते.)³ Prabhakara agrees with the Nyaya-Vaisheshika in holding that consciousness is an accidental quality of the self. It acquires consciousness in conjunction with the mind and the body. When the mind and the body with the senses are completely destroyed on the total exhaustion of merit and demerit, the self loses all consciousness and is divested of cognition, pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, volition, and impression. In final release the self loses merit and demerit completely. Merit is the cause of enjoyment. Demerit is the cause of suffering. Liberation is absolute cessation of merit and demerit and the consequent pleasure and pain. There is complete extinction of the body and

1 PP. p. 187.

2 PP. pp. 102-03.

3 PP. p. 155.

its contact with the self. Therefore there is total extinction of all consciousness. The soul exists in its pure essence without any empirical contents,—knowing, feeling and willing, and impressions. It exists in its natural condition devoid of merit and demerit. Liberation is purely negative in character. It consists in the complete destruction of the specific qualities of the soul, cognition, pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, volition, impression, merit and demerit. This is also the Nyaya-Vaisheshika conception of liberation. The Naiyayika, Jayanta Bhatta, defines liberation as total destruction of the nine specific qualities of cognition, pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, volition, impression, merit, and demerit. (नवानामात्मगुणानां बुद्धिसुखदुःखेच्छाद्वेषप्रयन्तधर्माधर्मसंस्काराणां निर्मूलोच्छेदोऽपवर्गः).¹ Prabhakara and the Naiyayika agree in holding that liberation is not a state of positive bliss. It is a negative state of absolute extinction of pain. (सांसारिकविविधदुःखोपरमरूपत्वान्मोक्षस्य ।² बाधनालक्षणं दुःखम् । तदत्यन्तविमोक्ष अपवर्गः)³ Both agree in holding that liberation is the natural transcendental condition of the soul free from empirical contents as an eternal and ubiquitous substance.⁴

Prabhakara holds that exhaustion of merit and demerit by undergoing the experiences resulting from them, abstention from prescribed acts for selfish ends and prohibited acts, performance of unconditional duties, and the knowledge of the self aided by self-control, contentment, celibacy, and other auxiliaries, lead to liberation. Action (कर्म) and knowledge (ज्ञान, both are necessary for final release. A person becomes averse to pains of mundane existence and to pleasures which are mixed with pain, and exerts himself for the attainment of liberation. He abstains from all prohibited acts, which are the cause of bondage, and which lead to punishment here or hereafter. He abstains from all prescribed

1 NM, p. 508.

2 PP., p. 153.

3 NS, I.1. 21—22.

4 NM., p. 511 ; PP., p. 157.

acts which lead to some kind of reward or happiness here or hereafter. He wears off the accumulated merit and demerit by undergoing the experiences that necessarily result from them. He completely destroys the body which is the sole vehicle of all experience by the knowledge of the self aided by severe moral discipline enjoined by the scriptures.¹ Abstention from all prescribed acts for the attainment of happiness, and from all forbidden acts, and performance of unconditional duties together with rigid moral discipline are the means to liberation. But knowledge of the self (आत्मज्ञान) also is necessary for liberation. Action (कर्म) alone is not sufficient for the attainment of final release. It must be supplemented by the knowledge of the self, which stops further accumulation of merit and demerit, and completely destroys the body, which is the vehicle of all experience. Knowledge of the self is not subservient to action. Thus, action and knowledge both are necessary for final release.²

Kumarila's view of liberation does not substantially differ from that of Prabhakara. Kumarila agrees with Prabhakara in holding that liberation consists in the absolute negation of pain and pleasure. It consists in the absolute cessation of all experience which is due to the conjunction of the self with the mind and the body. It consists in the total exhaustion of merit and demerit, and the complete destruction of the present body and non-production of any further body. In liberation the self remains in its pure essence devoid of cognition, pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, impression, merit and demerit. The self remains in its transcendental condition free from empirical contents. Kumarila agrees with Prabhakara in holding that liberation is purely negative in character.

Kumarila argues that liberation does not consist in enjoyment of happiness. If it did, it would be synonymous with heaven, and thus perishable. Heavenly bliss is not eternal. When merit is worn off, it is succeeded

1 PP. pp. 156—57.

2 PP. pp. 156—57.

by rebirth and bondage of empirical life.¹ Bondage is due to connection with the body. Liberation is negation of this connection. It consists in destruction of the present body and non-production of any future body. Bondage is due to *karma* or merit and demerit. Liberation is due to complete disappearance of merit and demerit.² Because liberation is negative in character, it is eternal. If it be a state of positive happiness in heaven, it cannot be eternal. Liberation is of the nature of negation and therefore it is eternal. But negation cannot be the result of any action (क्रिया).³ When accumulated merit and demerit are worn off by undergoing the experiences resulting from them, the knowledge of the self (आत्मज्ञान) prevents further accumulation of merit and demerit.⁴ When merit and demerit are completely destroyed, the body, which is the vehicle of experience, is destroyed. When there are no traces of merit and demerit, there is no cause left for the production of the body.⁵ On the total destruction of the present body and non-production of any future body, the self attains liberation. It is a state of absolute negation of all experience of pleasure, pain, cognition, volition, and the like. It is devoid of merit and demerit. It is the natural transcendental condition of the self free from empirical contents.

Kumarila holds that action (कर्म) and knowledge (ज्ञान) both are necessary for the attainment of liberation. An aspirant for liberation should not perform forbidden (निषिद्ध) acts, which leads to suffering, as well as prescribed (काम्य) acts, which lead to happiness here or hereafter. But he should continue to perform obligatory (निश्चय) and occasional (नैमित्तिक) duties in order to avoid the sin which accrues from their non-performance.⁶ The performance of obligatory and occasional duties appropriate to different castes and stations in

1 SV. *Sambandhakṣhepaparīkṣā*, 105.

2 *Ibid.*, 106, NR, p. 670.

3 *Ibid.*, 107.

4 *Ibid.*, 108.

5 *Ibid.*, 109.

6 *Ibid.*, 110.

life is necessary for the destruction of the sins committed in the past and for the prevention of the sins that will accrue from their omission.¹ Prescribed acts for the realisation of selfish ends lead to prosperity and happiness here or in heaven. Forbidden acts lead to suffering and sins. They lead to transmigration and re-birth for the resulting enjoyment and suffering. A person striving for shaking off the fetters of the body should not perform prescribed prudential acts and forbidden acts. But he should perform the obligatory and occasional duties to destroy the sins committed in the past. The knowledge of the self wipes off all traces of merit and demerit with the aid of the performance of obligatory and occasional duties and prevents further accumulation of them.² But mere knowledge of the self is not adequate to effect final release. It impels the self to perform enjoined duties.³ It must be accompanied by the performance of obligatory duties. Thus Kumarila agrees with Prabhakara in holding that action and knowledge both are necessary for liberation.

Parthasarathi Mishra follows Kumarila in describing the nature of liberation. He does not conceive of it as cessation of the empirical world (प्रज्ञद्वित्य, as the Advaita Vedanta holds, but as extinction of the relation of the self to the world (प्रपञ्चसम्बन्धद्वित्य. The world binds the self through the body, the sense organs and the external objects of experience, which produce pleasure and pain in it. Liberation consists in total destruction of this three fold bondage. It consists in destruction of the present body, the sense organs, and experiences of external objects, and non-production of any future body, senses, and experiences. This can be brought about by completely wiping off all traces of merit and demerit acquired by past actions. (उत्पादकयोर्धमाधर्मयो निशेषयोः परित्त, सोऽयं प्रपञ्चसम्बन्धो बन्धस्तद्विलोत्तश्च मोक्षः)⁴ In the state of liberation all experiences, plea-

1 *Tantravartika*, p. 241, cp. I. M., p. 175.

2 SV, *Sambandhakshepaparthana*, 110, NL, no. 671-72.

3 *Ibid.*, 103.

4 SD, p. 356.

sure, pain, cognition, and the like are destroyed owing to the total destruction of the body and the senses, which are the vehicles of experience. Liberation is not a state of bliss. Bliss is due to merit. It is perishable. What is caused cannot be eternal. There is total destruction of all instruments of experience,—the body and the senses. So there can be no experience of bliss in liberation. The bliss cannot be said to be self-luminous (स्वप्रकाश), since it is not manifested in the state of bondage. It cannot be argued that the bliss, though self-luminous, is not manifested in empirical life, since it is overpowered. What is the meaning of its being overpowered? It means that self-luminous bliss is not manifested. But what is by nature self-luminous cannot be unmanifested. If it be said that bliss is non-existent in empirical life and is produced in the state of liberation, then it must have a cause. Cognition (विज्ञान) is the cause of manifestation (प्रकाश). But the liberated self can have no cognition which depends upon the sense-organs which are destroyed. So liberation cannot be said to be a state of bliss which is eclipsed in empirical life. It is a state of absolute negation of pain and pleasure, and other experiences. There is no knowledge in liberation, since the sense-organs and the mind are destroyed. But the self remains in its pure eternal condition as a mere potency of knowledge (ज्ञानशक्ति). But there is non-production of knowledge, since the sense-organs are destroyed.¹ So in liberation there is no knowledge of the self, as the Advaita Vedanta holds, but there is the existence of the self as mere potency of knowledge, devoid of all cognition and bliss. (मुक्तस्यात्म-ज्ञानाभावो ज्ञानशक्तिमात्रस्यावस्थानं श्रुत्या दर्शितम्, तस्मान्निःसम्बोधो निरानन्दश्च मोक्षः).²

IV. THEOLOGY.

23 Polytheism.

The Mimamsa teaches ritualistic morality and religion. It enjoins the performance of sacrifices which

¹ SD, pp 358-66

² SD., p. 366.

are offered to gods. The sacrifices generate an unseen potency (*अपूर्व*) in the soul, which leads to the attainment of the desired goods. The deities to whom the sacrifices are offered do not give the rewards of offerings. Nor does God give the rewards. The intervention of God or the deities is not necessary for leading the sacrifices to their fruition in the form of attainment of the proper rewards.¹ The unseen potency is the agency which makes duties generate their proper consequences. The unseen agency (*अपूर्व*) is the intermediate agency between the performance of sacrifices and the attainment of heaven. The Mimamsa believes in the existence of deities only as Beings to whom offerings are to be made. They are not objects of worship. They have existence only in the *mantras*. They have no existence anywhere else. At the time of making an offering, a person has to think of the form of a deity. The Mimamsa posits a number of gods to whom offerings are made. So it advocates polytheism. But its polytheism is not serious. The deities are not objects of worship. They do not give rewards for offerings made to them. The later Mimamsakas deny their existence except in the *mantras*. They regard the reference to the deities as mere praises (*अर्थवाद*) of the sacrifices.² The deities of the Mimamsa are eternal types or Ideas beyond the space-time world, revealed in the *mantras* of the eternal and self revealing Vedas.³

24. The Denial of God as Creator of the World.

Jaimini does not refer to God. Prabhakara and Kumarila deny the existence of God as the creator and destroyer of the world. The Mimamsa believes in polytheism but not in theism. It does not believe in the existence of God as the creator of the world, or the apportioner of rewards and punishments, or the author of the Vedas. Its belief in the deities does not serve any useful purpose. They are not objects of worship. They are the Beings to whom offerings are made in the sacrifices.

1 KM., p. 61.

2 SV., E. T., *Introduction*, p. xliv.

3 IIP., p. 384.

They do not give the desired goods as results of sacrifices. They do not make the sacrifices generate their proper results. They are said to exist nowhere except in the *mantras*. They have no function in the universe. Their relation to the souls is not clearly stated. They are not organically connected with the Mimamsa system. Hence the Mimamsa has been branded as atheistic,¹ though some regard it as theistic² without sufficient evidence.

Prabhakara and Kumarila adopt the Nyaya-Vaisheshika view of the world, but reject the existence of God as the creator of the world out of pre-existing atoms. They also reject the periodic creation and dissolution of the world admitted by the Nyaya-Vaisheshika. They adopt the realism, but reject the theism of the Nyaya-Vaisheshika, which believes in the doctrine of atoms, the periodic creation and destruction of the world, and the existence of God who combines the eternal atoms with one another and creates the world out of them in accordance with the merits and demerits of the individual souls, and disjoins them from one another and destroys the world in order to give temporary rest to the individual souls. Prabhakara and Kumarila do not believe in the existence of God as the creator and destroyer of the world. They reject the periodic creation and dissolution of the whole world. But they accept the creation and destruction of the constituent parts of the world. They accept the constant process of their coming into being and passing away without the intervention of God.

Prabhakara argues that there is no evidence for the creation or the destruction of the whole world at the same moment, though all finite things composed of parts are created by the conjunction of the parts, and destroyed by their disjunction. They come into existence gradually and pass away gradually. All animals and men are born of their parents. They do not owe their existence to the intervention of God. So all things in

1 KM., ch. IV; PSPM., pp. 85-88; HIP., Vol. 1, pp. 402-03; IP., vol. II, pp. 424-26.

2 Maxmuller: *The Six Systems of Indian Philosophy*, ch. V.; IPM., ch. III, B.

the world are produced by their causes. They do not owe their existence to God. All effects are due to their natural causes. No supernatural cause is necessary for them.¹

The Nyaya-Vaisheshika argues that God is the supervisor of merit and demerit of the individual souls. Merit and demerit are unconscious. So they cannot bring about their results without the guidance of a Being endowed with supreme intelligence (यस्यावसौ चेतनातिशयाधिष्ठानौ).¹ God, who is omniscient, is the supervisor of merit and demerit of the individual souls. Prabhakara urges that the individual souls may supervise their own merit and demerit. If they cannot supervise them because they have no knowledge of them, then God also cannot supervise them because He has no knowledge of them. Even supra-mundane God can have no knowledge of merit and demerit residing in the individual souls different from Him, since there is no cause of His knowledge. Merit and demerit are imperceptible. Further, God has no sense-organs through which He can perceive them. He cannot perceive them through the mind, since the mind cannot apprehend external objects without the aid of the external sense-organs. God is devoid of merit and demerit which are the causes of the body, and the sense-organs, and of the sense-mind-contact. So God cannot have perception which is due to the sense-mind-contact. Hence God cannot know merit and demerit of the individual souls, and therefore cannot supervise them. God's knowledge (बुद्धि) cannot be said to be due to other causes. His knowledge must be perceptual. Perception is always due to the sense-mind-contact. His knowledge cannot be said to be uncaused and eternal, since knowledge is always found to be caused. His knowledge must be assumed to account for His supervision of merit and demerit. Prabhakara urges that God's supervision of them is unintelligible. God cannot supervise them without being related to them. His

1 PP., p. 137.

relation to them is either conjunction or inherence. It is not conjunction, since it holds between two substances only. God is a substance. But merit and demerit are qualities. There can be no conjunction between a substance and a quality. So there can be no conjunction between God and merit and demerit. Nor can there be inherence between them. Merit and demerit inhere in the individual souls. They cannot inhere in God who is distinct from them. So God cannot create the world out of the atoms with the aid of merit and demerit of the individual souls for their enjoyments and sufferings. A carpenter's supervision of his tools consists in his contact with them. But God's supervision of merit and demerit cannot consist in His contact with them. God cannot act upon merit and demerit, which are qualities, and cannot therefore be acted on.

It cannot be said that the atoms act under the will of God, even as the soul acts upon its own body by virtue of its merit and demerit. The atoms are not the body of God, on which He may act and create the world out of them. Even if we grant a body to God, action of the body is not due to mere desire, but to effort or volition. But there is no cause of the volition of God. If the divine will were eternal, creation would be unceasing¹

The Naiyayika argues that an unintelligent body must have a supervisor who is intelligent. Prabhakara urges that God cannot be the supervisor of the atoms, because he has no motive in doing so. He has no motive of creation. The Naiyayika argues that God creates the world out of the atoms, as a carpenter creates a table out of wood. Prabhakara urges that this argument would assume that God has a body like a carpenter. But God with a body cannot act upon such subtle things as atoms, merit and demerit. Even if He did, He would require another creator to create His body, and so on *ad infinitum*. Again, body is due to merit and demerit. God is devoid of them, and so cannot have a body. God is not omniscient. There is no cause of His knowledge which is due to the sense-

1 PP., pp-137—140.

mind-contact, and God is devoid of the sense-organs. So God is not the creator of the world. Nor is He the destroyer of it. The world as a whole is neither created nor destroyed. But there is a constant process of its constituent parts coming into existence and passing away under the influence of the merit and demerit of the individual souls animating the bodies which come into contact with them. There is no need of a supra-mundane creator of the universe.

Prabhakara argues that God is not the author of the Vedas, which are eternal and self-revealing. The individual souls can know *dharma* from the authority of the Vedas only. God is not the creator of convention (संकेत). There is an eternal relation between words and their meanings.

God is not the creator or destroyer of the world. He is not the supervisor of merit and demerit of the individual souls. He is not the moral Governor or apportioner of rewards and punishments. He is not the author of the Vedas. He is not the promulgator of the moral code. The existence of God is an unwarranted hypothesis.

Kumarila also denies creation and destruction of the whole world. But he admits that the things in the world gradually come into existence and pass away.¹ He denies the existence of Prajapati or God as the creator and destroyer of the world. The Nyaya-Vaisheshika argues that God is the efficient cause of the world and the atoms are its material cause, even as a carpenter is the efficient cause of a table and wood is its material cause. But Kumarila urges that if God is the creator of the world, He must have a body. He cannot have desire to create without a body, since desire is due to the contact of the soul with its body and mind. If God has a body, it could not have been created by Himself; so we must postulate another creator of His body, and so on *ad infinitum*. If the body of God be held to be eternal, it could not be material, since there was no earth or the like prior to creation. Again, if His body is material, it must be

1 SV., *Sambandhakshepaparihara*, 67-68.

transient like our own body. If his body is eternal, our body also must be eternal, since both are material.¹ His body must have a cause, since it is a body like ours made of constituent parts. If God be held to be the creator of His own body, then He must have created His body in a bodiless state, and the bodiless God, like an emancipated soul, could not exercise any control over His body. A jar is found to be made by an intelligent potter, who is perishable. So the body of God must be made by an intelligent maker who is perishable.² If God has no body, He cannot exert His will on the atoms. If it be held that God Himself does not carry on any operations, as the potter does in making a jar, then how can insentient atoms follow His will? Therefore the insentient atoms cannot combine and form various substances under the guidance of the will of God.³ Similarly, they cannot separate from one another and bring about destruction of the world under the guidance of the divine will.

God has no motive for creating the world. He could not be moved by compassion (अनुकम्पा) for living creatures, as the Nyaya-Vaisheshika holds. There were no creatures prior to creation, for whom He could feel compassion. Again, if He were moved by compassion to create the world, He would create only happy beings. But the world is full of suffering and pain. God, who is benevolent, cannot create so much suffering in the world. Evil is inconsistent with the benevolence of God. If He cannot create and preserve a world free from evil, He is not omnipotent and independent. If He is omnipotent, he can certainly create a world free from evil. If He were to depend upon laws and instruments, His independence would be compromised. Why did He create the world? If He did not create it, what purpose of Him would not be realised? What was the end of creation? Even a fool does not act without a motive. If God had no motive for creation, He should not be regarded as

1 *Ibid.*, 46-49, NR

2 *Ibid.*, 77-80, NR

3 *Ibid.*, 81-82

intelligent. If God created the world for amusement (क्रीडा), He should not be regarded as perfectly happy and contented, and creation would involve Him in wearisome toil.¹

The Nyaya-Vaisheshika holds that God creates the world out of the atoms with the aid of merit and demerit of the individual souls. When He destroys the world, He keeps their merit and demerit in abeyance. When He creates the world, He activates the latent merit and demerit in the souls, and creates the world in accordance with them for their enjoyments and sufferings². Kumarila urges that all actions are destroyed when the world is destroyed. Therefore, their results, merit and demerit also, are destroyed. God cannot rouse them to activity at the time of the next creation. It is needless to assume that God activates the latent merit and demerit of the souls, which regulate His creative activity. He is omnipresent and omnipotent. So He can create the world by His will without the aid of merit and demerit. If God depends upon them for creation, He is not independent and omnipotent. If they are subject to the will of God, they are needless³. Kumarila does not deny that the diversity of the world is regulated by the merit and demerit of souls⁴. But he denies the existence of God as the creator of the world.

Moreover, there is no evidence for the reality of God's creative activity. No one can testify to the creation of the world by God. The first creatures could not know how they were born. Nor could they know the state of things prior to the creation of the world by God. If they relied on the assertion of the Creator, they might be deceived. God might not create the world and yet tell them that He did so to show off His powers (ऐश्वर्ये). So God cannot be regarded as the creator of the world. Similarly, there is no evidence to prove that God is the destroyer

1 *Ibid.*, 52—56.

2 *Ibid.*, 67, NR.

3 *Ibid.*, 72, NR.

4 *Ibid.*, 75.

of the world. There is none to testify to the fact that He destroys the world. So God is neither the creator nor the destroyer of the world¹. Kumarila denies periodic creation and destruction of the world. His attitude towards the world is naturalistic, though he believes in the moral law of Karma regulating the creation and destruction of various things in it.

God is not the author of the Vedas. If they proceed from Him, they are doubtful. They cannot be admitted to be a sure proof of His existence. If the Vedas existed before creation, they could not be connected with the objects created. If they speak of creation as proceeding from God, they are mere praises of certain injunctions of sacrifices². The Vedas are eternal, self-revealing, and authoritative. They contain injunctions and prohibitions which embody positive and negative duties. God is not the promulgator of moral codes. We learn duties from the Vedas which are not created by any person.

Parthasarathi argues that God cannot produce motion (स्पर्श) in the atoms by mere will (इच्छा). He must make an effort (प्रयत्न) to produce motion in them. Effort is not possible without a body. The soul, which is ubiquitous, makes an effort in the region of its own body. So effort depends upon a body. God is a disembodied soul. He cannot make an effort. Even if we grant a body to God, it must be destroyed along with all effects at the time of dissolution. Bodiless God can have no will and effort. Nor can He have any knowledge, since He is devoid of the sense-organs. His knowledge, will, and effort cannot be said to be eternal, since all knowledge, will, and effort are found to be transient. The argument may be stated thus: The earth and the like are not produced by a bodiless, intelligent agent, or by eternal knowledge, will, and effort, because of their being of the nature of effects, like a jar. If we grant an eternal body to God, which persists at the time of dissolution, then the earth and the like, which are composed of parts, would not be

1 *Ibid.*, 57—60.

2 *Ibid.*, 61—63.

effects, like the divine body. Grass, sprouts, and the like are not produced by an embodied agent. This contradicts experience. If the effort of God be one and eternal, it cannot bring about variety of effects, and is therefore useless. If His efforts are multiform and abide in Him always, they would persist at the time of dissolution, and therefore the efforts to create and the efforts to destroy would neutralize each other, and there would be neither creation nor dissolution. The variety of effects cannot be due to the variety of unseen merit and demerit of the individual souls, since the variety of effects is found to be due to the variety of perceived causes with the aid of the unseen agencies (अहङ्क) in the souls; the variety of effects is never due to mere variety of unseen agencies; palm trees never grow without palm seeds in spite of the variety of the unseen agencies. All effects cannot be said to be due to the great powers of God without physical causes, since there is no evidence for it.¹ Merit and demerit are non-existent before creation. So they cannot account for the variety of effects. No effects can be produced by mere merit and demerit. If God depends upon merit and demerit to create the world, He loses His independence. He does not realize any purpose in creation since He is completely fulfilled (आप्तकाम). No activity is possible without an end. If He were moved by compassion in creating the world, He would create only happiness. If creation is due to His compassion, what is His motive for destruction? It cannot be compassion. The same cause cannot give rise to contradictory effects,—creation and destruction. There were no creatures before creation. So God cannot have compassion in the absence of the objects of compassion. God cannot create for amusement, since He is perfectly contented and does not require amusement. Therefore God is not the creator or destroyer of the world.² The earlier Mimamsakas did not believe in the existence of God. The world is self-existent and self-evolving. Effects are modifications (परिणाम) of their causes. But

¹ SD., pp. 328—31.

² SD., YSP., pp. 330—31.

the merits and demerits of the souls influence the production of the variety of effects in the world, which they experience. These are the supernatural agents in the production of the effects, which are otherwise due to purely natural causes. But the later Mimamsakas smuggled the concept of God into the Mimamsa system. God was conceived as the supervisor of the Law of Karma, and apportioner of rewards and punishments. He was conceived as the Moral Governor of the world. Laugakshi Bhaskara recognized the existence of God as the creator, preserver, and destroyer of the world, the inner controller of the individual souls, the Moral Governor.¹ Vedanta Deshika brought the theistic tendency to the fullest development.²

V. The General Estimate of the Mimamsa System.

The Mimamsa recognizes the reality of the external world, and the plurality of the individual souls. It does not believe in the existence of God. Later Mimamsa smuggles in the concept of God to comply with the demand of the people. Prabhakara and Kumarila deny the existence of God as the creator or the destroyer of the world and the apportioner of the fruits of actions. But the Mimamsa believes in the Law of *Karma*, which regulates the production of effects out of their causes in accordance with the moral deserts of the individual souls. In its attitude towards the world it is empirical and naturalistic. Kumarila wrote *Shlokavartika* with the avowed object of making Mimamsa orthodox (आस्तिक), which was mostly regarded as materialistic.) प्रायेणैव हि मीमांसा लोके लोकायतीकृता । तामास्तिकपथे कर्तुमयं यत्नः कृतो मया.³ The Mimamsa belief in the Law of *Karma* and future life in heaven or hell, and belief in the authority of the Vedas are the supernatural elements in its metaphysics.

The Mimamsaka is a realist. He believes in the reality of the external world, independent of the souls apprehending it. External objects are real. They are permanent substances. They are not mere aggregates

¹ *Arthasangraha*, pp 1—2.

² *Seshvara Mimamsa*

³ SV., 1. 10.

of qualities. The substances are permanent. The qualities change in them¹ Kumarila rejects the notion of substances as self-identical units devoid of all difference. He advocates the doctrine of *Parinamavada* (परिणामवाद) or *Satkaryavada* (सत्कार्यवाद). The cause is transformed into the effect. The relation between them is one of identity-in difference (भेदाभेद). Kumarila does not recognize the relation of inherence (समवाय). The world is self-existent. It is never created. It is never destroyed. There is no periodic creation or dissolution of the world. But qualities appear and disappear in the eternal elements. Individual things are created and destroyed. But the universe as a whole is never created or destroyed.² The Mimamsaka is a pluralist. He believes in the variety of things in the world. The variety is due to the variety of causes which produce their various effects in accordance with the Law of *Karma*.³ The Mimamsaka assumes that physical causation is regulated by the Law of *Karma* or moral causation. He does not explain how physical causation can be regulated by moral causation. He does not explain the relation of the individual souls to the physical world. He does not advocate materialism or spiritualism. The soul is not material. Matter is not the sole reality. The soul cannot create matter. External objects are not mere ideas of the souls. The Mimamsaka believes in dualism of matter and soul. He believes in the atomic structure of earth, water, fire, and air, like the Nyaya-Vaisheshika, but his atoms are not infinitesimal as those of the Vaisheshika, but the smallest particles which can be perceived. The Vaisheshika atoms are infinitesimal and imperceptible. They cannot account for the magnitude of gross objects. The atoms of the Mimamsaka correspond to the triads (त्रयगुणक) of the Vaisheshika, like visible motes in the sunbeam.⁴ These material atoms are transformed into objects of different magnitude, which are related to their causes by identity-in-difference. This is the view

1 *Ibid.* V. 32-33, p. 443

2 *Ibid.* IX. 113, p. 173

3 *SD.* p. 331

4 *SV.* V. 1b3-b4 p. 404

of Kumarila Prabhakara recognizes the relation of inherence (समवाय). He mentions inherent cause (समवायि कारण) and non-inherent cause (असमवायि कारण).¹ Prabhakara adopts the Nyaya-Vaisheshika doctrine of *Asatkaryavada* (असत्कार्यवाद) Kumarila adopts the Vaisheshika doctrine of four-fold negation (अभाव) while Prabhakara rejects it.²

The Mimamsaka does not relate the individual souls to the world, and to one another. The Law of *Karma* is assumed to relate the souls to the world. It is an impersonal law without a law-giver. The notion of God as the creator of the world and regulating the Law of *Karma* is rejected. The Mimamsa metaphysics is inadequate and unsatisfactory.

The Mimamsa ethics is ritualistic. It is an ill-assorted jumble of discordant elements. It is partly egoistic hedonism, partly supernatural legalism, and partly eudæmonism. Kumarila's external and legalistic view of morality can never satisfy the human spirit. Prabhakara's rationalism, formalism, and conception of duty for duty's sake is equally unsatisfactory, though his conception of the eternal Moral Order is a great contribution to ethical thought. His analysis of volition, moral obligation, and moral imperatives show keen psychological insight.

The Mimamsa has made a great contribution to epistemology. Its theory of self-validity of knowledge, theories of error, and different kinds of valid knowledge, Kumarila and Prabhakara's theories of knowledge, show great metaphysical acumen. The six ways of knowing recognized by Kumarila are adopted by the Advaita Vedanta. Kumarila and Prabhakara have made great contribution to the metaphysics of the self and the knowledge of it, though it is not quite satisfactory. Prabhakara and Kumarila's anti-theistic arguments are on the same lines as those of the Sankhya, and the Jaina, and will contribute to the clarification of the idea of God and His relation to the world. The Mimamsa metaphysics is a curious mixture of realism, pluralism, naturalism, super-naturalism, dualism and atheism.

1 PP., p. 57

2 OI. P., pp. 323-26.

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